Houri Berberian, Roving Revolutionaries: Armenians and the Connected Revolutions in the Russian, Iranian, and Ottoman Worlds (New Texts Out Now)

Houri Berberian, Roving Revolutionaries: Armenians and the Connected Revolutions in the Russian, Iranian, and Ottoman Worlds (New Texts Out Now)

Houri Berberian, Roving Revolutionaries: Armenians and the Connected Revolutions in the Russian, Iranian, and Ottoman Worlds (New Texts Out Now)

By : Houri Berberian

Houri Berberian, Roving Revolutionaries: Armenians and the Connected Revolutions in the Russian, Iranian, and Ottoman Worlds (Oakland: UC Press, 2019).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book and how does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

Houri Berberian (HB): This book is both a departure and a continuation of my previous work. 

My fascination with revolutions and revolutionaries dates back to my first book, which focused more closely on the Iranian Constitutional Revolution and Armenians, and the latter is something I pursued in shorter essays as well. Although the book indirectly addressed connections and crossings in the triangulated frontier empires of the Russians, Ottomans, and Iranians, it was not its main focus. I continued to develop my interest in early twentieth-century revolutions and revolutionaries and delved into world history in my teaching. Starting in 2008, I was introduced to the possibilities of connected histories, especially in relationship to the history and historiography of Armenians.

The graduate seminar I taught on comparative and connected revolutions in 2012 and the animated discussions we had in that seminar served to cement in my mind the necessity of a connected histories study on revolutions. I became convinced that expanding our lens to explore larger regional and global contexts opens up multiple worlds of richness, possibilities, and interconnections. This book is a product of my deepening commitment to excavating and examining the myriad connections and the meaningful ways in which those connections shape lives and histories, ties that may seem invisible at first, until we look closely and realize how ubiquitous and powerful they are.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

HB: This book explores the connectedness of the Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian revolutions by using the case of Armenian revolutionaries. The three revolutions coincided with revolutions in Portugal (1910), Mexico (1911), and China (1912). The revolutions in the Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian states drew strength from each other’s successes and attempted to effect change in their own particular environments. In all cases, but in varying degrees, these upheavals all involved, to some extent, the collaboration of linguistically and ethnically diverse imperial subjects and the adaptation of European Enlightenment ideas, as well as socialism in its many variants.

The book looks at the prevalent crisscrossing or circulation of Armenian activists, arms, and print through these revolutions and across the South Caucasus, Asia Minor, and Iran, as well as Europe, within the context of transformations in transportation and communication. It also analyzes the weight of ideas—like constitutionalism, federalism, and socialism—all of which filtered through the frontiers via revolutionaries and workers, as well as circulars and newspapers, and were adapted to or indigenized under local conditions.

I apply two key approaches to the study of these revolutions and Armenians that are both novel and absolutely crucial in understanding them. First, I employ a connected histories and—what I call—a “connected revolutions” approach, which I apply to the study of our three revolutions. By connected histories, I mean a systematic exploration of the circulation of ideas, individuals, and objects, and—in our case of Armenian revolutionaries—arms, print, and global ideologies. It is substantially different from comparative history in that it considers ideas, people, and objects not merely in relation to one another but through one another, in terms of relationships, interactions, and circulation. 

Critical to a meaningful understanding of these revolutions is an appreciation of the global context or conjuncture that allows us to see them beyond their regional setting and local particularities and in light of larger transformations.

Second, the study insists on a global approach by focusing on turn-of-the-twentieth-century global transformations that smoothed the road toward revolution and facilitated the circulation of revolutionaries. Critical to a meaningful understanding of these revolutions is an appreciation of the global context or conjuncture that allows us to see them beyond their regional setting and local particularities and in light of larger transformations. The extent of circulation of roving Armenian activists, arms, and global ideas that we witness at the turn of the twentieth century only becomes possible when we consider the role of new technologies like railways and telegraph and the proliferation of periodicals and books, all of which had a powerful effect on revolutionaries taking part in multiple struggles. The period in which these revolutions took place, particularly from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, witnessed significant shifts in technologies of global communication and transportation that led to faster and therefore more frequent travel (by railway and steamship) and communication (by telegraph) across wider distances, thus shrinking the time it took to get to places near and far and giving the impression that the world had become smaller because it had become more easily accessible (David Harvey’s time-space compression). At the same time, the world seemed to expand because these same technologies made available a range of ideas, encounters, and exchanges, thus magnifying the available and reachable horizons. This two-pronged consequence of time-space compression, shrinking and expanding, was instrumental in connecting our revolutions because it made possible the circulation of revolutionary operatives and intellectuals as well as the ideas and ideologies that fuelled those revolutions.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

HB: I hope the book will reach a wide academic and lay audience, but I suspect scholars and students will get most from the book, particularly those who are interested in world history, the history of revolutions, as well as the history of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, of the South Caucasus, and more specifically of Armenians. I would be very pleased, of course, if it had a broad impact on a number of fields, disciplines and across academic and lay audiences and changed the way we think about and study revolutions and non-dominant groups, such as the Armenians, with a focus on connectivity rather than insularity or comparison.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

HB: I am currently preparing an essay about Armenian revolutionary Rubina who helped plan and herself attempted the assassination of Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II in 1905. The study explores the portrayal of Rubina by contemporaries and others, which has produced a highly gendered narrative at the cost of appreciating her truly revolutionary role–not only in the conventional sense but also revolutionary in terms of her gender. This essay will appear as a chapter in Age of Rogues: Rebels, Revolutionaries and Racketeers in Turn of the Century Eurasia Minor, edited by Ramazan Hakki Oztan & Alp Yenen (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021) but is also part of a larger book project I am planning on late nineteenth/early twentieth-century Armenian revolutionaries’ use of political violence, from attempted assassinations of government officials to traitors and informers. In addition to exploring the local and regional circumstances of such acts, the study will also place these operations within the larger context of global terror tactics, including the closest examples from the Russian Empire, and examine them and their practitioners as part of a global transformation in political movements, organizations, and tactics.

J: What conclusions would you like readers to draw from your book?

HB: I would like readers to appreciate the importance of studying these three revolutions through connections and within their local, regional as well as broader global context. My engagement with a connected histories approach is in direct contrast to a comparative method which invariably privileges one side. So, I hope that readers will appreciate the novel application of this methodological model particularly in the case of the MENA region.

With the study, I would also like readers to recognize the significance of studying the place of less well-represented and little-studied peoples like the Armenians and to bring them out of the marginality they have at times inscribed for themselves—and others have inscribed for them—to foreground histories often hidden by national and nationalist approaches. In many ways, Armenians’ participation in three revolutions, their journeys across and within imperial frontiers, and their experimentation with global ideologies make them ideal subjects for grasping the connections between these early twentieth-century revolutions. Armenians were only one of many groups that, through their mobility, acted as connectors in history; for that reason, they should be viewed as one part of a larger whole within the wider regional and global context.  However, they are also a unique group for investigation because they prepared for all the movements and participated in varying degrees in all three revolutions.

Last but not least, it is crucial for us to comprehend why they did so. They did so because they believed that the fate of the Armenian populations living in all three empires would benefit from revolutionary change and the promise of greater representation, social and economic justice, harmonious coexistence, and equality of all citizens. Therefore, the wider participation and collaboration in these revolutionary and constitutional movements must also be seen as part and parcel of the more limited Armenian struggle in the Ottoman and Russian Empires, as the campaigns and their participants were intertwined and informed by each other. Our revolutionaries saw the movements as connected and part of the same fight and, therefore, so should we. 

 

Excerpt from the book

In October 1908 a full-page illustration appeared on the last page of the Armenian-language satirical weekly, Khatabala (Trouble), in Tiflis. It features a simplified depiction of the Ottoman Empire arched by a banner-like rainbow that reads “CONSTITUTION.” The backdrop is a cloudy, stormy sky. The seas are dark and tempestuous. Below the rainbow, in the center of the empire, stands a man identified as a Turk, with his back to the reader/viewer, holding a banner that proclaims “Unity, Equal[ity].” On his right, from the top, with expressions and postures that vary from attentiveness to ennui, are men identified as Kurd, Armenian (in red), Bedouin, Arab, and Jew. They hold banners that say “Autonomy,” but only the Armenian’s banner is upright. The others brush the ground. All except the Arab (depicted as black) and the Bedouin, both of whom are armed, are on their knees in submission or supplication. The Armenian’s posture, however, appears somewhat different than that of the other kneeling Ottoman subjects. His outstretched arms, along with his gaze, seem to be directed across Anatolia toward the Balkans, perhaps with respect or in support. In the Balkans, from right to left, are those identified as Albanian, Macedonian, and Greek. Between the Albanian and the Macedonian, standing slightly in the background, is an older, white-bearded, and rather meek man, who is not identified. These figures all hold banners of autonomy and are standing; the Macedonian and the Greek, however, hold rather agitated poses, with their banners unfurled in the air. The caption to the illustration is a poem: 

Թող շողշողուն ծիածան                          Այս «նշանով հաշտութեան»

Ձեզ շաղկապէ, հէք ազգեր                      Թող դարման են ձեր վէրքեր

May the resplendent rainbow             With this “sign of conciliation”
Conjoin you, poor nations                  May they remedy your wounds

How are we to interpret this illustration? How could this satirical portrayal of constitution and the relationship of the empire’s ethnicities to it reflect a real and complicated relationship with constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire? Could it also perhaps even help us understand the contrasting Armenian views toward constitutionalism, in general, and toward specific constitutions in the Russian and Iranian states, as well as views on autonomy, unity, and equality? The Armenians’ complex relationship with constitutionalism is not unique to that concept; rather, it reflects a wider and equally multifaceted affiliation with other prevalent, global ideas and ideologies such as socialism, nationalism, and anarchism, particularly anarchist interpretations of federation, autonomy, and decentralization. Our frontier-crossing revolutionaries who traversed Eurasia in pursuit or in support of revolutionary transformation in the Russian, Iranian, and Ottoman Empires were also boundary crossers—that is, they navigated not only geographical expanses but also the world of global ideas and ideologies. They experimented, adopted, adapted, and even synthesized concepts and world visions according to the actual circumstances in which they lived and their own particular interests and aspirations. Their disagreements and debates over constitutionalism, federation and decentralization, and socialism and the national question in many ways mirror the disputes taking place contemporaneously among European (understood in its broadest and most extensive sense) leftists. They also reflect or are part of larger trends in the region, as the discussion in this and the following chapter demonstrate by drawing parallels when germane, especially with Georgians, Bulgarians, and Macedonians. This chapter and the next rely heavily on revolutionary Armenian-language periodicals and a number of books published in the revolutionary period by intellectuals and activists in the Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian Empires and in Europe. They represent the vibrant array of ideological and political leanings.

. . .

In this chapter, the focus is on the ways in which and the paths through which ideas moved as well as the ways revolutionaries accommodated and applied them. The chapter returns to the illustration with which it began to discuss constitutionalism’s place in the Armenian revolutionary discourse and then moves to federation, decentralization, and autonomy... This chapter seeks to answer the following questions, which are key to understanding how the circulation of global ideas contributed to connecting triangulated revolutions: How did ideas such as constitutionalism and federation motivate and inspire our revolutionaries? How did the revolutionaries understand these ideas? Which ideologues and theoreticians did they find appealing? In other words, what did they read, with what concepts did they engage, and whom did they reference and translate? How did their personal encounters and exchanges with thinkers in and from Western and Central Europe and Russia, as well as their keen awareness and deep familiarity with international leftist views, movements, publications, and world events, contribute to the mobility of ideas and revolutionaries’ ideological boundary crossings? How did they adapt ideas or mental constructs to their own reality, link them to their own objectives, and accommodate them to the revolutions for which they fought?

. . .

The illustration with which I began this chapter certainly gives us an idea of the perceptions of different ethnicities in relation to the Ottoman Empire. Even though they are all shown holding the banner of autonomy in response to or to accompany the banner of unity and equality, some seem to be more vehement advocates of autonomy than others. The Armenian is portrayed as somewhere between the aggressive Balkans on one side and the rather apathetic or dispirited Kurd, Bedouin, and Jew on the other. His banner is held high, although he himself is kneeling. The Turk takes center stage, representing his dominance in the empire’s power structure. Constitution is represented by the rainbow, symbolizing peace, rebirth, and promise. The illustration may be drawing from the story in Genesis, in which a great flood brought on by God to rid the world of humans who have corrupted the world and filled it with violence—an ancient form of man’s inhumanity to man—is followed by a rainbow signifying God’s covenant with man. In Genesis, God vows, “I establish my covenant with you, that never again shall all flesh be cut off by the waters of a flood, and never again shall there be a flood to destroy the earth. . . . I have set my bow in the clouds, and it shall be a sign of the covenant between me and the earth. When I bring clouds over the earth and the bow is seen in the clouds, I will remember my covenant that is between me and you and every living creature of all flesh.” Following Genesis, if we understand the rainbow of constitution as a symbol of that covenant and covenant as “a formal agreement . . . between a superior and inferior party, the former ‘making’ or ‘establishing’ the bond with the latter,” then we can make sense of all the illustration’s symbolism, including the stormy clouds menacingly looming behind the rainbow. The constitution represents a covenant and a promise between the “superior” Ottoman state and its subjects not to rain violence upon them and instead to usher in a new period of unity and equality. The response of the “inferior” parties seems demoralized, hopeful, skeptical, or indignant. The poem, too, rings a note of promise and expresses a wish to “conjoin” with “conciliation” and to “remedy” past injuries. However, it does so in the context of and perhaps in contrast to competing visions or understandings of constitution. 

The illustration no doubt represents a complex, newly constitutional Ottoman world. It also, however, opens a way for us to comprehend the rather nuanced relationship of Armenians to the period’s global craze of constitutionalism in three empires and revolutionary movements. Much has been written about the impact of the concept of constitutionalism on Russians, Iranians, and Ottomans.

. . . 

The overwhelmingly positive view, not only throughout this region but also around the world, dominated the discourse on constitution and the aspirations of people worldwide.

Constitutionalism as an idea, a goal, and an actualized model had wide reach. News of constitutional struggles as well as pamphlets and books about constitutionalism circulated not only through telegraphy and print but also frontier-crossing revolutionaries who benefitted from the other turn-of-the-century marvels, the steamship and railroad. Thus, the idea of constitutionalism and its devotees connected revolutions at home and afar. Armenians pursued and sought constitution in all three empires: Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian. Some activists and thinkers, however, had mixed feelings about the reality or practical application of constitution, even if they espoused its principle and promise. This should not be construed as a rejection or ambivalence about the significance of constitution; on the contrary, they attached so much importance to it and the multiple problems it could resolve that they worried about the kind of constitution being supported or established.

_____________________________


This article is part of the new Jadaliyya Iran Page launch. To inaugurate the Iran Page, its co-editors are pleased to present the following articles, interviews, and resources:

Articles

"Jadaliyya Launches New Iran Page" by Iran Page Editors

"Covering Race and Rebellion" by Naveed Mansoori

"The Systemic Problem of 'Iran Expertise' in Washington" by Negar Razavi

Media Roundup

Extended Iran Media Roundup

New Texts Out Now (NEWTON) Interviews

Houri Berberian, Roving Revolutionaries: Armenians and the Connected Revolutions in the Russian, Iranian, and Ottoman Worlds

Nile Green, The Persianate World: The Frontiers of a Eurasian Lingua Franca

Narges Bajoghli, Iran Reframed: Anxieties of Power in the Islamic Republic

Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, Revolution and its Discontents: Political Thought and Reform in Iran

Golbarg Rekabtalaei, Iranian Cosmopolitanism: A Cinematic History

Peyman Vahabzadeh, A Rebel’s Journey: Mostafa Sho‘aiyan and Revolutionary Theory in Iran

Resources

Engaging Books Series: Cambridge University Press Selections on Cosmopolitanism and Political Reform in Iran

Jadaliyya Talks: Arash Davari and Sina Rahmani on "Divorce, Iran-America Style"

"Essential Readings: Post-Revolutionary Iran" by Arang Keshavarzian

 

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.