Michael Dumper, Power, Piety, and People: The Politics of Holy Cities in the Twenty-First Century (New Texts Out Now)

Michael Dumper, Power, Piety, and People: The Politics of Holy Cities in the Twenty-First Century (New Texts Out Now)

Michael Dumper, Power, Piety, and People: The Politics of Holy Cities in the Twenty-First Century (New Texts Out Now)

By : Michael Dumper

Michael Dumper, Power, Piety, and People: The Politics of Holy Cities in the Twenty-First Century (Columbia University Press, 2020).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Michael Dumper (MD): As with many other researchers who had become involved in the Middle East peace process, the failure to achieve an agreement over Jerusalem led not only to disappointment but also to critical reflection. Like others, I started to ask myself what went wrong, what misleading assumptions were made, and how realistic had our expectations been? The current protracted impasse between Israel and Palestinian negotiators has demonstrated the need for a re-think, for new ideas, and for new perspectives. As a result, I have been looking at other “holy” cities in Europe and Asia to see if they offer possibilities to researchers to reconfigure the study of Jerusalem and make policy recommendations which may assist a resolution of its conflicts. 

The question at the heart of the book is this: do cities ameliorate or exacerbate religious conflicts?

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

MD: All cities are arenas of contestation, but some cities exhibit specific forms of conflict arising from the salience of religious activity within them: powerful religious hierarchies, the generation of often unregulated revenues from donations and endowments, the presence of holy sites and the enactment of ritualistic activities in public spaces—all these combine together to create forms of conflict which are, arguably, more intense and more intractable than other forms of conflicts in cities. The question at the heart of the book is this: do cities ameliorate or exacerbate religious conflicts? 

There are two main themes in the book. Firstly, “the paradox of ethno-nationalist urban governance” (my phrase). Here I mean that given that cities are intrinsically heterogeneous, the attempt to impose an exclusivist ideology by a dominant community (Hindutva in Banaras, Communism in Tibet, Ulster Unionism in Belfast, Zionism in Jerusalem) leads to the subordinate community to look for political, financial, religious, military support from external actors and to challenge the legitimacy of the governance. Thus, the action to assert dominance leads to a reaction that undermines it. This is particularly the case with cities like Jerusalem with strong religious associations. Heterogeneity and exclusivity are in opposition.

Secondly, large concentrations of religious sites in a city can constrain state sovereignty by empowering clergy, channeling funds independent of the state into non-state activities, creating semi-autonomous territorial enclaves and attracting international attention and scrutiny. In cities where these activities occur, the religious hierarchy becomes a significant political actor.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MD: The book’s starting point is my long engagement in discussions over the political future of the city of Jerusalem where religion is at the center of the conflict. At the same time, the book draws upon empirical research on the “holiness” of  four other cities: Cordoba in southern Spain where the Islamic history of its Mosque-Cathedral challenges the control exercised by the Roman Catholic church; Banaras, where competing Muslim and Hindu claims to sacred sites threaten the fragile equilibrium that exists in the city; Lhasa in Tibet, where the Communist Party of China is eradicating the ancient practice of Tibetan Buddhism; and George Town in Malaysia which is a rare example of a city with many different religious communities whose leaders at the same time have successfully managed the conflicts between them. The book draws insights from the study of religious conflicts in these cities to delineate a possible “toolkit” for researcher, civil society, and policymakers.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have? 

MD: This book also departs from the style of my previous academic work in that I have worked hard at making it accessible to a non-academic readership. A few years ago, I read W G Sebald’s The Rings of Saturn and also Simon Schama’s Landscape and Memory and was amazed at the liberties they took with the conventional academic form, weaving personal observations, anecdotes, and imaginary scenes into their examination of landscape, history, and literature. It emboldened me to shake off the rather turgid and cautious style I had often employed and to become a bit more adventurous in the way I wrote.

So in this book, although it is thoroughly referenced and carefully argued (I still feel, even at this stage of my career, that I have to watch my back), I include travelogue, memoir, ethnographic observation, humor, and ruminations with the result that it is more engaging than my previous writing. The book, covering as it does Jerusalem, Cordoba, Banaras, Lhasa in Tibet and George Town in Malaysia, has ample scope to bring drama, color, and pageantry to the text. For example, in describing Muslim-Hindu tensions in George Town, although I was not present to observe a particular riot, I am able to draw a vivid picture of the violent night-time confrontation, mostly based on reports but partly also based upon my own experience of similar tensions in Jerusalem and my own personal knowledge of everyday religious life in George Town. In this way, I hope the book will prove to be interesting not only to policymakers but also to a more general reader.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MD: I would like to explore in greater depth the sectarian interactions in George Town, Malaysia, as my research to date suggests that it has important lessons for other multi-ethnic and multi-faith cities. However, the COVID pandemic and funding issues have put this on hold for the time being. At present I am examining issues with Palestinian partner institutions regarding the financing of UNRWA with a view to writing a book on UNRWA as a significant regional actor. I also help run a small farm in Devon, UK, where I live.

J: Did you have a “eureka” moment when conducting your research, and what was it? 

MD: There were a few, but the one that sticks out the most was when I realized the extent to which internal urban dynamics could neutralize the impact of national policies. By this I mean that residents of a city could push back on their municipal level some of the more unwelcome interventions from the national level. Taking this on board, I then could see even more clearly the role that some religious hierarchies and movements could play or would not play in fostering a more inclusive city identity.

The other eureka moment was when, despite being a born swimmer and despite having many sins to wash away in its pure and holy waters, I decided that a swim in the toxically polluted River Ganges in Banaras was not a requirement for my research project.

 

Excerpt from the book (from chapter 2, pp. 27- 29)

London, 2nd May 1997: It was the morning after the British elections which saw the Labour Party sweep into power under Tony Blair with a huge majority. Threading my way through the exuberant, dancing crowds between Westminster and Whitehall, I tried to focus on the tense meetings being held in the offices of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). I had been asked by the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office to chair a session on the future of Jerusalem at what is unofficially known as the “London Track”, a series of unofficial negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. The London Track was attempting to build upon the breakthrough in 1993 when the Oslo Accords, signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation, took place. The Oslo Accords, however, only laid down the framework for a transition period but did not spell out a final agreement on many contentious issues, with the issue of Jerusalem as one of the most contentious still to be agreed upon. The Palestinian team was led by the FATAH leader, Faisal Husseini, a charismatic individual who exuded gravitas and calm. The Israeli team was led by the veteran Israeli Labour Party member, Yossi Beilin, a principled operator who was convinced that Israel had to be steered away from the populist nationalism which was preventing a strategic vision of its place as a good neighbour in the Middle East being grasped. Active in his team was also the youthful academic and peace activist, Ron Pundak, one of the architects of the secret negotiations which led to the Oslo Accords. The discussion on the morning of 2nd May did not go very well. Not only was there a scratchiness and grandstanding between the two teams which had been absent from earlier meetings, but the sessions were also punctuated by shouts and victory chants from the Labour party supporters outside as they headed down Whitehall for Downing Street and Westminster Palace. There was one particularly loud and prolonged roar which drew all of us all to the tall windows overlooking Whitehall and we caught a glimpse of the Blairs walking into the Prime Minister’s residence in Downing Street, waving at the crowds. Even the police were clapping!

In contrast to the celebrations outside, the mood inside the grand RUSI rooms was increasingly sombre. The particular session I was chairing did not go well either. The excitement of Oslo had faded and the Palestinians were both confronting the cautious and legalistic pedantry of the Israeli team but also back-peddling from their over-enthusiastic embrace of a peace process which, on closer reading, did not lead to Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem or to the return of significant numbers of Palestinian refugees. The Jerusalem session was turning out to be an exercise in futility. The four presentations, two from each side, were, at root, extrapolations from two sets of assumptions that neither side shared. The Israelis were working on the assumption that whatever form the Palestinian presence in East Jerusalem took, Israel would remain in charge of policing and security. That was a red line for them. They were not prepared to give up security arrangements for a territory, that is, a tangible asset, for the promise of good behaviour on the part of the Palestinians, particularly for a territory as significant to them as East Jerusalem. The Palestinians, on the other hand, would not countenance anything much less than the status quo ante of 1967. A lease-back arrangement for some of the Israeli colonies in East Jerusalem including access to the Wailing Wall would be considered, but certainly no residual Israeli controls regarding the Muslim and Christian religious sites in the Old City. From their point of view, Israel had no right to be there and they were not going to go down in history as the people who had surrendered control over the holy places of Islam and Christianity. I found that as Chair of the session, drawing out the potential commonalities between the two sides had been almost fruitless. In one of the breaks between sessions, I chatted to Ron Pundak over some coffee and he asked me what I thought was going on. I remember answering that unless Israel worked quickly and demonstrated, as the stronger party, some magnanimity over the religious sites issue, the momentum towards a peace agreement that had built up around the Oslo Accords would flounder. The Palestinian position was hardening the more detailed the discussions became. Writing as I am now, twenty years later, after many hours of such off-the-record meetings, reams of paper written and digital files made, miles of travel covered, gallons of lousy coffee consumed, the two sides are no closer to an agreement. They are possibly even further away from one.

It is this experience of watching the possibility of peace slowly slipping through our collective fingers that partly drives this comparative project. The failure of the Oslo process has been analysed and dissected repeatedly and it has led me to personally reflect on what lessons can be learned. As I mentioned in the Introduction, the causes of religious conflicts are complex and need careful disentangling from many other factors. I hope to demonstrate this further in the following chapters as well. While this chapter will focus on Jerusalem, I want to ensure that the perspective I keep is broad and to some extent generalizable. To this end, the conflict around the religious sites of Jerusalem will be discussed while simultaneously exploring and delineating the contours of the religious dimensions to urban conflicts in a wider context. This approach has the added benefit of not repeating some of the material I have already published and also of allowing me to navigate around what has become a rather crowded field on the Jerusalem issue since the 2000s. In trying to encapsulate what it is about some cities which have religious conflicts that is different from others, I will at the same time draw on Jerusalem as my main case study. The first step in this exploration is to look more closely at the term “holy city”.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.