Ayad Al-Ani, The Arabs from Alexander the Great until the Islamic Conquests: Orientalist Perceptions and Contemporary Conflicts (New Texts Out Now)

Ayad Al-Ani, The Arabs from Alexander the Great until the Islamic Conquests: Orientalist Perceptions and Contemporary Conflicts (New Texts Out Now)

Ayad Al-Ani, The Arabs from Alexander the Great until the Islamic Conquests: Orientalist Perceptions and Contemporary Conflicts (New Texts Out Now)

By : Ayad Al-Ani

Ayad Al-Ani, The Arabs from Alexander the Great until the Islamic Conquests: Orientalist Perceptions and Contemporary Conflicts (Gorgias Press, 2021).*

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Ayad Al-Ani (AAA): My initial aim was to study the period between Alexander the Great and the coming of Islam. I wanted to understand the role played by Arabs in the conflict between Rome and Persia, a fundamental conflict that in many ways is still ongoing in the area that was then Oriens, the Roman Diocese of the East. To my astonishment, it became clear that the period in question was formative in laying the foundations of current Western perceptions of Arabs. Also—unsurprisingly and not unrelatedly—the history of the Arabs before Islam has been, and still seems to be, an exclusively Western field of scholarship. Arab historians have for the most part been excluded from the construction of that history, their contributions dismissed as biased and unscientific. This subtle, and sometimes not so subtle regulation can be explained in the context of a thousand years of history that paradoxically does not fit easily into the antagonistic “clash of cultures” paradigm. 

Nevertheless, there are sources that permit an alternative view: that the Arabs were not an obscure group that suddenly entered history bearing a religious book composed in an inexplicably sophisticated language and script, but rather can be considered as a “Kulturnation” long before Islam. According to this view, the Arabs had contact and knowledge with monotheism for centuries and were deeply embedded in the Hellenistic and Roman world as citizens, scientists, senators, Caesars, warriors, saints, and popes—while holding onto their underlying Semitic identity. This view can hardly be reconciled with the perception of Arabs as “Others.” Its acceptance has been hampered by the fact that the dominant narratives of the period have generally deconstructed the Arabs before Islam into several distinct civilizations with no concept of their own “Arabness,” all speaking different languages and with no significant role in the Eastern Roman Empire. In this view, their almost simultaneous success against Rome and Persia remains largely mysterious. As Philip Hitti concluded: “Who living then could have guessed that such a happening was within the realm of possibility?” 

The more this historiography, with its contradictions, political intrusions, biases, and academic mechanisms unfolds, the clearer it becomes that without a new, more objective (and so also less racist) interpretation of the sources of this period of history, a reimagination of the relationship between the Arabs and the West remains out of reach. The Arabs will continue to be depicted as inferior, peripheral antagonists who were and are excluded from the political core. It was this conclusion that provided the impetus for writing the German original version of the book in the midst of the refugee crisis and now the updated and enhanced international edition in times of severe upheaval of the region.

When we investigate why the significance of the Arab sphere before Islam has been downplayed, two principal reasons emerge.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

AAA: The book covers the emergence of an Arab sphere of politics, culture, religion, and language before Islam. The presence of Roman Arabs and Foederati living in some of the most significant metropolitan centers of late antiquity laid the groundwork for the Islamic conquests of these areas; without them, the Arab empire would never have been feasible. To describe these groups, the book also focuses on the problems associated with defining the term “Arab” and the concept of an “Arab” culture, language, and script before Islam. Many Western sources label the ethnicity of these groups differently; local dialects of Arabic are treated as separate languages, and the ethnic roots of many Arab Rhomaioi are obscured. Those who try to argue that there was an integrated Arab sphere before Islam run up against the prevailing narrative of Semitic, rather than Arab, ethnicities and languages. Nevertheless, the existence of an Arab Kulturnation before Islam more than accounts for the “easy” integration of Roman Oriens into the Islamic empire and casts a fascinating light on “Orient and Rome”: the afterglow of a thousand years of common history that lasted for centuries after the fall of Rome in the east. 

When we investigate why the significance of the Arab sphere before Islam has been downplayed, two principal reasons emerge. First, the loss of the Christian heartland in Oriens was deeply traumatic for Christianity, which needed to be re-founded as a Western religion. For this to be successful, its connections with the Orient had to be neglected or disregarded and the Arabs had to be recast as the “Other,” an inferior ethnicity that conquered Roman Orient “by stealth and deceit” (Kaegi) against an otherwise superior and more sophisticated empire. Second, this perspective, founded on fear and arrogance, has clear racist undertones. Christianity, as a now primarily Western concept, was assimilated with the “European spirit,” creating a peculiar role for science: the European spirit “subdues the external world to its purposes with an energy which has ensured for it the mastery of the world” (Hegel). Surprisingly, despite these powerful mechanisms, many Western scholars held a more integrative view of the region’s history until the Great War, culminating in German attempts to join forces with Islam and encourage a Jihad against the British. In a strange twist, after the Great War the idea emerged that the degeneration of Europe was somehow connected to the effects of the Islamic invasion in the seventh century, which substituted “Frankish roughness for the old Mediterranean sheen” (Fowden). Islam and the Arabs could then be blamed for destroying the old order. And by extension, they could also be held responsible for the carnage and war in Europe itself, absolving Western powers of guilt. 

These are the perspectives and topics that the book seeks to address: a combination of historical analysis and political reflections that tie this long-gone period to our current thinking.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

AAA: In many of my works, I focus on institutional change. But this is the first time I have used historical analysis to understand the political, cultural, and religious framework directing such transitions. To do so, I had to “recapitulate” the historical analysis to some extent, so that the reader can grasp the significance of the events and processes discussed. I also had to evaluate different historical interpretations and linguistic concepts both from within the mainstream historical community and from outside it, which is always a risk. Writing a political book about history is challenging and humbling in the sense that historical interpretations must be evaluated, or new ones put forward, which crosses academic boundaries. This is even more true when the political intentions and backgrounds of historians themselves are considered as well. I saw this as a challenge, but it may be said that a study like this can only be written by a non-historian. I must admit that I was frustrated at times by the excessive self-assurance of some of the traditional historical interpretations I was dealing with. And I was impressed and sometimes unsettled by the invisible forces that prevent alternative views from surfacing, even when current narratives are clearly unsatisfactory. I have never experienced this in any of my other works. 

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

AAA: Generally, I think the book should be relevant for anyone who is interested in Western-Arab relations. Strangely enough, that relationship is still determined, haunted, and sustained by aspects of the period of history covered in this study. Science also plays an important role in contributing images, perceptions, and biases to this relationship. Students of the Middle East might also gain insights into how the coming of Islam was affected by the cultural, religious, and political realities of the Roman East. Historians might appreciate some perspectives, concepts (i.e. the role of the imaginary) and alternative interpretations that include Arab voices. My hopes and wishes for the book’s impact are twofold: first, an enhanced appreciation of how the period under investigation still shapes our political realities; second, a better consideration of how conventional historical writing of this period is affected and shaped by these events and influences perceptions of the Arabs and their relationship with the West.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

AAA: Together with Carsten Siebert from the Barenboim-Said Academy I am currently working on a project to support Arab cultural institutions in digitizing their artefacts and research. This platform will connect museums in the region, enabling the exchange of expertise, and help to build a database of cultural assets and labels. Institutions will also be able to upload their digital assets onto the platform, which could then function as a sort of Arab cultural Wiki enabling anyone to access their artefacts and research without restrictions. 

 

Excerpt from the book (from "The Disappearing Arabs Before Islam: Beyond Orientalism. Preface to the International Edition," pp. vii-xi)

This is not a conventional history book. It is rather a study of the sociology of historical writing about a period that, although quite distant in time (330 B.C. to A.D. 670), still influences political discourse about the Arab world, and especially the relationship between the West and the Middle East. 

This book focuses on the riddle of the disappearance of the Arabs from history before Islam, their sudden appearance be-hind the banners of the Prophet, and the powerful and traumatic effect this emergence into world history has had on the relationship between the Arabs and the West. 

Although the mainstream Western historical narrative does not see the Arabs before Islam as a political or cultural force, or even as members of a defined cultural unit, Arab historians and more traditional Western sources do permit a rather different picture once misguiding or obscuring labels have been removed. In this study, Arabia and the Arabs appear as a region and people that enjoyed considerable linguistic, cultural, religious, and political cohesion centuries before Islam. The appearance of the Prophet was, from this perspective, the culmination of a historical process that had already been long underway – perhaps delayed by Roman interference in the East and the establishment of the Roman diocese of Oriens, but also reinforced by Hellenistic-Roman culture and religious thought. In this scenario, the rise of Islam is in no way surprising or in need of explanation as a retrospective forgery, as the revisionist school would have it. 

Uncovering this historical process involves answering two questions: what was the history of the pre-Islamic Arabs under their Hellenistic and Roman rulers, and why has that history disappeared? 

There is evidence that the Arabs, under different names and labels (Semites, Saraceni, Barbaroi, Indignae…), were in fact a kind of consolidated union with a shared cultural consciousness, although of course not in the form of an Arab nation in the modern sense. The situation was perhaps similar to that of the Germanic tribes, who would not have described themselves as “Germanic” even though they were aware of their shared characteristics, which were also clear to the Romans who fought and colonized them. Although it may seem surprising in the context of contemporary attitudes to the Middle East, this Arab Kulturnation was closely politically and culturally integrated into the Hellenistic-Roman world. Moreover – contrary to the current prevailing view – the Greeks themselves were well aware that a considerable portion of their own culture had originated in the Middle East and Africa. The Greek and Arab regions were by no means antagonistic poles, but rather mutually influencing spheres – as would be expected of cultural systems that had been interacting for many centuries. This allows us to move past the idea of “Orient oder Rom,” the belief that Rome and the East were elements of different historical systems. Instead, we can show that such a belief is the result of current political and cultural circumstances being projected back onto the past.

Why did this history disappear? Although the period was certainly no “dark age” with silent sources and scarce archaeological remains, there seems to be a desire to deconstruct the Arab world into smaller elements – local or regional cultures, civilizations, and languages–that make it difficult to identify a wider Arab sphere, an area of shared Arab language and culture. The Arab victory over Rome and the loss of the Christian heartland in the Middle East, sealed by the unsuccessful crusades some centuries later, were a traumatic experience for the West. Christianity had to be reimagined and redefined as a Western religion. Suddenly, the joint historical experience of East and West, their common roots and cultural exchanges, became a burden. As Edward Said showed, Arabs needed to be seen as different, as the “Other.”

This led to two reactions. First, Arabs and their long history of interaction with the Hellenistic-Roman world had to be suppressed. Second, the Arabs’ military success against Rome and Christianity in the seventh century had to be explained away as an opportunistic seizing of the “critical moment,” or even as the result of dishonest strategies used against an otherwise more sophisticated and culturally and religiously superior power. Arab integration and participation in the Greco-Roman world had no place in this narrative. When the West began to return to the Orient in the 18th century, the imperialist and colonial idea was legitimized by a belief in the superiority of Western culture and religion. Ethnically Arab Roman Emperors, senators and scientists were a clear contradiction and even an impediment in this context, which also saw the rise of an intellectual anti-Semitism that further reinforced the underlying processes and attitudes.

Of course, history could not be fully suppressed, and memories remained. To strengthen the idea of Western superiority against a once and perhaps still dangerous adversary, negative images of the pre-Islamic Arabs were absorbed into the narrative of the “Clash of Cultures” introduced by the Orientalist Bernhard Lewis in the 1990s. As this book shows, these negative images are the result of a highly selective approach to historical sources that, in reality, portray a much more nuanced situation. The Arabs appear in these sources as Roman allies and citizens, bound to Rome in a difficult and complex relationship in which Christianity played in important role. 

Edwards Said’s groundbreaking work on Orientalism and its arguments can now be updated: the portrayal of the Arab as the “Other” was a necessary step in the process of muting a thousand years of close interaction between Arab and Greco-Roman culture. The image of Arabs as barbarians draws selectively on historical sources that have been stripped of their context, concealing their writers’ individual circumstances and attitudes towards the Arabs.  

At the least, this book should make available a fascinating stretch of history that seems to contradict current views of the Western-Arab relationship. What are these powerful sources – we may wonder – that are capable of shaping historical narratives in such a specific, antagonistic way, despite the fact that traditional Western sources were able to admit other explanations? If the writing of history depends – more even than we perhaps wish or imagine – on interpretation, interpretation itself is always molded by the attitudes, values, and motives of the commentator. Moreover, as this book shows, interpretations, once set in motion, are then reinforced by scientific methods that deconstruct the field into smaller pieces, digging deeper into specific subject areas while neglecting the overall historical system and its longue durée.  

Such conclusions may make us feel uneasy. If such a significant piece of history can be so severely contested and interpreted in so many different ways; if the Arabs themselves seem to be unable to reclaim their history, being for the most part seen as outsiders to the Western scientific community, what hope is there for a relationship between the Arab world and the West that is based on mutual appreciation, recognition, and trust?

* Add discount code ALANI21 here at checkout for a 30% discount

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.