Golbarg Rekabtalaei, Iranian Cosmopolitanism: A Cinematic History (New Texts Out Now)

Golbarg Rekabtalaei, Iranian Cosmopolitanism: A Cinematic History (New Texts Out Now)

Golbarg Rekabtalaei, Iranian Cosmopolitanism: A Cinematic History (New Texts Out Now)

By : Golbarg Rekabtalaei

Golbarg RekabtalaeiIranian Cosmopolitanism: A Cinematic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Golbarg Rekabtalaei (GR): For as long as I remember, I have had an avid interest in Iranian cinema. However, when I migrated from Iran, my interest began to grow—perhaps as a means for me to connect with the country that I had left behind as an adolescent and to come to terms with my new life in the diaspora. Most of the films that I used to watch before I started my graduate program were post-revolutionary films, part of what is commonly known as the Iranian New Cinema, a post-revolutionary movement that solidified after the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. From the mid-1990s onwards, Iranian films began to gain much international acclaim, and that is when I became interested in understanding the success of these films on an international level. However, as I began my research on Iranian cinema of the post-revolutionary era in my MA program, I realized that I needed to go back further in time to better comprehend the current state of this cultural form. As I delved more into the past, I became more conscious of the cosmopolitanism of Iranian cinema before the revolution, as well as the heterogeneous social conditions and hybrid identities that facilitated this cosmopolitanism. And like that, I started writing my PhD dissertation on the cinema of pre-revolutionary era—a project that culminated in the form of the book at hand.

... much of the history of Iran is overdetermined by a political periodization that amplifies rupture.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

GR: Due to its geopolitical position and tumultuous history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, much of the history of Iran is overdetermined by a political periodization that amplifies ruptures. In other words, politics is often seen as determining the temporality of culture, society, economy, etc. Iranian Cosmopolitanism decouples the history of cinema from political history, by investigating continuities and discontinuities in the history of cinema in Iran, while at the same time situating its transformations within larger international and national debates. Through its focus on cinematic temporality (rather than on a strictly political one), the book reveals a different periodization and narrative of cinema in Iran.

To give you an example, the book attends to an overlooked era in the history of cinema in Iran. Since the first Persian-language films (or what is generally regarded as “national” cinema) were produced in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the history of cinema in Iran prior to this period has been largely ignored. It is commonly held that cinema was unpopular during this period due to the religious establishment’s disapproval of the technology, or because it was utilized by colonial agents in the service of imperialism and neocolonialism in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Going beyond such explanations that place much significance on the agency of European powers, Iranian Cosmopolitanism examines the role of cosmopolitan cinema owners/operators, the space of cinema, and international films in shaping a vernacular modernity and contributing to a diverse urban culture in the early twentieth century. The heterogeneous cinematic culture that was engendered during this period came to bear a cosmopolitan character upon Iranian cinema in the decades that followed. It seems to me that the configuration of such highly diverse conditions was central to the shaping of nationalist sentiments and a national cinema in the early decades of the twentieth century. In other words, as the book shows, for the most part, cosmopolitanism went hand in hand with nationalism. 

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

GR: I consider myself a cultural historian of modern Iran, and I am generally interested in the social and cultural cosmopolitan conditions and transnational interactions that have shaped Iranian cinema. This is my first book and it is the culmination of the research that I carried out throughout my PhD program. Some of this research, connected to the theme of cinematic cosmopolitanism, has appeared, in more detail, in the form of independent articles. For example, in an article that I published in Iranian Studies, I explore the ways in which the alternative cinema of pre-revolutionary cinema, commonly known as Iran’s New Wave cinema, engaged with international cinematic movements such as Italian neorealism, French New Wave, and Third Cinema, in addition to global political sentiments of the 1960s and 1970s. Such dynamic engagements and dialogue among filmmakers, producers, film critics, and film enthusiasts contributed to the formation of a vernacular cosmopolitan cinematic movement in Iran that set itself apart from the popular cinema of the era. Sublimating the political tensions of the pre-revolutionary era, this alternative cinema gave rise to a revolution in cinema (in form and onscreen) prior to the 1979 political revolution of Iran.

In another article, I explore the shaping of a sovereign (“national”) cinema in the 1920s and 1930s. This article challenges the argument that cinema was ostracized by the religious establishment based on Islamic condemnation of figural depiction of humans. I demonstrate that cinema was widely employed by people from diverse ethnic, linguistic, and religious backgrounds as an educational tool to promote “social morality” and stir nationalist sentiments. In other words, Iran’s cosmopolitan film operators and cinema owners were central in shaping nationalism in Iran before it was co-opted by the newly-formed Pahlavi state in the 1930s. Incorporating cinema into nationalist discourses on education in Iran, the Pahlavi Dynasty then took over cinema as an extension of the government’s technologies of power and discipline in the interwar period. In my book, I further trace the connection between the state and Iranian cinema during and after World War II. 

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

GR: The book is an interdisciplinary project that poses cinema as a prism through which the history of modern Iran can be investigated. As such, I think the intended audience for the book includes both students and scholars of the modern history of Iran and the Middle East at large, as well as Iranian cinema (and Middle Eastern cinema). For its theoretical framework, the book would also be of interest to those who work on cosmopolitanism in the Middle East.

In terms of impact, by providing different sets of social and cultural networks, this book contributes to discussions that rethink centers and peripheries of modernity. Very few studies have dealt with transnational exchanges and heterogeneous cultural dynamics that contributed to urban modernity in Tehran in the early twentieth century. Therefore, this project adds Tehran to other hubs of modernity in the Middle East and North Africa such as Cairo and Istanbul. In that sense, the book also aims to add to the historiography of cosmopolitanism in the Middle East, and transnational exchanges throughout the twentieth century.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

GR: I am currently working on a few articles that all relate to the transnational history of early cinema in Iran. One of these attends to international silent and early talking fiction films and newsreels that made Iran the main subject of their films from 1900s to 1930s. I find it fascinating how the Great Powers’ portrayal of Iran in propaganda films and newsreels (in particular in German, British, and Russian films) was illustrative of their political agendas, especially evident in their policies towards Iran. 

I have also started working on a second book project on youth and youth culture in the late Qajar and early Pahlavi (early to mid-twentieth century) Iran. I am interested in investigating how the youth were approached and co-opted by cultural trendsetters, social critics, and various governments for the nationalist projects that were undertaken in this era. I am also intrigued by how the youth responded to the ways in which they were to be disciplined as Iran’s future-makers. Many of the youth who were members of state-sponsored youth and school groups later became critics of the government and got involved in socialist political groups that worked to undermine the Pahlavi state.

 

Excerpt from the Book 

From the introduction:

An empire at the turn of the century, Iran was home to various ethnic groups such as (Azerbaijani) Turks, Kurds, Lurs, Baluchis and Arabs, and different religious communities, such as Muslims, Jews, Zoroastrians and Christians, who lived under the sovereignty of the Persian Empire. Nevertheless, toward the end of the nineteenth century and in the early twentieth century, ever-increasing numbers of war-ridden neighbouring communities chose Iran as their new national home, while a large number of Iranian merchants, political figures, students, journalists and workers also travelled back and forth to the neighbouring regions and beyond. Many members of ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, such as Armenian, Azerbaijani, Georgian and Russian communities, along with Indian, American, French, German and British peoples, congregated in Tehran. The aforementioned groups conceived the growing urban centre as either a safe haven from socio-political pressures that had compelled them to migrate from the empires or newly founded states in which they previously resided, or as a suitable centre for cultural and commercial activities, or alternatively as a fertile locus for the actualization of colonial and imperial aspirations. The increased assembly and interaction of these communities in Tehran turned the city into a diasporic hub of highly diverse national, ethnic, religious and linguistic communities. 

I call Tehran “diasporic” to highlight it as a “site for mixed and hybrid identities”; to bring to the foreground the conditions made possible for “mobility and mobilization,” “trade and merchants,” “migrants and diasporas” and “travellers and communication,” conditions that allowed for novel encounters and practices. The social and cultural exchanges of diverse groups led to the formation of experiences that, following Stuart Hall, could only be defined “by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of ‘identity’ which lives through, not despite, difference; by hybridity.” The diasporic communities who resided in Tehran had diverse, urban, middle-class cultural habits which included a vigorous engagement with newspapers, photography, theatre, music gatherings, conferences and charity events – societal conventions that further contributed to the city’s cultural assortment at the turn of the century. Such social and cultural heterogeneity, to borrow from Gerrard Delanty, was not reducible to “cultural diversity,” but was a “product of transnational movements” of people, cultures and ideas, and was marked by “hybridity.”

I choose Tehran as the site of my social and cinematic analysis largely because Tehran was arguably the Bombay of Bollywood or Hindi Cinema. It was the location of many of the sustained film productions that began in the late 1940s, as well as the hub for the publication of film journals, the organization of film festivals and cinematic activities that shaped the “national” cinema of the country. Furthermore, as mentioned before, it hosted a large number of people from different ethno-religious and cultural groups, and facilitated “geographies of coexistence,” which all together conjured conditions of social cosmopolitanism in the city and beyond.

When considering its connection to early twentieth century societal changes in Tehran, cinema proves to be an ideal form to investigate cosmopolitanism. Early cinematograph owners and operators were members of diasporic communities and/or merchants, who by virtue of their trade and travels, were informed of latest technological devices and gadgets outside Iran. The early cinematographic screenings that these trendsetters organized in urban districts facilitated interactions between Tehran’s diverse communities. Moreover, the images that films projected provided opportunities to encounter and register difference. Cinema’s technology, moreover, allowed for the articulation of local experiences that could speak on a global level. As a cultural “site of tension,” a “space of new dynamics, interactive moments, and conflicting principles and orientations,” a site where traumas of and negotiations with modernity could be recorded and staged, early cinema opened new avenues to perceive the world and understand the self. This quality of cinema is indicative of its “reflexive relation” with Iranian cosmopolitan modernity, especially in the context of early twentieth century Tehran.

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The cosmopolitan cinematic culture that was engendered through the dynamic activities of the early cinematograph operator-merchants came to bear a cosmo-national character upon the first Persian-language films that were produced and screened in Iranian theatres in the 1930s. The emergent cinema of the 1930s was shaped by cosmopolitan filmmakers who entertained nationalist sentiments in their visual offerings. The subsequent “national” cinema that emerged in the late 1940s, after World War II, and continued to the late 1970s was likewise informed by Iran’s heterogeneous culture, insofar as it engaged cosmopolitan filmmakers and conversed with international cinematic trends. By probing into the early cinema’s cultural practices, cosmo-national film industry of the 1930s and cinematic productions that ensued in the decades prior to the 1979 Revolution, this book shows that cinema is an advantageous form to investigate Iranian cosmopolitanism; on the other hand, cosmopolitanism is a valuable interpretive category through which one could interrogate Iranian modernity. Viewed through the prism of cinema, for much of the twentieth century, Iranian modernity was the sum of contentious viewpoints that negotiated and competed between local/global, traditional/modern, old/new, ideological/spiritual and national/international tendencies. 

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Although commonly and sometimes haphazardly used in academia and popular narratives, cosmopolitanism escapes easy definition. The cosmopolitanism of interest to this project cannot be seen in light of globalization, especially since, in the context of Iran, cosmopolitanism was a socio-cultural agent in societal transformations before the processes of globalization were at play. It is neither associated with political accounts nor with a Universalistculture as originally set out by the tradition of Kant in modern cosmopolitan thought. I am interested in a cosmopolitanism that “takes as its point of departure different kinds of modernity and processes of societal transformation” that do not “postulate a single world culture.” Not defined in terms of a single notion of (European) modernity, this cosmopolitanism rejects theories of “Westernization.” Upholding “the temporal assumption of the non-contemporaneity of European and non-European societies,” Eurocentric accounts associate modernity with a “European narrative of progress” that overlooks local experiences, “ideas, institutions, intellectuals, and processes which function as a bridge between the local and global, tradition and change.” Cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, conceived as “an opening to the world,” a process in which the universal and the particular, the similar and dissimilar, the global and the local are to be conceived as interrelated and reciprocally interpenetrating principles, demands “the opening up of normative questions.” Considering it not as an “orientation” that focuses on a specific social form, but as an imagination that can take the shape of “many different forms,” cosmopolitanism provides an avenue to analyze the interstitial spaces and practices that defined the contestatory and competing experiences of modernity in Iran.

An inquiry into conditions of cosmopolitanism underpinned by cinematic experiences also offers a stimulating foray into the shaping of nationalism and national imagination in Iran. No matter how “educationally, genetically, economically, juridicially, socially, militarily, cartographically, or otherwise imposed or inculcated” nationalism and national identity are, David Yaghoubian reminds us, it is the people from different classes, races, ethnicities, religious and linguistic backgrounds who are “the producers, bearers, and interpreters” of these concepts. As the following chapters demonstrate, the experience of compound identities, their quotidian cultural practices and their ways of life become indispensable to the configuration of nationalism, especially in early-twentieth-century cosmopolitan Tehran. As cultural products, Iranian filmic offerings also drew on global tropes, figures, icons, visual grammar and motifs in the creation of national, and at times, nationalist, films. In other words, Iran’s national cinema was arguably a cosmopolitan construct; by facilitating encounters with difference and interactions with global cinematic cultures, it opened up new outlooks on the world and new opportunities for understanding national selves. Cosmopolitanism, I demonstrate throughout this book, was arguably a style of national imagination.

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This article is part of the new Jadaliyya Iran Page launch. To inaugurate the Iran Page, its co-editors are pleased to present the following articles, interviews, and resources:

Articles

"Jadaliyya Launches New Iran Page" by Iran Page Editors

"Covering Race and Rebellion" by Naveed Mansoori

"The Systemic Problem of 'Iran Expertise' in Washington" by Negar Razavi

Media Roundup

Extended Iran Media Roundup

New Texts Out Now (NEWTON) Interviews

Houri Berberian, Roving Revolutionaries: Armenians and the Connected Revolutions in the Russian, Iranian, and Ottoman Worlds

Nile Green, The Persianate World: The Frontiers of a Eurasian Lingua Franca

Narges Bajoghli, Iran Reframed: Anxieties of Power in the Islamic Republic

Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi, Revolution and its Discontents: Political Thought and Reform in Iran

Golbarg Rekabtalaei, Iranian Cosmopolitanism: A Cinematic History

Peyman Vahabzadeh, A Rebel’s Journey: Mostafa Sho‘aiyan and Revolutionary Theory in Iran

Resources

Engaging Books Series: Cambridge University Press Selections on Cosmopolitanism and Political Reform in Iran

Jadaliyya Talks: Arash Davari and Sina Rahmani on "Divorce, Iran-America Style"

"Essential Readings: Post-Revolutionary Iran" by Arang Keshavarzian

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.