Candace Lukasik, Martyrs and Migrants: Coptic Christians and the Persecution Politics of US Empire (New Texts Out Now)

Candace Lukasik, Martyrs and Migrants: Coptic Christians and the Persecution Politics of US Empire (New Texts Out Now)

Candace Lukasik, Martyrs and Migrants: Coptic Christians and the Persecution Politics of US Empire (New Texts Out Now)

By : Candace Lukasik

Candace Lukasik, Martyrs and Migrants: Coptic Christians and the Persecution Politics of US Empire (NYU Press, 2025).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Candace Lukasik (CL): I first traveled to Egypt in 2007 for an Arabic-language program. During that initial trip, I became well-acquainted with a Coptic Orthodox Christian family in Cairo’s Masakin Sheraton neighborhood. I experienced Orthodox liturgy for the first time with them, and they introduced me to a Coptic lifeworld that drew me to return to Egypt nearly every year since. Throughout the years of travel to and from the country, I also began attending Coptic churches in the United States—from Buffalo, New York, to Hayward, California. Over those years, and most strikingly after the 2011 Egyptian revolution, church dynamics in the United States shifted, and I also noticed intergenerational tensions with new waves of Coptic migrants. While I had initially begun a project on the growth and eventual decimation of Coptic political movements in post-revolutionary Egypt, the renewed importance of Coptic migration to the religious and political life of this transnational community piqued my interest as an anthropologist and as a practitioner of Coptic Orthodox Christianity. 

So, in 2016 I traveled from Washington, DC, to New York to Los Angeles, and eventually Nashville, Tennessee, to choose my primary field sites. During my trip to Washington in June 2016 to attend the organization Coptic Solidarity’s annual conference, I met with the founder and executive director of a Coptic-led NGO who encouraged me to participate in their volunteer program: an opportunity to teach English for three weeks in rural Egypt. On 11 December 2016, a suicide bomber killed twenty-nine people and injured forty-seven at Saint Peter and Saint Paul’s Coptic Orthodox Church (also known as the al-Buṭrusiyya Church), a chapel next to Saint Mark’s Coptic Orthodox Cathedral in Cairo’s al-Abbasiyya district. The bombing set off transnational shockwaves, and many participants in the January-February program from the diaspora withdrew their participation. Only three other women (Coptic and non-Egyptian evangelical) and I took part in the early 2017 volunteer program in Bahjura, Upper Egypt. During the program, almost everyone I encountered in Bahjura noted that they had kin in the United States. One prominent interlocutor in the book—Amin—mentioned that his niece now lives in New Jersey, and that she was able to migrate through the US Diversity Visa Program, or Green Card Lottery. During a subsequent conversation on the subject, Amin explained over lunch one afternoon that while there are certainly issues of Muslim-Christian animosity throughout Egypt, “when Christians go to the [US] embassy, they tell them [they want to travel because of] persecution.” The (dis)connection between these two comments set off my more extensive fieldwork, with guidance from Amin, on the transnational contentions and imperial encounters of minority migration between Bahjura and Jersey City.

Coptic migrants relate to each other through their religious tradition as well as their transnational minority condition.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

CL: While attending to the rise in violent attacks and religious constraints on Copts in Egypt over the past decade following the 2011 Egyptian revolution, Martyrs and Migrants focuses instead on how Copts have worked with respect to Egyptian politics, the socio-economic conditions of rural Upper Egypt, the consequences of the US “War on Terror,” and changes in US presidential administrations and foreign policy priorities to translate their suffering into various forms of religious and political visibility. The book examines the ambiguities of that visibility, especially within the racialized context of the United States’s preoccupation with Islam and terrorism, which has caught Coptic Christians in the apparatuses of anti-terror surveillance even as it offers them a means by which they can emigrate to the United States from Egypt as “persecuted Christians.” 

Journeying back and forth across sites of migration between Egypt and the United States, the books shows the everyday practices and processes that shape transnational Coptic communal formation and belonging as they interface with the tension between their minority status in Egypt and their racial-religious placement within an American Christian conservative landscape. Coptic migrants relate to each other through their religious tradition as well as their transnational minority condition. Their struggle to grapple with their different minority positions between Egypt and the United States is what articulates their own political praxis and frames their interpellation into a broader US geopolitical frame of international religious freedom advocacy and strategies of counterterrorism. That does not mean that Coptic migrants, positioned within these broader structures of power, are simply conscripts of US empire or fully outside of empire’s grasp. Instead, the case of the Copts offers a window onto how empire shapes transnational, minority communities in the (re)narration of their collective identity and the transformation of their political orientations, racial identification, and religious solidarities.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

CL: I hope scholars, community members, and general audiences will read the book and be drawn in by the stories it retells and the tensions it considers. In general, Martyrs and Migrants argues that local and national considerations of violence and memory are already scaled by transnational and global translations of religious difference. And by rethinking Christianity and US empire through Coptic minority migration, it seeks out a new understanding of how contemporary religious life is uncontainable in either local or national frames within a globalized world of asymmetrical power circuits. Among Copts, the geopolitical refractions of American hegemony through pathways of migration as well as globally mediatized understandings of Christian suffering unfold in the ordinary affects of imperial persecution politics. With the focus of Western Christians, policy makers, and Coptic diasporic communities themselves on the varied experiences of violence against Egyptian Copts, some of those very Copts question the uneven attention on narratives of bloodshed in Egypt. 

What is absent from the entrenched politics of persecution and martyrologies of Christian suffering are the wages and witness of migration that exceed such narratives and representations of perennial religious violence. While both acknowledging and attending to the pervasive discriminations that Christians face in Egypt, many of those Christians also know the dangers—both lethal and less-than-lethal—that lie ahead for them in the United States. While awaiting the hope of showcasing migrant resistance to these imperial formations or the openings up to possibility and production in diaspora is a worthy endeavor, its preference displaces the gaze from the structural flows of destruction and despair that shape the lifeworlds of so many migrants. Martyrs and Migrants traces the destructive forces of migration, attending to how violence and sacrifice translate across national and imperial formations, from Egypt to the United States and back again. While offering the promise of freedom, justice, and witness, migration also wages exile and alienation, a white (bloodless) martyrdom for uncertain futures of prosperity and possibility.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

CL: Moving between post-ISIS Mosul, Iraq, and Detroit, Michigan, I am currently completing fieldwork for my second book project, tentatively titled Somewhere Else: Political Ecologies and Indigenous Sovereignty in Global Assyria. It traces how ecologies of war—in the form of everyday experiences, material effects, and affective resonances of violence—shape religious and political claims of rootedness and stateless sovereignty, and impact upon Christian-Muslim relations locally and globally. Northern Iraq is part of the ancestral Assyrian homeland. Prior to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the number of Assyrians in Iraq was estimated to be 1.5 million. Today, fewer than 150,000 remain, primarily concentrated in the Nineveh Plain and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Somewhere Else focuses on how mass violence and climate change in the continuing aftermath of war shape social movements of indigenous communities and inflect upon collective memory and transnational mobilization toward non-sovereign futures. In their global claims to indigeneity and demands for economic, environmental, and political reparation, Assyrians have also formed networks with Indigenous peoples on Turtle Island. These decolonial narratives of solidarity and kinship frame diasporic humanitarian efforts and international aid strategies that oscillate between the Western Christian gaze and Assyrian indigeneity.

In conversation with Indigenous studies and settler-colonial studies, Somewhere Else explores an established tradition of thought that has long critiqued the “secular” as a distinctive formation of power and knowledge. What has received less attention within this tradition is the relationship between the genealogy of the “secular” and the history of colonial settlement. It is against this background that Somewhere Else seeks to stage a conversation about if and how these different trajectories, geographies, and methodological insights can supplement each other, especially in the context of the Middle East. What can the study of the secular say about the increasing recourse to the language of “indigeneity” in a variety of political and legal contexts, globally? Has “indigeneity” become a traveling concept? If so, how do claims to “indigeneity” intersect with the minority concept and religious difference? How do questions of translation (as a secular practice) mediate its applications in various contexts? And what might this tell us about the way the secular mediates different forms of kinship—through land, as well as theology, ecclesiology, and/or collective memory? In tracing the shadows of secularity in the geopolitics of concern over Middle Eastern minority communities like Assyrians in Iraq, the book hopes to show how we may be better able to parse a decolonial approach to the intersections of Christianity and indigeneity in the Middle East, that exceeds Western, neo-colonial instrumentalization.

 

Excerpt from the book (from Chapter 2, pages 97 to 101)

Violence and Shared Life

On May 26, 2017, masked gunmen opened fire on a bus filled with Coptic pilgrims traveling from Maghāgha, al-Minyā, Upper Egypt, to the Monastery of Saint Samuel the Confessor. At least twenty-eight were murdered/martyred and at least twenty-two were injured/witnessed. I arrived in Bahjūra an hour after the attack hit Egyptian news cycles and international media. The family I was staying with gathered in the living room, with solemn faces, for tea. Coverage of CTV, a popular Coptic broadcasting network, played in the background. The women of the household had to start getting ready for the wedding we were all set to attend that evening. Churches in the area had immediately sent WhatsApp messages to their congregations informing them that upcoming monastery trips were postponed until further notice. During the wedding, the martyrs of al-Minyā were on the lips of many, and some questioned whether to even allow dancing or music, in honor of the dead. Many of the men drank and danced throughout the night. An older man was visibly intoxicated. One of the sisters whispered in my ear, “People are sad tonight because of al-Minyā.” Later that night, after we returned home, a cousin of the family sat in the living room scrolling through his Facebook. In his late twenties, Ishak expressed his frustration about the way Muslims were relating to the al-Minyā events; he desired a more direct acknowledgment of their martyrical suffering and death. On Facebook, his Muslim friends would comment, “al-baqāʾlillāh” or “innā lillāhi wa inna ilayhi rājiʿūn”—both phrases of consolation. Ishak said sternly, “These phrases are used when someone dies from sickness or gets in a car accident, not for when people are murdered. It’s like you’re adding insult to injury!” 

For a nightcap, we made our way to the rooftop of the building. The conversation centered around al-Minyā, and one of the women interjected: “I think the problem is connected to the pope and his support for the president [Sisi]. When he came out on July 3rd [2013] with Sheikh al-Azhar and Sisi, he was sending a message in support of the deposal of Morsi.” Her sister-in-law replied, “But I think he [the pope] had to do so. The message of July 3rd was that Muslims and Christians are both supporting the deposal of Morsi.” Another family member responded, “But this is why it is so dangerous, because the Islamists use this as a reason to kill Copts.” An uncle retorted, “We’ve been here for 2,017 years, and they’ve only been here for 1,400 years. Who are the original inhabitants of this country [mīn aṣl al-balad]?” The following day, a friend and I made our way to a local church to meet with a priest. Sitting in his office, he asked us, “Did you see what happened?” Abouna was referring to the al-Minyā incident. He continued, “Of course, many people are emigrating, with the state of the country and this persecution [iḍṭhād]!”

Yet other Copts from Bahjūra insisted that the narrative of persecution does not encompass all aspects of life. Even despite the horrors of the al-Minyā incident, Coptic interlocutors in Bahjūra emphasized that discrimination [tamyīz] was not only directed against Christians by Muslims in Egypt. Rather, discrimination also occurred between Chris tians, based on class divisions [ṭabaqāt]. “It’s not just Christians and Muslims,” a young pharmacist insisted. “Al-Minyā is a political incident, and it will continue to occur because those terrorists [irhābyīn] attacking are hitting Sisi’s weak spot—Christians. They have supported him. So targeting them is like targeting Sisi.” Muslim-Christian relations in Egypt are not solely demarcated by persecution politics, or the framing of sectarian relations by conflict and cooperation (as a perpetual waiting for the next incident of violence to erupt). Rather, the ambiguities of intercommunal tension and shared life offer a different way to think about the politics of migration beyond a binary of socioeconomic factors and forced displacement and dispossession.

The oscillation between a politics of friendship and conflict defines Muslim-Christian relations in an Upper Egyptian village like Bahjūra, where in one instance a Muslim mother might tell her child, “Don’t eat in the Christian area [Shig al-Naṣāra] because they’ll poison you,” and in another she might take her child to the church for the Saint George festival every November to receive blessings, or baraka.

In June 2017, I was walking through Bahjūra, again, with Amin (who opened this chapter). As we began to walk, I noticed that a falafel restaurant at the end of the street was open and serving food. I peeked inside and saw that there was a “There is no god except Allah, and Muhammad is his messenger” decorative portrait, indicating that the place was most likely owned by Muslims. I was perplexed, given that it was Ramadan and in places like Cairo, cafés open during the day have been forcibly shut down by Egyptian police. As we walked further, I noticed that, on the predominantly Muslim street, there was also a sheesha shop open for business, with customers drinking tea and smoking cigarettes. I became even more perplexed. I inquired about these scenes to Amin. “Things are different here in the village,” he said. “I would say only about 50 percent of Muslims fast during Ramadan.” I then noted to Amin that in Cairo, the police would come and shut down these businesses themselves if they were open. He responded, “We don’t have anything of the sort [maʿandinash al-kalām da]. We have a shared life together [al-hayat al-mushtarika]. We decide what is permissible and what is not.”

What are some practical implications for an ethics within the framework of local difference as a classed communalism? Shared life entails a collective frame of the everyday—in its common conditions of electrical outages, road (dis)repair, sweltering weather in the summer months and frost on the dirt pathways in winter, and in the affective communion of landscape and historical presence. Minority experiences of discrimination and violence are also part of this collective frame, but they are negotiated intercommunally (although the state intervenes in such negotiations as well) for a common flourishing in a place like Bahjūra.

There are intersecting scales in the above scene with Amin. Class difference—as channeled through geographic difference from the centrality of the Egyptian state in Cairo—unfolds how locality molds relationality with the other, which also can spill over into disagreement as well as violence. In violent spillover, those forms of negative relationality scale upwards to national, transnational, and imperial frames, when violence against “the Copts” melts the Christians of Bahjūra away from their Muslim neighbors, those they depend on (like the relationship between Jackleen and Ahmed) and those they despise.

Migration circuits have exacerbated this dynamic, straining the continuation of a collective frame, as Christians leave and return to/ from the United States with new frames of religious difference. In the summer of 2021, I returned to Bahjūra and had lunch one July afternoon with Jackleen and the rest of the Ayoub family. Over post-lunch tea, Jackleen described how, when her mother visited London, she rode a taxi with a Pakistani driver. Along the way, the driver asked her whether she was Muslim. Her mother responded with an emphatic “No!” After recounting the short anecdote, she asked me, “Why do they allow all of these Muslims into England and America? My sister in Florida says that they are taking over whole neighborhoods near her. You think that you’d be able to escape them after leaving Egypt!” The abstraction of “Muslims” from Jackleen’s everyday encounters and friendships with Muslims—at the local school, shopping with colleagues in Najʿ Ḥammādī, or calling old classmates on the phone and talking for hours about family life and death—in this retelling gestures to imagining the outside of Egypt through the reconfiguration of religious difference.

Shared life for someone like Amin is upended in its translations in migration enabled by empire (determining the flows of people to where and by what means). Amin voiced his frustrations with these flows during one of our many post-dinner conversations: “Coptic people in the diaspora don’t understand everyday life in Egypt, and especially Upper Egypt. They have their own image in their minds as to what life is like here, especially in the village—that there is religious persecution nonstop. But the reality is that here, in Egypt, Copts have to deal with the messiness and the humiliation [bahdala] of the everyday, living in poverty, without jobs or a future.” Although religious difference and sectarian violence condition intercommunal relations even in places like Bahjūra, other factors such as class also shape persecuted positionalities and (im)possibilities of repair. An “ethical thematization” of religious difference in Egypt includes an intersectional approach to precarity. Put simply, Coptic precarity is also dependent upon class and economic difference, and contextualized by geographic difference. As economic opportunities dwindle in Egypt, especially in the south, migration to places like the United States, where relatives speak of Christian flourishing and the American Dream, often becomes the solution to broader structural disparities at the intersection of religious identity and poverty.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.