Mathilde Zederman, Tunisian Politics in France. Long-Distance Activism since the 1980s (New Texts Out Now)

Mathilde Zederman, Tunisian Politics in France. Long-Distance Activism since the 1980s (New Texts Out Now)

Mathilde Zederman, Tunisian Politics in France. Long-Distance Activism since the 1980s (New Texts Out Now)

By : Mathilde Zederman

Mathilde Zederman, Tunisian Politics in France. Long-Distance Activism since the 1980s (Cambridge University Press, 2024).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Mathilde Zederman (MZ): My motivation for writing this book comes from the fact that Tunisian exiles are still not recognized as full political actors, either in France or in Tunisia. Through investigating Tunisian political activism in France since the 1980s, I wanted to show that migrants and their descendants are neither depoliticized nor do they form a disembodied and homogeneous group. My ambition instead was to document the history of their political struggles in exile and analyze a little-known aspect of Tunisian politics, which unfolded across borders and had a long-lasting impact. In doing so, I also wanted to transcend uniform visions of the Tunisian community in France, and to stress that different cleavages animated Tunisian politics in exile: the book pays attention to different constellations of actors, mainly pro-regime groups and the oppositional milieu made up of Tunisian Islamists and leftists exiles. Put differently, as the last words of the book point out: “Thirteen years following the “Arab Spring”, and in face of new forms of repression emerging in Tunisia, I wanted to contribute to safeguarding the social and political memory of collective action in opposition to an authoritarian regime – an opposition that can take place well beyond national borders and a memory that can be the breeding ground for new forms of activism in the present”.

What were the conditions that enabled long-distance Tunisian politics? What does it mean to oppose or support an authoritarian regime from afar? How is activism reconfigured in migration?

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

MZ: The book proposes a political sociology framework to advance our understanding of the nexus between exile, activism, and authoritarianism. It addresses questions such as: What were the conditions that enabled long-distance Tunisian politics? What does it mean to oppose or support an authoritarian regime from afar? How is activism reconfigured in migration? 

The volume is organized thematically to grasp the universe of Tunisian politics in France as fully as possible. First, it maps the key actors involved and traces the ways in which they conducted their politics, through political parties, associations, or other movements. Furthermore, it draws attention to the constraints and possibilities involved in long-distance activism. The Tunisian system of control from afar is explored, through the concept of “politics of encadrement,” in order to specify the restrictions imposed upon Tunisian anti-regime mobilization under Ben Ali. It also probes the ways in which the French authorities managed the different groups, from a diplomatic approach towards Ben Ali’s party-state to a securitized approach towards Islamists, and a somehow indifferent one towards the leftist movements. The book then examines the repertoires of action used by activists fighting Ben Ali’s authoritarian regime, and stresses the ambivalence of what is identified as a turn to human rights in the 1990s. It also sheds new light on the history and political sociology of immigrant activism, in which Tunisians in France have played a central role. Indeed, Tunisian activists took part in other struggles, linked for instance to the Palestinian cause or to the betterment of the social and economic conditions of immigrants in France and to anti-racism. On this basis, the book narrates the coalitions of oppositional actors who gathered to fight the Ben Ali regime from afar; it also examines, in particular, how Islamists and leftists worked to bind their community through their own spaces of sociability and inter-knowledge networks. The last chapter provides a conclusion by addressing the evolution of Tunisian activism abroad both during and after the 2011 Tunisian Revolution, which led to the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MZ: I had done previous work on the political uses of the past in Tunisia—more specifically addressing Ennahda appropriations of Bourguiba legacy in the post-revolutionary context, which was useful for this research. But this book is my first published manuscript, and it stems from my PhD dissertation and subsequent postdoctoral positions, so it is in fact my first big research project. 

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MZ: Anyone interested in exile, diaspora, and immigration politics; transnational activism; authoritarianism; and French and Tunisian history and politics! I hope that the book appeals to students and scholars who are interested in those different strands of the literature. 

Ultimately, I hope this book will be accessible to a wide audience beyond academia, especially in activist circles. However, I am also aware that this is an academic book written in English (a language that not all actors interviewed in the book master). Although I have done my best to write this book in an accessible way, this raises more general political and ethical questions about the production of knowledge—for whom and from where do we produce knowledge? As I mention in the introduction of the book, the actors I am talking about are not objects or mere sources, but were part of the research project itself, both empirically and theoretically speaking. Yet in this case, the complex issue of knowledge restitution remains unsolved. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MZ: As the quote in response to your first question shows, the book concludes with issues of memory of activism and forgotten voices, and this also makes the link with my ongoing research. I am currently engaged in various projects related to the preservation of traces of political activism, more particularly interrogating the relationships between archiving, activism, and exile. The archiving of political activism in exile is a site where power relationships are produced and expressed. Besides, having been recently recruited as an Associate Professor at the University of Paris-Nanterre, I am mainly focusing right now on my teaching and I am very enthusiastic about diverse reflection on alternative pedagogies.

 

Excerpt from the book (from the Introduction, pages 1 to 3)

Abdelmalek Sayad used to speak of the ‘double absence’ of migrants in the political imagination of the country of origin and the host country. We wanted to lift a veil of contempt and ignorance on the double social and political presence of Tunisian immigrants-emigrants in France and Tunisia.

(Ben Hiba, in Fédération des Tunisiens pour une Citoyenneté des deux Rives 2014, 3)

With these words Tarek Ben Hiba, a major figure of Tunisian activism in France, opened a retrospective of forty years of mobilisation by a leading Tunisian leftist association in France of which he was then president. The statement acknowledges Abdelmalek Sayad, an Algerian sociologist who pioneered the concept of immigration being a ‘double absence’. This reverse idea of ‘double presence’ between the two shores of the Mediterranean that Tarek Ben Hiba was writing about is far from being a euphemism. Ben Hiba embodied this himself, and on his death in June 2022 he left behind an impressive political heritage that numerous actors quickly sought to pass on to future generations. 

First active within one of the main leftist groups in Tunisia, el-‘Amel el-Tounsi, in the 1970s and in trade union activities, Ben Hiba came to France in 1988 and was thereafter at the forefront of all struggles against discrimination, racism and Islamophobia. He supported the rights of undocumented migrants, citizenship for all, and the rights of Palestinians. Elected as a regional counsellor in the Paris region from 2004 to 2010, he also continued to participate in the fight against dictatorships in the Maghreb, and particularly in Tunisia. From France, he contributed to the organisation of many demonstrations, wrote communiqués against repression and took part in original alliances gathering Islamists and leftists to oppose the Tunisian regime.

When in December 2010 street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi self-immolated to protest against police harassment in a small town in central Tunisia called Sidi Bouzid, which was followed by weeks of mass protests initiating the misnamed ‘Arab Spring’, Ben Hiba engaged from France in the Collective of Solidarity with the Struggles of Sidi Bouzid Residents to support the ongoing revolution. As thousands of Tunisians took to the streets in Paris, often for the first time, many had the opportunity to discover Ben Hiba’s words as he addressed the crowds. A couple of months later, following the overthrow of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali’s twenty-three-year rule, he was a member of the High Authority for the Realisation of the Objectives of the Revolution of Political Reforms and Democratic Transition. While the High Authority was in charge of organising ‘the transition from revolution to elections’ of the Constituent National Assembly (Lieckefett 2012, 133), Ben Hiba represented the category of ‘Tunisians abroad’.

Yet Ben Hiba’s words seem entirely accurate when he evoked ‘the veil of contempt and ignorance’ over this ‘double presence’ of many actors. Tunisian migrants in France found themselves struggling to secure a legitimate position in an increasingly securitised and hostile environment. Often described in the public sphere as a homogeneous entity, and frequently dehumanised, these migrants are seldom considered as political actors with any sense of agency. On the other side of the Mediterranean, in a context in which binationals are far too often discredited and suspected of not really being Tunisian, the relocation of Tunisian politics abroad that took place over decades does not seem to be a part of Tunisian collective history or memory. This twofold invisibilisation of political mobilisation in exile stands in stark contrast to the ever-growing scholarship on political transnationalism and exile politics in the social science literature. This rather unsettling paradox is what laid the ground for this research. This book seeks to explain how Tunisia’s politics and history can only be understood by taking into account its history of long-distance activism. Prior to the 2011 Revolution, an understudied and yet central aspect of post-independence Tunisian politics was the way in which both pro-regime and oppositional activism played out across borders – particularly in France, where the majority of exile groups took refuge and were spurred to action.

This book rests on two guiding questions: What were the conditions that enabled long-distance Tunisian politics? How do we explain what it meant to oppose or support an authoritarian regime from afar in terms of reconfiguring this activism in a migratory context? To answer these questions, this book will explore the creation and dynamics of what I conceptualise as the ‘trans-state space of mobilisation’ by looking at the main actors who worked to produce this space: the oppositional milieu that was made up of Tunisian Islamists and leftists, as well as networks of support and stakeholders within the Tunisian authoritarian party-state. The book also analyses the way this space came to be structured and the conflicts that were involved as pro- and anti-regime homeland politics aspired to inform and influence power from afar. It also draws particular attention to the constraints and possibilities involved in long-distance activism. From the perspective of political sociology, this book thus explores the evolution of political action that took place when Tunisian activists crossed national borders and started, continued or reconfigured homeland struggles from abroad, thereby challenging but also reinforcing the boundaries of Tunisian politics.

Before beginning an in-depth exploration of long-distance Tunisian activism, I will first discuss the choice to examine the Tunisian case in France and situate the study in the broader political, economic and migratory relationships between Tunisia and France. The second section of this introduction will present the theoretical framework underlying that universe of political practice, located at the intersection of scholarship on North African politics, social movements and diaspora politics, and will clarify this study’s contributions to those different strands of the literature. The third section will outline the issues involved in doing fieldwork after the 2011 Revolution and introduce the material on which this book draws – namely sixty-eight semi-structured interviews with active members of a wide range of exile groups, including Islamists, leftists and elites within the Tunisian and French regimes, numerous informal discussions and observations as well as archival work.

The Choice of Tunisian Politics in France

Why choose France for understanding long-distance Tunisian activism? Fundamentally because France and Tunisia are bound by colonial, migration and mobilisation histories. The density and diversity of the Tunisian communities made France – Paris in particular – a unique breeding ground for activism and a particularly rich site for research. The long-term and diverse Tunisian political action that took place in France allows us to follow its variations and understand its complexities from afar. Yet, until the 2011 Revolution Tunisia was much too often envisaged as an ‘exceptional’ and ‘quiet’ country (Dakhlia 2011) where social and political contestations were not worthy of interest. This ‘myth of Tunisian exceptionalism’ (Camau 2018) was in itself a discourse of power useful to legitimate the policies of Habib Bourguiba – the first president of postindependence Tunisia (1957–1987) – and later his successor Ben Ali (1987–2011). This was particularly the case for European partners for whom Tunisia was seen as a miracle in the so-called Arab world, particularly in terms of women’s emancipation, religion and education (Marzouki and Meddeb 2016). But this ‘myth’ also had an influence on the production of knowledge. This problematic discourse on the ‘exceptionality of Tunisia’ fuelled a lack of scholarly interest in the contestation of political order and was reinforced in the context of Ben Ali’s neoliberal Tunisia. The country was then also considered a model of economic stability and performance, a ‘good student’ of the international organisations because of its supposed reformist character (Hibou 2009) – and was therefore seen as unshakable by Western powers.

The 2011 Revolution changed the dynamics. Pioneering works on Tunisian opposition politics (Khiari 2003; Ayari 2016) and the political economy of repression in Tunisia (Camau and Geisser 2003; Hibou 2006) have been complemented by recent studies concentrating on the revolutionary processes that followed the fall of Ben Ali (Hmed 2016; Allal and Geisser 2018; Yousfi 2019). These stimulating works on post-independence Tunisian history and politics have mainly focussed on national events, and little attention has been paid to what has happened outside the nation’s boundaries, although political actions have often started there and their study can shed much light on any number of national issues. There is therefore a risk of romanticising the sudden post-2011 political awakening of essentialised Tunisian diasporas. By documenting and analysing the way Tunisian politics has played out across borders, this study of Tunisian activism in France under Ben Ali’s authoritarian rule aspires to fill this gap while avoiding the attendant risks that such an approach may involve.

The dynamics of long-distance Tunisian activism described here emerged from the history of colonisation and, relatedly, from the history of post-colonial immigration. To understand Tunisian activism in France, it is first necessary to offer as a backdrop a quick overview of Tunisian emigration and immigration, and the diplomatic issues this entailed between France and Tunisia. Both countries played a role in emigration dynamics. Bourguiba’s and Ben Ali’s authoritarian regimes institutionalised ‘the Tunisian paradigm of migration’ as a cornerstone of political order in post-colonial Tunisia (Dini and Giusa 2021, 26), whilst the importation of Tunisian labourers was also central to France’s policies. If Tunisian politics in France draws on earlier labour migratory configurations, we will also discover that this entanglement is only partial.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.