Mojtaba Mahdavi, ed., The Myth of Middle East Exceptionalism: Unfinished Social Movements (New Texts Out Now)

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Mojtaba Mahdavi, ed., The Myth of Middle East Exceptionalism: Unfinished Social Movements (New Texts Out Now)

Mojtaba Mahdavi, ed., The Myth of Middle East Exceptionalism: Unfinished Social Movements (New Texts Out Now)

By : Mojtaba Mahdavi

Mojtaba Mahdavi (ed.), The Myth of Middle East Exceptionalism: Unfinished Social Movements (Syracuse University Press, 2023).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you edit this book?

Mojtaba Mahdavi (MM): The idea for this volume originated years ago when I chaired and co-organized an international interdisciplinary conference, “The Unfinished Project of the Arab Spring: Why the Middle East Exceptionalism Is Still Wrong.” It took several years to put this volume together with completely revised versions of selected conference papers as well as additional chapters from invited distinguished scholars.

But what inspired me to organize the conference and edit this book was the return and revival of the discourse of Middle East and Muslim exceptionalism after the crisis of democratic social movements in the post-Arab Spring MENA. My goal was to demystify the myth of MENA exceptionalism, which has been propagated by multiple trends, each with its own unique perspective, naively identifying culture/tradition/civilization/religion as the most significant, if not the only, explanatory factor for the cultural particularity of the MENA region. These trends include Western Orientalism, the Orientalism in-reverse represented by some Islamists and other extremists in the MENA region, and even a particular reading of cultural relativism. Furthermore, the crisis and catastrophic conditions in post-Arab Spring MENA contributed to the “quiet encroachments” of counterrevolutionary forces and the rise of populist right-wing demagogues. They have often manipulated ideas of social justice and safety and security of the nation to betray the goals of the revolutions and mobilize the masses to restore the ancient regimes.

Informed by critical postcolonial, political economy, and interdisciplinary approaches, my goal was to show the simplicity of the many faces of the discourse of “MENA exceptionalism,” to highlight the complex dynamics of the impacts of global, regional, and local factors on these movements, and, finally, to propose that social justice is an absolute precondition for any sustainable model of democracy and development in the MENA region. A quest for democracy and freedom can succeed and survive only if it is merged with a discourse of social justice—in other words, a local and indigenous manifestation of democratic socialism that is deeply grounded on the local culture, ensures a successful transition to, and consolidation of, democracy in the MENA region.
MENA social movements are therefore in crisis but not dead; they are “unfinished” endeavors.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

MM: Inspired by critical postcolonial/decolonial studies and the interdisciplinary perspectives of social movement theories, gender studies, Islamic studies, and critical race theory, this edited volume problematizes and demystifies the many faces of the myth of “cultural exceptionalism” in the context of contemporary MENA social movements. It shows how a postcolonial/decolonial critique better explains the crisis of democratic social movements, the resilience of authoritarianism, and the violent religious and secular politics in the region. It reveals the simplicity and ahistorical assumptions of the Orientalist discourse of cultural exceptionalism.

This book, in sixteen chapters and divided into three parts, argues that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the MENA region has experienced profound socio-structural transformations and is witnessing a “post-Islamist” social condition. MENA social movements are therefore in crisis but not dead; they are “unfinished” endeavors. The post-Islamist social (not political) condition in MENA, in other words, nullifies the cultural determinism of the Orientalist myth of “MENA exceptionalism” and signifies the “unfinished” and ongoing processes of democratic social movements in the region.

Chapters in the first part place MENA in the larger global context and challenge the alleged cultural exceptionalism of the region. They demystify discourses of MENA exceptionalism and Israel exceptionalism, among others. The second part focuses on the “unfinished projects” of contemporary MENA social movements and their constant quest for freedom, social justice, and human dignity. The third part problematizes the idea of gender passivity and women’s exclusion/exceptionalism in the MENA region. Although acknowledging the existence of gender injustice, it contextualizes the argument and demystifies the myth of MENA exceptionalism.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MM: The connection of this book to my previous works is threefold. First, the book’s central argument on grassroots pro-democracy social movements in the MENA region closely relates to my previous works, which offer a radical critique of both Western-centric hegemonic universalism and regressive particularism. These themes manifest in the discourses of Orientalism and nativism/Orientalism in-reverse. In works such as Towards the Dignity of Difference: Neither ‘End of History’ nor ‘Clash of Civilizations’, I have challenged both positions. The MENA movements represent a paradigm shift from the two hegemonic discourses of the post-Cold War era: Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” and Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history.” Values such as human dignity, freedom, and social justice are not exclusively Western civilizational achievements but are widespread across the West and East, a common theme in the streets of Tunis, Cairo, Aden, Tehran, Madrid, New York, Athens, and London. Moreover, these social movements have exposed a systematic crisis in the neoliberal order, which some have depicted us as “the endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution.” Informed by critical decolonial studies and the ideas of alternative/multiple modernities and universalism from below, I have shown how a third, alternative way—a GloCal path—towards democracy and development offers a sustainable solution to the postcolonial MENA region’s problems. It suggests that each culture or nation should engage in a critical dialogue with its own tradition and formulate universal values of freedom and social justice in a local language that can be implemented through local and homegrown institutions. I also discussed this in Contemporary Social Movements in the Middle East and Beyond and Rethinking China, the Middle East and Asia in a "Multiplex World", among others.

Second, this edited volume expands on my previous works about post-Islamist (not post-Islam) social (not political) conditions in the region. In The Many Faces of Contemporary Post-Islamism, among others, I explored the rise, crisis, and social and intellectual contexts of multiple forms of post-Islamism in the MENA region. I argued that a progressive post-Islamism could represent one manifestation of a glocal third way in the region.

Third, in line with my previous and forthcoming works, the book advocates for a balanced combination of ideas of freedom/democracy, social justice/socialism, and indigeneity (rooted in local culture, religious tradition, and moral/ethical codes) as necessary conditions for a sustained, inclusive, and home-grown model of democracy and development.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MM: This book is inspired by critical postcolonial/decolonial studies and the interdisciplinary perspectives of social movement theories, gender studies, Islamic and Middle East studies, and critical race theory. It examines the dynamics, rise, and crises of MENA democratic social movements, highlights the role of geopolitics and decoloniality, and demystifies many forms of cultural and political exceptionalism in the region. I believe students and scholars of social movements, Middle East, Islamic, gender, and race studies will find valuable explanations about the resilience of authoritarianism, the simplicity of the Orientalist discourse of MENA cultural exceptionalism, and the dynamics and livelihood of MENA societies.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MM: I am currently working on three book projects. The first two books explore the discourse of an indigenous democratic socialism with particular reference to the sociopolitical thought and unthought of Ali Shariati (1933-1977), a radical critical thinker in Iran. The books provide a novel and progressive post-Islamist reading of his ideas in postrevolutionary Iran. I argue that Shariati’s Gramscian approach/formulation posits that structures of domination rest upon a triangle of economic power, political oppression, and inner ideological/cultural justification. He critiques the “trinity of oppression”—zar, zur, tazvir (gold, coercion, deception)—which he associates with material injustice (estesm’ar), political dictatorship (estebd’ad), and religious and other forms of cultural alienation (estehm’ar). Shariati’s emancipatory alternative to this trinity is a three-dimensional ideal type: “freedom, social justice, and civil spirituality” (azadi, barabari, ‘erfan). I argue that his “trinity of emancipation” can be translated into an indigenous and ethical democratic socialism, liberating individuals and societies from both earthly and heavenly captivities, leading to true humanism. I also highlight Iran’s deep and diverse local tradition of democratic socialism. The pursuit of social justice and indigenous democratic socialism in Iran is neither new nor confined to a specific socio-intellectual trend. It dates back to the 1906 Constitutional Revolution and spans secular and religious socialists of Muslim, Marxist, and nationalist origins. The projects illuminate the potential for a grassroots, homegrown, and bottom-up indigenous ethical democratic socialism in Iran and beyond.

Informed by critical postcolonial studies, social movements, and democratization literature, my third book project examines the challenges and possibilities in postrevolutionary Iran for a post-Islamist democracy in a largely post-Islamist civil society ruled by an Islamist oligarchy. This book problematizes the political (domestic and international), socioeconomic, and cultural factors and actors that facilitate or impede this transformation. My project investigates the complex and dialectical interactions between structural and agential factors and their impact on democratization in postrevolutionary Iran. It argues that Iran’s post-Islamist “social” condition is hindered by numerous international and domestic obstacles. Internationally, military threats and comprehensive economic sanctions have largely empowered the ruling oligarchs and weakened the ordinary people, especially the middle and working classes, the main agents of democratization from within. Domestically, obstacles include the greater institutionalization of the clerical oligarchy supported by the military-security apparatus and sanctioned by the rentier structure of the state, and the growing gap between the poor and rich under a crony Islamist capitalism (or neoliberalism with Islamist and rentier characteristics). Additionally, there is a crisis of strong political leadership, well-organized political parties, and an inclusive and engaging political discourse of pro-democracy. Despite these challenges, the quest for a post-Islamist democracy holds significant potential as it is deeply rooted in a post-Islamist civil society disenchanted by four decades of top-down, autocratic Islamization and a rentier clerical oligarchy. Today, the clerical oligarchy faces open challenges not only from the educated middle class but also, more importantly, from the mostaz’afin, Iran’s subaltern oppressed. 

 

Excerpt from the book (from the Introduction, pp. 1-25)

More than a decade after the birth of contemporary social movements in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), we may ask what these movements have achieved and how we can evaluate their lasting legacies. Iran’s pro-democracy Green Movement of 2009 – the first MENA post-Islamist mass social movement –, and the Zan-Zendegi-Azadi (Woman, Life, Freedom) Movement of 2022 did not achieve their political goals. The Gezi Park movement started in Turkey in 2013, but has lost its momentum largely because of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s iron fist. And the Arab Spring of 2010-11 remains in multiple crises: Yemen is home to the world’s worst humanitarian crisis owing to a regional proxy war; Bahrain’s monarchy suppressed the popular pro-democracy movement; and the so-called humanitarian intervention – a neoliberal invasion – ruined Libya. Chief among the predicaments were the failure of Egyptian Islamism in power and the subsequent return of a military junta to power in 2013, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria in 2014, and the breakout of a proxy/civil war in Syria – marked as another major world’s humanitarian crisis with mass killing of citizens and destruction of the country. In addition, the Arab secular despots such as Bashar al-Assad in Syria, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt, and the populist Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia are consolidating their power. Even the Tunisian post-Islamist democracy seems in a crisis because President Kais Saied’s issued an emergency rule by decree on July 25, 2021. And last but certainly not the least, the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, after two decades demonstrates a profound political crisis in the MENA and Muslim contexts.

On the surface, the confluence of the global power structure and local sociopolitical conditions appear to have repressed the revolutionary spirit in MENA. In other words, the “quiet encroachments” of counterrevolutionary forces seem to have replaced hope with despair and excitement with resentment. Such catastrophic conditions have largely contributed to the revival of an old Orientalist discourse of “Middle East exceptionalism,” implying that the region’s culture is exceptionally immune to democratic movements, values, and institutions. Even the most recent waves of mass protests in Lebanon, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, Iraq, and Iran from 2017 to 2022 seem to have had little impact on the advocates and agents of a discourse of MENA exceptionalism.

This book, however, argues that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the MENA region has experienced profound socio-structural transformations and is witnessing a “post-Islamist” social condition. MENA social movements are therefore in crisis but not dead; they are “unfinished” endeavors. The post-Islamist condition in MENA, in other words, nullifies the cultural determinism of the Orientalist myth of “MENA exceptionalism” and signifies the “unfinished” and ongoing processes of democratic social movements in the region.

It is important to remind ourselves that the main slogans used by ordinary Muslims/people in the MENA streets in the Arab Spring of 2010-11, Iran’s Green Movement of 2009 and post-Green Movements of 2017-2022, and the Gezi Park movement of 2013 in Turkey were absolutely devoid of a single reference to concepts/ideals such as the caliphate and the Islamic state. The popular quest in the Arab streets was to overthrow the dominant regime (“Ash-shaʾb yurid isqat an-nizam,” The people want to bring down the regime), not only the political regime but also the hegemonic regime of knowledge and dominant apologetic postcolonial paradigms of pan-Arabism and other forms of state-sponsored nationalism, the outdated discourse of Third World socialism, and the exhausted dawah of Islamism. 

Equally important was the quest for hurriyya (freedom), ʿadala ijtimaʿiyya (social justice), and karama (dignity). Millions of ordinary people – men and women, young and old, religious and secular, Muslims and non-Muslims – chanted such popular and post-Islamist slogans in the Arab streets. 

Furthermore, during the Tamarod (Rebellion) movement in June 2013 some 22 million Egyptians signed a petition asking President Morsi to leave office, far more than the 13 million who voted for him.

This is also true of the more recent popular demonstrations in Iran from December-January 2017-18 to November 2019, to August and November 2021 and September 2022, the Lebanese protest in October 2019, the Algerian movement of 2019, the Iraqi protests of 2019--21, the Sudanese movements of 2019-21, the Tunisian protest in 2021, as well as the women’s demonstration against the Taliban and the Panjshir resistance in Afghanistan in 2021.

More specifically, it is important to note the main motto of Iran’s most recent democratic and feminist mass movement of September 2022 – “Zan, Zendegi, Azadi” (Woman, Life, Freedom) – clearly demonstrates people’s quest for women’s rights over their bodies, and rejects the Islamist patriarchal and misogynistic values. Iran’s anti-Islamist movement largely led by women nullifies the ideas of “Islamic exceptionalism” and “democratic minimalism” for the MENA region.

A balanced collection of the work of both well-established and emerging scholars, this edited volume offers theory-oriented and case-study chapters. Inspired by critical postcolonial/decolonial studies and the interdisciplinary perspectives of social movement theories, gender studies, Islamic studies, and critical race theory, it problematizes and demystifies the many faces of the myth of “cultural exceptionalism” in the context of contemporary MENA social movements.

This edited volume consists of a comprehensive introduction, sixteen chapters divided into three parts, as well as a foreword and an afterword by distinguished scholars of Middle East and Islamic studies. Part one, “Beyond the ‘Middle East Exceptionalism,’” includes six chapters. Part two, “The Unfinished Project of the Resilient Citizenship,” comprises five chapters. And part three, “Gendering the MENA Movements,” includes five chapters.

Inspired by a critical postcolonial/decolonial perspective, the first part places MENA in the larger global context, challenges the alleged cultural exceptionalism of the region, and sheds light on the impact of geopolitics on the current crises and how it may shape the interactions of global, regional, and local actors and factors. This part, in other words, puts culture in the larger historical and political context, critiques cultural exceptionalism, and advances the idea of a “global” MENA.

The second part focuses on the “unfinished projects” of contemporary MENA social movements and their quest for freedom, social justice, and human dignity. It examines different case studies in the Arab world and Iran to showcase the dynamism of MENA civil societies in their enduring resistance to the status quo and persistence in pushing for change. This part, in sum, challenges the myth of MENA exceptionalism by examining specific cases of post-Islamist movements – the Arab youth, student, and other popular nonviolent movements – arguing against the alleged MENA cultural determinism/essentialism/exceptionalism.

A major pillar of the Orientalist discourse of “MENA exceptionalism” is the idea of gender passivity and women’s exclusion/exceptionalism, which reduces the reality of gender injustice to some eternal and essentialized Muslim/MENA mindset. The third part takes up this challenge seriously by placing gender as an independent category of thought and action, demonstrating the presence of MENA women’s movements, and providing contexts to the cases of gender injustice to debunk such simplistic, ahistorical, and culturalist assumptions. Although acknowledging the existence of gender injustice in the region, part three complicates and contextualizes the argument and demystifies the myth of MENA exceptionalism.

This edited volume, in sum, shows how a postcolonial/decolonial critique better explains the crisis of democratic social movements, the resilience of authoritarianism, and the violent religious and secular politics in the region. It reveals the simplicity and ahistorical assumptions of the Orientalist discourse of cultural exceptionalism.
Oct 16, 2016 Lebanon
Mandy Turner By :
Mandy Turner

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.