[This is an ongoing post, updated periodically, in which Editor of the Quick Thoughts Series on Jadaliyya provides commentary on the war on Gaza. This commentary may or may not appear elsewhere on the author’s social media.]
31 March: Anything Goes
Since 7 October 2023 there has been a concerted campaign by Israel, its apologists and other flunkies to erase any distinction between Palestinian civilians and combatants. “It’s an entire nation out there that is responsible”, proclaimed Israel’s head of state, Isaac Herzog, on 13 October. Other Israeli leaders, virtually without exception, have expressed similar sentiments.
As so often, the US has proven to be more pro-Israeli than Israel itself. This week, for example, Tim Walberg, an elected member of the US legislature, recommended that the correct approach to the Gaza Strip “should be like Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Get it over quick.”
It’s a familiar playbook. Demonize your enemy with lurid propaganda about deliberate, systematic diabolical savagery, particularly against angelic children and defenceless women, then demonize an entire people and society by holding it responsible for the existence of this enemy. In Nazi Germany, for example, communists were accused of every imaginable depravity, and “the Jews” condemned for producing the communist menace. The German state’s ceaseless campaign against “Judeo-Bolshevism” was an important ingredient in the witches’ brew that ultimate produced the Holocaust.
The narratives produced to justify Israel’s genocidal war against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip are not fundamentally different. Israel, its apologists, and other flunkies (not least mainstream Western media outlets) have inundated us with tall tales of babies roasted in ovens, mass rapes, and similarly fabricated “reports” of unfathomable sadism. Never one to miss an opportunity to mobilize support for his favorite ally, US President Joe Biden went so far as to repeatedly claim he viewed gruesome images of babies beheaded by Hamas, even after his aides sheepishly admitted these existed only in his imagination.
As for the general Palestinian population, Exhibit A has been, “They elected Hamas!”, and are therefore reaping what they sowed. Many go further, with Herzog, for example, insisting “It is not true this rhetoric about civilians not being aware, not involved. It’s absolutely not true. They could have risen up. They could have fought against that evil regime which took over Gaza in a coup d’etat.” In other words, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip are doubly responsible: first for electing Hamas, and then for not overthrowing the movement after it seized power in the Gaza Strip. Similar variations by other Israeli and US leaders make clear the only option Palestinians had to avoid the present cataclysm was voting Likud.
There are several problems with the argument that begins with, “You elected them!”. Most obviously, Israel has killed at least 15,000 children. Individuals below the voting age who never cast a vote and now never will. Because the last elections were held in 2006, nearly two decades ago, many thousands more – arguably a majority of those who have perished in the Gaza killing fields – never voted for anybody.
Secondly, Hamas did indeed win an absolute majority of parliamentary seats in the 2006 legislative elections, which were correctly certified as thoroughly free and fair. But it shouldn’t have.
In the 2006 elections the West Bank and Gaza Strip were not contested as a single electoral district, but rather divided into fifteen constituencies reflecting the governorates within these territories. Hamas was disciplined enough to field a single list of candidates in each of these districts. The Fatah movement was everything but well-organized. Numerous candidates passed over in its official slates, dictated by Mahmoud Abbas and his closest associate at the time, Muhammad Dahlan, formed competing lists. In some cases several of them.
Additionally, leaders of prominent local families, who would normally have been expected to support Fatah but were in many cases excluded from the official Fatah list, contested the elections as independents or joined one of the unofficial Fatah slates. Had the electoral system dispensed with multiple districts, such figures would have had much less influence and probably sat out the polls. But this was not the case. The result was that Hamas failed to win the popular vote, but thanks to the disarray of its rivals and an electoral system that gave local forces an incentive and opportunity to further sap the Fatah vote, Hamas nevertheless routed Fatah in terms of number of seats won.
If one takes all of the above factors together, it emerges that not that many victims of Israel’s genocidal campaign actually voted for Hamas.
But let’s assume that Hamas had won the popular vote. Should that change anything? The idea that entire societies should be held responsible and collectively punished for the conduct of their elected leaders is a fairly new innovation, dating from approximately 7 October 2023.
Another of its distinguishing characteristics is that it’s not consistently applied and reserved for official enemies. George W Bush, for example, was in 2004 re-elected with a majority of electoral as well as popular votes, more than a year after launching the illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq. Yet the idea that US society should be held responsible and entire cities reduced to rubble as punishment for this choice never really gained traction. Similarly, what is one to make of a society that repeatedly elects Binyamin Netanyahu, to the extent that he has become Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, and in its latest sojourn to the ballot box gave him Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich as powerful coalition partners? Probably better not to go there.
Even more absurd – actually, equally absurd – is the idea that a society can be held responsible for not overthrowing a government that rules by force. Yet that is precisely what Israel’s head of state, along with many others in the US-Israeli echo chamber, have been advocating. (Although Hamas was democratically elected in 2006, in 2007 it seized power in the Gaza Strip to forestall a coup attempt set in motion by Elliot Abrams and Muhammad Dahlan).
“They elected Hamas!” has been repeated so often that it’s become normalised as a justification for genocidal warfare, and now also for the deliberate engineering of famine. It demonstrates, once again, that when it comes to providing apologia for Israel and demonizing the Palestinians, there are no restrictions or limits. Anything goes.
30 March: Another ICJ Ruling
On 28 March the International Court of Justice issued a new ruling (“Order”) in the case known as Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in The Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel).
The ICJ’s ruling came in response to a new request by South Africa, submitted on 6 March, asking the Court “to indicate further provisional measures and/or modify its provisional measures indicated on 26 January 2024”.
The historic 26 January ruling had come in response to South Africa’s initial 29 December 2023 invocation of the Genocide Convention with respect to Israel’s conduct in the Gaza Strip. By an overwhelming 15-2 majority the ICJ’s judges found that South Africa had plausibly accused Israel of violating its obligations under the Genocide Convention.
On this basis the Court announced that it would proceed to a full hearing of the case, which has yet to commence and will probably require several years before a final verdict is issued. To ensure that no “irreparable harm” is inflicted while the ICJ considers the matter, the Court in late January set out a series of “provisional measures” required of Israel as well as other signatories to the Convention. It additionally ordered Israel to report back within 30 days on compliance. Had the ICJ found South Africa’s case to be insufficiently persuasive, or Israel’s rebuttal sufficiently convincing, it would have simply dismissed South Africa’s application, closed the file, and moved on to the next case.
As it stands, the state that presents itself as reparations for Germany’s campaign of extermination against Europe’s Jews, and which has weaponized the Holocaust to shield its policies from scrutiny and criticism, is now indelibly associated with genocide as a formally accused perpetrator of “the crime of crimes”.
South Africa’s most recent application to the Court essentially argues that Israel’s refusal to implement the provisional measures ordered by the Court in January, and the continued deterioration of conditions in the Gaza Strip, require the Court to take further action.
It is not the first time South Africa has called upon the Court to take additional action. On 12 February, referencing “the developing circumstances in Rafah”, it filed an “urgent request” with the ICJ, calling upon the Court to invoke its powers to issue additional provisional measures. In its response, the Court disappointed not only South Africa but also those who insist the ICJ is a partisan institution.
Although it confirmed the assessment of United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres than an Israeli ground invasion of Rafah “would exponentially increase what is already a humanitarian nightmare with untold regional consequences”, the Court concluded that “the perilous situation demands the immediate and effective implementation of the [26 January] provisional measures … which are applicable throughout the Gaza Strip, including in Rafah, and does not demand the indication of additional provisional measures”. In other words, the Court declined to go beyond what it had already pronounced in January, even as it again emphasized that “the State of Israel remains bound to fully comply with its obligations under the Genocide Convention”.
Fast forward to 28 March and the ICJ is singing a different tune. Recounting the case thus far, the Court notes, without further comment, that it received both Israel’s report on its compliance with the January Order and South Africa’s comments on this report (neither of which have been made public). It also summarizes South Africa’s 6 March application for additional measures and Israel’s response - both of which are available on the ICJ website.
The Court clarifies that, according to its statutes, it can only issue additional provisional measures (or modify or revoke existing ones) if it determines there has been a “change in the situation” that would justify doing so. It also notes that, according to these same statues, the Court’s options are not limited to either accepting or rejecting those measures requested by South Africa.
Reviewing the evidence before it, the Court “observes that Palestinians in Gaza are no longer facing only a risk of famine [as it had noted in January] … but that famine is [now] setting in, with at least 31 people, including 27 children having already died of malnutrition and dehydration". “The Court [therefore] considers that the above-mentioned developments, which are exceptionally grave, constitute a change in the situation that within the meaning” of the court’s own rules. It additionally notes that its existing measures ordered in January no longer “fully address the consequences arising from the changes in the situation” in the Gaza Strip, “thus justifying the modification of these measures”.
The Court notes it also has to satisfy two additional conditions. First, that there is a genuine risk of “irreparable harm” to the rights of the Palestinian people under the Genocide Convention, and second, “that there is urgency, in the sense that there exists a real and imminent risk that such prejudice [i.e. irreparable harm] will materialize before the Court gives its final decision in the case”.
It speaks to the weakness of Israel’s report to the ICJ on its compliance with the provisional measures ordered in January, the weakness of its response to South Africa’s 6 March application for additional measures, and the sheer savagery of its military operations in the Gaza Strip, that the Court determined that “the circumstances of the case require it” to act.
The ICJ ruling begins by repeating “the need for immediate and effective implementation of the measures” it ordered in January, “which are applicable throughout the Gaza Strip, including in Rafah”.
Israel’s non-compliance, in combination with the “catastrophic situation in the Gaza Strip”, led the the Court to unanimously order the following new measure:
“[Israel shall] Take all necessary and effective measures to ensure, without delay, in full co-operation with the United Nations, the unhindered provision at scale by all concerned of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance, including food, water, electricity, fuel, shelter, clothing, hygiene and sanitation requirements, as well as medical supplies and medical care to Palestinians throughout Gaza, including by increasing the capacity and number of land crossing points and maintaining them open for as long as necessary”.
By fifteen votes to one, it additionally ordered Israel to “submit a report to the Court on all measures taken to give effect to this order, within one month”.
As expected, and consistent with precedent, the judges once again rejected South Africa’s request that the ICJ order a ceasefire. In doing so the Court made no determination on either the nature or legitimacy of Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip. Rather, it stated that because a ceasefire order would only oblige states who are parties to the Genocide Convention but not other belligerents, it “cannot” do so.
By 15-1, the ICJ judges did however order Israel to “[e]nsure with immediate effect that its military does not commit acts which constitute a violation of any of the rights of the Palestinians in Gaza” under the Genocide Convention, “including by preventing, through any action, the delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance”.
It must have been a close call for Israel, because seven of the sixteen judges – one short of half – appended opinions that the Court should have endorsed South Africa’s ceasefire request. They did so primarily on the grounds that without a ceasefire the provisional measures ordered will remain ink on paper.
The seven judges may have been responding to the concluding paragraphs of South Africa’s application, which reminded the Court that in 1993 “it declined to order additional provisional measures” in the Bosnia Genocide Case, and within two years “approximately 7,336 Bosnians in the so-called ‘safe area’ of Srebrenica had been slaughtered, in what this court retrospectively determined to have been a genocide”. “South Africa fears that this application may be the last opportunity that this court shall have to save the Palestinian people in Gaza already dying of starvation".
Once again, I found the separate opinion submitted by the German judge, Georg Nolte, to be the most interesting. As in his January opinion, he initially expresses skepticism about the measures proposed, in this case because these in his view imply Israeli non-compliance and could therefore prejudice its position when the Court holds full hearings on the case. Nevertheless, and as in January, he voted for the measures despite his misgivings, this time citing “a qualitative change in the situation [since January] which is exceptional. These circumstances also reflect a plausible risk of a violation of relevant rights under the Genocide Convention”.
The only judge to vote against the measures was the one appointed by the Israeli government, Aharon Barak. (Under ICJ procedures, states that are party to a case but do not have a sitting judge are entitled to appoint one for that particular case). Barak made his name as president of Israel’s Supreme Court, which has served, also during his tenure, as an organic part of the machinery of occupation. His opinion is of a piece with his numerous and often legally as well as morally obscene rulings deferring to the Israeli military and his government’s expansionist agenda.
As many have noted, the ICJ’s latest ruling will have no impact on the situation in the Gaza Strip. But it is nevertheless significant. It represents one more chink in Israel’s shield of impunity, and makes it more difficult for Western states to continue providing Israel with an unlimited line of credit.
Already Ireland has indicated that it will intervene in the case, and propose that the acts constituting genocide be broadened to include the deliberate blocking of humanitarian aid. In the words of its foreign minister, Micheál Martin, “First of all there needs to be accountability for what happened in Gaza, but secondly we want to influence the future conduct of war”. Only in Ireland would a center-right European government be capable of taking a principled position on Palestine.
28 March: More Density
Steven Bonnell (stage name “Destiny”) responded to my previous post with a series of comments on Twitter/X. True to form it contained more juvenile name-calling (“cowardly fuck”, “disgusting human”, “sniveling worm”, etc.).
Regarding the issue of genocide, he appears to have appointed himself the resident expert on the phenomenon: “How can you idiots claim to be scholars or have strong opinions about genocide WHILE STILL REFUSING TO UNDERSTAND THIS TERM [dolus specialis]. STOP TALKING ABOUT THIS, YOU ARE NOT QUALIFIED”.
In point of fact, regarding this particular term my previous post referenced, in addition to my own understanding of it, the views of Bonnell, Norman Finkelstein, an international lawyer involved in cases before the International Court of Justice, and of Francesca Albanese, the author of a recent report on genocide for the UN Human Rights Council. Whether or not Finkelstein and I understand this term and its role in determining genocide can therefore easily be assessed.
On the subject of understanding terms, Bonnell doubles down on insisting that Jim Crow in the United States did not constitute apartheid. In his words: “Jim Crow in the US wasn't apartheid because people could travel, among other things, and the segregation wasn't done top down constitutionally and federally, but rather geographically throughout the US with a collection of local restrictions and policies. You're utterly clueless.”
In fact, and as noted in my previous thread, “Jim Crow was a formal system of rigidly enforced segregation in the United States imposed by state authority, enforced by legislation and violence, and confirmed by the US Supreme Court.”
Last time I checked, the US Supreme Court, whose infamous 1896 ruling in Plessy v Ferguson confirmed state laws enforcing segregation, was a federal institution.
But, assuming for the sake of argument that Bonnell’s points about travel and federal edicts are correct, are these in any way relevant? Here is how the International Criminal Court (ICC) defines apartheid, which it classifies as a crime against humanity: “an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime”. Seems the ICC didn’t get Bonnell’s memo about travel and federal regulations in time to incorporate them into the Rome Statute.
Bonnell also declines to address my other point in this regard, which specifically concerns Palestinian refugees. If, in his view, Jim Crow did not constitute apartheid, why does he insist that Arab states exercising their universally-recognized sovereign right to not extend collective citizenship rights to refugees on their territory are guilty of a crime against humanity?
27 March: A Little Knowledge is a Dangerous Thing
On 29 February I participated in a debate organised by Lex Fridman on Israel and Palestine, alongside Norman Finkelstein, Benny Morris, and Steven Bonnell (stage name “Destiny”).
Apart from reposting a link to the recording of the event, I’ve thus far refrained from comment. I’ve done so on the grounds that people interested in the discussion and prepared to endure a five-hour video can watch it themselves and make up their own minds about the various issues discussed, rather than being told what to think by a participant.
Bonnell has taken a decidedly different approach. In addition to multiple hours-long podcasts broadcast before the event, he began relitigating the discussion from virtually the moment it ended. Taking to Twitter/X and YouTube, he immediately began promoting his own version of events, including in podcasts, issued prior to the debate’s 14 March release, that were significantly longer than the debate itself.
Much of Bonnell’s commentary consisted of juvenile name-calling, insults, and distortions directed primarily at Norman Finkelstein. Bonnell’s obsession with Finkelstein, and his fixation with convincing viewers he acquitted himself with distinction in his exchanges with Finkelstein before these were publicly available, speaks for itself. As does his repeatedly expressed view that nothing of substance was uttered during the debate and watching it a waste of time. (Bonnell also lamented that he missed a "gang bang" to participate in the debate.)
As for my own contribution, Bonnell appeared to take particular exception to an observation of mine regarding a statement he made regarding apartheid in one of his pre-event podcasts. During that particular podcast, Bonnell stated that he doubted either Finkelstein or I would be watching. In fact, and since I hadn’t previously heard of Bonnell, had not previously come across anything he has published on the Middle East (he apparently hasn’t), and was entirely unacquainted with his views, I made it a point to watch.
Full disclosure: I was at the time unaware that Bonnell had in previous podcasts identified himself as “pro-genocide” with respect to Israel’s mass killings of Palestinians. Or that among other displays of familiarity with the region he couldn’t identify Bashar Assad, thought Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the president of Israel, and was apparently unable to locate his favorite MENA state on a map.
In any event, during the pre-debate podcast in question Bonnell was explaining to his audience how he would dispense with the finding that Israel is an apartheid state. Purportedly basing his views on the legal definition of apartheid (“separateness”), Bonnell asserted that Jim Crow did not constitute apartheid, but that Arab states that have not extended citizenship to Palestinian refugees in their territory is a clear example of this crime.
I recounted this statement to Bonnell during the debate (at 4:45:59). Once again claiming to base himself on the legal definition of apartheid, Bonnell changed his position somewhat, this time to “I don’t know if Jim Crow would have qualified for apartheid”. For good measure he added, “just like if Israel were to literally nuke the Gaza Strip and kill two million people, I don’t know if that would qualify for the crime of genocide”.
It remains unclear why the legal definition of apartheid leaves Bonnell clueless about the status of Jim Crow but sufficiently confident to indict Arab states. After all, Jim Crow was a formal system of rigidly enforced segregation in the United States imposed by state authority, enforced by legislation and violence, and confirmed by the US Supreme Court. By contrast, Arab states were at worst exercising a universally-recognized sovereign right to not extend collective citizenship to foreign refugees on their territory. Rather than clarify his position, Bonnell quickly changed the subject to Israeli civilian casualties on 7 October.
Perhaps Bonnell thinks there is a state named Arabia that is withholding citizenship from its Palestinian minority, or simply doesn’t know – or care to know - how apartheid operated in his own country. What is certain is that he is entirely unaware that Jim Crow served as a model and inspiration for the South African white-minority regime’s racist policies, which bequeathed us the term and crime of apartheid.
In his post-debate podcasts the above exchange metamorphosed into my “playing the race card” and the like. In fact, I had merely restated his own words, verbatim, seeking an explanation for his rather unorthodox understanding and misunderstanding of what constitutes apartheid.
But the above incident was trivial compared to Bonnell’s multiple victory laps concerning the use of two Latin legal terms, “mens rea” and “dolus specialis”, with respect to South Africa’s 29 December 2023 application to the International Court of Justice instituting proceedings against Israel under the 1948 Genocide Convention.
I’ll start by reproducing the relevant exchange:
STEVEN BONNELL (03:17:58): I don’t know if you used the phrase “dolus specialis”, that’s the intentional part of genocide-
MOUIN RABBANI: I don’t know that term.
STEVEN BONNELL: I think it’s called “dolus specialis”, it’s the most important part of genocide, which is proving it is a highly special intent to commit genocide. It’s possible that Israel could-
NORMAN FINKELSTEIN: That’s “mens rea”.
STEVEN BONNELL: Yes, I understand the state of mind, but for genocide, it’s called “dolus specialis”. It’s a highly special intent. Did you read the case?
NORMAN FINKELSTEIN: Yeah.
STEVEN BONNELL: It is a highly special intent [inaudible].
This was not the first time Bonnell that day questioned whether Finkelstein, arguably the world’s foremost forensic scholar, a voracious reader, and someone who has on multiple occasions discussed the relevant text in detail, had read the document in question.
(Regarding my own ignorance of “dolus specialis” and for that matter “mens rea”, I know neither Latin nor legalese, and when confronted with such terms resort to a search engine to look up their translation into a language I understand, and typically consign the original to the memory hole).
Briefly, and to the best of my understanding, “mens rea” denotes criminal intent, and “dolus specialis” specific intent. “Dolus specialis” is, in other words, a subcategory of “mens rea”.
What is at issue in this specific instance is that in its application to the ICJ, South Africa references “dolus specialis” four times, but “mens rea” not once. As far as Bonnell was concerned this means not only that it is “dolus specialis” rather than “mens rea” that is required to demonstrate the intent to commit genocide, but also that Finkelstein had not read the document in question.
For the record, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, South Africa and Israel’s oral arguments before the ICJ on 11-12 January 2024, the Court’s Order (initial ruling) of 26 January, and for that matter the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) mention neither Latin term, and speak only of “intent”.
Bonnell appears to have taken too many victory laps for his own good. His continued juvenile taunting of Finkelstein on 21 March elicited a response from the latter entitled “Moron Specialis”. According to Finkelstein:
“MENS REA (criminal intent, from the Latin for “guilty mind”) denotes the legal principle at stake while DOLUS SPECIALIS (criminal intent to commit genocide) denotes one application of it. Here is an example of this usage from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda:”
Chapter and verse are duly provided by Finkelstein. Concluding his remarks he asks: “Did these distinguished judges err by referring to mens rea and not dolus specialis? I was stating the obvious that the critical point of contention in a genocide case is proving criminal INTENT ('That’s mens rea'), and of course everyone in the room understood that the threshold under the Genocide Convention is proving criminal INTENT to commit genocide.”
Given that Finkelstein has a vested interest in the matter, I thought it would make sense to get an independent opinion, and approached an international lawyer who has participated in cases before the ICJ unrelated to Palestine for clarification.
Here is the international lawyer’s response:
“In the crime of genocide, both mens rea and dolus specialis are essential elements that must be proven to establish criminal liability.
Mens rea refers to the mental state of the perpetrator when committing the acts that constitute genocide. The perpetrator must have the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such, which can be inferred from the actions, statements, and policies of the perpetrator.
Dolus specialis is particularly relevant in proving the intentionality behind the commission of genocide. It requires demonstrating that the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit the acts that constitute the crime of genocide.
Both mens rea and dolus specialis are necessary elements to establish criminal liability for genocide. Prosecutors must demonstrate that the perpetrator had not only the general intent to commit the underlying acts but also possessed the specific intent to destroy a particular group, as required by the definition of genocide.”
More recently we have the following from “Anatomy of a Genocide”, the 22 March 2024 report issued by Francesca Albanese, UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967:
“[T]he crime of genocide comprises two interconnected elements:
(a) The actus reus: the commission of any one or more specific acts against a protected group [these are enumerated]
(b) The mens rea: the intent behind the commission of one or more of the above-mentioned acts that must be established, which includes two intertwined elements:
(i) a general intention to carry out the criminal acts (dolus generalis), and
(ii) a specific intention to destroy the target group as such (dolus specialis).”
In other words, dolus specialis is a subdivision of the legal threshold called mens rea, exactly as Finkelstein stated.
As they say, a little knowledge is a dangerous thing.
17 March: Trump-Biden Continuities
Many have pointed out that US President Joe Biden’s embrace of Israel is unprecedented, even when compared to his immediate predecessor, Donald Trump. It’s certainly true that Biden has gone to extraordinary lengths to demonstrate his personal and ideological identification with Israel. “I’m a Zionist”, the US president has repeatedly and proudly proclaimed.
“Were there no Israel”, Biden declares like a recently-indoctrinated flunkie reciting the key tenets of his new cult, “there’s not a Jew in the world who will be safe”. Imagine the uproar and incredulity if a US president were to state that, were it not for the Republic of Ireland, the federal government would be unable to guarantee the safety of a single Irish-American. But when it comes to Israel, the most outlandish assertions typically garner a combination of pass and praise.
Biden’s passionate attachment to Israel, culminating in his enthusiastic complicity in its genocidal war against the Gaza Strip and callous contempt for Palestinian life, have served to obscure what are in fact remarkable continuities in US Middle East policy.
Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, for example, was presented as a sharp break with 70 years of US policy. More accurately, it presented the culmination of decades of changing US attitudes towards Israeli rule over the Holy City. The US Congress, with an overwhelming bipartisan majority in both houses (93-5 and 374-37), had already come out in support of Israel’s claims in 1995 with the Jerusalem Embassy Act, which stated that “Jerusalem should be recognized as the capital of the State of Israel”, and effectively endorsed Israeli claims of sovereignty over East Jerusalem by insisting that this capital be “undivided”. The Act also called for the US embassy to Israel to be relocated from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Recognition and relocation were delayed only because the Act allowed the president to sign a waiver every six months suspending its implementation on national security grounds.
For decades, every successful US presidential candidate promised to formally recognize Israel’s claims over Jerusalem and relocate the US embassy to the city, only to sign waivers postponing implementation of the Act once in office. Rather than overhaul US policy by passing new legislation, all Trump did was to stop signing waivers and implement the bipartisan Congressional legislation that had been on the books for more than twenty years.
As for the embassy itself, this too was not a Trump initiative, and acquisition of the site in fact commenced during the 1990s. Located on land expropriated from its rightful owners by the Israeli state in 1950, the heirs to this property include US citizens. But as with Israel’s killings of Palestinian-Americans, and in sharp contrast to US responses towards the infringements on the property rights of US citizens anywhere and everywhere else, in this case the US government insisted there was nothing amiss. Several years ago, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in fact refused to meet with Palestinian-Americans holding property rights on the site to discuss their claims.
Similarly, when former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo embraced Israel’s illegal settlements as the greatest invention since the hamburger, he was in good company. Already in 1981, Ronald Reagan had opined that they were “not illegal”, and since the 1993 Oslo accords every US administration has proposed diplomatic initiatives, closely coordinated with Israel, that would allow the latter to retain the bulk of its loot. The settlements went from illegal, to “not consistent with international law”, to “an obstacle to the peace process”. Pompeo simply determined that they weren’t necessarily inconsistent with international law nor an obstacle to successful US diplomacy. It was hardly a sea change, particularly given Washington’s heroic efforts over the years to shield Israel from condemnation or consequences for its settlement policies even though these are explicitly defined as war crimes under international law.
Trump and Biden are typically perceived as polar opposites. This being the case, a comparison of their policies on those issues where Trump is said to have broken with traditional US positions is instructive in assessing continuities:
- Jerusalem: Before Trump, and pursuant to UN General Assembly Resolution 181 of 1947 (the partition resolution), which specified that Jerusalem would be governed by an international administration rather than by the proposed Arab and/or Jewish states, no US administration had formally recognized any part of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital or Israeli sovereignty over West Jerusalem. Additionally, no US administration since 1967 had recognized Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem, or claims over it. Trump did both. Biden has maintained this policy without a single change.
- US Embassy: As part of its policy on Jerusalem after 1948, the US initially established its embassy to Israel in Tel Aviv. In 1980 UN Security Council Resolution 478, responding to Israel’s illegal annexation of East Jerusalem, required all UN member states to remove diplomatic missions from the Holy City, and those few that had them complied. In 2018, the Trump administration, in direct violation of international law, relocated the US embassy to Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The Biden administration has not only maintained this embassy but is expanding it.
- US Jerusalem Consulate: The US Consulate in East Jerusalem, responsible for relations with the Palestinians, reported directly to Washington rather than to the US Embassy in Tel Aviv. The Trump administration closed it, moved it into the relocated US embassy, and placed it under the direct authority of its ambassador to Israel. Upon assuming office in 2021 the Biden administration committed to re-opening the consulate. It has not done so and there is no indication it has any intention of doing so.
- Palestinian Self-Determination: US support for an independent Palestinian state, first enunciated by George W Bush, was declarative and never matched by concrete measures, particularly when it came to restraining Israel from policies designed to prevent it. Trump effectively removed this item from the US foreign policy agenda. Although Biden and Blinken have in recent months revived talk of a Palestinian state, it’s largely – and correctly – seen as a diversionary charade, an exercise in smoke and mirrors to deflect attention from Israel’s genocidal onslaught against the Gaza Strip and US complicity in it. In December 2023, the Biden administration revealed its hand when it was one of only four states to vote against UN General Assembly Resolution A/78/479, which “reaffirms the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right to their independent Palestinian state”.
- PLO Mission to the US: In 1987, the Congress overwhelmingly passed the bipartisan Anti-Terrorism Act, which determined that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) “is a terrorist organization; is a threat to the interests of the United States, its allies, and to international law; and should not benefit from operating in the United States”. The Act has never been revoked. While official US policy has ever since remained that the PLO is a terrorist organization, it was in 1988 granted a presidential waiver, renewable every six months, to open a mission in Washington, DC. In 2018 Trump declined to renew the waiver, ordered the closure of the PLO General Delegation, and expelled its diplomats. The Biden administration has declined to reverse this initiative, and six years later there is still no Palestinian diplomatic mission to the US.
- UNRWA: The Trump administration terminated US funding to UNRWA, the UN agency that provides for Palestinian refugees. It demanded the dissolution of the Agency, and essentially took the position that Palestinian refugees don’t exist. Upon assuming office, the Biden administration restored US funding to the Agency. In January 2024, in response to Israeli allegations that several UNRWA staff members participated in the 7 October 2023 Palestinian attacks on southern Israel, and before any evidence had been provided or an investigation launched, the Biden administration immediately stopped funding UNRWA. The allegations, for which no evidence or substantiation has been offered by Israel, are now widely recognized as a hoax concocted by Israel to undermine the Agency, divert from its difficulties at the International Court of Justice, and facilitate its siege of the Gaza Strip. Israel’s brazen fabrications have already embarrassed a number of Western governments that followed Washington’s lead into resuming their contributions to UNRWA. But as with Biden’s claims that he viewed images that don’t exist of beheaded Israeli infants, Washington is widely expected to maintain its support of Israel’s discredited allegations and permanently sever its funding of UNRWA.
- Occupied Syrian Golan Heights: In 2019, the Trump administration recognized Israel’s illegal annexation of the Golan Heights and its claim of sovereignty over the occupied Syrian territory. The Biden administration has stated that it will not change this policy.
- Western Sahara: In 2020, the Trump administration recognized Morocco’s illegal annexation and claim of sovereignty over the Western Sahara to reward the Moroccan state for normalizing relations with Israel. In 2021 the Biden administration announced that it would not reverse this recognition.
- Iran Nuclear Agreement: In 2017 the Trump Administration unilaterally renounced and withdrew from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the international agreement commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal. Upon assuming office the Biden administration declined to resume compliance with the JCPOA, instead demanding concessions from Tehran on issues that were not addressed by the JCPOA as the price for the fulfilment of US obligations under the original framework. The Iranians predictably demurred and the agreement has for all intents and purposes collapsed.
The list goes on, but the above should give a clear idea of US policy, where continuity generally reigns supreme. What may initially appear as sudden breaks more often than not turn out to be culmination of years if not decades of change. Seen from this perspective, singling out Trump or Biden, or both, for the direction of US policy makes as much sense as holding Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu single-handedly responsible for the policies of the Israeli state.
PS Did you say “honest broker”?
14 March: Who Was There First?
Who was there first? The short answer is that the question is irrelevant. Claims of ancient title (“This land is ours because we were here several thousand years ago”) have no standing or validity under international law. For good reason, because such claims also defy elementary common sense.
Neither I nor anyone reading this can convincingly substantiate the geographical location of their direct ancestors ten or five or even two thousand years ago. If we could, the successful completion of such an exercise would confer exactly zero property, territorial, or sovereign rights.
As a thought experiment, let’s go back only a few centuries rather than multiple millennia. Do South Africa’s Afrikaners have the right to claim The Netherlands as their homeland, or even qualify for Dutch citizenship, on the basis of their lineage? Do the descendants of African-Americans who were forcibly removed from West Africa have the right to board a flight in Atlanta, Port-au-Prince, or São Paolo and reclaim their ancestral villages from the current inhabitants, who in all probability arrived only after – perhaps long after – the previous inhabitants were abducted and sold into slavery half a world away? Do Australians who can trace their roots to convicts who were involuntarily transported Down Under by the British government have a right to return to Britain or Ireland and repossess homes from the present inhabitants even if, with the help of court records, they can identify the exact address inhabited by their forebears? Of course not.
In sharp contrast to, for example, Native Americans or the Maori of New Zealand, none of the above can demonstrate a living connection with the lands to which they would lay claim. To put it crudely, neither nostalgic attachment nor ancestry, in and of themselves, confer rights of any sort, particularly where such rights have not been asserted over the course of hundreds or thousands of years. If they did, American English would be the predominant language in large parts of Europe, and Spain would once again be speaking Arabic.
Nevertheless, the claim of ancient title has been and remains central to Zionist assertions of not only Jewish rights in Palestine, but of an exclusive Jewish right to Palestine.
For the sake of argument, let’s examine it. If we put aside religious mythology, the origin of the ancient Israelites is indeed local. In ancient times it was not unusual for those in conflict with authority or marginalized by it to take to the more secure environment of surrounding hills or mountains, conquer existing settlements or establish new ones, and in the ultimate sign of independence adopt distinct religious practices and generate their own rulers. That the Israelites originated as indigenous Canaanite tribes rather than as fully-fledged monotheistic immigrants or conquerors is more or less the scholarly consensus, buttressed by archeological and other evidence. And buttressed by the absence of evidence for the origin stories more familiar to us.
It is also the scholarly consensus that the Israelites established two kingdoms, Judah and Israel, the former landlocked and covering Jerusalem and regions to the south, the latter (also known as the Northern Kingdom or Samaria) encompassing points north, the Galilee, and parts of contemporary Jordan. Whether these entities were preceded by a United Kingdom that subsequently fractured remains the subject of fierce debate.
What is certain is that the ancient Israelites were never a significant regional power, let alone the superpower of the modern imagination. There is a reason the great empires of the Middle East emerged in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, and Anatolia – or from outside the region altogether – but never in Palestine. It simply lacked the population and resource base for power projection. Jerusalem may be the holiest of cities on earth, but for almost the entirety of its existence, including the period in question, it existed as a village, provincial town, or small city rather than metropolis.
Judah and Israel, like the neighboring Canaanite and Philistine entities during this period, were for most of their existence vassal states, their fealty and tribute fought over by rival empires – Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, etc. – rather than extracted from others. Indeed, Israel was destroyed during the eighth century BCE by the Assyrians, who for good measured subordinated Judah to their authority, until it was in the sixth century BCE eliminated by the Babylonians, who had earlier overtaken the Assyrians in a regional power struggle.
The Babylonian Exile was not a wholesale deportation, but rather affected primarily Judah’s elites and their kin. Nor was there a collective return to the homeland when the opportunity arose several decades later after Cyrus the Great defeated Babylon and re-established a smaller Judah as a province of the Persian Achaemenid empire. Indeed, Mesopotamia would remain a key center of Jewish religion and culture for centuries afterwards.
Zionist claims of ancient title conveniently erase the reality that the ancient Israelites were hardly the only inhabitants of ancient Palestine, but rather shared it with Canaanites, Philistines, and others. The second part of the claim, that the Jewish population was forcibly expelled by the Romans and has for 2,000 years been consumed with the desire to return, is equally problematic.
By the time the Romans conquered Jerusalem during the first century BCE, established Jewish communities were already to be found throughout the Mediterranean world and Middle East – to the extent that a number of scholars have concluded that a majority of Jews already lived in the diaspora by the time the first Roman soldier set foot in Jerusalem.
These communities held a deep attachment to Jerusalem, its Temple, and the lands recounted in the Bible. They identified as diasporic communities, and in many cases may additionally have been able to trace their origins to this or that town, village, or tribe in the extinguished kingdoms of Israel and Judah. But there is no indication those born and bred in the diaspora across multiple generations considered themselves to be living in temporary exile or considered the territory of the former Israelite kingdoms rather than their lands of birth and residence their natural homeland, any more than Irish-Americans today feel they properly belong in Ireland rather than the United States.
Unlike those taken in captivity to Babylon centuries earlier there was no impediment to their relocation to or from their ancestral lands, although economic factors appear to have played an important role in the growth of the diaspora. By contrast, those traveling in the opposite direction appear to have done so, more often than not, for religious reasons, or to be buried in Jerusalem’s sacred soil.
Nations and nationalism did not exist 2,000 years ago. Nor Zionist propagandists in New York, Paris, and London incessantly proclaiming that for two millennia Jews everywhere have wanted nothing more than to return their homeland, and invariably driving home rather than taking the next flight to Tel Aviv. Nor insufferably loud Americans declaring, without a hint of irony or self-awareness, the right of the Jewish people to Palestine “because they were there first”.
Back to the Romans, about a century after their arrival a series of Jewish rebellions over the course of several decades, coupled with internecine warfare between various Jewish factions, produced devastating results. A large proportion of the Jewish population was killed in battle, massacred, sold into slavery, or exiled. Many towns and villages were ransacked, the Temple in Jerusalem destroyed, and Jews barred from entering the city for all but one day a year. Although a significant Jewish presence remained, primarily in the Galilee, the killings, associated deaths from disease and destitution, and expulsions during the Roman-Jewish wars exacted a calamitous toll.
With the destruction of the Temple Jerusalem became an increasingly spiritual rather than physical center of Jewish life. Jews neither formed a demographic majority in Palestine, nor were the majority of Jews to be found there. Many of those who remained would in subsequent centuries convert to Christianity or Islam (or Christianity and thereafter Islam), succumb to massacres during the Crusades, or join the diaspora. On the eve of Zionist colonization locally-born Jews constituted less than five percent of the total population.
As for the burning desire to return to Zion, there is precious little evidence to substantiate it. There is, for example, no evidence that upon their expulsion from Spain during the late fifteenth century, the Sephardic Jewish community, many of whom were given refuge by the Ottoman Empire that ruled Palestine, made concerted efforts to head for Jerusalem. Rather, most opted for Istanbul and Greece. Similarly, during the massive migration of Jews fleeing persecution and poverty in Eastern Europe during the nineteenth century, the destinations of choice were the United States and United Kingdom. Even after the Zionist movement began a concerted campaign to encourage Jewish emigration to Palestine, less than five per cent took up the offer. And while the British are to this day condemned for limiting Jewish immigration to Palestine during the late 1930s, the more pertinent reality is that the vast majority of those fleeing the Nazi menace once again preferred to relocate to the US and UK, but were deprived of these havens because Washington and London firmly slammed their doors shut.
Tellingly, the Jewish Agency for Israel in 2023 reported that of the world’s 15.7 million Jews, 7.2 million – less than half – reside in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. According to the Agency, “The Jewish population numbers refer to persons who define themselves as Jews by religion or otherwise and who do not practice another religion”. It further notes that if instead of religion one were to apply Israel’s Law of Return, under which any individual with one or more Jewish grandparent is entitled to Israeli citizenship, only 7.2 of 25.5 million eligible individuals (28 percent) have opted for Zion.
In other words, “Next Year in Jerusalem” was, and largely remains, an aspirational religious incantation rather than political program. For religious Jews, furthermore, it was to result from divine rather than human intervention. For this reason, many in this community initially equated Zionism with blasphemy, and until quite recently most Orthodox Jews were either non-Zionist or rejected the ideology altogether.
Returning to the irrelevant issue of ancestry, if there is one population group that can lay a viable claim of direct descent from the ancient Israelites it would be the Samaritans, who have inhabited the area around Mount Gerizim, near the West Bank city of Nablus, without interruption since ancient times. Palestinian Jews would be next in line, although unlike the Samaritans they interacted more regularly with both other Jewish communities and their gentile neighbors.
Claims of Israelite descent made on behalf of Jewish diaspora communities are much more difficult to sustain. Conversions to and from Judaism, intermarriage with gentiles, absorption in multiple foreign societies, and related phenomena over the course of several thousand years make it a virtual certainty that the vast majority of Jews who arrived in Palestine during the late 19th and first half of the 20th century to reclaim their ancient homeland were in fact the first of their lineage to ever set foot in it. By way of an admittedly imperfect analogy, most Levantines, Egyptians, Sudanese, and North Africans identify as Arabs, yet the percentage of those who can trace their roots to the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula that conquered their lands during the seventh and eighth centuries is at best rather small.
Ironically, a contemporary Palestinian, particularly in the West Bank and Galilee, is likely to have more Israelite ancestry than a contemporary diaspora Jew.
The Palestinians take their name from the Philistines, one of the so-called Sea Peoples who arrived on the southern coast of Canaan from the Aegean islands, probably Crete, during the late second millennium BCE. They formed a number of city states, including Gaza, Ashdod, and Ashkelon. Like Judah and Israel they existed primarily as vassals of regional powers, and like them were eventually destroyed by more powerful states as well. With no record of their extermination or expulsion, the Philistines are presumed to have been absorbed by the Canaanites and thereafter disappear from the historical record.
Sitting at the crossroads between Asia, Africa, and Europe, Palestine was over the centuries repeatedly conquered by empires near and far, absorbing a constant flow of human and cultural influences throughout. Given its religious significance pilgrims from around the globe also contributed to making the Palestinian people what they are today.
A common myth is that the Palestinian origin story dates from the Arab-Muslim conquests of the seventh century. In point of fact the Arabs neither exterminated nor expelled the existing population, and the new rulers never formed a majority of the population. Rather, and over the course of several centuries, the local population was gradually Arabized, and to a large extent Islamized as well.
So the question as to who was there first can be answered in several ways: “both” and “irrelevant” are equally correct.
Indisputably, the Zionist movement had no right to establish a sovereign state in Palestine on the basis of claims of ancient title, which was and remains its primary justification for doing so. That it established an exclusivist state that not only rejected any rights for the existing Palestinian population but was from the very outset determined to displace and replace this population was and remains a historical travesty. That it as a matter of legislation confers automatic citizenship on millions who have no existing connection with the land but denies it to those who were born there and expelled from it, solely on the basis of their identity, would appear to be the very definition of apartheid.
The above notwithstanding, and while the Zionist claim of exclusive Israeli sovereignty in Palestine remains illegitimate, there are today several million Israelis who cannot be simply wished away. A path to co-existence will need to be found, even as the genocidal nature of the Israeli state, and increasingly of Israeli society as well, makes the endeavor increasingly complicated. The question, thrown into sharp relief by Israel’s genocidal onslaught on the Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip, is whether co-existence with Israeli society can be achieved without first dismantling the Israeli state and its ruling institutions.
28 February: German Hysteria
Dr. Andreas Krieg, a German academic who teaches at King’s College London, has commented on the hysteria in his native country regarding Israel and the Palestinians with the following tweet: “I am becoming increasingly concerned about the criminalization of discourse on the Middle East in Germany. For the time being, I would stay far away from any event organized/hosted in Germany on regional security.”
As it happens, I was several months ago invited to participate in a workshop on the Middle East to be convened Berlin. Although I have the highest respect for the distinguished German analyst who invited me, I felt compelled to decline the invitation. I did so for several reasons.
Most importantly, the workshop was co-sponsored by the Heinrich Böll
Foundation (HBS). In August 2023 an international jury, jointly convened by HBS and the state government of Bremen, awarded the annual Hannah Arendt Prize for Political Thought to the Russian-American writer Masha Gessen. It is awarded once a year to “individuals who identify critical and unseen aspects of current political events and who are not afraid to enter the public realm by presenting their opinion in controversial political discussions”.
According to press reports at the time, the range of Gessen’s writings was an important factor taken into consideration by the jury when making its decision. “In its announcement today”, Publishing Perspectives wrote on 4 August, “the program notes the sheer breadth of topical and thematic concern reflected in Gessen’s work”, further noting that the jury considered Gessen “one of the most courageous chroniclers of our time”.
The appreciation of Gessen’s courage and topical breadth would however prove to be short-lived. On 9 December 2023, Gessen published “In the Shadow of the Holocaust” in The New Yorker. An exploration of “how the politics of memory of the Holocaust and antisemitism obscure what we see in Israel and Gaza today”, it ranks among Gessen’s finest and most powerful essays. It’s still available online, and well worth reading for those who haven’t yet done so.
Germany’s commissar class by contrast went thermonuclear over the essay. Gessen, who is Jewish and lost family during Germany’s WWII Holocaust, was roundly and viciously denounced for deploying precisely those qualities for which the Hannah Arendt Prize for Political Thought is awarded. Except that in this case these qualities were deployed to examine Israel and its treatment of the Palestinians, a taboo subject in today’s Germany.
In scenes that would have made Goebbels proud, the usual epithets and slander were trotted out and flung at Gessen with abandon by politicians, newspaper editors, and the like. Instead of simply withdrawing the prize on the grounds that courage and controversy are verboten if the subject is Israel, the state government of Bremen cancelled the awards ceremony. Determined to demonstrate it could be even more cowardly than its partner in crime, HBS issued a press statement lauding Gessen’s “unconditional commitment to democracy and to debating uncomfortable issues,” before announcing its withdrawal from the awards ceremony on the absurd pretext that “the event has lost its venue”.
As I informed the workshop organisers:
In my view this cannot be characterised as anything other than an act of political cowardice, and an indefensible capitulation to illegitimate political pressure by advocates for Israel's most extreme policies. That HBS sought to justify its actions with reference to the change of venue instead of forthrightly condemning the campaign against Gessen, the tactics employed, and those committing this intellectual atrocity only adds insult to injury. It should not have been particularly challenging to stand up for the legacy of Hannah Arendt.
As expressed more succinctly by Samantha Hill in The Guardian: “Hannah Arendt would not qualify for the Hannah Arendt prize in Germany today”
There was also a second reason I declined the invitation. As I informed the organisers:
As for my own position, I have made statements similar to those which HBS apparently found sufficient to throw Gessen under the bus. Assuming that the thought police will also be carefully vetting the event I have been invited to, I must therefore take into account the very real possibility that HBS will also disassociate itself from me. Since I do not have the stature of a Masha Gessen, and therefore won't be besieged by the international media for comment or be offered public venues in Berlin to defend myself and my reputation, I am unprepared to sustain the reputational damage that would come with being thrown to the wolves by an organization with the credentials of HBS.
More generally, I have been following with increasing alarm (and, frankly, disgust) the campaign by the German federal government, as well as regional and local authorities in Germany, to stifle voices in support of Palestinian rights and/or opposition to Israel's mass killings of Palestinians and other policies. These include positions that are considered legitimate within Israel but apparently not so in Germany. I'm not averse to breaking the law where human decency requires this, but am not prepared to get on the wrong side of the law or be subjected to vilification by the German authorities on account of making an intervention consisting of factual statements and analytical observations at an academic/policy workshop. Unfortunately, the benefits do not justify the risks and potential costs.
In further correspondence I explained why I was unprepared to reconsider my decision:
In view of the unethical manner in which HBS responded to political pressure to throw Masha Gessen to the wolves, I have to take into account the realistic possibility that it could come under similar pressure regarding my participation in the workshop. In my case HBS would find it much easier to respond to such pressure and throw me under the bus, and this would cause me unnecessary reputational damage. Since in contrast to Gessen I do not have the recognition that would motivate the international media to investigate such a decision and public figures to denounce it, nor be offered public venues to defend myself, the ramifications of such a scenario would be serious and long-lasting.
An additional concern is the current atmosphere in Germany. I lived under military occupation in Palestine for nearly a decade, and thereafter for longer in Jordan. Absent compelling reasons I prefer to avoid situations where for reasons of personal security I need to refrain from making perfectly reasonable factual observations in the public sphere.
By way of analogy, in 2011 I spoke at an HBS function in Berlin. When I questioned the wisdom of military intervention in Libya, a member of the audience accused me of endorsing genocide. I had my say, she had hers, and that was the end of it. I suspect that in 2023 things would end very differently if I were to express similar objections to someone speaking out in support of Israel's war on the Gaza Strip.
When I read about the hysteria that seems to be – once again – the norm in Germany, and the multiplying number of incidents that are crudely racist and surreal in equal measure, I’m reminded of Eugene Ionesco’s play, Rhinoceros. I read it many years ago in high school and only recall its broad outlines, but for some reason every new incident in Germany reminds me of that play.
Conclusion: Andreas Krieg is not being alarmist or dramatic, but providing constructive and necessary advice to a very real and escalating problem. Following might even have a useful impact on the situation in Germany.
20 February: What is UNRWA? (Part I)
What is UNRWA? The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Middle East, commonly known by the acronym UNRWA, is the UN agency that currently provides humanitarian relief and services to Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the occupied Palestinian territories (the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including East Jerusalem). It has an interesting history.
UNRWA came into existence after the first attempt to implement a two-state settlement in 1948 ended in catastrophe. This attempt was initiated by the United Nations by way UN General Assembly Resolution 181(II) of 29 November 1947 recommending the partition of Palestine.
Beginning in December 1947, throughout the 1948-1949 Palestine War, and until the early 1950s, the vast majority of Palestinians living in those regions of the British Mandate of Palestine that became the state of Israel were ethnically cleansed (i.e. expelled and prevented from returning), dispossessed (i.e. their lands, homes, assets, and possessions summarily seized), and transformed into stateless refugees.
As the scale of the political and humanitarian disaster produced by the UN’s partition of Palestine became painfully apparent, the world body in May 1948 appointed Swedish diplomat Folke Bernadotte as “United Nations Mediator in Palestine”. He was the UN’s first ever such envoy.
Bernadotte had previously distinguished himself when, as vice-president of the Swedish Red Cross during the final months of WWII, he negotiated the release of tens of thousands of inmates from Nazi concentration camps with Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS and a main architect of the Holocaust. Himmler was motivated by the delusional idea that he could succeed Hitler, secure a separate peace with the US and Britain, and avoid Germany’s defeat at the hands of the Soviet Union. Needless to say, it came to nothing.
In Palestine Bernadotte initially got off to a good start, brokering two Arab-Israeli truce agreements in quick succession. He then, as required by his mandate, began proposing solutions to the conflict. These included the return of the Palestinian refugees to their homes and – as envisaged by the UN’s partition resolution – placing Jerusalem under international administration.
(Historical footnote: it was UNGA 181’s designation of Jerusalem as a “corpus separatum” to be placed under an international regime, as opposed to its incorporation into either the proposed Arab or Jewish states, that forms the basis for the international community’s refusal to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the city or maintain diplomatic missions in any part of it. While the world additionally rejects Israel’s illegal 1967 annexation of East Jerusalem as “null and void”, it also does not recognize Israeli sovereignty over West Jerusalem, which Israel conquered in 1948. Similarly, with the exception of Britain and Pakistan, states refused to recognize Jordanian sovereignty over East Jerusalem between before 1967. Here too of course US policy stands in direct contradiction to that of the international community, including its closest allies, and remains in explicit violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions. These include UNSC 478 of 1980, which calls upon “states that have diplomatic missions in Jerusalem to withdraw such missions from the Holy City”. Note that the resolution states “Jerusalem”, not “East Jerusalem”.)
Returning to Bernadotte, his proposals for a resolution of the conflict cost him his life. On 17 September 1948, while driving through Jerusalem, he was assassinated by gunmen dispatched by Lehi (aka Stern Gang), a Zionist militia so fanatical that it in 1941 proposed a formal alliance with Nazi Germany on the basis of what it stated were shared ideological principles. The Lehi triumvirate that ordered Bernadotte’s assassination included Yitzhak Shamir (née Yezernitsky), a self-proclaimed “terrorist” who was also wanted as one by the British Mandate authorities. Rather than being imprisoned or extradited, Shamir would later be elected speaker of Israel’s parliament, serve as its foreign minister for six years, and then a further seven as prime minister. Indeed, Israel never tried or convicted anyone for the murder. That may also explain why it has never apologised to either Sweden or the UN for Bernadotte’s killing.
Guela Cohen, self-styled “woman of violence,” would decades later recount the bloodcurdling threats she directed at Bernadotte over Lehi’s clandestine radio station, pointedly informing Donald Macintyre of The Independent that she regretted nothing. Her husband, Emanuel Hanegbi, was according to Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, also involved in ordering the assassination. Their son, Tzahi Hanegbi, made his name in the early 1980s when, as president of the student union at Hebrew University, he organised violent assaults on Palestinian students. His violent racism proved sufficiently popular that he was subsequently elected head of the National Union of Israeli Students. Today Hanegbi Fils is Prime Minister Binyamnin Netanyahu’s National Security Advisor.
Bernadotte was succeeded by his deputy, the US diplomat Ralph Bunche, who was charged with negotiating the 1949 Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements. At the same time the UN General Assembly in December 1948 adopted Resolution 194 (III). This resolution, which has been consistently re-confirmed by the General Assembly since 1948, is best known for setting forth the refugees’ right of return and right to compensation. It states in the relevant part:
Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.
That same resolution also established the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP). Composed of France, Turkey, and the United States, the UNCCP’s role was to resolve the cataclysmic impasse created by the UN’s partition delusion. In addition to finding a political resolution, its mandate included, in the paragraph after the one quoted above, the “repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation”. This was to be achieved in close coordination with a recently-established agency known as United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR), which had been established a month earlier in response to the horrific humanitarian situation produced by the Nakba.
Over the next year, Israel rejected multiple initiatives, whether formulated by the UNCCP, the US, or anyone else, that included the full or partial repatriation of Palestinian refugees. The United States during the late 1940s and 1950s submitted a number of such proposals in the context of initiatives to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. In those days Washington often feared the conflict could serve as a conduit for Soviet influence in the Middle East.
Israel’s rejectionism in part explains why the Security Council declined to recommend Israel’s first two applications to join the UN to the General Assembly. Its third application, in May 1949, was approved by the latter, but – unusually – the relevant resolution (UNGA 273) went beyond standard wording and specifically mentioned “implementation” of UNGA 181 (the partition resolution designating Jerusalem as a city under international administration) and UNGA 194 (which codifies the refugees’ right of return). Many have on this basis argued that Israel’s UN membership was conditional on the fulfilment of these resolutions, which has of course never happened.
Because the UN and its member states were unwilling to compel Israel to implement the obligations it had accepted, the UNCCP – which continues to exist to this day with the same composition but has been starved of funds – in 1949 proposed the establishment of a "United Nations agency designed to continue [the] relief activities [of UNRPR] and initiate job-creation projects". An additional factor was that relief agencies active in the region, such as the Quakers who had distinguished themselves with extraordinary humanity in the Gaza Strip during the late 1940s, were indicating that their capacity to continue providing relief services was rapidly diminishing.
UNRWA was duly established in December 1949, and commenced operations on 1 May 1950. Israel, by this time a UN member state, along with the US and Europeans voted for UNRWA’s creation. In fact, the UNCCP recommendation to establish UNRWA was primarily inspired by the recommendations of Gordon R. Clapp, Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, who conducted a study known as the Economic Survey Mission at the request of UNCCP. More on Clapp and his recommendations later.
Several observations are in order about UNRWA:
First, like UNRPR it provided assistance to “Palestine” rather than “Palestinian” refugees. “Palestine refugees” are defined by UNRWA as “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.” Among those receiving assistance were Israeli citizens, non-Palestinian Arabs, and others displaced by the Palestine War, provided they met the above criteria. In 1967 UNRWA began providing services to the new influx of Palestinian refugees into Jordan, although many had already been receiving assistance since 1950.
Second, UNRWA only operates in states and territories where it is authorized to do so by the relevant authorities. Initially these comprised the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip, Israel, Jordan (which at that time also ruled the West Bank), Lebanon, and Syria. UNRWA operated within Israel until 1952, when the Israeli government informed the Agency that it was taking over its responsibilities. (A large proportion of Israel’s Palestinian citizens, who were expelled from their towns and villages but not from the new state, met UNRWA’s criteria for assistance).
Third, UNRWA does not provide services to Palestinian refugees who do not reside within its area of operations. Palestinian refugees in Iraq, for example, who faced persecution in that country after the 2003 US occupation and were in many cases forced from their homes, were assisted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) rather than UNRWA. Palestinian refugees forced out of Kuwait in 1991 similarly had no access to UNRWA services unless they were able to enter its area of operations. The same principle holds true for Palestinian refugees in Egypt, the Gulf states, Europe, and elsewhere who require assistance.
Fourth, UNRWA neither owns nor administers any of the 58 recognized Palestinian refugee camps, nor the additional informal ones, such as the sprawling Yarmouk Camp in Damascus. These were typically established on land leased by the relevant governments from private landowners or otherwise made available to accommodate the mass influx of refugees in 1948 and on a smaller scale in 1967. UNRWA’s role, with certain exceptions, is limited to the provision of services to Palestine refugees registered with the Agency within its areas of operations, whether they live within these camps or outside them.
Fifth, UNRWA has a humanitarian and development rather than political mandate. Although bound by UN resolutions it has no formal responsibility for either formulating, promoting, or implementing a resolution of the Palestinian refugee question. It’s also never done so. That remains within the purview of UNCCP and other UN organs like the Security Council and General Assembly.
Sixth, UNRWA unlike other UN agencies reports directly to the General Assembly, which created it. Although now in existence for more than seven decades, it formally remains a temporary agency, in the sense that it will cease to exist once a durable solution to the Palestinian refugee question is achieved. This also means that its mandate is subject to renewal by the General Assembly every three years. Its continued existence therefore reflects the collective will, repeatedly expressed, of the international community and not a decision by the UN. Additionally, it is funded by voluntary contributions paid directly to the Agency, as opposed to being funded from the UN general budget which consists of mandatory annual contributions by member states and which the UN is free to allocate as it sees fit.
UNRWA is also the world body’s largest agency, with 30,000 employees. This number was recently reduced to 29,989. I only subtracted 11 because according to Gréta Gunnarsdóttir, Director of the UNRWA Representative Office New York, UNRWA did not fire one of the twelve Palestinians recently accused by Israel of participating in the 7 October 2023 Hamas attacks in southern Israel. Reason: he isn’t an UNRWA employee. Kind of helps one understand why Israeli intelligence performed so disastrously on 7 October...
UNRWA is the only UN agency specifically dedicated to serving only one group of refugees. There are several reasons why the UN did not make Palestinian refugees, like those elsewhere in the world, the responsibility of UNHCR. Most obviously, the UN bears a special responsibility towards Palestinian refugees. It played a direct role in their dispossession by partitioning their country and handing most of it over to a supremacist movement committed to transforming its allotted entity into an exclusivist state. No partition, no Nakba. Or at least not one for which the UN bears moral, political, and arguably legal responsibility for the entirely predictable consequences.
This sets Palestinian refugees apart from, for example, South Asian and Chinese refugees during the same period, or Sahrawi, Afghan, or Syrian refugees more recently. None lost their homes, homeland, and livelihoods because the world body decided to partition their homeland.
Additionally, UNHCR did not exist when UNRWA was established, but the Palestinian humanitarian emergency did. UNHCR was created about a week later, and during its early years was primarily concerned with assisting the millions of refugees in Europe produced by the Second World War and its aftermath.
Anne Irfan of University College London, who has written a highly-regarded book on the Palestinian refugee question, in this respect notes:
When UNHCR was created it had a restricted mandate … that enabled its work to only be applied to European refugees. So this idea of creating specific UN agencies for particular groups of refugees was very much the norm at the time … So there was UNRWA, there was UNHCR, and then in the 1950s we also had UNKRA, which was created for Korean refugees so that was the norm at the time. It wasn’t until 1967 that UNHCR’s mandate was universalized and the Eurocentrism was dropped.
Even after UNHCR became a genuinely global agency UNRWA was not merged into it. Institutional inertia probably played a role, but the primary reason remains the political will of the international community to sustain it until a durable solution to the Palestinian refugee question is achieved. As expressed on 4 February of this year by Josep Borrell, Vice-President of the European Commission and the EU’s foreign policy chief (not to be confused with Frau Genocide): “UNRWA’s continued existence, since it was established in 1949, is the direct consequence of the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has never been resolved.”
Given the tsunami of Israel agitprop on UNRWA and UNHCR, Irfan makes another important distinction:
UNRWA has a much more restricted mandate to this day than UNHCR … UNRWA is mandated solely to provide services to Palestine refugees in the fields where it works. UNHCR by contrast is also mandated to pursue durable solutions … So Palestine refugees are actually in some ways almost at a disadvantage because the agency that serves them has a much more limited mandate than the agency that serves all other refugee groups.
UNRWA’s critics nevertheless habitually claim that a merger with UNHCR would be meaningful because UNRWA, unlike UNHCR, alone classifies the descendants of refugees as refugees. While this makes for effective agitprop, in the world of verifiable fact UNHCR applies exactly the same criteria. In the words of the UN itself:
Under international law and the principle of family unity, the children of refugees and their descendants are also considered refugees until a durable solution is found. Both UNRWA and UNHCR recognize descendants as refugees on this basis, a practice that has been widely accepted by the international community, including both donors and refugee hosting countries. Palestine refugees are not distinct from other protracted refugee situations such as those from Afghanistan or Somalia, where there are multiple generations of refugees, considered by UNHCR as refugees and supported as such. Protracted refugee situations are the result of the failure to find political solutions to their underlying political crises.
Refugees, and their descendants, are classified as refugees until they are no longer refugees. Until, in other words, the underlying conditions that made them refugees and sustain their dispossession are resolved. In this case it is thus up to Israel, not UNRWA, to change their status.
But the idea that UNRWA artificially perpetuates Palestinian refugee status is the hoax that won’t go away. It is, more than anything else, based on a profoundly racist mentality. Bought to you by the same people who used to and in many cases continue to insist that Palestinians don’t exist, the idea seems to be that there is this group of ignorant savages, who neither know they are refugees, nor have a clue they have been dispossessed, nor have an inkling that they are entitled to any rights. Rather, it is only because such ideas are being implanted into their unthinking heads by UNRWA that they call themselves refugees and insist they have rights vis-à-vis Israel. No UNRWA, no Palestine refugee question.
4 February: Red Sea Conflicts
The escalating conflict in the Red Sea is not without historical precedent.
Initially the crisis was situated much further north. On 10 March 1949 Israeli forces seized control of Umm al-Rashrash,an abandoned British police outpost astride the Gulf of Aqaba in the extreme southeast of Palestine. The conquest provided Israel with its only access to the Red Sea.
The southern Negev, including its coastal region, had been allotted to the proposed Jewish state by UN General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 recommending the partition of Palestine. Nevertheless, Israeli forces had not yet reached Umm al-Rashrash by the time an armistice agreement had been concluded with Egypt in February 1949, or prior to the beginning of armistice negotiations with Jordan on 4 March. The UN mediator in charge of the armistice talks, the US diplomat Ralph Bunche, had insisted that all parties observe a ceasefire for the duration of negotiations. Israel promptly responded by launching Operation Uvda (“Fact [on the ground]”) on 5 March. It would be its final offensive of the Palestine War.
As with hundreds of other locations during this period Israel promptly renamed Umm al-Rashrash and called it Eilat, after the ancient city of Elath mentioned in the Bible. Elath is located beneath the present-day Jordanian resort and port city of Aqaba, located on the other side of the eponymous Gulf. Undeterred by either geography or history Yehuda Press, a member of Israel’s Committee for the Designation of Place Names, intoned that “when the real Elath [i.e. Aqaba] is finally in our hands our settlement [of Eilat] will expand and reach there”.
Although Eilat would remain largely uninhabited for some years and had yet to develop port facilities Egypt, still formally at war with Israel, moved to close off Israel’s access to the Gulf of Aqaba. By agreement with Saudi Arabia, the Egyptian military in 1950 took over the Saudi islands of Tiran and Sanafir situated at the entrance to the Gulf. Through its control of the Straits of Tiran Egypt ensured Israeli shipping could not access the Gulf of Aqaba and therefore Eilat.
Simultaneously, and pursuant to the Arab League boycott, Israeli ships were banned from the Suez Canal and Israeli-bound products were classified as contraband and seized. Together with the prohibition on overland transit through Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, Israeli trade with Asia and Africa could only be conducted through its Mediterranean ports or by air.
On 26 July 1956 Egypt’s revolutionary leader, Gamal Abdel-Nasser, nationalized the Anglo-French controlled Suez Canal Company. Beyond the desire to eliminate European influence in Egypt, Nasser’s daring and wildly popular initiative was in response to the Eisenhower administration’s 19 July decision to block a World Bank loan to Egypt for the construction ofthe Aswan High Dam, a massive project designed to regulate the waters of the Nile and generate cheap electricity to power Egypt’s development.
Washington was using its muscle to demonstrate its displeasure with Egypt’s Cold War neutrality, which included Cairo’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China, the purchase of arms purchases from communist Czechoslovakia after a deal with the US fell through on account of excessive American demands, and Nasser’s vocal support for anti-colonial independence movements in Africa and Asia. Within the Middle East the Egyptian leader had led opposition to the Central Treaty Organization (the Baghdad Pact), which sought to entangle regional states into a formal pro-Western/anti-Soviet military alliance, and supported republican and independence movements in the Arab world.
Egyptian-Israeli relations had until 1955 been relatively stable. Nasser, who initially prioritized Egypt’s socio-economic development over confrontation with Israel, responded constructively to several initiatives to explore the prospects of Egyptian-Israeli peace. These included a series of secret meetings between Israeli and Egyptian representatives, primarily in Europe, as well as an initiative by Elmore Jackson, a US Quaker emissary who, in close coordination with the US government, shuttled between Nasser and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion.
While it’s questionable if such efforts could have succeeded their failure is easy to identify. The first is the 1954 Lavon Affair, also known as Operation Susannah. In this grandiose plan, Israeli military intelligence recruited Egyptian Jews to plant bombs at US and UK-affiliated facilities, such as the libraries of the US Information Agency in Cairo and Alexandria, in order to blame the attacks on anti-Western Egyptian nationalists, communists, and Islamists. The campaign was supposed to produce sufficient instability throughout the country that Egyptian relations with the West would be undermined to an extent that the UK would indefinitely maintain its military presence in the Suez Canal zone. At the time, negotiations on ending this presence were nearing conclusion and the US, seeking to supplant Britain and France as the pre-eminent imperial power in the region, supported British withdrawal.
Israeli intelligence was also prone to incompetence in those days, and the plot was quickly exposed and the perpetrators arrested by the Egyptian security forces. Avri Elad (née Seidenberg), one of the Israeli operatives in charge of the campaign, was in fact later revealed to have been a double agent. Amid howls of Israeli and Western outrage at the most despicable episode of anti-Semitic persecution since the fall of the Third Reich, several of the perpetrators were executed and Nasser denounced as “Hitler on the Nile”.
The episode is called the Lavon Affair because it led to the resignation of Israeli Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon (néeLubianiker), accused of perjury for claiming (correctly, it later emerged) that he was unaware of Operation Susannah. Israel’s Prime Minister, Moshe Sharrett (née Chertok), who had strenuously denied any Israeli involvement in the affair because he had been kept in the dark, also resigned when it emerged Israel was in fact the only country involved. (In a 2007 review of a new edition of Moshe Sharett’s diaries,Israeli historian and journalist Tom Segev revealed that Lavon was hardly averse to such operations, having “proposed spreading poisonous bacteria” on the Syrian border and various “atrocities” in the Gaza Strip).
In the larger scheme of things Lavon and Sharrett were the losers in a power struggle with David Ben-Gurion (née Grün), who returned as defense minister and prime minister; his chief minion and Director-General of the Ministry of DefenseShimon Peres (née Perski), who appears to have been the one who approved the operation but gave false testimony that it was Lavon who authorised it; Moshe Dayan, chief-of-staff of the Israeli military, and head of Israeli military intelligence Binyamin Gibli. With strict military censorship in place for years after the event, the Israeli public knew only that the executed saboteurs were innocent victims of anti-Semitism.
The second reason Israeli-Egyptian relations deteriorated sharply in the mid-1950s had to do with the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip, whose population had in 1948 swelled from 80,000 to 280,000 on account of Israel’s ethnic cleansing of southern Palestine during the Nakba and the massive influx of refugees.
Until 1955, Egypt as a rule prevented Palestinians in that territory from conducting guerilla raids into southern Israel. But not always successfully. Typically, Israel would respond with attacks on the newly-established Palestinian refugee camps, such as a 1953 attack on Bureij Refugee Camp in the central Gaza Strip which killed dozens.
In 1955, with the hawkish Ben-Gurion re-installed as prime and defense minister, and eager for conflict with Egypt and revenge for the execution of Operation Susannah’s amateur saboteurs, matters took a dramatic turn. On the night of 28 February, after an Israeli had been killed by Palestinian commandos in southern Israel, Israeli paratroopers directly targeted Egyptian forces and attacked an Egyptian military base near Gaza City. 17 Egyptian soldiers were killed in their beds, and a further 21 in an ambush laid for the military unit sent to rescue them.
Nasser termed the attack a turning point. He accelerated negotiations with the Soviet Union to sign the Czech arms deal, and Egypt began training Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in guerilla warfare, encouraging rather than preventing their activities.
After Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, Britain and France decided it was time to get rid of him. For Paris, Egypt’s open support of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) in its war of independence against France was an additional reason to depose its leader. A delusional Paris was genuinely convinced that if Nasser were overthrown, Algeria would be quickly pacified.
Regime change in Egypt was duly planned at a secret meeting convened on 24 October 1956 in the Paris suburb of Sèvres bythe UK, France, and Israel (represented by Ben-Gurion, Peres, and Dayan). Pursuant to the agreement known as the Protocol of Sèvres, Israel would invade Egypt up to the Canal zone, and Britain and France would demand that Egypt stop fighting the invaders, “withdraw all its troops ten miles from the canal”, and “accept temporary occupation of key positions on the Canal by Anglo-French forces to guarantee freedom of passage through the Canal by vessels of all nations until a final settlement”. If Nasser refused, British and French forces would commence military operations against Egypt until their demands are accepted – code for regime change. Article 4 of the Protocol specified that Israel will “occupy the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba [i.e. eastern Sinai]” Tiran and Sanafir islands “to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba”.
In a detailed review of the Sèvres meetings and resulting protocol, British-Israeli historian Avi Shlaim recounts how Ben-Gurion, describing Israel as the “prostitute” in this transaction, initially demanded annexation of the Sinai, Gaza Strip, West Bank, and southern Lebanon, and expulsion of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, as payment for Israel’s services. In the end he had to settle for only part of Sinai and the abovementioned islands, though Peres, the architect of Israel’s nuclear program, at the last minute managed to obtain a French commitment to provide Israel with a nuclear reactor. That’s how desperate France was to end the Algerian rebellion, and how convinced it was that removing Nasser would end it. (France would become Israel’s primary arms supplier through 1967, when De Gaulle imposed an arms boycott in response to Israel’s initiation of the war and occupation of Arab territory. It was enthusiastically replaced by the United States.)
Israel duly invaded Egypt and the Gaza Strip on 29 October, rapidly advancing towards the Suez Canal. In the process it conducted numerous atrocities, most notoriously the massacre of 275 Palestinians in Khan Yunis, and mass executions of Egyptian POWs in Sinai. British and French forces were equally savage, with hundreds of Egyptian civilians killed in bombing raids and the Egyptian city of Port Said reduced to rubble.
The above notwithstanding the plan hatched at Sèvres did not survive contact with geopolitical realities and was a total fiasco. The United States, determined to supplant Britain and France in the Middle East, joined forces with the Soviet Union, equally determined to defend its new Egyptian ally.Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin went so far as to threaten theuse nuclear weapons to defend Cairo. Together the rival superpowers put a definitive end to European domination of the region.
Israel, which initially expressed an intention to annex Sinai, was forced to withdraw from it and from the Gaza Strip in March 1957. True to form the retreating Israeli army left massive destruction of civilian infrastructure in its wake. In the past is prologue department, Germany virtually alone supported the tripartite aggression against Egypt; at the height of the crisis German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer paid a demonstrative solidarity visit to his French counterpart Guy Mollet. Also in the past is prologue department, Eisenhower in 1965 expressed regret for demanding an Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory.
The Suez Canal, which had been rendered impassable when Egypt sunk ships within it, reponed a month later. Egypt was also required to cease interfering with shipping bound for Israel through the Straits of Tiran. As a result Eilat became a viable port and played an increasingly important role in the Israeli economy. By 1967 some 90% of Israel’s oil supplies, imported from Iran, entered the country via Eilat.
In response to Israeli threats to overthrow the Syrian government in 1967 and its subsequent mobilisation of forces on the Syrian front, Egypt in May of that year announced that it would once again close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping to deter Israel. Although not enforced, the threat was cited by Israel as justification for launching the June 1967 War. As Israeli forces once again approached the Suez Canal, Egypt again blocked the Suez Canal with mines and scuttled ships. It would remain impassable until 1975.
1967 also bought Bab al-Mandab off the coast of Yemen, the focus of the current Red Sea crisis, into the picture. After several years of insurgency against British rule in South Yemen, London finally called it quits and announced its withdrawal. When it did so, Israel sought to persuade Britain to retain control of Bab al-Mandab on the pretext of ensuring international maritime security in the Red Sea. When this failed on account of Yemeni opposition, Israel proposed placing the Yemeni island of Perim, which divides the Bab al-Mandab Straits into two channels, under international administration under similar pretexts.This also failed.
In advance of the 1973 October War the Egyptian navy covertly sent warships to Bab al-Mandab. Once war erupted, the force successfully imposed a blockade on shipping bound for Eilat, putting the port out of service. Israel’s air force was in 1973 unequipped to conduct operations that far from its basd, and Egyptian mining of the waters further north apparently prevented the Israeli navy from coming to the rescue.
The crucial difference in 2023-2024 is that the interdiction of shipping through Bab al-Mandab to force an end to Israel’s genocidal assault on the Gaza Strip is having a far greater impact on the global economy than previous crises in Red Sea shipping. Another is that Israel, which promotes itself as a bastion of Western interests in the Middle East (Ben-Gurion’s “prostitute” turning tricks for France and Great Britain), is not only the cause of this crisis, but incapable of resolving it. Rather than Israel keeping the Red Sea open for Western shipping, the US, with the UK as always dutifully in tow, is today expending considerable resources to keep these waterways open for Israeli shipping and global trade. So that Israel can continue its genocidal onslaught on the Gaza Strip. As of this writing, neither operation looks particularly successful.
31 January: Genocide in the US Courts
Earlier today I interviewed Diala Shamas, Senior Staff Attorney with the Center for Constitution Rights (CCR), for my Connections podcast on the topic of “Unsilencing Palestine”.
Towards the conclusion of our discussion, I asked her about a case she and CCR are currently litigating. The case is “Defense for Children International-Palestine, et al., v. Joseph R. Biden, et al.”, and was heard before the US District Court for the Northern District of California. It was initiated by several Palestinian human rights organizations, Palestinian-Americans with relatives in or connections to the Gaza Strip, and individuals currently within the Gaza Strip. All represented by CCR.
It essentially consists of a lawsuit against US President Joe Biden, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, requiring them to “take all measures within their power to prevent Israel’s commission of genocidal acts against the Palestinian people of Gaza”. In other words, CCR was seeking an injunction to prohibit the US from further complicity in genocide. It therefore requested a court order “enjoining Defendants and all persons associated with them [i.e. the US government] from providing any further military or financial support, aid, or any form of assistance to Israel’s attacks and maintenance of a total siege on Palestinians in Gaza, in accordance with their duty under federal and customary international law to prevent, and not further, genocide”. It additionally requested the court to require the defending trio to “exert influence over Israel to end its bombing of the Palestinian people of Gaza, … to lift the siege on Gaza, … [and to] prevent the ‘evacuation’ or forcible transfer and expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza”, and to enjoin them “from obstructing attempts by the international community, including at the United Nations, to implement a ceasefire in Gaza and lift the siege on Gaza”.
CCR argued that these measures are required pursuant to the US government’s obligations under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, to which it is a signatory.
The case was always a long shot, because US foreign policy is the preserve of the Executive, in this particular case personified by #GenocideJoe, #GenocideTony, and #GenocideLloyd. US courts are as a rule loathe to intrude on decisions by the Executive to sow death and destruction abroad, even if it’s on a genocidal scale. Separation of powers, separation of limb from limb, that sort of thing. Nonetheless Diala Shamas observed that the Judge, Jeffrey White, appeared to be genuinely moved by the evidence placed before him, and had made that explicitly clear during the hearings. CCR therefore held out hope that Judge White might see the imperative of prioritizing human life and justice, and issue the requested injunction. She concluded by noting that a ruling could be expected as soon as today or at any point in the next several weeks.
As it happens Judge White issued his verdict only hours after I concluded my interview with Diala. Unfortunately, but not unexpectedly, he dismissed the case out of hand and denied those represented by CCR the relief they so urgently sought. Yet his decision had nothing to do with his assessment of the evidence placed before him and was, as the judge made quite clear, based solely on the basis of the respective roles of the Executive and Judiciary in the conduct of US foreign policy. Judge White basically determined that the case before him constituted a “political question” and could not therefore be adjudicated by his court or influenced by decisions of the judiciary.
The above notwithstanding the more interesting part of the ruling is that Judge White also considers the evidence before him. After lengthy references to the recent International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on South Africa’s case accusing Israel of genocide Judge White writes:
“[T]he undisputed evidence before this Court comports with the finding of the ICJ and indicates that the current treatment of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip by the Israeli military may plausibly constitute a genocide in violation of international law. Both the uncontroverted testimony of the Plaintiffs and the expert opinion proffered at the hearing on these motions as well as statements made by various officers of the Israeli government indicate that the ongoing military siege in Gaza is intended to eradicate a whole people and therefore plausibly falls within the international prohibition against genocide. It is every individual’s obligation to confront the current siege in Gaza, but it also this Court’s obligation to remain within the metes and bounds of its jurisdictional scope.”
It's unclear to me if the above represents Judge White’s assessment of the evidence submitted by CCR or merely his obligation to repeat CCR’s allegation. Either way, the opening paragraph of his Conclusion is in this respect unambiguous:
“There are rare cases in which the preferred outcome is inaccessible to the Court. This is one of those cases. The Court is bound by precedent and the division of our coordinate branches of government to abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this matter. Yet, as the ICJ has found, it is plausible that Israel’s conduct amounts to genocide. This Court implores Defendants [i.e. the genocidal trio] to examine the results of their unflagging support of the military siege against the Palestinians in Gaza.”
Expressed differently, more public pressure on #GenocideJoe and #GenocideTony is required because a court, even while agreeing with the case before it, is unable to provide the urgently required remedy.
26 January: The International Court of Justice Responds to South Africa
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has issued its ruling in response to South Africa’s invocation of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, accusing Israel of perpetrating the crime of genocide in the Gaza Strip.
It has been my view that at this stage of the proceedings this case boils down to a single issue: whether the ICJ determines that South Africa has presented a plausible accusation that Israel is committing genocide, and on this basis allows this case to move forward to a full hearing before the world’s supreme court. Everything else is secondary.
On this crucial, main point the Court’s verdict was unambiguous: the arguments presented by South Africa before the ICJ earlier this month were sufficiently compelling, and Israel’s rebuttal and denials unconvincing. Therefore, the Court will now conduct a full and proper hearing to determine whether Israel is not only plausibly accused, but substantively responsible, for the crime of genocide.
History – with a capital H – was made today. As of 26 January 2024, Israel and its Western sponsors can no longer mobilize the Holocaust to shield themselves from accountability for their crimes against the Palestinian people. Raz Segal, a professor of Holocaust and Genocide Studies, recently made the point that the Israeli state was born in impunity, with the Holocaust serving as an all-purpose shield against accountability for its crimes. No more.
The late Edward W. Said often spoke of the Palestinian people as “the victims of the Victims”, and the difficulties many in the West had conceiving of Israel, which claims to exist as a response to the Holocaust, as a state capable of war crimes and crimes against humanity. No more. Israel is as of today associated with the crime of genocide primarily as perpetrator, not victim. Israel’s policies towards the Palestinian people will henceforth be judged on their own merits rather than against the long shadow of European history.
The ICJ today redefined “Never Again”. It is no longer a slogan that can be used by Israel to commit and justify crimes against others, but is now one that applies equally to Israel’s actions, and Palestinian victims.
ICJ judges are not diplomats who follow instructions from their governments. It was nevertheless particularly satisfying to see the Court’s ruling delivered by the presiding American judge, in American English, Joan E. Donoghue, who additionally voted in favor of each of the provisional measures. It was a fitting retort to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s rush to judgement that South Africa’s case was “meritless”. I’d be very surprised if Blinken even bothered to read South Africa’s submission to the ICJ. As far as he is concerned any accusation against Israel, any challenge to its impunity, any initiative to hold it accountable for its crimes, is by definition meritless.
The provisional measures ordered by the court, which are legally binding, are in my view of secondary importance. We should not confuse the ICJ with the United Nations Security Council. Nevertheless read them because they are important. Israel must take “immediate” measures, immediately refrain from others – including incitement – and report back in 30 days. In other words Israel is in the dock and is being carefully watched. The fact that the Court did not order a ceasefire which would be simply ignored by Israel, with the support of its Western sponsors, was expected and hardly what this case was about.
Finally, the ICJ ruling also imposes legal obligations upon all other signatories to the Genocide Convention, including the US and EU member states. The sun does not rise in the west, and Western hypocrisy – the foundational principle of its rules-based international order - will not end anytime soon. But the ICJ ruling lays the ground for also holding Israel’s sponsors responsible. This is the subject of a further hearing in the US later today.
26 January: The International Court of Justice Responds to South Africa
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has issued its ruling in response to South Africa’s invocation of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, accusing Israel of perpetrating the crime of genocide in the Gaza Strip.
It has been my view that at this stage of the proceedings this case boils down to a single issue: whether the ICJ determines that South Africa has presented a plausible accusation that Israel is committing genocide, and on this basis allows this case to move forward to a full hearing before the world’s supreme court. Everything else is secondary.
On this crucial, main point the Court’s verdict was unambiguous: the arguments presented by South Africa before the ICJ earlier this month were sufficiently compelling, and Israel’s rebuttal and denials unconvincing. Therefore, the Court will now conduct a full and proper hearing to determine whether Israel is not only plausibly accused, but substantively responsible, for the crime of genocide.
History – with a capital H – was made today. As of 26 January 2024, Israel and its Western sponsors can no longer mobilize the Holocaust to shield themselves from accountability for their crimes against the Palestinian people. Raz Segal, a professor of Holocaust and Genocide Studies, recently made the point that the Israeli state was born in impunity, with the Holocaust serving as an all-purpose shield against accountability for its crimes. No more.
The late Edward W. Said often spoke of the Palestinian people as “the victims of the Victims”, and the difficulties many in the West had conceiving of Israel, which claims to exist as a response to the Holocaust, as a state capable of war crimes and crimes against humanity. No more. Israel is as of today associated with the crime of genocide primarily as perpetrator, not victim. Israel’s policies towards the Palestinian people will henceforth be judged on their own merits rather than against the long shadow of European history.
The ICJ today redefined “Never Again”. It is no longer a slogan that can be used by Israel to commit and justify crimes against others, but is now one that applies equally to Israel’s actions, and Palestinian victims.
ICJ judges are not diplomats who follow instructions from their governments. It was nevertheless particularly satisfying to see the Court’s ruling delivered by the presiding American judge, in American English, Joan E. Donoghue, who additionally voted in favor of each of the provisional measures. It was a fitting retort to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s rush to judgement that South Africa’s case was “meritless”. I’d be very surprised if Blinken even bothered to read South Africa’s submission to the ICJ. As far as he is concerned any accusation against Israel, any challenge to its impunity, any initiative to hold it accountable for its crimes, is by definition meritless.
The provisional measures ordered by the court, which are legally binding, are in my view of secondary importance. We should not confuse the ICJ with the United Nations Security Council. Nevertheless read them because they are important. Israel must take “immediate” measures, immediately refrain from others – including incitement – and report back in 30 days. In other words Israel is in the dock and is being carefully watched. The fact that the Court did not order a ceasefire which would be simply ignored by Israel, with the support of its Western sponsors, was expected and hardly what this case was about.
Finally, the ICJ ruling also imposes legal obligations upon all other signatories to the Genocide Convention, including the US and EU member states. The sun does not rise in the west, and Western hypocrisy – the foundational principle of its rules-based international order - will not end anytime soon. But the ICJ ruling lays the ground for also holding Israel’s sponsors responsible. This is the subject of a further hearing in the US later today.
25 January: Awaiting ICJ Ruling
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has issued a press release stating that it will this Friday “deliver its Order” in response to South Africa’s “Request for the indication of provisional measures” in the case concerning “Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel)”.
Many people, rightly horrified by Israel’s genocidal campaign against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, expect the ICJ to order a comprehensive ceasefire. In their view this is the least the ICJ can and should do. They will consider anything less a failure by South Africa, a betrayal of the Palestinian people, and an indictment of the ICJ and indeed of international law itself.
My own view is that this matter should be looked at very differently and judged by different criteria.
The ICJ can respond in several ways to South Africa’s application. It can determine that South Africa has not presented a plausible case that Israel needs to answer, decline to order any provisional measures, and effectively consider the case closed. The Court could also determine that South Africa has failed to demonstrate that there is a dispute between South Africa and Israel as defined by the Genocide Convention, and dismiss the case on technical grounds. Either scenario would be a clear defeat for South Africa and the Palestinians, and for that matter the concept of international justice. Most specialists consider either of these scenarios to be the least likely outcome, largely because the South African legal team presented such a meticulously detailed and cogently argued legal and factual case, while Israel’s rebuttal was comparatively weak.
If the Court does indeed order provisional measures, it is not bound by those requested by South Africa. It can adopt all of them, some of them, or entirely different ones than those proposed by South Africa. In the relevant precedents, Bosnia and thereafter Myanmar, the ICJ sufficed with general injunctions ordering the accused state to “take all measures within its power” to prevent acts that amount to or contribute to the crime of genocide. In doing so it may even prohibit specific acts identified in the Convention, such as deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the threatened group.
The ICJ did indeed order a ceasefire in the case of Ukraine, but as was pointed out to me in response to a previous thread, this was an entirely different case. Ukraine did not claim that it was the victim of genocide, but rather that unsubstantiated Russian accusations of genocide against Ukraine were being used by Russia to justify military operations on Ukrainian territory. It was on this basis that Ukraine requested, and the ICJ ordered, Russia to halt those operations.
Although South Africa has in the present case asked the Court to order an “immediate” suspension of Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip in order to prevent further Israeli violations of the Genocide Convention, it has not asked the Court to specifically rule on the legality of Israel’s military operations against the Gaza Strip. The ICJ is therefore highly unlikely to offer its view on the matter by, for example, declaring Israel’s Operation Iron Sword illegal or intrinsically genocidal and on this basis ordering it to a halt.
On the basis of the above I do not expect the ICJ – which does not operate in a vacuum – to voluntarily wade into a political hornet’s nest and order a ceasefire. Even if it did, such a ruling would be dead on arrival because Israel has already stated it would ignore it. The Court does not have the power to enforce its rulings. That role is performed by the United Nations Security Council. And so long as the United States remains a veto-wielding permanent member of the Council, it will block any attempt by the ICJ to prevent Israel from committing genocide. I have it on good authority the US constitution will soon include a 28th amendment codifying Israeli impunity.
It would in my view therefore be a mistake to judge the Friday ICJ Order by whether or not it calls for a ceasefire. It won’t, for reasons largely unrelated to the substance of this case, and even if it did this would have only symbolic value and have zero impact on the ground.
Much more important, in my view, is whether the Court issues any provisional measures at all. If it does anything other than dismiss South Africa’s application this would be hugely significant, because it means the world’s highest court has judged that South Africa has made a plausible case that Israel is in violation of the Genocide Convention and that its allegations deserve a full hearing. Think of it as a formal accusation requiring a proper and full trial. And any provisional measures mean there will be that full trial.
As has been noted elsewhere, the Court is at this stage not determining whether or not Israel is guilty of the crime of genocide. Rather, it is only examining whether South Africa has plausibly accused Israel of genocide, and if so what “provisional measures” are required to prevent irreparable harm pending the conclusion of the hearings. If it indeed proceeds to that stage, these hearings can be expected to last several years. (The Bosnia case was initiated in 1993 and concluded in 2007, the Myanmar case was launched in 2019 and remains ongoing.)
While anything is possible Friday, including an ICJ ruling that either dismisses the case or orders a ceasefire, many specialists expect neither. Rather, they seem to believe that the Court will agree to proceed with the case and adopt more generic provisional measures. This would, as noted, be hugely significant. It means that Israel stands legitimately accused of genocide, widely considered the most serious crime on the books, “the crime of crimes”.
The state that claims to be a “Light unto the nations”, that claims to have “the most moral army in the world” because it fights according to the code of “purity of arms”, and that claims to exist so that “Never Again”, will stand accused of intentionally seeking to destroy a group of people on the basis of their identity, and be forced to defend itself. A searchlight unto the nations, determined to do it yet again. Irrespective of the ultimate outcome, it is a stain from which Israel will never recover.
I am indebted to Ardi Imseis, professor of law at Queen’s University, for pointing out a further significant aspect of an ICJ Order on provisional measures: “The Convention is not just about the punishment of the crime of genocide, it is also about the prevention of the crime of genocide. Once you have a plausible case of genocide, which is implied if the Court does issue a provisional measures order, that triggers a positive obligation on the part of other signatories to the Genocide Convention: to prevent genocide. This leads to the need to adjust their own policies vis-à-vis the occupying power’s actions in Gaza, including arms transfers and diplomatic protection.”
In other words, judge the ICJ Order Friday by whether it endorses or dismisses South Africa’s application, not on the basis of whether or not it orders measures that Israel will ignore and the US render meaningless.
It is also worth reflecting on how far South Africa has come since its white minority regime was one of Israel’s closest allies. Given Israel’s long and sordid record of alliances with anti-Semites, it should come as no surprise that many of the South African apartheid regime’s ruling National Party leaders, such as D.F Malan, H.F. Verwoerd, John Vorster, and P.W. Botha, actively supported the Nazis during WWII or otherwise openly espoused anti-Semitic policies. During the 1970s and 1980s both Israel and South Africa were international pariahs, bringing these institutionally racist, supremacist states even closer together. US intelligence strongly suspected that they jointly conducted a nuclear test in the Indian Ocean in 1979. Birds of a feather.
Today of course South Africa is a if not the leader of the free world, while the US and EU merely posture, preaching slogans – as we see in Gaza today – primarily honoured in the breach. And speaking of nuclear weapons and sanctimonious posturing, Israeli cabinet minister Amichai Eliyahu today once again advocated dropping a nuclear bomb on the Gaza Strip. “Even in The Hague they know my position”, he noted.
Why does he speak so brazenly? Because when he previously advocated nuclear war in late 2023, each and every Western capital ignored his genocidal advocacy and looked the other way. Because their official position is that Israel does not possess the nuclear weapons it has, and only Iran is a proliferation risk. That’s how their disintegrating rules-based international order operates.
17 January: Genocide at ICJ
South Africa’s application to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accusing Israel of genocide is, to the best of my understanding, only the fourth time a state has been accused before this court of violating the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The other three are: Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro(1993-2007); The Gambia v Myanmar (2019-); Ukraine v Russian Federation (2022-). In other words, the first case was submitted to the Court more than four decades after the Convention was adopted.
Each case is of course very different, and only in the case of Bosnia has a final ruling been issued. But the others are worth examining for clues they might provide about how the Court will deal with the case initiated by South Africa. I should add from the outset that I’m not a specialist in either international law or the Genocide Convention, and that we also need to take into consideration that the composition of the Court, as well as the legal and political environment in which it operates, has changed over the years.
The Bosnia case lasted fourteen years from the time it was submitted in 1993 until a final ruling was issued in 2007. There were a number of reasons for this, such as disputes about the standing of the parties and their status as parties to the Genocide Convention after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. These will not be at issue in the Palestine case. Secondly, Bosnia’s main accusation was that the Government of Serbia in Belgrade exercised command responsibility over Bosnian Serb forces organized within the framework of Republika Srpska, which introduced a further complicating element that will not figure in the South African claim against Israel.
The first observation is that the Court issued provisional measures (akin to an injunction) within a few short weeks of Bosnia’s initial 1993 application. These were however of a fairly general nature, instructing Serbia “to take all measures within its power to prevent commission of the crime of genocide”. Even though war was raging throughout Bosnia at that time, it did not make any specific demands regarding, for example, an immediate and comprehensive cessation of hostilities. This may reflect the reality that the Court had not yet established whether or not Serbia exercised command responsibility over the forces of Republika Srpska.
The second observation concerns the Court’s final 2007 ruling. Having considered all the evidence, which was voluminous given the documentation collected and made available to the Court by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the ICJdetermined that only the 1995 Srebrenica massacre qualified as an act of genocide. Neither the numerous other massacres, mass rapes, or concentration camps the Court considered were assessed to qualify as genocide. Where the Court felt that the criteria of intent was insufficiently substantiated, or that there was at least one plausible alternative to genocide as the motivation for particular atrocities, it rejected the claim that these constituted acts of genocide. Whether the Court would have characterized the entire military campaign rather than individual acts as genocide if it had reached different conclusions about other events is to me unclear, but I suspect not.
Because the case was brought to the ICJ pursuant to the Genocide Convention, and war crimes and crimes against humanity fall outside its purview, the Court drew no further conclusions with respect to acts it determined were not genocidal in character.
In its judgements the ICJ generally followed the lead of the ICTY. This raises the possibility that in adjudicating South Africa’s claims the Court may look into the conclusions reached by the investigation into “The Situation in Palestine” by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC). If so, it will take all of three minutes to do so because, pretensions and press statements notwithstanding, there is no ICC investigation and can therefore be no conclusions to consider. Would such a scenario compel ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan to begin to take his job and responsibilities seriously and finish his homework? Don’t hold your breath, you’re guaranteed to asphyxiate.
The Court also found that Serbia was not responsible for the genocidal act in Srebrenica perpetrated by the forces of Republika Srpska, because it did not exercise command responsibility over them. What was interesting in this respect was the dissenting opinion of the ICJ Vice President, Judge Awn Al-Khasawneh of Jordan. Al-Khasawneh took the view that, going beyond the stringent requirements concerning intent imposed by the Genocide Convention, the majority chose to adopt an unrealistically high bar, and could and should have inferred intent from conduct to a greater extent than they did.
Al-Khasawneh additionally argued that his colleagues would have reached a different conclusion if they had gained access to the “redacted” sections of documents provided by Serbia’s Supreme Defence Council, and that they had the “power to do so”. Those who think South Africa merely needs to present the avalanche of available facts to the ICJ to substantiate its case would do well to read Al-Khasawneh’s dissent. And take into consideration that Serbia had considerably fewer friends on the court than does Israel.
In the Myanmar case, which has been ongoing since 2019 and concerns Gambia’s claim that Myanmar has committed genocide against the Rohingya in that country’s Rakhine State, provisional measures were also issued within weeks of the initial application. As in the Bosnia case these were also general in nature, but closely reflected the general nature of Gambia’s requests. (NB: Gambia’s invocation of its responsibilities to prevent and punish genocide by other signatories of the Convention, even though it was itself not directly affected by Myanmar’s actions, was accepted by the Court and served as a template for South Africa’s proceedings against Israel.)
Of particular interest in this case is that Gambia identified Myanmar’s “clearance operations”, the systematic destruction of Rohingya villages designed at “removing them from Myanmar”, as evidence of its genocidal intent and policy. This even though ethnic cleansing was specifically considered and excluded from the definition of genocide by the delegates who finalized the Convention in 1948. If the ICJ takes the view that these actions demonstrate an intent to erase the Rohingya identity and are thus indeed genocidal, this could have implications for its assessment of Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip, which have included systematic destruction of the entire territory, to the extent that it now looks different from space.
The second noteworthy aspect is that Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom in November 2023 – just one month before South Africa launched its case against Israel – submitted a joint declaration to the ICJ supporting Gambia’s allegations against Myanmar. In their joint declaration these governments make numerous statements revealing an expansive interpretation of genocide and of the application of the Genocide Convention.
I’m inclined to suggest that it will be very hard for them to reverse course and say they didn’t really mean what they said in order to ensure their observations and analysis are not applied to Israel. But, as always when dealing with European governments, assume consistency and principle at your peril. Germany for one has already haughtily denounced the South African application, and among these governments only Canada has come out in open support of the ICJ (while indicating this does not mean it supports the South African case). Given that that the recent Dutch elections were won by Geert Wilders, a platinum blond airhead who thinks Jordan is Palestine, and all-around Israel flunkie, don’t be surprised if the Dutch government – should Wilders come to lead it – expels the ICJ from The Netherlands if it proceeds with this case. When it comes to perpetuating Israeli impunity, anything goes.
The most recent case was that launched by Ukraine against Russia in 2022. Like the Myanmar case, it remains ongoing. Nevertheless, it too has already produced several points of interest.
First and foremost, the Court on this occasion issued Provisional Measures that went beyond the general obligation not to violate the Genocide Convention. It specifically called on Russia to “immediately suspend” its military operations within Ukrainian territory. Secondly, the Court one week later issued a new set of Provisional Measures expediting its consideration of the case.
The Ukraine case is somewhat different from the others in that Ukraine is not accusing Russia of genocide. Rather, it is rejecting an accusation made against it by Russia in multiple official statements, but not before the ICJ pursuant to the Genocide Convention. Ukraine claims that Russia has falsely accused it of genocide, and that Russia is using this false allegation as a justification for its invasion of Ukraine. It on this basis requested an end to Russian military operations within Ukraine as a provisional measure.
The Court found that Ukraine presented a plausible case that it is not engaged in genocideand decided provisional measures accordingly. Additionally, the Court considered it “doubtful” that the Genocide Convention authorizes the unilateral use of force against a foreign state to enforce the Convention. This explains the explicit ceasefire order, issue to Russia alone, as compared to the more general provisional measures the Court issued in the other cases. Like Israel during the 2004 Advisory Opinion on the West Bank Wall, Russia chose not to participate in the proceedings and was therefore not in a position to contest Ukraine’s various claims.
While South Africa has called for a cessation of Israeli military activity in the Gaza Strip, if this is accepted by the Court it would be for very different reasons than in the Ukraine case. In other words, the Provisional Measures adopted by the ICJ in Ukraine don’t constitute much of a precedent for Gaza.
Interestingly, the Court rejected the intervention of the United States in the Ukraine case at this stage of the proceedings (unclear if in full or in part), on the grounds that Washington in 1948 entered a reservation upon its ratification of the Convention that its prior consent must be obtained for its involvement in any subsequent case. It had forgotten to provide it. Or something like that. Team Biden will no doubt be more diligent when it comes to defending its favorite protégé.
The above cases may or may not be relevant as South Africa proceeds with its claims against Israel. But it’s useful information nonetheless. All the documents cited are available on the ICJ website, and well worth reading.
3 January: Revisiting a "Death Zone"
According to a 2 January NYT article, US intelligence sources are claiming that both Hamas and Islamic Jihad were using Al-Shifa Hospital as a “command center”, and also held captives there, until shortly before it was invaded by the Israeli military in November of last year.
The report is interesting for several reasons. So far as I can recall, no US intelligence source was available to be directly quoted on the matter when the US was supporting Israeli allegations about the hospital last November. Rather, it was left to Biden, Blinken, and Kirby to claim that US intelligence had independently verified Israeli claims about the hospital and thus justify its transformation into what the World Health Organization called a “death zone”.
Now, more than a month after the fact, a “senior US intelligence official” is suddenly willing to speak to the press, to state that Israel’s accusations “were at least partially correct”. NYT notes that its intelligence sources “provided no visual evidence” to back up their account, so – like Iraqi WMD – we will have to take their confirmation on faith.
The other curious aspect concerns timing. Why would US intelligence, which remained mum when it mattered, suddenly go public in early January? Particularly if, as previously claimed, it already had independent verification in November.
I suspect this development has everything to do with the upcoming session of the International Court of Justice, which in about ten days will consider the application by South Africa instituting proceedings against Israel pursuant to the Genocide Convention. Israel needs a few “slam dunks” before the court convenes, and its sponsors are readily obliging in order to ensure the genocide can continue undisturbed.
30 December: Taxing Transfers
The Israeli correspondent Barak Ravid had an interesting article in Axios on 29 December. The article in question, about a recent phone call between Biden and Netanyahu, deals in part with US efforts to persuade Israel to transfer the Palestinian tax receipts it owes to the Palestinian Authority (PA). First, a little background:
From the outset of the occupation in 1967 Israel enforced a common market and customs union between Israel and the occupied territories. This meant trade and monetary policy, and matters such as customs duties, taxation, and currency, were unilaterally determined by Israel and imposed on the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip - foreign territory whose Palestinians are not Israeli citizens.
Palestinians paid the same tariffs and same sales tax as Israelis. Foreign trade was fully controlled by Israel. If, for example, Palestinians wanted to export oranges from the Gaza Strip or olive oil from the West Bank to Europe, they could not do so directly. Rather, they had to sell their produce to Israel’s Agricultural Export Company AGREXCO, which would then export them to Europe as Israeli products. AGREXCO was also the main exporter of illegal Israeli settlement products to Europe. The Europeans, who like to sanctimoniously pontificate to the rest of the world about human rights and the rule of law, didn’t give a damn about such practices and formed AGREXCO’s largest market. Thankfully, the company went bankrupt in 2011.
The crucial point about the enforced common market is that Israel formulated economic policy based on what was best for the Israeli economy, and then imposed these policies wholesale upon the Palestinian economy. Given the growing disparity between the two economies over time, it created a situation where Palestinians earned like Jordanians but were taxed like Israelis, but unlike either Jordanians or Israelis couldn’t trade freely with the rest of the world.
One of Israel’s main priorities in the 1993 Oslo Accords was to ensure that the Palestinians would not become economically independent. Which meant Israel was determined to prevent the PA from having the authority to develop trade and monetary policies of its own. The 1994 Israeli-Palestinian Protocol on Economic Relations, also known as the Paris Protocol and incorporated into the Oslo Accords, achieved this.
Pursuant to its terms the common market and customs union continued unabated. The New Israeli Shekel (NIS) – introduced in the 1980s after the Israeli Lira (IL) became worthless on account of rampant inflation in the wake of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon – remained legal tender within territory where the PA had jurisdiction. The PA was prohibited from issuing a currency of its own. VAT was determined by Israel, and the PA was obliged to adjust its own VAT (sales tax) rate commensurate with whatever Israel decided. The same applied to customs (import) duties and related tariffs. What the Palestinians could (and could not) import and export was also determined by Israel.
Egypt and Jordan, which both had peace treaties with Israel, could not freely export their products to PA territories or import from them, since such matters were regulated by the Paris Protocol. If I remember correctly there was a schedule indicating which items Jordanian companies were permitted to export to the PA, and in which quantities.
The key instrument in Israel’s hands to enforce such arrangements was its continued control over borders, between the West Bank and Jordan, and until the 2005 disengagement between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. The PA presence at these borders during the 1990s never entailed control. A Palestinian returning to Nablus from Beijing or London via the Allenby Bridge that connects Jordan to the West Bank, for example, would give his passport to a PA border official, who would then give it to the Israeli soldier sitting in a booth behind him concealed by a two-way mirror. If the Palestinian was wanted for questioning, harassment, or arrest by the Israelis, he would be delivered to them. This cosmetic arrangement was abolished during the Second Intifada when Israel once again took full and direct control.
Pursuant to the Paris Protocol Israel also has full control over the clearance of imports and the collection of customs. This means that Israel has the right to inspect and approve/reject any imports destined for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It also means that Israel collects, on the PA’s behalf, all import duties and related tariffs on goods and services destined for these territories. As specified in the Paris Protocol, Israel shall at the end of each month transfer to the PA the various taxes and duties it has collected on its behalf, less a three percent processing fee. The same arrangement applies taxes paid by Palestinians who work in Israel, from which Israel deducts twenty-five per cent. (Somewhat more, since the three percent processing fee is applied to the sum total of the entire monthly payment).
Although Israel since 2005 no longer has control over the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, these arrangements still apply to goods and services imported to Gaza from Israel, which account for the majority of imports in view of Egypt’s collaboration and enforcement of the Israeli blockade.
The Palestinians should of course never have accepted such an iniquitous arrangement, and should have immediately recognised the potential – in my view the absolute certainty – that Israel would use and abuse these arrangements for political gain. But the Palestinian leadership was excessively eager to get the ball rolling once the Oslo Accords were signed, and acted on the assumption that the Paris Protocol, like Oslo, consisted of interim arrangements that would expire within five years – i.e. by 1999, and be superseded by a different treaty.
The monthly payments, it needs to be emphasised, consisted exclusively of Palestinian funds that Israel insisted on collecting on the PA’s behalf. In exchange Israel accepted a legal/treaty obligation to transfer these funds to the PA on a monthly basis. These transfer also accounted for over two-thirds of the PA budget. In other words, it didn’t take Israel long to realise that its ability to withhold the transfers constituted a powerful instrument that could be exploited for political leverage. Starting already in the late 1990s Israel – during Netanyahu’s first term of office – would periodically withhold monthly payments under various pretexts in order to weaken the PA or pressure it to accept various Israeli demands.
Over time, Israel also began unilaterally deducting sums from these transfer payments to settle the debts of Palestinian companies and individuals – not debts of the PA itself – owed to Israel companies.
At other times Israel has refused to transfer the full amount of the monthly payment, claiming objection to the intended destination of that portion of the transfers it is withholding (e.g. social security payments to families of Palestinians languishing in Israeli prisons or killed by Israel’s soldiers and settlers). In other words, Israel has claimed the right to determine how the PA spends its budget. On previous occasions, the PA has refused to accept partial payments. This has produced a budgetary crisis, meaning that the PA cannot pay the salaries of its security forces, whose main role is to enforce the occupation on Israel’s behalf. Pressure on the Israeli government from the Israeli security establishment, Washington, and Brussels, equally committed to keeping the occupation running smoothly until the end of time, has tended to resolve the issue.
Although Hamas seized power in the Gaza Strip in 2007, part of the PA’s budget is still destined for the enclave. Initially these were limited to for example pension payments to retired PA employees or salary payments to those who obeyed orders from Ramallah to go on strike against Hamas rule. More recently, agreements were reached between the PA and Hamas whereby the PA would use that portion of the monthly transfer Israel had collected from Gaza, to pay the salaries of civil servants in the Gaza Strip, and to cover the costs of its medicine imports, of electricity imported from Israel, and the like. This amounts to some thirty per cent of the monthly transfer.
After the 7 October Hamas attacks Israel’s finance minister, the far-right messianic Zionist Bezalel Smotrich, who advocates – for starters – dismantling the PA and the immediate and total annexation of the West Bank, proclaimed that he would halt the monthly transfers on the spurious pretext that the PA supported the attacks and bore responsibility for them. After public condemnation from the Israeli security establishment, which feared the impact the measure would have on Palestinian security forces in the West Bank at a time the Israeli military was pre-occupied with its genocide in the Gaza Strip, Smotrich partially relented. He agreed to transfer the monthly payment to the PA, but insisted on withholding the thirty per cent the PA would normally disburse in or on behalf of the Gaza Strip.
Once again demonstrating unyielding principle when it comes to money, Abbas refused to accept a partial payment. Netanyahu, recognising an opportunity to further weaken the PA, probably agrees with Smotrich. More importantly, he needs the flamethrowing extremist onside to keep his governing coalition intact.
Which brings us back to Ravid, Biden, and Netanyahu. According to Ravid’s narration, Biden has been seeking to persuade Netanyahu to transfer the fund to the PA so that its security forces receive their salaries and won’t produce another crisis for Israel in the West Bank. Biden also believes the PA can be sufficiently strengthened to rule what’s left of the Gaza Strip after the genocide runs its course. Netanyahu by contrast has repeatedly and publicly opposed any role for the PA in the Gaza Strip. His preference is that there will be no one left in the territory to govern, and failing that he would like to see local notables subservient to Israel administer different sectors of the enclave. But Netanyahu also understands that Israel’s genocide is entirely dependent upon Biden’s unconditional military and diplomatic support, and therefore has to pretend he’s taking US concerns seriously.
To this end, Netanyahu had during a previous call with Biden proposed sending the withheld portion of the payment to Norway, which would retain it until arrangements are found to satisfy Israel that none of the funds would go to Hamas (which they weren’t in the first place). Presented with this option by the Americans, Abbas agreed. It seems Israel was banking on a PA rejection, and faced with its acceptance began to backtrack. During their most recent phone call, Netanyahu indicated to Biden that he was having second thoughts because he doesn’t trust the Norwegians, and that Biden should instead be pressuring Abbas to accept a partial payment. According to Ravid, Biden was sufficiently upset with Netanyahu that he abruptly ended the call.
Ravid then quotes US officials variously describing Biden as frustrated because he “is going out on a limb for Bibi every day and when Bibi needs to give something back and take some political risk he is unwilling to do it”; as satisfied because Netanyahu indicated Israel hasn’t rejected the Norwegian option and is “still working through things on their end"; and as having had a “good and productive” conversation with Netanyahu.
In other words Biden, who wants to see the PA empowered and installed in the Gaza Strip, never thought to insist that Israel simply fulfil its treaty obligations towards the PA. He instead spent the phone call trying to convince Netanyahu to accept Netanyahu’s own proposal. When this failed, he also didn’t simply insist that Israel implement its own initiative and be done with it. As I’ve previously noted in response to reports that Biden and his senior advisors destest Netanyahu, the latter must be thinking: With enemies like these, who needs friends?
Netanyahu’s problem is that unless Smotrich concedes, Netanyahu can’t accept his own proposal without entering into conflict with Smotrich. That is a conflict that could see Israel’s governing coalition implode.
Seen in broader perspective this is essentially an argument between Biden, Netanyahu, and Smotrich about which of them has the right to choose who rules the Gaza Strip. Biden wants the PA, Netanyahu wants hand-picked cronies answerable to Israel, and Smotrich wants to re-establish Israel’s settlements in the territory. The idea that this issue should be determined by Palestinians is equally rejected by all of them.
As Khalid Turani deftly summarised this Israeli government infighting amidst Israeli-US policy differences: a gang of bankrobbers start fighting about how to divide the loot before leaving the premises, then get in a fight with the driver of their getaway car about which escape route to take.
Given the state of Israel’s efforts in the Gaza Strip, soon to enters its fourth month, he might also have added that the brawl is taking place the night before the robbery, and that the gangsters have yet to figure out how to crack the safe.
Link to Barak Ravid Article: https://www.axios.com/2023/12/28/biden-netanyahu-call-palestinian-authority-tax-revenue
28 December: Transfer
Senior Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, are again publicly advocating the ethnic cleansing of the Gaza Strip. Their proposals are being presented as voluntary emigration schemes, in which Israel is merely playing the role of Good Samaritan, selflessly mediating with foreign governments to find new homes for destitute and desperate Palestinians. But it is ethnic cleansing all the same.
Alarm bells should have started ringing in early November when US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and other Western politicians began insisting there could be “no forcible displacement of Palestinians from Gaza”. Rather than rejecting any mass removal of Palestinians, Blinken and colleagues objected only to optically challenging expulsions at gunpoint. The option of “voluntary” displacement by leaving residents of the Gaza Strip with no choice but departure was pointedly left open.
Ethnic cleansing, or “transfer” as it is known in Israeli parlance, has a long pedigree that goes back to the late-nineteenth-century beginnings of the Zionist movement. While the early Zionists adopted the slogan, “A Land Without a People for a People Without a Land”, the evidence demonstrates that, from the very outset, their leaders knew better. More to the point, they clearly understood that the Palestinians formed the main obstacle to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. This is for the simple reason that to them a “Jewish state” denotes one in which its Jewish population acquires and maintains unchallenged demographic, territorial, and political supremacy.
Enter “transfer”. As early as 1895 Theodor Herzl, the founder of the contemporary Zionist movement, identified the necessity of removing the inhabitants of Palestine in the following terms: “We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our own country ... expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly.” David Ben-Gurion (née Grün), Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, and later Israel’s first prime minister, was more blunt. In a 1937 letter to his son, he wrote: “We must expel the Arabs and take their place”.
Writing in his diary in 1940 Yosef Weitz, a senior Jewish National Fund official who chaired the influential Transfer Committee before and during the Nakba (“Catastrophe”), and became known as the Architect of Transfer, put it thus: “The only solution is a Land of Israel devoid of Arabs. There is no room here for compromise. They must all be moved. Not one village, not one tribe can remain. Only through this transfer of the Arabs living in the Land of Israel will redemption come”. His diaries are littered with similar sentiments.
The point of the above is not to demonstrate that individual Zionist leaders held such views, but that the senior leadership of the Zionist movement consistently considered the ethnic cleansing of Palestine an objective and priority. Initiatives such as the Transfer Committee, and Plan Dalet, initially formulated in 1944 and described by the pre-eminent Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi as the “Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine”, additionally demonstrate that the Zionist movement actively planned for it. The 1948 Nakba, during which more than four-fifths of Palestinians residing in territory that came under Israeli rule were ethnically cleansed, should therefore be seen as the fulfilment of a longstanding ambition and implementation of a key policy. A product of design, not of war. Historical Christmas footnote: the Palestinian town of Nazareth was spared a similar fate only because the commander of Israeli forces that seized the city, a Canadian Jew named Ben Dunkelman, disobeyed orders to expel the population. He was relieved of his command the following day.
That the Nakba was a product of design is further substantiated by the Transfer Committee’s terms of reference. These comprised not only proposals for the expulsion of the Palestinians but, just as importantly, active measures to prevent their return; destroy their homes and villages; expropriate their property; and resettle these territories with Jewish immigrants. Weitz, together with fellow Committee members Eliahu Sassoon and Ezra Danin, on 5 June 1948 presented a three-page blueprint, entitled “Scheme for the Solution of the Arab Problem in the State of Israel”, to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to achieve these goals. According to leading Israeli historian Benny Morris, “there is no doubt Ben-Gurion agreed to Weitz’s scheme”, which included “what amounted to an enormous project of destruction” that saw more then 450 Palestinian villages razed to the ground.
The understandable focus on the expulsions of 1948 often overlooks the fact that ethnic cleansing remains incomplete unless its victims are barred from returning to their homes by a combination of armed force and legislation, and thereafter replaced by others. It is Israel’s determination to make Palestinian dispossession permanent that distinguishes Palestinian refugees from many other war refugees.
After 1948 Israel put out a whole series of fabrications to shift responsibility for the transformation of the Palestinians into dispossessed and stateless refugees onto the Arab states and the refugees themselves. These included claims that the refugees voluntarily left (they were either expelled or fled in justified terror); that Arab radio broadcasts ordered the Palestinians to flee (in fact they were encouraged to stay put); that Israel conducted a population exchange with Arab states (there was nothing of the sort); and the bizarre argument that because they’re Arabs, Palestinians had numerous other states while Jews have only Israel (by the same logic Sikhs would be entitled to seize British Columbia and deport its population to either the rest of Canada or the United States). More importantly, even if uniformly substantiated none of these pretexts entitles Israel to prohibit the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes at the conclusion of hostilities. It is, furthermore, a right that was consecrated in United Nations General Assembly 194 of 11 December 1948, which has been re-affirmed repeatedly since.
In 1967 Israel seized the remaining 22 per cent of Mandatory Palestine – the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. Depopulation in these territories operated differently than in 1948. Most importantly Israel, in addition to prohibiting the return of Palestinians who fled hostilities during the 1967 June War, and encouraging others to leave (by for example providing a daily bus service from Gaza City to the Allenby Bridge connecting the West Bank to Jordan), during the summer of 1967 conducted a census. Any resident who was not present during the census was ineligible for an Israeli identity document and automatically lost their right of residency.
As a result the population of these territories declined by more than twenty per cent overnight. Many of those thus displaced were already refugees from 1948. Aqbat Jabr Refugee Camp near Jericho for example, until 1967 the West Bank’s largest, became a virtual ghost town after almost all its inhabitants became refugees once again in Jordan. So many Palestinians from the Gaza Strip ended up in Jordan that a new refugee camp, Gaza Camp, was established on the outskirts of Jerash. The occupied Palestinian territories would not recover their 1967 population levels until the early 1980s.
Within the West Bank there were also cases of mass expulsion. These included the town of Qalqilya, which was additionally slated for demolition but to which its residents were later permitted to return. Those of ‘Imwas (the Biblical Emmaus), Bayt Nuba, and Yalu in Jerusalem’s Latrun salient were less fortunate. They were summarily expelled (many today live in Ramallah’s Qaddura Refugee Camp), their villages demolished and annexed to Israel, and replaced by Canada Park, so named because the project was completed with donations from the Canadian Jewish community. Within Jerusalem’s Old City the historic Mughrabi Quarter, abutting the Haram al-Sharif, was summarily razed to make way for a plaza astride the Wailing Wall. With many residents given only minutes to evacuate their homes, several were killed when the bulldozers went to work. According to Eitan Ben-Moshe, an engineer who oversaw the atrocity, “We threw out the wreckage of houses together with the Arab corpses”.
In subsequent years Israel employed all kinds of administrative shenanigans to further reduce the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Until the 1993 Oslo Accords, for example, an exit permit from Israel’s military government was required to leave the occupied territories. It was valid for only three years, and thereafter renewable annually for a maximum of three additional years, for a fee, at an Israeli consulate. If a Palestinian lost an exit permit, or failed to renew an exit permit prior to its expiration for any reason (including bureaucratic foot-dragging), or couldn’t pay the renewal fee, or failed to return to Palestine prior to its expiration, that Palestinian automatically lost residency rights. Separately, Israel over the years deported numerous activists and community leaders, primarily to Jordan and Lebanon. During the late 1960s and 1970s it also exiled Gaza Palestinians accused of resisting the occupation, along with their families, to prison camps in the occupied Sinai Peninsula. Among those who spent time there was the iconic Palestinian leader Haidar Abdel-Shafi.
A particularly notable case of administrative deportations occurred in 1992, after Israeli special forces botched an operation to rescue an Israeli soldier who had been seized by Hamas to exchange him for their imprisoned leader, Shaikh Ahmad Yasin. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin ordered the summary deportation of approximately 400 Palestinians, many of them prisoners affiliated with Hamas and Islamic Jihad (PIJ), none accused of involvement in the incident that led to Rabin’s frenzied rage.
In contrast to previous deportations, which were considered permanent, these were for one- and two-year terms. In its rush to carry out the deportations under cover of night, Israel expelled a number of Palestinians who were not on its list, and left behind others who were. Needless to say the mass expulsion was, as always in such matters, approved by Israel’s High Court of Justice after minor modifications. It ruled, among other things, that this was not a collective deportation but rather a collection of individual deportations. Perhaps more significantly the deportees were stuck in an inhospitable no-man’s land, Marj al-Zuhur, because Lebanon refused to facilitate the deportations by receiving them. During their involuntary residence in Marj al-Zuhur, assistance came primarily from Hizballah, and it was during this period that relations between Hamas, PIJ, and Hizballah were solidified.
With the focus in recent years on the intensified campaigns of ethnic cleansing in the West Bank, it is often forgotten that for decades the primary target for depopulation was the Gaza Strip, and particularly its refugee population which accounts for approximately three-quarters of the territory’s residents. Even before it occupied Gaza in 1967, Israel regularly promoted initiatives to achieve the “thinning” of its refugee population, with destinations as far afield as Libya and Iraq. Not without reason, Israel’s leaders felt uncomfortable with the presence of so many ethnically-cleansed Palestinians within walking distance of their former homes. After 1967 it encouraged Palestinian emigration from the Gaza Strip to not only foreign countries but also the West Bank.
In 1969 Israel even devised a scheme to send 60,000 Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to Paraguay with offers of lucrative employment. The plan was negotiated between Paraguay’s military dictator Alfredo Stroessner and Mossad, the Israeli foreign intelligence agency. It was of course purely coincidental that shortly thereafter Mossad discovered it no longer had the resources to hunt Nazi fugitives in Paraguay, which had been their destinations of choice. The scheme was discontinued when several of its victims, upon realising the promise of a new life of comfort was all a sham, shot up the Israeli embassy in Asuncion, killing one of its staff.
In the decades since, “transfer”, often presented as the encouragement of voluntary emigration either by providing material incentives or making the conditions of life impossible, has become increasingly mainstreamed in Israeli political life. In 2019, for example, a “senior government official”, quoted in the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz, expressed a willingness to help Palestinians emigrate from the Gaza Strip.
Mass expulsion has been gaining its share of adherents as well, and it is a position that is today represented within Israel’s coalition government. As has the idea that “transfer" should include Palestinian citizens of Israel. Avigdor Lieberman for example, several years ago Israel’s Minister of Defense, is an advocate of not only emptying the West Bank and Gaza Strip of Palestinians, but of getting rid of Palestinian citizens of Israel as well. As one might expect from a minister in charge of the Israeli military, he is also an advocate of “beheading” disloyal Palestinian citizens of Israel with “an axe”.
Against this background Israel saw the attacks of 7 October as not only a threat but also as an opportunity. Fortified with unconditional US and European support, Israeli political and military leaders immediately began promoting the transfer of Gaza’s Palestinian population to the Sinai desert. The proposal was enthusiastically embraced by the United States, and by Secretary of State Antony Blinken in particular. As ever hopelessly out of his depth when it comes to the Middle East, he appears to have genuinely believed he could recruit or pressure Washington’s Arab client regimes to make Israel’s wish a reality. Given Egyptian strongman Abdel-Fatah Sisi’s economic troubles, the fallout of the Menendez scandal, and looming Egyptian presidential elections, it was suggested to him by the Washington echo chamber that it would take only an IMF loan, debt relief, and a promise to file away Menendez to bring Cairo on board. As so often when it comes to the Middle East Blinken, armed only with Israel’s latest wish list, didn’t have a clue his indecent proposal would be categorically rejected, first and foremost by Egypt.
The fallback position is opposition to “forcible displacement” at the point of a gun, while anything else is fair game. This includes reducing the Gaza Strip to rubble in what may well be the most intensive bombing campaign in history; a genocidal assault on an entire society that has killed civilians at an unprecedentedly rapid pace; the deliberate destruction of an entire civilian infrastructure, including the targeted obliteration of its health and education sectors; the highest proportion of households in hunger crisis ever recorded globally and the real prospect of pre-meditated famine; severance of the water and electricity supply leading to acute thirst, widespread consumption of non-potable water, and termination of sewage treatment; and promotion of a sharp rise in infectious disease. One Israeli soldier has already died of a fungal infection resulting from the collapse in sanitation he helped bring about in the Gaza Strip. How many Palestinians have been consumed by similar illness we do not know, but it is reasonable to assume that children and the elderly are hit particularly hard.
In other words, if desperate Palestinians seek to flee this seventh circle of hell to save their skins, that’s considered voluntary emigration, their choice. If they cannot remain in the Gaza Strip because Israel has made it unfit for human habitation with US weapons, that is a voluntary choice that will be respected. And the US and Israel are only here to help, like Mother Theresa determined to assist every last one of them whether they like it or not. Danny Danon, a member of parliament who was previously Israel’s envoy to the United Nations (the guy who sounds like Elmer Fudd), recently held up the mass displacement of Syrians to multiple shores during the past decade as an example to be emulated. “Even if each country receives ten thousand, twenty thousand Gazans, this is significant”. Asked about Danon’s proposal at a Likud meeting on Christmas Day, Netanyahu responded, “We are working on it. Our problem is [finding] the countries that are willing to absorb [them].” As an editorial in the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz put it on 27 December: “Israeli lawmakers keep pushing for transfer under the guise of humanitarian aid”.
Not to be outdone by the politicians, the Jerusalem Post ran an opinion piece entitled “Why Moving to the Sinai Peninsula is The Solution for Gaza’s Palestinians”. “Sinai”, its author Joel Roskin enthused, “comprises one of the most suitable places on Earth to provide the people of Gaza with hope and a peaceful future”. Not individual Gazans, but “the people of Gaza”. Notably, such proposals consistently take it as a given that those departing will never return. One waits with baited breath for the European Union is expected to respond to these calls for mass expulsion with further investigations of Palestinian textbooks.
While ethnic cleansing has been intrinsic to Zionist/Israeli ideology and practice from the very outset, it also has a flip side: the 1948 expulsion of the Palestinians expanded what had been a conflict between the Zionist movement and the Palestinians into a regional, Arab-Israeli one. The second Nakba Israel is currently inflicting on the Gaza Strip similarly appears well on its way to instigating the renewal of hostilities across the Middle East.
As importantly, the 1948 Nakba did not defeat the Palestinians, who initiated their struggle from the camps of exile, those in the Gaza Strip most prominently among them. It would take a Blinken level of foolishness to assume the expulsion of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip would produce a different outcome.
16 December: Israel Kills Captives
The 15 December killing of three Israeli captives in the Gaza Strip by the Israeli military is significant in several respects.
According to the account provided by Israel the three men, in civilian attire, torsos bared, waving a white flag, and yelling for help in Hebrew, were shot on sight by Israeli snipers who feared they were Palestinian fighters. Two were instantly killed and a third, only wounded, escaped into a nearby building. When he re-emerged in the hope of being rescued, he was shot again, and this time killed. It was only later suspected, and subsequently confirmed, that those killed were in fact Israeli. The Israeli account does not indicate how the three emerged from captivity. It is noteworthy that two of the captives had distinctly European features. Not unknown among Palestinians, but neither common as in Israel.
The incident recalls one in Jerusalem last month, in which an armed Israeli man who had shot at two Palestinian who attacked the Givat Shaul junction was summarily executed by Israeli soldiers after he kneeled down, threw down his weapon, and raised his hands to demonstrate that he didn’t present a threat. The soldiers assumed he was a Palestinians involved in the attack and therefore, as so often in such circumstances, killed rather than arrested him.
According to the Israeli military its soldiers fired at the three captives in error, violating existing rules of engagement. Given numerous reports over the years, including in recent weeks, of Palestinian civilians bearing white flags being shot and killed, this is a demonstrably false statement. Rather, the incident confirms yet again that Israeli soldiers are authorized to shoot dead both surrendering combatants and civilians waving flags of surrender. Under current conditions in the Gaza Strip, and despite the Israeli military being fully aware it may encounter live Israeli captives – ostensibly a key reason for their presence there – it may additionally be the case that soldiers are being encouraged by their commanders to shoot anything that moves, or are excessively trigger-happy given their inexperience and fear of urban combat. Tellingly in this respect the incident took place in the Shuja’iyya neighborhood of Gaza City, which remains the scene of particularly intense fighting and significant Israeli losses, repeated Israeli claims to have subdued it notwithstanding.
Israeli claims that its forces have been targeted by suicide bombers and were therefore on panic alert is also fantasy. Prior to this incident neither Israel nor the Palestinians have reported have reported such attacks, for the simple reason that it makes no sense for Palestinians with access to a considerable arsenal and the means to safely withdraw to needlessly blow themselves up.
Aside from providing an instructive and globally-publicized case study of Israel’s actual rules of engagement, something habitually ignored when the resulting corpses were Palestinian, the incident is significant in additional respects.
Most obviously, it is strong evidence of an Israeli policy to take no prisoners. This would be consistent with the repeatedly stated Israeli intention to kill every member of Hamas, as well as numerous statements by Israeli leaders rejecting any distinction between civilians and combatants in the Gaza Strip.
It furthermore strongly suggests that the number of Hamas fighters Israel has captured are few in number, and that Israeli claims they are surrendering in droves and providing invaluable intelligence in interrogations can be taken with a generous helping of kosher salt. As can the various claims Israeli officials attribute to such interrogations. Quite apart from other evidence that Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other Palestinian organizations retain the will and ability to fight, and that Israeli forces are generally seeking to avoid close-quarter combat, the only images of prisoners thus far provided by the Israeli military concern civilians stripped down to their underwear and paraded before television crews before being forced to surrender weapons handed to them for the occasion by Israeli soldiers.
If Israeli forces are indeed taking the fight directly to Palestinian militants, gaining the upper hand in such encounters, and detaining rather than killing them, the evidence remains absent. Al-Manar, the television station affiliated with Hizballah, as a rule does not broadcast Israeli military propaganda. On this occasion it has made an exception, in order to highlight the distinction between Hamas and PIJ propaganda clips that show direct confrontations with Israeli forces, and Israeli ones that exhibit its soldiers firing with abandon into empty rooms or a hole in the ground in obviously staged performances. Yes, Israeli propaganda has become that ridiculously bad, and then some.
At the political level, the killing of the three captives, taken together with the recovery of the bodies of others killed in Israeli bombing raids or failed rescue operations, could constitute a turning point to the extent that it strengthens the hand of those who insist that Israel can only recover its captives alive through negotiations and payment in kind, and that the continuation of the frenzied bombing and shelling of the Gaza Strip places not only Palestinian but also Israeli lives at risk. Hamas statements that additional Israeli captives have been killed in air and artillery raids may be no more than psychological warfare but also can’t be dismissed, and should be understood in this context.
The view that military pressure is futile and counterproductive has considerable basis in reality, given that Israel conducted its last successful rescue operation in the mid-1970s and has since had to make do with Hollywood movies glorifying its vastly diminished abilities. Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier captured in 2006, was held in the Gaza Strip by Hamas until 2011 despite Israel doing everything within its power to locate him and avoid a negotiated prisoner exchange. It failed, and in the resulting deal over 1,000 Palestinians obtained their freedom. Among them was Yahya Sinwar, today the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and widely considered the architect of the 7 October attacks.
While we already have proof the Palestinians can’t conceal 250 captives and hostages with the same success, it seems reasonable to assume that the most senior military officers captured on 7 October have, like Shalit before them, the visual profile of a needle in a haystack. These are also the individuals Israel’s government is most intent on retrieving or, failing that, killing to reduce their value to their Palestinian captors. See under: Hannibal Directive.
A return to negotiations is promoted most prominently by Hamas, and also by the families of Israeli captives, who have been leading a popular campaign in Israel to urge the Netanyahu government to prioritize the fate of the captives over the illusion of eradicating Hamas, and exchanges of captives over warfare.
More than its previous killings of Israeli captives, the shooting deaths of three Israelis on the verge of freedom by those supposed to secure their release, on the mistaken assumption they were killing a few more Palestinians waving white flags, has significantly intensified the pressure on the Israeli government. It has increased domestic and foreign criticism of the Israeli government and security establishment’s continued prioritization of the onslaught on the Gaza Strip. And it has once again exposed the hollowness of assertions by Israeli leaders that it is precisely this military campaign that is forcing Hamas to release captives. This is for the simple reason that it is Hamas that from the outset insisted that only negotiations would lead to the release of live captives, while Israel had rejected this on the grounds that it would bomb the Palestinians into submission. More than 70 days later it has yet to retrieve a single live captive through armed force.
The situation today is different than that which produced a truce and exchange of captives in late November. Hamas is now insisting it will not negotiate under fire and will only engage in discussions after a cessation of hostilities. Secondly, it has announced that the terms that governed the previous exchange were explicitly negotiated for the release of civilian captives, and that a different formula will need to be agreed for the release of military prisoners.
The Israeli government has also hardened its stance, repeatedly announcing that its military campaign – despite being on the verge of decisive victory almost every time an Israeli leader grabs a microphone – will require at least several additional months to attain its objectives. Several days ago, the government blocked Mossad Director David Barnea from traveling to Qatar to resume talks about a further Israeli-Palestinian exchange of captives. Barnea did subsequently travel to Europe to meet with Qatari Prime Minister Muhammad bin Abdel-Rahman Al-Thani for discussions about a new deal. So while Hamas may not yet be negotiating, negotiations are already taking place.
When the previous truce collapsed on 1 December, I had anticipated that a new one would be concluded within a week or so. It’s now been almost three weeks. I had underestimated Israel’s determination to throw good money after bad, and its desperation to chalk up significant military achievements so that it can declare victory to its constituents and the Israeli public at large. I also mistakenly assumed that Israel’s sponsors in Washington and Brussels, having concluded Israel was not up to the task and is putting them at growing geopolitical disadvantage, would intervene more decisively to wind down this war and thereby contain further regional escalation.
Where we go from here is difficult to predict. A new ceasefire seems likely in the coming weeks, and if one is indeed achieved it can be expected to last for considerably longer than the previous one. It’s a decision that will ultimately be made by Washington, not Israel. Some believe the US has had enough of this war and of Israel’s failure to achieve anything other than genocide, because of the damage it is inflicting on Biden’s 2024 election campaign. Others argue that Biden has already lost the progressive wing of the coalition that elected him in 2020, and is not going to risk additionally alienating the more conservative elements of his party by taking on Netanyahu during an election year. My own view is that Washington will decide not on the basis of what is happening in the Gaza Strip or US, but the broader region. The effective closure of the Red Sea and therefore the Suez Canal to global shipping by Yemen is in this respect hugely significant. Will Washington try to force it open and risk even further escalation, or tell Israel that time is up?
Netanyahu has of late increasingly taken to airing his differences with the US very publicly. He has repeatedly rejected a role for the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip, and on 16 December announced that he has been opposed to the Oslo process for thirty years and repeated his rejection of a two-state settlement and independent Palestinian state. This places Washington in the strange position of needing a decisive Israeli defeat of Hamas to install the PA to the Gaza Strip. It would then need a PA discredited and delegitimized beyond redemption to revive Oslo. And in the ultimate irony a two-state settlement, should Washington ever seriously pursue one, would under such circumstances require the support of Hamas, which unlike Israel has formally accepted this paradigm.
14 December: Human Shields and Suicide Bombers
The following translation of a witness statement from the Gaza Strip was produced by a volunteer with the Palestinian Journalist Syndicate, because it is an account that according to the translator “we find to be highly credible”.
I am not in a position to verify the account provided, but would suggest that doing so is an urgent task for those who claim to oppose human shields and suicide bombings, and demonstrate they are acting in support of a principle rather than of a state. Begin Translation [Brackets indicate the translator’s clarifications]:
Prior to our apprehension within Majda Wasila School, located near Palestine Mosque in the western sector of Gaza City. [When this incident occurred, the civilian was in Majda Wasila School along with his family members and others, near Palestine Mosque in the western part of Gaza City.]
I was approached by an [Israeli] officer who asked my name, occupation, and age. He also sought information regarding my relatives and family.
He then directed me to accompany him. When I asked about our destination, he said: "I am going to present you to your Lord akin to a bride." Clarifying if he meant a groom, he elucidated, "a bride adorned in white attire and makeup." [In this dialogue, the Israeli soldier is making light of the possibility of killing the civilian.]
I was escorted to a location next to a tunnel that belongs to the resistance. There, the Israeli officer outfitted me with a belt containing explosives and a GoPro camera affixed to my head. He secured a rope around my waist, with the directive, "When I tug the rope, you are to return to me." I was held at gunpoint near the tunnel entrance and threatened with harm against my family. While I was resisting compliance with his commands, he suddenly thrust me into the tunnel opening, where I landed and remained for approximately 3 minutes. Then he started yelling [at me to move] and fired shots to force me to move forward in the tunnel. I walked a distance of about 40 meters.
He then pulled me from the tunnel using the rope, and said: "your Lord still does not desire your presence." I was handed over to the soldiers, who received instructions to find another individual of younger age. When I got back outside the tunnel, I discovered my family members still near the tunnel, and a child (15 years old) was taken from the group. Fortunately, he returned unharmed, and I saw him upon my release from detention.
The [Israeli military’s] objective underlying these actions is to avoid entering the tunnel. If the camera affixed to my head had detected the presence of resistance fighters within the tunnel, [the Israeli officer] would have detonated [the explosives on my belt], killing me and others.
Further details will come out in the coming days. End Translation.
An Israeli acquaintance adds: What is described here is not "use of human shields", but rather a much more severe crime: forced conscription of a civilian to act as a suicide bomber on behalf of the IDF. That being said, there is ample evidence that the IDF is also using human shields in recent weeks, both in Gaza and in the West Bank (including one instance in which after using a Palestinian as a human shield the IDF apparently attempted to execute him: at the time reports indicated he survived the shooting).
I would also note that in [Operation] Cast Lead [in 2008-2009] there was a somewhat similar case, which in Israel is dubbed the "Child Procedure" incident, in which a 9-year-old Palestinian child was forced to open bags which the IDF suspected were wired to explode. "Child Procedure" is a paraphrase of "Neighbor Procedure", the IDF-speak for using Palestinians as human shields (a practice notably used by newly popular "leftist" Yair Golan, who called it "very humane". It is widely assumed Golan will lead the leftist-Zionist camp in the upcoming elections).
13 December: Incident in Gaza City
On Monday Israel’s Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant, stated that Hamas’s military force, the Martyr Izz-al-Din al-Qassam Brigades as well as the Jerusalem Battalions of Islamic Jihad (PIJ) were on the verge of collapse. His views have been echoed by most other Israeli military and political leaders, including Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Chief of the General Staff Herzl Halevi and Ronen Bar, Director of the domestic intelligence agency known as Shin Bet or Shabak. These assessments were augmented by reports that Hamas and PIJ leaders are no longer able to command or communicate with their forces, and that the latter, feeling abandoned, are deserting and surrendering in growing numbers. The battle for control over the northern Gaza Strip was effectively over.
Wednesday, Israel announced that ten of its soldiers were killed in a single encounter with the Qassam Brigades in the Shuja’iyya neighborhood on the eastern fringes of Gaza City, i.e. the neighborhood closest to the boundary with Israel. This is the highest daily toll of military casualties reported by Israel since 7 October. Significantly, those killed included a lieutenant colonel who was a battalion commander in the Golani Brigade, a colonel who led a commando brigade, and four majors. More than two dozen soldiers and officers were wounded in the incident.
Significantly, the Israeli soldiers were not killed in street battles but in a carefully prepared and executed two-stage ambush. According to initial Israeli media reports, Israeli and Palestinian forces were engaged in house-to-house combat in the Qasaba quarter of Shuja’iyya, and an Israeli force, monitored by video surveillance, entered a building from which Palestinian fighters had withdrawn. An explosive device that had been concealed within the building was detonated, killing or injuring a number of Israeli soldiers. When a second force arrived to rescue them the building, which had been previously mined, was blown up over their heads.
Further south, Israel airdropped supplies to soldiers near Khan Yunis, indicating the force was surrounded and could not be supplied by land from depots within Israel located only a few kilometers away. The villages east of Khan Yunis and closer to the boundary with Israel – Khuza’a, Bani Suhaila, Abasan al-Kabira and Abasan al-Saghira – as well as Qarara to its north continue to be bombed by the Israeli air force and artillery around the clock. In other words, Israeli land forces have yet to establish control over them. Intermittent air raids and battles also continue to be reported in Beit Lahia and Beit Hanun, the northernmost towns in the Gaza Strip that Israel entered on 26 October on the first day of its ground operation. And Hamas and PIJ last week fired their heaviest rocket barrages on greater Tel Aviv region since the war began.
Although Israel several days ago reported that it had completed its encirclement of Jabalya Refugee Camp and the adjoining town of Jabalya-Nazla, located to the northeast of Gaza City, and expected to complete their subjugation within a day or two, satellite imagery suggested encirclement was still a long way off. Nor have Israeli ground forces yet penetrated the inner neighborhoods of Gaza City.
Separately, Israeli media this week reported that its military forces have suffered over 5,000 wounded since (including) 7 October, with some 2,000 expected to have permanent disabilities, such as amputations. And yesterday the military reported that some twenty per cent of its casualties were the result of friendly fire.
Given that Israel is operating under military censorship the above can be assumed to be an at best incomplete and partial account. There are persistent suspicions Israeli casualties are significantly higher, and we also for example know very little about Israeli casualties resulting from daily attacks launched from Lebanon by the much more powerful and better-armed Hizballah. Prohibiting foreign journalists, investigators, and human rights monitors from entering the Gaza Strip is only side of the coin. Restricting what Israeli media are permitted to report, for not only operational but also political considerations, is the other.
The daily video clips released by Hamas, PIJ, and Hizballah, which document direct encounters with Israeli forces and whose authenticity has not been seriously questioned, certainly suggest a higher level of Israeli casualties. Israeli clips by contrast show soldiers firing into an empty classroom, or a stripped down captive (in this case a middle-aged restaurant owner forced to play the part of Qassam commander) successively handing over a machine gun apparently concealed in his shorts with different hands in multiple takes of Unconditional Surrender in Tokyo Bay. And, of course, hundreds of Hagari tunnel memes. As previously noted, Israel has yet to assassinate a senior Hamas or PIJ leader, and has thus far killed more UN staff, journalists, and health care workers (take your pick) than Hamas commanders. Its most visible achievements to date consist of raising an Israeli flag over Al-Shifa Hospital, and more recently blowing up an empty UN school in Beit Lahia to the deafening cheers of a company of Israeli soldiers cowering behind a sandy embankment hundreds of yards away.
Given the overwhelming disparity in military power, Israel indisputably has the capacity to fully conquer the Gaza Strip and deal a severe blow to Hamas and PIJ. If it so chooses. The question, rather, is whether it is prepared to invest the (Israeli, not Palestinian) blood, treasure, and time required to do so. In this respect Israel’s military doctrine, that its wars need to be short, decisive, and fought on enemy territory, has already been shattered. Instead, Israel is fighting a war of attrition on multiple fronts. This is also imposing significant economic costs. Aside from the obvious price tag, it includes hundreds of thousands of reservists mobilised and removed from the work force since 7 October, reductions in foreign investment and tourism, ships avoiding the journey to the port of Eilat, and other losses that can’t be compensated by US taxpayers. The so-called Gaza envelope surrounding the Gaza Strip, and the far north abutting the Lebanese border, account for the bulk of Israel’s agricultural production, including fruits, vegetables, poultry and eggs. Not only have the residents of these regions been evacuated, but the foreigners who do the actual work are no longer arriving.
It is probably true that Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu would, for personal as well as political reasons, like to see this war prolonged. As would his extreme-right brothers in arms. But those who are most determined to prosecute the war against the Gaza Strip, and Lebanon if given half a chance, are the security establishment. It is they who on 7 October lost the confidence of the Israeli public, and of their US and European sponsors. They are therefore determined to restore both this confidence and Israel’s power of deterrence vis-à-vis not only the Palestinians but the Arabs in general. No one likes to place their personal security in the hands of an incompetent weakling, or maintain a strategic partnership with one, but loves such an adversary. This explains the frenzied, genocidal violence unleashed by Israel against the Gaza Strip. It is not only a lust for revenge and campaign to either expel the Palestinians to the Sinai desert or make the Gaza Strip unfit for human habitation. It is equally to impress upon friend and foe alike that Israel remains a mighty regional power deserving of their support and fear.
Israel’s problem, as previously noted and demonstrated yet again in Shuja’iyya yesterday, is that its military is a highly efficient killing machine but mediocre when it comes to combat. You can’t conquer territory using only an air force. And ground operations are by contrast not cost free. As for reports that Israel has begun flooding the Gaza Strip tunnel network, such wars are rarely if ever decided by silver bullets. Destroying the water supply in the Gaza Strip is probably the more important motivation.
The Israeli military’s strength is colonization and genocide, not urban warfare. Even when pitted against a comparatively weak adversary that has been under occupation for half a century and blockade for almost two decades, two months have proven insufficient for decisive progress. Suffice it to say that Israeli, US, and European leaders have, in unison, been insisting Israel is fighting for its very existence and survival. Not against Egypt or Iran, or even Hizballah. But against Hamas and PIJ, which between them have zero fighter jets, zero tanks, zero battleships, and zero anti-aircraft systems.
Reeling from the attacks of 7 October, Israeli public opinion was initially solidly behind Israel’s war effort. The campaign by the families of captives in the Gaza Strip to bring their loved ones home alive at any cost has eaten into this consensus, particularly after the Palestinians demonstrated that negotiations and truce, rather than insane violence, was the only option in this regard. In a society more sensitive to military than civilian casualties, mounting losses such as those in Shuja’iyya will have a further impact. But as with the US in Vietnam, a crisis of confidence in political and military leaders who repeatedly offer rosy predictions, mistaking mass killings of civilians for imminent military victory, can be decisive. People don’t like being lied to on matters of national security. What scares them even more is a realisation they’re not being lied to because their leaders are delusional.
Aware of the dangers, expect Israel’s onslaught to escalate yet further and reach a murderous crescendo potentially without parallel since the Second World War. But there are increasing indications this is the darkness before dawn. When US and European leaders who have repeatedly demonstrated their thorough disdain for Palestinian life begin to advocate for a reduction in the pace of mass killings, it’s clear that as far as their real interests are concerned this war is gradually running its course.
12 December: More on Visa Bans
It seems the new fad among Western governments is to denounce settler violence and adopt measures against individual settlers. Following the US, the European Union and United Kingdom are now also considering the nuclear option: a visa ban against particularly violent settlers who are not citizens of the state(s) adopting such measures.
It’s the ultimate charade, even on its own terms: refusing to provide someone with something they do not have, are not entitled to by right, and may not even want, as opposed to taking away something already in their possession, hardly qualifies as a punitive measure. This is not an asset freeze or even no-fly list. The US has additionally indicated that it will not reveal the names of those denied a US visa under this initiative. So we won’t find out which, if any, settlers the US government considers a particularly violent threat to society. We’ll have to take the program’s existence and implementation on faith from the same people who gave us Iraqi WMD.
More importantly, we’ll have to take it on faith from the same people who have made the entire illegal settlement enterprise viable in the first place. This is because the states adopting or considering these visa measures have since 1967 not only refused to adopt a single punitive measure against the settlement project, which is true even for those who consider Israel’s settlements illegal; the states in question have adopted or acquiesced in numerous measures that directly support the settlement project.
This includes permitting their citizens to participate in the enforcement of the occupation by enlisting in the Israeli military and security forces (Editor-in-Chief of The Atlantic and US citizen Jeffrey Goldberg, for example, served as an Israeli prison guard); permitting their citizens to participate in the confiscation and theft of Palestinian and Syrian (and until 1979 Egyptian) land and property, and in the establishment of illegal settlements on these lands and properties; permitting their citizens to reside in, and conduct commercial activities in and with illegal settlements; permitting their citizens to carry weapons to contribute to the consolidation and expansion of illegal settlements; and permitting their citizens to participate in armed vigilante attacks and violent pogroms, including attacks that have resulted in the theft or destruction of property, ethnic cleansing, and murder. All with total impunity and a total rejection of accountability. To the best of my knowledge Western governments have since 1967 collectively refused to investigate, indict, charge, try, or convict a single one of their citizens for any act conducted in furtherance of Israel’s illegal settlement enterprise. (Corrections welcome). A very different approach than that taken towards citizens who, for example, travel to Syria to join ISIS or Sri Lanka to engage in pedophilia.
Closer to home, a network of organizations in Western states raise funds for the establishment and expansion of illegal settlements, support projects in them, and promote their interests in various ways with legal recognition and impunity. Most such organizations enjoy charitable, tax-free status. This includes those that funnel funds to some of the most violent and extremist settler groups, who openly espouse genocidal agendas
Similarly, Europe is the primary market for settlement products. But rather than treat such products with the same prohibitions imposed on for example blood diamonds, they have free access to Western markets and can be openly sold and advertised. Such products have often additionally enjoyed the same preferential access to markets that Western governments provide to products exported from Israel. By contrast, try sending money from your bank account in the US or Europe to Gaza to help a pupil buy school supplies.
The effort by Western states to present settler violence as an isolated phenomenon that exists independently of the settlement enterprise writ large, and one in which neither these governments nor their citizens are directly implicated, is ultimately an exercise in smoke and mirrors. But the greater sleight of hand consists of the focus on individuals, in order to divert attention from the central player in the settlement project: the Israeli state. It’s a bit like constantly blabbing about the urgency of humanitarian aid for the Gaza Strip while your bombs are ensuring many thousands will never need another meal.
9 December: More on Karim Khan
Regarding International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Karim Khan, there is an interesting personal dimension to his story. Karim Khan, although a British citizen, is the grandson of the distinguished Pakistani diplomat and jurist Muhammad Zafarullah Khan (1893-1985). The elder Khan was Pakistan’s first foreign minister, and to date remains the only person who has served as president of both the United Nations General Assembly and of the International Court of Justice.
More importantly in this context, the elder Khan in 1947 served as Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations. This was the year during which the UN General Assembly debated the future of Palestine, and ultimately adopted Resolution 181 (II) (”Future Government of Palestine”), which recommended partition with economic union.
The UN first took up the Question of Palestine – which it has yet to answer – in 1946 at the request of the United Kingdom. Great Britain had ruled Palestine since the early 1920s pursuant to a mandate obtained from the League of Nations, the precursor to the UN established after the First World War and which was thoroughly dominated by the imperial powers. But in the aftermath of the Second World War the British no longer had the resources to enforce their will on a global empire. In August of 1947 for example, as the UN was debating various proposals regarding the future of Palestine, London relinquished control over India, the jewel in the British imperial crown.
The Palestinians and the Arab states were fiercely opposed to the UN partition resolution. They opposed partition as a matter of principle. They also opposed the UN resolution, on the grounds that it allocated more than half the territory of Mandatory Palestine to the proposed Jewish state even though Palestine’s Jewish population, consisting largely of foreign-born immigrants, formed only approximately a third of the total population, and also did not form a clear demographic majority in the regions allocated to a Jewish state. The UN was a very different organization in 1947, with only 57 members because most of Africa and much of Asia had yet to achieve independence from European colonial rule. Even if one accepts that the General Assembly has a right to partition territories and establish states, Resolution 181 would never have seen the light of day in today’s UN.
The partition of Palestine was also one of the very few instances during the Cold War where the United States and Soviet Union saw eye to eye on a major international question. The Soviets, along with their satellite states in eastern Europe, energetically supported partition because they viewed it as a means of weakening British influence in the Middle East. It was only later that they realized they had been playing midwife to the establishment of a Western client state in the region.
Muhammad Zafarullah Khan’s significance in these events is that during the General Assembly debate on Resolution 181 he gave arguably the most powerful and eloquent speech against partition. For those interested, it is reproduced in Walid Khalidi’s seminal anthology, From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948. His speech, and for that matter the entire book, is very highly recommended.
More to the point, Palestinians (and others) who take an interest in these matters know who the elder Khan was and remember him, fondly, for his efforts at the UN in 1947. The younger Khan is well aware of this. When campaigning for the office of ICC Prosecutor, he made a point of engaging with Palestinian diplomats, reminding them of his pedigree, and emphasizing that on this basis Palestine has a special place in his heart and that he would and could never betray it. I have this from first-hand sources.
In my view Karim Khan’s objective was not so much to gain Palestinian support for his candidacy, but to prevent a Palestinian campaign against it. It is somewhat difficult to assess if he succeeded in this endeavor or obtained his position primarily on the strength of UK, US, and Israeli sponsorship of his candidacy (somewhat ironic given that the US and Israel have refused to join the ICC and ratify the Rome Statute). Be that as it may, and as related in a previous thread, once Karim Khan was comfortably ensconced in The Hague he mercilessly threw the Palestinians to the wolves without a second thought.
The manner in which Karim Khan was willing to use and abuse the memory of his grandfather reflects, to put it politely, on his character. It is reminiscent of the way Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, in different circumstances, built a political career atop the corpse of his older brother. Not that further evidence is needed, but it is one more indication that Karim Khan is unfit for office and needs to be removed forthwith.
Postscript: It has been bought to my attention that Karim Khan is not Muhammad Zafarullah Khan’s biological grandson. According to Karim Khan he never met his biological grandfathers, but had a very close relationship with the elder Khan and considers him his “adopted grandfather”. Family trees aside it has no bearing on the above, except to note that Karim Khan did not clearly reveal this distinction when campaigning for the post of ICC Prosecutor.
7 December: Article 99
Mouin Rabbani and Hasmik Egian
On 6 December 2023 United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres invoked Article 99 of the UN Charter. A consensus has emerged that Guterres has deployed the heaviest instrument he has available under the UN Charter. It is therefore worth exploring what he has done as well as its significance.
Pursuant to Article 99, “the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his (sic) opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security”. It is considered unusual for the SG to do so because such matters are as a rule brought to the Council by one or more of its 15 members, acting either on their own initiative or on behalf of other UN member states. Essentially, Article 99 gives the Secretary-General the authority to determine that an issue on the Security Council’s agenda constitutes a threat to international peace and security. It is in this context significant because the Council has since 7 October dealt with Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip primarily as a humanitarian matter. This includes the only resolution it has passed on the issue, UNSC 2712 of 15 November.
The last time the wording of Article 99 was explicitly invoked was in 1989, by Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar on account of the situation in Lebanon. Guterres himself invoked the spirit but not the letter of Article 99 in 2017, during the first year of his tenure, to draw the Council’s attention to the situation in Myanmar’s Rakhine State.
According to Guterres’s 6 December letter to the Security Council, he acted to “urge the members of the Security Council to press to avert a humanitarian catastrophe” in the Gaza Strip” and “use all its influence to prevent further escalation and end this crisis”, which “may aggravate existing threats to the maintenance of international peace and security”.
The sequence of events is not definitively clear but appears to have developed as follows: earlier this week the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the only Arab current member of the Security Council, and acting on behalf of the Arab Group (Arab member states of the UN) and states affiliated with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), indicated its intention to submit a draft resolution to the Council calling for a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.
Given Washington’s consistent opposition to a ceasefire resolution, it appears that a coalition of Arab and other states, including some Security Council members, called upon Guterres to act. When considering their messages, he would have been further motivated to act by additional, alarming messages arriving from within the UN. Of particular note are those of Martin Griffiths, the UN’s Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, who has been the most direct and outspoken UN official during this crisis about the impact of Israel’s onslaught on the Gaza Strip. Together, these developments may have forced Guterres’s hand.
On 6 December Guterres issued his letter invoking Article 99. Shortly thereafter the UAE released its draft resolution, now explicitly presented as one “taking note and acting upon” the Secretary-General’s position. It is unclear whether the UAE would have gone ahead and introduced a draft resolution to the Council in the absence of Guterres’s letter, given the strength of US opposition. It is therefore entirely possible that it took a final decision to do so only after the UN Secretary-General issued his letter.
US Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Robert Wood emphasized that Guterres’s letter changes nothing and that Washington continues to oppose a ceasefire and for that matter further Security Council consideration of the crisis. The US, together with the UK, did attempt to have the term “immediate humanitarian ceasefire” amended to either “humanitarian pauses” or “another urgent humanitarian pause”. But this, together with their attempt to have the resolution focus on condemnation of Hamas, was rejected by the UAE, the draft resolution’s author. Israeli foreign minister Eli Cohen was less diplomatic, and accused Guterres of “endorsing Hamas terror” and acting in support of the Palestinian movement.
While a veto of the resolution by the US and perhaps the UK as well seems a foregone conclusion, Guterres’s letter is nevertheless significant. Future historians are likely to identify it as accelerating the countdown to the end of Israel’s onslaught against the Gaza Strip and its Palestinian population.
Regarding the US role, some have speculated that Washington may be using the negotiations surrounding this draft resolution to influence Israel’s conduct of the war, which is isolating the Biden administration on the world stage. Some have gone even further and suggested that if Israel’s response to Washington’s concerns is excessively rude and dismissive, the US may even consider abstaining. As noted, this is speculation.
There are two additional issues that need to be taken into consideration in evaluating the significance of Guterres’s letter. For those who have not read beyond its first paragraph, the double standards in the language he uses make it indisputably clear that, once again, Guterres is going out of his way not to offend the United States and its Western partners.
Thus, in its third paragraph he recalls that he has “condemned repeatedly” the “abhorrent acts of terror by Hamas and other Palestinian organizations” in which “[m]ore than 1,200 people were brutally killed”. Yet when referring to Israel’s violence inflicted upon the Palestinians in the subsequent two months, which has claimed in excess of 15,000 lives, he cannot bring himself to condemn anything or anyone. Rather, he speaks of those “who have reportedly been killed”.
Similarly, while “accounts of sexual violence during the [7 October] attacks are appalling”, none of the depredations Israel has been visiting upon the Palestinians since that date merit similar characterization. This despite the fact that Guterres explicitly identifies these measures. In addition to the killings, “40 per cent of whom were children”, these include a “collapse” of the health care system as a result of which “more people will die”; “desperate conditions” that make humanitarian relief “impossible”; a genuine risk of “epidemic diseases” and “increased pressure for mass displacement to neighboring countries”; a “severe risk of the collapse of the humanitarian system”; and “a situation fast deteriorating into a catastrophe with potentially irreversible implications for Palestinians as a whole”.
With respect to the “at least 130” UN employees killed since 7 October, “many with their families”, which represents the highest number of UN staff killed in any conflict since the world body was established in 1945, Guterres has yet to condemn these killings, or even call for an independent investigation into them to ensure accountability.
The second issue is one of timing. The crisis erupted on 7 October, and alarm about the issues Guterres addresses in his 6 December letter have been on the international agenda since at least the second half of that same month. The caution, hesitancy, and delay in his response to this crisis cries out for explanation. As does his continued absence from the region.
With the exception of Griffiths, the same observation applies to many of his most senior officials. Griffiths as a humanitarian official has successfully managed to repeatedly place those issues within his mandate prominently on the global agenda, even as he cannot be expected to discuss the broader political crisis. The same cannot be said, for example, of the UN’s Under-Secretary General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Rosemary DiCarlo, who has during this crisis been enveloped in an impenetrable invisibility cloak.
When DiCarlo finally visited the region in early December, the world only learned about it after her office issued a press release upon her return to New York. When she subsequently briefed the Security Council, she seemed primarily concerned with efforts to ensure the Palestinian Authority (PA) was sufficiently empowered to play a role in the future governance of the Gaza Strip, an agenda item that closely reflects that of her former employer, the US State Department. Reportedly, China’s Permanent Representative to the UN presciently took DiCarlo to task for her focus on “the day after” at a time when active hostilities are putting the security and stability of the entire region at risk.
In conclusion, Secretary-General Guterres’s letter invoking Article 99 of the UN Charter is politically significant. But as noted it also raises questions about other actions and opportunities the Secretary-General could and should have taken to promote a ceasefire.
5 December: US Visa Ban
On 5 December, the United States announced “a new visa restrictions policy targeting individuals and their family members involved in or meaningfully contributing to actions that undermine peace, security, and stability in the West Bank.” According to Secretary of State Antony Blinken, “Violence against civilians will have consequences.”
On this occasion, according to reports, the punitive measures are intended primarily for use against Israelis rather than Palestinians. Specifically, they are to be deployed against Israel’s West Bank settlers, whose pogroms against Palestinian villagers have been escalating dramatically in recent years. This explains why the measures are weak, ineffective, and ultimately meaningless.
As Blinken’s announcement makes clear, the measures concern “individuals” engaged in “violence against civilians”. Because the “individuals” include Israelis, and their “violence against civilians” is being inflicted upon Palestinians, in this case it doesn’t qualify as “terrorism”. That’s a term reserved for Arabs, including Palestinians who resort to armed force against Israeli soldiers on active duty.
If applied scrupulously, the visa ban imposes no legal penalties on the individuals concerned, regardless of how much violence they inflict on civilians, and even if their victims are US citizens. Correction: even if their victims are Palestinian-Americans. No criminal indictments, no asset freezes, and certainly no “Wanted” posters. Just a visa ban on them and their families. I suspect many such settlers will conclude that not taking the kids to Disneyland is a price worth paying to knock off a few Palestinians, ethnically cleanse a village, and replace it with a Jewish settlement. They can always take the children to EuroDisney, where “individuals” who inflict “violence against civilians” in the West Bank remain very welcome. Provided they’re Israeli and their victims Arab.
If the US was serious about taking on pogroms in the West Bank it could start by making it a criminal offense for US citizens to contribute to Israel’s illegal West Bank settlement enterprise, for example by residing in, or conducting commercial transactions with, the illegal settlements. But that’s not an option because Washington rejects the position, confirmed by the International Court of Justice, that the settlements are illegal.
This being the case, the US could alternatively make it illegal for US citizens to inflict violence upon civilians in the West Bank. Particularly because Israeli courts provide impunity rather than accountability, A healthy proportion of West Bank settlers are in fact US citizens, who together with the French cohort are among the most violent and fanatic of the bunch. Baruch Goldstein, who perpetrated the 1994 Ibrahimi Mosque Massacre, and a poster of whom for many years thereafter adorned the living room of Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, was a US citizen.
But this too is a non-starter. Not only does the US not consider the settlements illegal, it believes that West Bank settlers engaged in the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians have a right of self-defense. Those affected by the visa ban, if it is indeed applied, would do well to remind the US that charity begins at home, and that it is unfair of Washington to punish them for running riot in the West Bank while giving US citizens running riot alongside them a pass.
Another option available to the US government is to revoke the tax-free status of US organizations that funnel funds to Israeli organizations and individuals engaged in attacks against civilians that are sufficiently violent to cause the US government to respond with a visa ban. Previous attempts to have US courts revoke the charitable status of what can only be described as US organizations involved in the financing of terrorism failed. But the initiative did not come from the US government. When it does act against such organizations, their status changes instantaneously.
Even if the US were to take each of the above measures – and, to be clear, it won’t – it would still only be scratching the surface of the problem. Israel’s settlement enterprise is a state project, not the work of vigilantes operating independently or in opposition to the state. Even those settlements that the Israeli government itself has classified as illegal because they were not established pursuant to government directives, are as a rule retroactively legitimized. The Israeli state is the engine of the settlement enterprise. It establishes and funds settlements, arms its settlers, and deploys its military to enable and participate in their pogroms. Armed settler groups are first and foremost auxiliary militias of the state, serving its policies and strategic agenda.
Ultimately, no initiative to curb settler extremism that ignores state policy will have much impact. And that’s not really on the cards for a US government that doesn’t even believe the settlements are illegal.
Not only are the measures announced by the US weak, ineffective, and ultimately meaningless, they’re also a pre-meditated diversionary charade. At a time when the US government is arming, funding, and providing diplomatic cover for Israel’s genocidal onslaught against the Gaza Strip, it helps to pretend that you oppose violence against Palestinian civilians.
4 December: Why the Truce Collapsed
The verdict is in. The US, as could have been predicted even before the recent Israeli-Palestinian truce came into force, has blamed Hamas for its collapse. (More accurately, the truce expired because no agreement was reached by the parties on its extension or renewal). Interesting context on this issue was today provided by US National Security Advisor Jake “All Quiet on the Western Front” Sullivan.
In exonerating Israel of any culpability for anything, Sullivan didn’t bother to highlight the 30 November attack by Hamas at the Givat Shaul junction near Jerusalem, which some have erroneously identified as the moment the truce broke down and Israel decided to resume its offensive against the Gaza Strip. Sullivan’s account makes sense, because the truce was geographically limited to the Gaza Strip. Thus, unless Givat Shaul was the work of a rocket fired from Khan Yunis, where we are now all certain the Hamas leadership is ensconced after its daring escape from the Al-Shifa Hospital, the attack was irrelevant to the truce. The same goes for Israel’s continuous incursions into West Bank cities during this period.
Nor does Sullivan waste time discussing the rocket that, according to Israel, Palestinians fired into Israel some 40 minutes before the truce expired. After all, Hamas had several days earlier detonated several IEDs against Israeli forces inside the Gaza Strip, claiming it was responding to Israeli violations. Although several soldiers were wounded, the truce was unaffected and the exchange of captives continued.
According to Sullivan Hamas is to blame because it refused to release “civilian women who should have been part of the agreement”, pursuant to which Israel would have reciprocated with the release of three women and/or children captives from its prison system for every one it received. Some Israeli sources have provided a slightly different account, namely that Hamas disingenuously claimed it needed time to locate the women because they were not in its custody, thereby demonstrating it was seeking to extend the truce at no additional cost rather than fulfilling its commitments.
The most detailed account was provided by State Department spokesman Matthew Miller. In his telling Hamas was refusing to release these women to prevent them from providing testimony about their experiences in captivity, clearly implying they were being held in sexual slavery. Unlike Biden, who continues to insist that he has seen videos that don’t exist of Palestinians beheading infants, Miller under questioning from Matt Lee of the Associated Press admitted that the only verified fact in his account is that he allowed his imagination to run wild. The dais made it impossible to determine if Miller was concealing a hard-on or worn-out copy of Raphael Patai’s The Arab Mind.
Hamas and Islamic Jihad have provided a very different account of the failure to agree on an extension of the truce. According to them, the women in question are indeed their captives, but are not civilians. Rather, they are soldiers and intelligence agents who were captured, in uniform, from the security installations the Palestinians overran on 7 October. If the claim is correct, this would explain their refusal to release them under the formula agreed at the outset of the truce.
From the outset, the Palestinian organizations offered Israel a choice for the exchange of captives: “All for All”, which would see the release of all captives held in the Gaza Strip and of all Palestinians in Israel’s prison system, or a phased exchange. Israel initially opted for a third option, military pressure to force Hamas’s hand, before its failure led Israel to accept negotiations and opt for a phased exchange. In this construction, captives are grouped in categories: civilian women and children; men and boys who do not serve in the military on account of their age; and serving members of the armed forces. Additionally, each category would be exchanged according to a different formula, so that the end result would be “All for All”.
The only agreement reached between Israel and Hamas comprised an exchange of civilian woman and child captives. While Israel would be correct to claim it never agreed to a different formula for other captives, the Palestinians are equally correct in their insistence they never agreed to release additional captives, from other categories, according to the same formula.
Given that the names of the unreleased women are known, it should not be particularly difficult to determine their status, and thus who we should believe. If Sullivan’s account is correct, it would suggest the Palestinians miscalculated in the belief they could extend the truce without meeting their end of the bargain. If the Palestinian version is validated, it suggests the Israelis either refused to negotiate a further agreement or were determined to resume their offensive against the Gaza Strip, and that Miller may want to consult a therapist.
The other point to bear in mind is that Israel did not launch its war against the Gaza Strip primarily in order to retrieve its captives. This was a secondary objective, subordinated to the determination of Israel’s military and political leadership to wreak vengeance upon Palestinian society, and deal a painful blow to Hamas (even Israeli commentators no longer take Israeli vows to eradicate the movement root and branch seriously). For Israel, the destruction of the Gaza Strip is the main event.
3 December: Yemen Makes a Difference
In contrast to most military operations, Yemeni attacks on Red Sea shipping don’t need to hit their target in order to achieve their objective. The Bab Al-Mandab (“Gate of Lamentation”) strait is a very narrow maritime chokepoint, only some 25 kilometers wide, separating Yemen from the Horn of Africa. More importantly, it is the only passageway connecting the Arabian Sea to the Red Sea. The Red Sea terminates at the southern entrance to the Suez Canal, through which 10-15% of global trade, including significant volumes of oil, gas, and Chinese goods intended for Western markets, pass on any given day.
Bab al-Mandab is best compared to the better-known maritime chokepoint located on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait of Hormuz, through which huge volumes of Middle Eastern oil and gas must pass to reach global markets, has often been in the news due to fears it would be made impassable by Iran in the event of an attack on that country by the US and/or Israel.
Global shipping companies often operate on tight profit margins and tend to be risk-averse. They also don’t like to pay more in insurance rates than they can earn from shipping a tanker of oil or deck of containers from Asia to Europe. In other words, they are not going to keep using Bab Al-Mandab until the first ship is sunk to the bottom of the Red Sea. Readers may recall that when the Suez Canal was blocked by a supercontainer ship a few years ago, an incident that had nothing to do with armed conflict or threats to global shipping, the entire global supply chain was disrupted for weeks on end, and large numbers of ships chose the much longer route around the Cape of Good Hope off South Africa to transport goods between Europe and Asia.
In other words, Lloyds of London only requires the knowledge of ongoing, regular attacks on shipping off the Yemeni coast to send its insurance rates through the stratosphere. Routine attacks by pirates off the coast of Somalia earlier this century resulted in billions of dollars in excess costs resulting from higher insurance rates and re-routing of ships alone. For Israel the challenge is even greater: if shipping to and from Israel can’t use Bab al-Mandab to reach Eilat, or pass through the Suez Canal to reach its Mediterranean ports, a ship delivering goods to Israel from e.g. India has to go around South Africa all the way to Morocco, through the Straits of Gibraltar, and then traverse the entire Mediterranean Sea to reach its destination.
Given that Yemen’s objective is to impose escalating costs on not only the perpetrators but also the sponsors and enablers of the Gaza genocide, it can achieve its goal without sinking a single ship to the bottom of the sea. It just needs to instil confidence in the global shipping industry that regular attacks on its assets will continue until Israel is called to a halt.
Separately, such attacks are intended to impress upon the West, and Washington in particular, that the self-proclaimed Axis of Resistance means business when it threatens to meet Israeli escalation with regional escalation. The latter, rather than the sight of thousands of Palestinian children blown to bits by US bombs supplied to its Israeli proxy, is the West’s main concern.
2 December: Scenes From an Echo Chamber
Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip has resumed in full force. The intensity of its bombing and shelling is as intense as before the truce, perhaps even more so. Israel will however find it difficult to continue this campaign for another 50 days. Even if does, the results are unlikely to be significantly different than what we saw during the first 50 days. In other words, eliminating Palestinian military capabilities in the Gaza Strip, let alone eradicating the presence of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and others from the territory, is an unattainable objective.
But Israel is extremely unlikely to be permitted another 50 days of war by its US and European sponsors. Their foremost concern, increasingly likely with each passing day, is uncontrolled regional escalation and the ramifications this could have on their regional and global interests, and on their economies as well. Their statements of concern about the staggering levels of death and destruction in the Gaza Strip, and about the humanitarian emergency which is predicted to result in epidemics, perhaps even famine, in the Gaza Strip, are for public consumption. After all, it’s a little disingenuous for these governments to wail about a reality they encouraged, justified, defended, enabled, and in many cases directly participated in creating. It’s equally the case that these governments, and the US in particular, could transform this reality with a single phone call. If they so choose. Rather, these statements of concern are designed to deflect public and political pressure upon such governments for a change of policy, provide cover for their complicity in Israel’s war, and present a more acceptable rationale for eventually calling a halt to Israel’s offensive.
According to press reports, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu informed US President Biden that Israel would need at least an additional two months to achieve its objectives. The US response was reportedly that Israel has only two weeks. Sounds plausible in view of the above factors. The message to the Israeli government would have been along the lines of “We gave you unlimited support, everything you need, and you’ve already had 50 days to achieve it. Regrettably, you weren’t up to the job. We now need to find an alternative to your military mediocrity that is somewhat more effective.”
Even though I have argued that Israel should be analyzed as not only a radical but also an irrational state, Washington when it so chooses retains the power and leverage to set policy for its client regime. That’s certainly the case with respect to major issues that directly affect US interests, and where the US controls the arms supply and other crucial factors like a vote at the UN Security Council.
I suspect that within the next week or so we will see a new truce agreement. It is likely to be more extended than the previous one, and see complex negotiations about further exchanges of captives. These could break down and result in a new round of warfare, but that too is likely to be short and sharp.
Ultimately, and once again assuming Israel continues to fail militarily (the most likely and plausible but not a certain scenario), the Palestinians are not going to release their most valuable prisoners, the senior Israeli military officers, without obtaining the release of senior Palestinian leaders in Israeli prisons. They will also seek a guaranteed end to Israel’s war on the Gaza Strip and the withdrawal of Israeli forces to their 7 October positions. This will be a very bitter pill for Israel to swallow, but the results of military failure tend to be bitter, and the US and Europe will help Netanyahu (or whoever replaces him) take his medicine.
This leaves a fundamental question in which Western and Israeli interests remain closely aligned, unresolved: removing Hamas as a governing authority from the Gaza Strip. The most logical resolution would be for Palestinians to choose their own leaders, but this is a non-starter for both the only democracy in the Middle East and the world’s greatest democracy. In my view a Palestinian coalition makes the most sense, not only because no single Palestinian movement has the requisite qualifications to single-handedly administer the Palestinians in these territories, but also because such a construction would assist in the revitalization of the Palestinian national movement. For example as a prelude to the integration of Hamas and PIJ into the PLO, and the formation of a new national leadership committed to pursuing Palestinian rights rather than US and Israeli approval.
At this stage in their struggle Palestinians require pluralism more than elections. Although the US and Europe are in principle open to the idea of a Palestinian government chosen and appointed by Washington and Brussels administering both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel has invested decades in promoting Palestinian fragmentation, will be bitterly opposed to re-unification of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and on this issue is unlikely to be challenged by its Western sponsors. As importantly, Israel will prevent any coalition government that includes Hamas from taking office and discharging its mandate in the West Bank. Which probably means Hamas won’t accept it in the Gaza Strip.
But Israel and its Western partners are determined to remove Hamas as a governing authority from the Gaza Strip. On this point, my dear friend Ibrahim and I both almost died laughing this evening discussing the latest idea emerging from the Washington echo chamber. It’s genuinely that ridiculous, and that detached from reality. Basically, there is serious discussion of applying the same formula to Hamas in Gaza that was used to extract the PLO from Beirut in 1982.
In 1982, the US engineered an agreement whereby the PLO, both leadership and cadres, boarded trucks and ships in the port of Beirut, and withdrew from Lebanon, primarily to Algeria, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. That agreement was possible for several reasons: the PLO could justify leaving Lebanon, because Lebanon was a foreign country whose capital city was being destroyed by Israel; the decision to withdraw was endorsed (and in some cases encouraged) by the PLO’s Lebanese allies; the PLO had formal Arab legitimacy (it is a full member of the Arab League), and also international legitimacy (it has permanent observer status at the UN); and the US provided security guarantees for the unarmed Palestinian civilians the PLO would leave behind. The following month Israel perpetrated the Sabra-Shatila massacres via its fascist Lebanese proxies. The US had knowledge of these massacres in real time, did nothing to stop them, and the Palestinians learned an unforgettable lesson in the value – that is, worthlessness – of US commitments.
In 2023 the idea would be that Hamas, or at least its leadership, senior echelons, and fighters, would depart their Palestinian homeland for a life of exile. In other words, voluntarily commit political and organizational suicide, and relinquish their main source of leverage, so that Israel and the US can claim the victory Israel’s military was unable to achieve on the ground. And once abroad, explain to their constituents and Palestinians more generally, that they carefully considered the matter and concluded that saving their own skins justifies the extraordinary price Palestinians have had to pay to make this possible. Only in Washington…
Finding governments prepared to receive several thousand PLO fighters in 1982 was a real challenge. Finding ones willing to receive Hamas in 2023, particularly its military members, will be virtually impossible. Recalling the US guarantees of 1982, it also seems reasonable to assume that if Hamas leaders and cadres board a ship in what’s left of Gaza harbor it will be sunk by an Israeli torpedo before it leaves port, and if they leave by land will be picked off by Israel’s death squads soon after. Unless Karim Khan’s ICC grabs them first in a further act of fealty to non-members US and Israel.
If this war proceeds as anticipated, the US and Israel will need to reconcile themselves to Israel’s failure to achieve a decisive outcome. Israel will probably opt for a period of more limited strikes, incursions, assassinations, and similar operations, which Hamas is unlikely to leave without response. But wars of attrition are not Israel’s strength, and at a certain point a more durable cessation of hostilities will have to be reached.
That could give the West time to consider the possibility of accepting the principle of Palestinians choosing their own representatives. And consider alternatives to active support or passive acquiescence to Israel’s agenda with respect to Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli relations. It won’t happen under Biden, who apart from sprinkling a few dollars over UNRWA has maintained each of Trump’s Palestine policies. This includes the closure of the representative office in Washington of the PLO/PA, which Blinken is now promoting as Gaza’s new governing authority.
1 December: Truce Collapses
As predicted, no sooner did Antony Blinken arrive in the region than hostilities erupted again. The first killings, numbering in the dozens, resulting from Israeli air raids and artillery barrages throughout the Gaza Strip have already been reported.
Israel claims the truce ended because a Palestinian rocket was fired from the Gaza Strip. If true, also unconvincing. Several days ago, claiming to respond to a series of Israeli shellings in the Gaza Strip that killed several Palestinians, the latter set off explosive devices that wounded a number of Israeli soldiers, and the truce continued. There are larger forces at work. It’s at this stage unclear whether Israel, the Palestinians, or both are flexing their muscles prior to resuming the truce on improved terms, or whether there has been an Israeli decision to resume its offensive with full fury. I suspect it’s the latter.
Several dynamics are at work. The truce that expired on the morning of 1 December local time comprised an exchange of captives, whereby the Palestinians would release child, civilian woman, and foreign captives from the Gaza Strip, in exchange for Israel releasing women and children from the much larger pool of such Palestinian captives it holds, at a ratio of 1:3.
Additionally, the United States and Israel permitted a limited volume of essential supplies (food, water, medicine, fuel) into the Gaza Strip. The latter has been presented by USAID Director Samantha Power as a major US policy victory, as if the US had nothing to do with either the 17-year blockade of the Gaza Strip or the medieval siege of the territory since 7 October. As Elliott Colla so presciently put it, “Little did we know that [Power’s bestseller], A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, was a HOW-TO book.”
There are two conflicting dynamics at work. On the one hand, there appear to be few women, children, and foreign captives left in the Gaza Strip. This means that subsequent prisoner exchanges will require the release of a different category of captives from Gaza (e.g. male youths and older men whose age makes them ineligible for military service) in exchange for a different category of Palestinian captives (e.g. those with terminal diseases and the thousands arrested in the West Bank since 7 October). An agreement therefore requires not just an extension of the existing truce in order to continue with exchanges of captives pursuant to the previously agreed formula, but further negotiations about categories, numbers, duration, and the like. In effect a new agreement, particularly since each party is also introducing additional demands. For Israel, primarily ICRC visits to the remaining captives. For the Palestinians, Samantha Power’s consent to an increase in genocide-preventing essential supplies, and the release of Palestinian prisoners who hold Israeli citizenship.
The second dynamic concerns Israel. Rather than responding to its failure to achieve anything of decisive military significance during the past 55 days by searching for an offramp, it appears convinced that where overwhelming force has failed, even more overwhelming force will succeed.
It is in this respect important to recall that 7 October represents the most catastrophic military and intelligence failure in Israel’s (admittedly short) history, and Israel’s security establishment is desperate for achievements that it believes, falsely in my opinion, will at least partially remove the stain from its reputation.
Parenthetically, I would also take reports, such as in the NYT Thursday, that Israel had precise intelligence preceding the 7 October attacks (including all relevant documentation produced in secret by Hamas), but failed to properly act on them, with a large helping of kosher salt. In addition to prosecuting Operation Swords of Iron against the Gaza Strip, Israeli leaders are no less intensively engaged in Operation Cover Your Ass. Suddenly, everyone and their brother knew exactly what was about to transpire, and it happened only because someone else failed to recognize the significance of the intelligence in their possession. It’s also a way for Israel to broadcast to its adversaries, its allies, and clients of its military-intelligence industries that despite their abysmal performance Israel’s intelligence capabilities are second to none.
Israeli leaders have indicated that their renewed offensive will continue for several months, perhaps even a year, until each of its unattainable objectives is achieved. Highly unlikely. Israel will face significantly more difficult military, political, and diplomatic challenges compared to the previous fifty days.
If it decides to enter into the heart of Gaza City and other Palestinian urban areas it has not yet reached, as opposed to terror bombing them from the skies, its air force will be of increasingly limited utility, and its mediocre ground forces will be confronting increasingly entrenched Palestinian forces. It’s not going to be a cakewalk, to borrow a phrase.
Politically, the expired truce has already demonstrated that Israel can retrieve captives through negotiations, if not exclusively through negotiations, and we may see greater pressure on the Israeli government to return to the negotiating table from both Israeli public opinion and the international community, and perhaps even from some Western governments as well.
Additionally, the damage to the Israeli economy is mounting, and will deepen further as this confrontation continues. Diplomatically, there is already a solid consensus within the international community against Israel’s slaughter of Palestinian civilians. We are now also seeing several European governments responding to popular pressure by – at least verbally – withdrawing their unconditional support for Israel’s mass killings. (That said, no European leader has yet so much as acknowledged that a serving Israeli cabinet minister recently advocated deploying a nuclear weapon against the Gaza Strip).
The United States is much less responsive to popular pressures due to its more superficial democracy, in which the political class is bought and paid for by the donor class. (Opposition to the war in the US is of course vital, given its central role in this war, but results will take time to materialize and it’s important not to get disillusioned by the absence of immediate results.)
Add to the above the fanatical support of Israel of many in the US leadership (e.g. Biden, Blinken, Sullivan, McGurk), and their conviction that Israel’s success or failure will reflect on Washington’s geopolitical position, and it becomes clear that Israel doesn’t need Karim Khan in order to perpetrate war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide with impunity. The protective embrace of the Biden administration is sufficient in this regard.
In recognition of ever-increasing US complicity with Israeli crimes, there’s an established tradition in Israel that every outgoing US president is – accurately – described as the best friend Israel has ever had in the White House. I think it’s fair to say that the next US president will be facing an extraordinarily high bar and may be the first to leave office without this sordid accolade.
What will restrain Western and particularly US support for a continuation of Israel’s war is threats to US/Western interests. These could take the form of regional escalation, which seems all but certain at this stage; threats real or perceived to the security and stability of regional client regimes; threats to US installations in the region; global partners opting out of the West’s rules-based international order; or other forms.
So even in the unlikely scenario that Israel is prepared to expend the blood and treasure required to achieve objectives that most have already concluded are unattainable, the escalating damage its war is inflicting on Western interests – in significant part because Western states are such enthusiastically active partners – is likely to limit the time Israel has available before the clock starts winding down. That said, we are likely to see extraordinarily and perhaps even unprecedentedly vicious and lethal days ahead.
Finally, it’s also important to recognize that Israel can legitimately be characterized as an irrational state. Not just radical, but irrational. This has only partly to do with its knee-jerk resort to extraordinary levels of violence, the routine genocidal statements by its leaders, and the like. Primarily on account of the West’s consistent refusal to confront Israel with any consequences for the policies of its increasingly radical and fanatic governments, Israel has become ever more radical and fanatic. To the point where it is a state that is no longer capable of inhibition or self-restraint.
This is most evident in how it treats its closest allies. Most recently, it has accused the leaders of Belgium and Spain of supporting terrorism. Its representative to the United Nations donned a yellow star, with his entire entourage dutifully following suit, in the Security Council, and proceeded to demand the “immediate resignation” of the UN Secretary-General on account of his pedestrian observation that there is a conflict in the Middle East, with similar snarls directed at other senior UN officials. During Biden’s vice-presidency, it would announce a major settlement expansion on the eve of each of Biden’s visit to his favorite state. And Israel thought nothing of converting its greatest strategic asset, solid bipartisan support in the US Congress, into a partisan political issue. That’s just scratching the surface. The point is that those engaged in “day after” scenarios also need to take into account the irrational nature of the Israeli state.
27 November: The Zionist Movement, Israel, and Their Relationships with Anti-Semitic Forces
The relationship between Zionism and anti-Semitism is often misunderstood, and just as often deliberately distorted.
Contemporary political Zionism emerged in late nineteenth-century Europe as one of several Jewish responses to the twin pressures of persecution and emancipation. European Jewish thinkers variously proposed assimilation under liberal constitutional regimes, integration through proletarian revolution, or preservation through intensified religious orthodoxy as the preferred approach to ensuring the future of their communities within the European continent.
Political Zionism offered a radically different perspective. Absorbing the nationalist milieu of the time, Theodor Herzl and his contemporaries proclaimed that Europe’s Jews formed not a religious community, national minority, or common citizenry, but rather a people and nation in their own right in the modern, political sense of these terms. (non-European Jews were with few exceptions absent from Zionist considerations until the Nazi Holocaust).
Seen from the Zionist perspective the Jews of France, Great Britain, and Russia were not French, British, or Russian nationals, but rather members of a Jewish nation and people who happened to reside in those countries, not unlike a Frenchman born and raised in Denmark or Poland.
In the nineteenth-century European political milieu a people could only achieve its fulfilment in the framework of a nation-state, a defined and recognized area in which it formed an unambiguous demographic majority and exercised political as well as territorial hegemony. Thus the title and contents of Herzl’s best-known work, Der Judenstaat (variously translated as “The Jewish State” or “The Jews’ State”).
Recognizing that establishing a Jewish state on the territory of an existing European state was a non-starter, the early Zionists embraced that other European contribution to humanity: colonialism. Even a cursory reading of Herzl’s memoirs reveals that his hero and role model was Cecil Rhodes, the founder of the unlamented former colony of Rhodesia. The early Zionists variously considered, among others, Argentina, Cyprus, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Manchuria, San Domingo, the Sinai Peninsula, Uganda, and the western United States as the location of their state, before settling on Palestine.
They did so primarily because they believed it would resonate with otherwise skeptical European Jews, who despite current Zionist propaganda had over the centuries showed little inclination to emigrate to Zion even though plenty of opportunities to do so existed. The same, parenthetically, might be said of Middle Eastern Jews, the majority of whom for centuries lived under the same Ottoman rule as Palestine, but refrained from migrating there (as opposed to undertaking religious pilgrimage). “Next Year in Jerusalem” was an aspirational religious incantation, not a political program.
Given current efforts by the Defamation League and other Israel apologists to conflate anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism, it bears recollection that the first anti-Zionists were neither Palestinians nor Arabs, but rather European Jews. The religious amongst them considered a Return to Zion accomplished through human rather than divine agency nothing short of blasphemy. Liberals feared the existence of a Jewish state would lead to accusations of dual loyalty, and socialists and other revolutionaries insisted it constituted a renunciation of the struggle for Jewish emancipation and equality. The latter had a point, because it is a foundational principle of Zionism that anti-Semitism is permanent and immutable, and fighting it an exercise in futility.
(Interesting historical footnote: the only member of the British cabinet who in 1917 voted against its endorsement of the Balfour Declaration was also its only Jewish member, the Liberal politician Edwin Samuel Montagu. He denounced Zionism as “a mischievous political creed” that would foment anti-Semitism.)
Since the Zionist movement lacked the power and resources to independently colonize Palestine, it hitched its star to yet another European contribution to modern international relations: imperialism. Preliminary efforts to establish Jewish settlements in Palestine during the so-called First Aliyah of 1881-1903, which had a tenuous connection with Zionism and lacked great power sponsorship, met with only limited success.
During those decades, millions of Jews fled intensified pogroms and persecution in eastern Europe, primarily for the United States and the Americas. Secondarily for Britain and Western Europe. Supported with funding from the Rothschilds, much like Americans can today make tax-free donations to Israeli terror groups and their illegal settlements in the West Bank, Zionist activists hoped to use this refugee crisis and funding to establish settlements in Palestine. But most Jews left disenchanted after only a few months.
Zionist leaders from the very outset recognized the utility of enabling the anti-Semitism of European leaders in seeking their support for the colonization of Palestine. Under the circumstances they emphasized not only Zionism’s determination to promote the emigration of established Jewish populations from European states to Palestine, but particularly the removal of destitute eastern European Jewish immigrants who had become an increasingly visible and unwanted presence. Much like far-right parties today, Zionist officials sought to pander specifically to anti-immigrant prejudices – in this case against those they claimed were their own people. Witte, Von Plehve, and others, all were cultivated as potential strategic allies.
The Zionist movement ultimately found its champion in Arthur Balfour, who when prime minister in 1905 had been repeatedly and explicitly condemned for “anti-Semitism” by British Jews for his sponsorship of the Aliens Act, a piece of legislation specifically designed to keep eastern European Jews out of the UK. While British sponsorship of Zionism was primarily about the Suez Canal, Balfour – like the Zionist movement – undoubtedly viewed the prospect of fewer Jews, and particularly of fewer eastern European Jews, in Great Britain with great relish.
Since both Zionism and European anti-Semitism shared the objective of removing Europe’s Jews from the continent, and both opposed their further integration or assimilation into European society, and both considered anti-Semitism to be the natural order of things, their collaboration is entirely logical rather than counterintuitive.
Zionist policy during the 1930s and 1940s was no different. In 1933, the Zionist movement negotiated the Ha’avara (Transfer) Agreement with the Third Reich, thus aborting the anti-Nazi boycott to the fury of those who had initiated it to make Hitler pay a price for his rabid anti-Semitism. In 1937 Adolf Eichmann visited Palestine as a guest of the Zionist movement. In 1941 future Israeli leader Yitzhak Shamir even went so far as to propose a formal alliance with Nazi Germany against Great Britain.
Revisionist Zionism, that branch of the movement that produced today's Likud, the party led by Netanyahu, was founded Vladimir Jabotinsky in emulation of Benito Mussolini's National Fascist Party. His Zionist rivals used to denounce him as "Vladimir Hitler".
It is often forgotten that prior to WWII and the Holocaust, the Nazis were quite happy to see Jews leave and in fact encouraged Jewish emigration. It was a policy that found a willing partner in the Zionist movement. As the US and UK closed their doors to desperate Jewish refugees as the Nazis consolidated power, Washington and London had the support of a Zionist leadership that would support only Jewish emigration to Palestine. As David Ben-Gurion cynically put it in the late 1930s regarding the kindertransport: “If I knew it was possible to save all the children of Germany by transferring all of them to England, and only half by transferring them to Palestine, I would choose the latter, for before us lies not only numbers but the historical reckoning of the people of Israel.”
As Ben-Gurion makes clear, Zionism’s singular obsession with establishing a Jewish state invariably took precedence over the survival of Jewish diaspora communities, and it was no different during the Holocaust. Where the Jews of Europe experienced anti-Semitism as a cataclysm, the Zionist movement additionally saw it as an opportunity.
It is a pattern that has been consistently maintained since Israel was established in 1948. Israel may be a Jewish state, but its leaders base their relations with foreign powers and individuals not on the basis of their attitudes towards Jews, but rather their policies towards Israel. As has been repeatedly and consistently demonstrated in practice, support for Israel, and particularly for its most violent and illegal policies, makes anti-Semitism by those offering such support a forgivable sin. Paraguay’s Stroessner, the Argentine Junta, and Idi Amin of Uganda are just a few examples. More recently the far-right, which despite its fascist roots and persistent anti-Semitism has prioritized Islamophobia, and celebrates Israel as a model for subjugating Arabs, Muslims and other undesirables, has become – along with evangelical Christians – Israel’s most enthusiastic and dependable base of support. Nazi salutes and glorification of the Third Reich? No problem, provided one also salutes Israel’s own genocide.
Yet, because anti-Semitism has acquired the status of a uniquely pernicious form of racism in the wake of the Holocaust, both because of the nature of the Nazi extermination campaign and because its victims were Europeans rather than for example Africans, Israel has simultaneously wasted no opportunity to denounce each and every critic of Israel and its policies as an anti-Semite. Pro-Israeli anti-Semites get praise, and even a kosher certificate from the Defamation League, but anti-Zionist Jews are delegitimized as anti-Semites. The examples are too numerous to recount.
Israel has consistently compared its enemies to Hitler. Gamal Abdel-Nasser, Yassir Arafat, Saddam Hussein, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and a host of others have all had this distinction thrown casually their way. At the same time, and needless to say, any comparison of Israel to Nazi Germany has drawn howls of outrage on the pretext that the Holocaust was unique and it is therefore verboten to ever compare anything to that incomparably sordid chapter of history.
It has now reached the point where Israel – the Jewish state as it likes to call itself – is downplaying the Nazi Holocaust to bolster its own policies. Thus several years ago Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu claimed that Hitler was not responsible for proposing the mass extermination of Europe’s Jews, and that the thought hadn’t occurred to him until it was planted in his head by Palestinian leader Hajj Amin al-Husseini. Imagine the firestorm – initiated, needless to say, by Israel – if an Arab or European leader had suggested that the Holocaust wasn’t Hitler’s idea. In Netanyahu’s case his remarks were met by a deafening silence. Yet today, in order to promote Israel’s own genocide, we are being informed that the Nazi Holocaust was comparatively benign because Hitler only wanted to kill the Jews of Europe, while Hamas wants to kill all Jews everywhere and then explore outer space for further signs of Jewish life.
Israel and its flunkies, often led by the Defamation League, have transformed “anti-Semite” into an entirely meaningless term. At this rate it will soon be worn as a badge of distinction by opponents of genocide, including of the Nazi Holocaust. The victims of this thoroughly cynical and opportunist campaign are not only Israel’s Palestinian and Arab victims, but also Jews who are victims of genuine anti-Semitism and may find assaults on their persons, property, and institutions dismissed for wolf having been cried several million times too often. It is yet another way in which Zionism, which claims that Israel and its policies represent and are conducted on behalf of Jews everywhere, in practice jeopardizes Jewish well-being and security.
29 November: Hamas and ISIS
About a week ago the US and Israel suddenly stopped comparing Hamas to ISIS. The term “Hamas-ISIS” had become de rigueur among Israeli officials in their public statements, and along with their partners-in-crime in Washington they often insisted Hamas is worse – much worse even – than ISIS. It’s a familiar playbook. In 2001 the Twin Towers had barely collapsed and Ariel Sharon immediately began insisting the PLO was no different than Al-Qaeda and that Yassir Arafat was worse than Usama Bin Laden. Israel’s flunkies and apologists immediately and dutifully followed suit.
But “Hamas-ISIS” is no longer. Israel’s acolytes have for the most part yet to receive the message, and continue parroting a line that has gone out of style with their leaders, but will probably follow suit at some point within the next 24 months.
So, what happened? Most obviously, the US and Israel have been negotiating, concluding, and implementing a series of agreements with “Hamas-ISIS”. It’s not a particularly good look to be in intensive discussions with, and make one concession after the other to, a movement that is purportedly more vicious and brutal than an organization that not only the West but the international community as well considers entirely beyond the pale. Especially at a time when a broader agreement, extending beyond an exchange of captives, is reportedly being discussed in Doha by the CIA and Mossad chiefs – the city where not only the Qatari mediators but also Hamas’s current and former political leaders, Ismail Haniyyeh and Khalid Mashal, reside.
The fact that Hamas is negotiating exchanges of captives and releasing not only foreign but also Israeli Jewish civilians, rather than slitting their throats in gruesome snuff videos also doesn’t help the cause. Nor do testimonies by released captives that, the violence and abuse of their initial seizure notwithstanding, they have generally been treated humanely.
Of course, no civilian deserves to be held captive unless convicted of a specific crime by legitimate authority, yet the contrast between the testimonies of released Israeli and Palestinian civilian captives is enormous. Released Palestinian women and children speak of constant physical and verbal abuse, particularly since 7 October; all manner of deprivation; and an escalation of abuse once it became apparent they would be released. Furious at Palestinian joy at the release of their own captives, rampaging Israeli forces have also shot and killed several Palestinian well-wishers, enveloped most others in clouds of tear gas, and raided the homes of receiving families to evict journalists and warn against celebrations or even “expressions of joy”.
Palestinians are not ruled by the Israeli government in the same sense that Israelis within the pre-1967 boundaries are. Rather, they are subject to military government, effectively an Israeli military dictatorship whose rule is best described as totalitarian. It has for example banned flags, even particular color combinations (in clothing and painting for example), and in 2023 also “expressions of joy”.
Hamas videos of the release of their captives, in which they assist the elderly, provide water bottles, and wave goodbye (not quite ISIS-friendly optics) have been criticized as political theatre and propaganda. Fair enough. But it is still quite the contrast with the scenes outside Ofer Prison where Israel releases Palestinian captives. There, the best that Israeli propaganda can achieve is clouds of tear gas, intimidation of journalists, live ammunition, and bullet-ridden corpses. (And, for good measure, arresting more civilians than it releases.)
So not only did the US and Israel want to avoid the accusation they were negotiating with ISIS, the available imagery is also unconducive to the narrative. Joe Biden will go to his grave insisting he has seen videos of infants beheaded by Hamas, but it’s gotten to the point where even poor Jill rolls her eyes. Other Israeli and US claims have also drawn the short end of the stick.
For example, the Israeli authorities recently reduced their tally of Israelis killed on 7 October from 1400 to 1200. The reason is that 200 corpses, burned beyond recognition, belonged to Palestinians rather than Israelis. This suggests Hamas was not systematically setting fire to live humans. Similarly, Israeli intelligence (or what’s left of it) has now concluded that Hamas did not have prior knowledge of the rave organized close to the boundary between Israel and the Gaza concentration camp. Therefore this could not have been a premeditated atrocity. I am of course not claiming no atrocities were committed on 7 October, but rather that as more facts become available the “Hamas-ISIS” propaganda line becomes increasingly untenable.
If we put aside Biden’s hallucinations and take Netanyahu off autorepeat for a moment, the ideological, organizational, and political relationship between Hamas and ISIS remains a legitimate field of inquiry. It’s also pretty conclusive. Hamas and ISIS are indeed both Islamist movements. But that’s pretty much where the comparison ends. To suggest they are equivalent or identical is akin to claiming there is no difference between constitutional and absolute monarchies because their heads of state acquire office in the same manner.
Hamas is the Palestinian chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood, a regional Islamist movement formed almost a century ago. Its various national branches have sought to achieve political power through mass mobilization, and as such have formed political parties; provided social services; participated in elections, coups, and uprisings; engaged in armed campaigns against domestic autocracy and foreign domination; and in a number of cases formed internationally-recognized governments. It’s a fundamentally different template than that pursued by ISIS.
Hamas was established in the cauldron of the Israeli occupation, and like other Palestinian organizations actively participated in the struggle to end Israeli rule. In 2006 it participated in Palestinian legislative elections, fully certified by the Carter Center, which it won. In 2007 Hamas seized power in the Gaza Strip after a year during which its various domestic and foreign adversaries, to put it politely, actively worked to undermine it. In the intervening years it has in addition to attacks which have garnered global headlines developed relations with states as diverse as Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Russia, and Qatar; negotiated prisoner exchanges and ceasefires with Israel; freed and released foreign hostages (including BBC journalist Alan Johnston) abducted by rivals and criminal gangs; endorsed a two-state settlement with Israel; and cooperated with a variety of UN agencies and international organisations.
Its governance of the Gaza Strip has, to varying degrees, been hegemonic and repressive, but like its politics and policies defies any comparison to that experienced under ISIS’s self-styled caliphate in Syria and Iraq.
ISIS has in fact been bitterly critical of Hamas, and considers the group in its entirety, as well as each of ts individual members, “apostates” and “polytheists” – its most serious transgressions of all. This is on account of, among other mortal sins, Hamas’s participation in democratic elections, its failure to govern solely in accordance with shari’a (Islamic law), its relations with Iran and other regional states, and prioritization of Palestinian liberation. Perhaps for this reason Hamas made short shrift of attempts by the Islamic State movement to establish a foothold in the Gaza Strip, primarily in Rafah, during 2015-2016.
26 November: Can Hamas be Destroyed?
On 7 October Israel vowed to destroy Hamas. To eradicate it as an organization. To neuter it as a military force, political movement, and governing entity. More recently Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, in true mob boss style, stated that he had given Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, Mossad, orders to assassinate all Hamas leaders residing in exile.
Fifty days into this war, how close is Israel to achieving its objectives? The short answer is that it requires zero knowledge of military affairs to conclude that 1) Israel’s proclaimed objectives are unattainable, and 2) Israel has additionally failed to significantly degrade either Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
The elimination of Hamas is unattainable for several reasons. Most importantly, unlike for example ISIS or the European Union, Hamas has – much like the IRA/Sinn Fein or Facebook, in the decades since its establishment in 1988 become deeply rooted within society, and today exists wherever Palestinian communities are to be found. So even if Israel succeeded in eradicating Hamas from the Gaza Strip – or, more accurately, driving it underground – the organization will survive in the West Bank, Lebanon, Jordan, and elsewhere. Indeed, the combined efforts of Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank since 2007 have yet to succeed in eliminating either its military, political, or social presence. FYI it is now 2023.
Previous campaigns to eradicate Palestinian movements have not only generally failed, but as a rule enhanced their stature. The scale of the current onslaught has catapulted Hamas’s stature to unprecedented levels among Palestinians, and indeed among Arabs and in the Global South more generally. That’s not a challenge that can be resolved by a fleet of F-35s armed with tons of high explosives.
Israel’s extraordinary self-regard and capacity for self-glorification notwithstanding, the elimination of Hamas is a non-starter, least of all at the hands of the thoroughly mediocre Israeli military and intelligence capabilities revealed on 7 October.
Let’s for example take a closer look at those charged with assassinating Hamas leaders abroad. When a Mossad cell tried to poison Hamas leader Khalid Mashal in Amman in 1997, the assassins were caught and arrested by one – just one – of his bodyguards, after a long chase. On foot. King Hussein threatened to publicly execute the James Bond wannabes, and Israel (in the person of none other than Netanyahu) was forced to deliver to Jordan not only the antidote that saved Mashal’s life but also the imprisoned Hamas founder/leader Shaikh Ahmad Yassin. In 2010, when Mossad inexplicably dispatched a team of some two dozen agents to Dubai to assassinate a single Hamas operative, Muhammad Mabhouh, they forgot to observe elementary principles of operational security (e.g. hiding their faces from hotel CCTV monitors), and all ended up on Interpol’s wanted list. Their amateurish use of foreign passports additionally strained relations with key international allies, like Israel acolyte Stephen Harper of Canada.
There’s no indication the agency has gotten any better during the intervening years. Unless you’re watching a Hollywood movie produced by Mossad asset Arnon Milchan, the Israeli foreign intelligence agency is not your go-to outfit for a campaign of high-profile foreign assassinations against an organization on high alert. I suspect American and European intelligence agencies are slowly reaching similar conclusions.
Mossad’s domestic counterpart, Shin Bet, hasn’t fared much better. Not only because it has been unable to eliminate Hamas military chief Muhammad Deif for decades, but more importantly because Hamas was able to arm itself, prepare, and launch the 7 October attacks right under its noses, and it hadn’t a clue. While Israel was busy “mowing the lawn” in the belief it was keeping Gaza’s armed groups in check, the Palestinians constructed an entire rainforest in plain sight.
Israel may well get a few high-profile scalps and proclaim the End of History, but the organizational impact will be minor and temporary. Yassin was assassinated in 2004, a time when the most powerful rocket in the Hamas arsenal had difficulty making it across my living room. Its successful assassination of Hizballah leader Abbas in Mussawi in 1992 produced Hassan Nasrallah, Israel’s worst nightmare. In 2006, a daring midnight wartime raid in the Bekaa Valley finally captured Hassan Nasrallah. But there was a minor hiccup: the Mossad, which constantly proclaims itself the greatest and most sophisticated intelligence agency in recorded history, confused the head of Hizballah with a greengrocer bearing the same name.
Similarly, Israel’s assassination campaign against Iranian nuclear scientists has been – to put it mildly – ineffective. Even the 2004 assassination of Yassir Arafat was counterproductive, as it set the stage for not only the obedient non-entity that is Mahmoud Abbas but also made possible the rise of Hamas as a genuinely national movement.
But I digress. How significantly has Israel weakened Hamas since 7 October? If you listen to Daniel Hagari (the tunnel meme celebrity), Defense Minister Yoav Gallant (who looks like death warmed over when delivering good news), or Netanyahu, it’s clear there is very little left of the Palestinian movements, their leadership, or infrastructure. Antony Blinken, Jake “All Quiet on the Western Front” Sullivan, and John “Tearstosterone” Kirby, who seem to prefer receiving news after it has been vetted by the Israeli military censor, appear similarly confident.
But once you step outside their echo chamber reality tells a very different story. A significantly degraded organization would not have been able to uniformly and simultaneously cease firing throughout the Gaza Strip at the very moment a truce went into effect. Or to continue firing coordinated rocket barrages until moments before. Or to record, edit, and centrally broadcast video footage of its military operations from multiple locations on a nearly daily basis. Or collect and deliver captives from multiple locations, to multiple locations, during the truce – including deliberately choosing a location in central Gaza City that the Israeli military claimed is under its control.
The most important functions of any military organization – command and control, communications, logistics, reconnaissance, PR, and last but not least the ability and will to fight, appear intact and at best marginally affected. As pointed out previously, Israel has killed more UN staff than Hamas commanders. The same in fact holds true for journalists and medical personnel. And the Israeli military has yet to unearth a fraction of the tunnels found in Hagari memes.
It's inconceivable that Hamas has not been weakened and degraded during the past 50 days, or not lost important cadres and commanders, or depleted a significant proportion of its arsenal. But significantly degraded? The evidence for this is entirely absent. The Israeli military is admittedly a highly efficient killing machine, but also a mediocre fighting force, particularly in ground operations. Wars are not won by slaughtering children by the thousands, or turning Gaza City into rubble and depriving an entire society of basic necessities. The Germans tried this in the Soviet Union, and the Americans in Iraq, and it didn’t end well for either of them. Many have expressed disgust at the video of an Israeli major dedicating the destruction of a building to his daughter on her second birthday. One could also point out that when a military reaches the point of celebrating the demolition of an apartment building, it should repurpose as a municipal engineering corps and can no longer be considered a serious fighting force.
This also helps explain why the US – by any standard an active participant in this war – and Israel decided to not only negotiate with Hamas, but specifically with Yahya Sinwar, the architect of the 7 October attacks, and to accept most of Hamas’s conditions for the agreement reached several days ago.
Before the truce was concluded US and Israeli officials – who previously rejected anything of the sort – explained that it would be an important agreement because it would legitimize a subsequent continuation and escalation of the war against the Gaza Strip. Several additional months on the scale of what we have witnessed this past month or even greater, as Gallant and Hagari keep promising, now seems increasingly unlikely.
To be sure, Israel has an overwhelming advantage in military power. But when a serving cabinet minister advocates using a nuclear weapon against the Gaza Strip (a threat that has yet to be acknowledged by a single Western leader), it suggests the conventional military is having difficulty succeeding.
Given its overwhelming power, Israel can of course inflict very severe damage on not only Palestinian society but also Hamas. It will almost certainly make another effort to do so in the coming days or weeks. But it seems increasingly unlikely it is prepared to expend the blood and treasure required to achieve a meaningful military result. Its US and European sponsors also appear to be reaching a point where they would prefer to gradually wind this down before it gets completely out of hand and Israeli conduct ends up damaging rather than promoting their interests in the region.
Israel’s systematic, deliberate attacks on the civilian population of the Gaza Strip, and systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure, should be understood in this context. In addition to being motivated by a lust for revenge and desire to achieve a body count many time higher than that inflicted by the Palestinians on 7 October, such campaigns, for example by the Nazis in occupied Europe, the French in Algeria, the British in Kenya, the US in Iraq and before that in Vietnam/Laos/Cambodia, and indeed Israel in Palestine and Lebanon, deliberately target civilian society in order to put pressure on armed groups that superior military force is unable to eliminate. The British after all pioneered the concentration camp during the Boer War for this objective, decades before the Nazis repurposed it for mass extermination.
Given the above examples, one might conclude that such tactics rarely end well for the occupiers. They often don’t. Yet it is also true that the dustbin of history is littered with just causes. In the case of Israel and the Palestinians, and despite the colossal imbalance of power, it appears that Israel is increasingly losing the plot.
25 November: Truce
It is difficult to predict whether or not the Israeli-Palestinian truce will be extended beyond its expiration on the morning of 29 November, or for that matter whether it will even last until then.
There are a number of factors that would appear to encourage a resumption of the Israeli offensive. Many have pointed to Netanyahu, and his personal interest in prolonging the conflict in order to remain in power as a wartime leader and thereby avoid conviction on corruption charges. This is not irrelevant, but also at best a secondary factor. I don’t believe the Israeli prime minister can drag the entire country into a war against its will in a transparent effort to save his political skin. And even if he did, it merely postpones the day of reckoning and buys him some time to cut a deal that would see him avoid a prison sentence. Furthermore, his management of the war is placing severe strain on the governing coalition because he has been forced to make compromises with political rivals, and conclude agreements with the Palestinians, that would otherwise be unnecessary.
Rather, it is Israel’s entire political and military-intelligence leadership that has the greatest interest in renewing the war. They are collectively and individually responsible for the 7 October debacle, the most catastrophic military failure in Israel’s (admittedly short) history. Since that date and despite the most intensive bombing campaign in the history of the Middle East against a fairly modest adversary that doesn’t possess a single airplane, tank, anti-aircraft battery, or APC, the Israeli military has failed to achieve anything of military significance - unless one considers raising a flag over a hospital and 10,000 tunnel memes the greatest battlefield accomplishment since the Soviet victory at Kursk.
Israel’s initial strategic objective was to expel the Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip into the Sinai desert. Despite enthusiastic and energetic US support for this exercise in ethnic cleansing, particularly by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, the initiative was stopped dead in its tracks by Arab opposition and Palestinian resolve. Israel and the US also vowed to eradicate Hamas root and branch, as both a military force and political movement, and jointly insisted there would be no truce until this was achieved. They also repeatedly proclaimed that only military pressure rather than negotiations would result in the recovery of their captives. One month later and they have negotiated and concluded an agreement with the architect of the 7 October attacks, Yahya Sinwar, for both an exchange of captives and a truce, and on conditions that closely mirror those proposed by Hamas before negotiations began. Israeli leaders and their US sponsors have a tendency to believe that where force fails to achieve an objective the solution is even greater violence, and this forms an additional incentive for them to resume hostilities.
Among these are forces within the Israeli governing coalition, not limited to Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, who see the current crisis as an opportunity: to reclaim the Gaza Strip for colonisation, to intensify settlement and ethnic cleansing of the West Bank, to further dispossess Palestinian citizens of Israel, and ultimately to make Greater Israel a reality. Others in the leadership believe this is an opportune time for a regional conflict, and are convinced that if they play their cards right, they can draw the US into a direct confrontation with Lebanon and perhaps even Iran.
But there are also and perhaps more compelling reasons for an extension. The truce agreement has been structured to permit and encourage further exchanges of captives, which can only take place if the guns remain silent. Thus far, only Israeli and dual-national women and minors are being released by the Palestinians. This was agreed in order to allay Israeli concerns that the US would prioritise the release of its own citizens and then abandon the negotiations, and to bolster Netanyahu’s standing with the Israeli public. The US and European governments, who have functioned as Israel’s partners in this war, thus have a real incentive to extend the truce, and can expected to make this preference known to Israel.
Within Israel, the Israeli public, which has clear memories of the 2011 Shalit prisoner exchange, has had a further demonstration that not one captive was recovered on account of military pressure, while dozens achieved freedom through negotiated agreements. And Qatar and Egypt have demonstrated their credentials as mediators that are able to deliver. They are reportedly already proposing a further 5-6 day extension of the present agreement. Public pressure on the government to continue with the truce could therefore be significant, and play a significant role.
Israel’s military failures notwithstanding it is also the case that if it resumes operations, its most difficult challenges lie ahead rather than behind it. Cognizant of its mediocrity as a fighting force, it may choose to cut its losses and take satisfaction with the staggering levels of death and destruction inflicted upon the Gaza Strip.
With Blinken largely sidelined in Washington, the US agenda appears to be increasingly dominated by concerns about regional conflict. A resumption of hostilities makes further such escalation a virtual certainty. US confidence in Israel’s ability to fight a two-front war and potentially on three fronts is non-existent, as is Washington’s appetite for another US war in the Middle East during an election year. Red Sea shipping (and rising insurance rates), attacks on US bases in Iraq and Syria, and the specter of confrontation with Iran, even if unlikely, are additional concerns. US client regimes in the region appear largely secure, but threats to their stability could emerge suddenly. While unprecedented demonstrations against Biden’s complicity in the Gaza killing fields and the possibility of Democratic voters sitting out the 2024 elections in disgust are a factor, Biden seems wholly unconcerned and determined to stay the course despite the political cost. In any case, and particularly in recent decades US elections are decided by dollars not voters – about half of whom typically don’t vote in presidential elections anyway.
European governments are more susceptible to public opinion and electoral consequences, and some of these have begun to advocate less or even no further mass killing in Gaza. Arab states, and other US partners globally, would prefer that this ended yesterday.
Informed by Israel’s instrumentalization of ceasefires during the 1982 Siege of Beirut to advance militarily, I initially believed the truce unlikely to last more than a few hours. But conditions in 2023 are fundamentally different. While it is true that Israel’s lust for revenge appears insatiable, the uncompromisingly tough talk coming from Defense Minister Gallant and others may prove to be cover for accepting a truce extension on the pretext that Israeli threats made it possible.
Hamas’s ability to remain intact, and Israel’s inability to defeat it, makes an extension of the truce both more and less likely. Again, one can at this stage only speculate, but I suspect there will be a temporary extension, Israel will at some point launch a final, furious assault, and its failure may prove to be the point where the end comes in sight.
25 November: Itamar Ben-Gvir
Itamar Ben-Gvir, Israel's Reinhard Heydrich wannabe, has banned "expressions of joy" in East Jerusalem for released prisoners. "My instructions are clear: Expressions of joy are equivalent to backing terrorism, victory celebrations give backing to those human scum". Ben-Gvir's stormtroopers now threatening any liberated prisoner whose freedom is publicly celebrated with re-arrest. He can't stomach presiding over the early release rather than execution of prisoners. The true mark of a desperate, defeated regime.
Ben-Gvir views introduction of death penalty as his signature policy and wants mass executions of Palestinian prisoners as his enduring legacy. He’s now overseeing their early release. The harder they come…
24 November: US Negotiators
There’s a reason why CIA chief Burns rather than Secretary of State Blinken was the chief US negotiator with Hamas to reach the current truce. One important reason is that unlike Blinken, who is a rather clueless airhead when it comes to the Middle East, Burns knows the region well and understands its politics. More importantly, while Blinken may be a diplomat who has never handled so much as a water pistol, the guy just loves war. As in obsessively besotted with it. Since reaching adulthood he’s done everything within his power to promote each and every war in the Middle East, and also worked overtime to promote armed conflicts that unfortunately for him ultimately didn’t erupt. He probably still considers the 2003 Iraq War his greatest accomplishment. It’s like the guy is either advocating for war or playing Call of Duty 24/7. Blinken is not the person you want in the room when you’re conducting complex diplomacy and trying to reach actual agreements with adversaries, as opposed to promoting mass killings and apocalyptic destruction. That's why the White House left the serious diplomacy to Burns, and recalled Blinken to Washington to issue meaningless platitudes about the current crisis. Now that an agreement has been reached, he's being allowed back to the region for a short trip.
23 November: The Decline and Fall of Hasbara
What has happened to Israeli hasbara (“explaining”, i.e. propaganda)? Others may disagree but it used to be professional, sophisticated, intelligent, and effective. Different messages were carefully tailored to appeal to the agendas, values, sentiments, and prejudices of different audiences. It was believable if you didn’t know better, and if you did real effort was required to expose it.
Today it is crude and vulgar to the point of being cartoonish, more often than not outlandishly detached from reality, and aside from committed apologists persuades nobody aside from Western mainstream media organisations which still dutifully report its claims as serious news. Beyond this narrow orbit Israeli propaganda produces a vastly greater volume of sarcastic memes than serious discussions.
So what happened? Simply stated, Israel has had it too good for too long. For decades its lies, distortions, and dubious assertions went essentially unchallenged. Then highly successful campaigns were launched by e.g. AIPAC and the Defamation League to delegitimise any who would dare criticise Israel and place them beyond the pale. As a result Israeli hasbara, much like the Israeli military, became complacent, lazy, and mired in past glory. It failed to recognise and prepare for new challenges emerging on the horizon, and once these became real was unable to respond to them with more than rote barking of “anti-Semitism”. Gilad Erdan, Israel’s clownish Permanent Representative to the United Nations, is the personification of Israeli hasbara in the twenty-first century. Military spokesperson Daniel Hagari runs an increasingly close second.
But there is also another dynamic at work. Israel’s elites as well as Israeli society have in recent decades shifted so decisively to the right that they are no longer able to formulate effective messages for multiple audiences without violating their own core principles. They would rather lose the argument if winning it means they have to go through the motions of expressing support for negotiations with the Palestinians, a two-state settlement, equal citizenship for Palestinians in Israel, and so on. As a result they are unable to reach beyond the converted - MAGA types, Islamophobic white supremacists, messianic evangelicals, and the like. For these reasons Israeli hasbara has in my view reached structural dead ends from which it cannot recover.
23 November: Nazis?
Israel has repeatedly denounced Hamas as Nazis. It has now concluded yet another agreement with the Palestinian movement. If we accept Israel’s characterisation of Hamas, this means it is negotiating with Nazis. Sound strange? Not really.
In 1933 the Zionist movement shattered the Ant-Nazi Boycott when it concluded the Ha’avara (Transfer) agreement with the Third Reich. In 1937 Adolf Eichmann visited Palestine as a guest of the Zionist movement. In 1941 Yitzhak Shamir proposed an alliance with Nazi Germany against Great Britain. And in 1944 Rudolf Kastner, prominent Hungarian Zionist, negotiated an agreement with Adolf Eichmann that facilitated the deportation of Hungary’s Jews to Auschwitz.
That’s the short and partial version. Perhaps characterizing Hamas as Nazis made it easier for Israel to negotiate an agreement with it.
21 November: Truce?
In an interview last week I speculated that there may have been an informal US-Israeli agreement: The Biden administration would support Israel’s invasion of Al-Shifa Hospital, and would cover for this war crime with lies of its own about the existence of a Palestinian Pentagon beneath it. But once it became clear that the only facility on the premises was a hospital and Israel completed its destruction, the US would finalise a deal with Hamas and Israel would agree to its terms. This is what now appears to have happened: in exchange for US support for Israel’s systematic destruction of the health sector in the Gaza Strip, a US-Israeli deal with Hamas has been reached. Some observations on this agreement:
The US and Israel, which vowed to eradicate Hamas, are negotiating with the Palestinian movement and reaching agreements with it. Qatari-Egyptian mediation is a formality. Biden and Netanyahu are not negotiating with Cairo and Doha. Judging by Israeli press reports Hamas was desperate for any respite, however brief, from the Israeli onslaught for almost any price. Yet the deal includes: the release of 3x the number of Palestinian women and children by Israel; no Israeli soldiers included in the exchange; humanitarian supplies to the entire Gaza Strip; a continuous 4-day ceasefire rather than for only several hours a day; and specified periods during which Israeli jets and drones are prohibited from using the airspace over the Gaza Strip.
This is quite close to the deal initially offered by Hamas some time ago, and it seems all of its key conditions have been accepted by Israel and the US. Desperate, you say? If the adage that negotiations reflect reality on the ground rather than overturning it applies, Hamas – in contrast to the Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip that has been Israel’s main target – seems to remain rather intact.
Hamas has forced the US and Israel to consent to the supply of essential humanitarian supplies throughout the entirety of the Gaza Strip. In other words, Hamas has in one fell swoop achieved exponentially more on the humanitarian front than the much-vaunted US “negotiations” about humanitarian relief during the past month. This confirms that the entire US effort was nothing but a circus and diversionary charade to enable Israel to continue with its mass killings and transform the Gaza Strip into a wasteland and killing field.
It bears repeating: Hamas forced the US and Israel to allow food, water, medicine, and fuel to reach the entire civilian population of the Gaza Strip. But of course, Hamas are Nazi-ISIS terrorists, Israel a light unto the nations with the world’s most moral army, and the US the world’s greatest democracy whose sole mission is to spread the gospel of human rights to the rest of the planet.
What happens next is difficult to assess. According to reports only Israeli and dual nationals are being released, presumably to help the Israeli leadership swallow this very bitter pill. This also means that further negotiations to release foreign citizens are ongoing, potentially leading to an extension of the ceasefire. I find it difficult to believe that the Israeli leadership – not just Netanyahu – can accept this. Although the Gaza Strip has been substantially destroyed, Hamas hasn’t, and none of its key leaders have been located.
If Israel is confident it can flout US policy and once again incur no consequences for doing so, it will. The Israeli-Lebanese front also seems to be rapidly escalating. While it is true that it is in Netanyahu’s personal and political interest to keep this conflict going, I don’t believe he can do so against the will of the Israeli leadership. The security establishment is desperate to wipe the stain of 7 October but has yet to kill more Hamas commanders than UN staff. Other coalition partners see the crisis as a golden opportunity to unleash the apocalypse and therefore voted against this deal.
So further escalation is likely. But it is also possible implementation of this deal could cause the government to collapse under a combination of internal contradictions and public pressure. The US leadership is also a question mark. With respect to the impact of this crisis on US interests in the region and beyond, and particularly the question of regional escalation: Biden doesn’t care, Blinken doesn’t know, and Burns and Austin are shitting bricks. Perhaps the one conclusion that can already be drawn: the various “day after” scenarios emanating from the Washington echo chamber can be safely filed away. They require the eradication of Hamas, not negotiated agreements with it.
20 November: Piracy
Given my limited knowledge of international law, could someone please explain why Yemen seizing a ship in international waters is very, very bad but Israel seizing a ship in international waters and killing ten of its passengers is very, very good?
16 November: Intelligence Failure?
Can Israel’s Al-Shifa Hospital debacle, and specifically the Biden administration’s full-throated support for Israel’s fraudulent claims about the hospital and for its invasion of the compound, be characterised as a US intelligence failure? Not in my view.
An intelligence failure requires the existence of actual intelligence reports that have reached particular conclusions with sufficient confidence, and are deemed sufficiently reliable by relevant decision-makers, to inform their policies. When such reports are subsequently found to have been based on significant errors of fact and/or analysis, resulting in policy debacles, we can legitimately speak of an intelligence failure. The 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam and 1973 October War are considered classic intelligence failures, for the US and Israel respectively. Why? Because there was extensive genuine intelligence and reporting preceding these events, but these were based on either faulty data or produced flawed analysis, contributing to disastrous decision-making.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq was by contrast not an intelligence failure. Why? Because the US and UK governments knowingly fabricated false reports about Iraqi WMD, Iraq’s relationship with Al-Qaeda, and other issues. Their fabrications either did not have a basis in existing intelligence, or thoroughly distorted the available intelligence, or were produced by alternative intelligence procedures specifically designed to produce fraudulent conclusions that would promote government policy. Colin Powell’s subsequent protestations about being hoodwinked by the CIA notwithstanding he was a liar, not a fool.
If we turn to Al-Shifa, the US cannot claim it was fooled by Israeli intelligence. US officials have repeatedly insisted they possess independent intelligence, collected by US agencies, that corroborate Israeli claims. More than 24 hours after Israel invaded the hospital and it became indisputably clear that such intelligence could not have existed, Joe Biden continues to insist that it is both real and wholly accurate.
But it’s inconceivable that US intelligence agencies independently collected detailed, extensive information about a facility that doesn’t exist. In other words, like Powell, Biden is lying. But unlike Powell, he’s also a fool.
US National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby has made similar claims. The proposition that Kirby, a retired admiral, would have been willing to make claims of such significance without first ensuring they are substantiated by reliable intelligence, simply stretches credulity. In other words, he is certain to have checked, found out that there was nothing to substantiate the claims, and then went to the podium and knowingly lied to the assembled media. Like Biden, both a liar and a fool. For my part I consider it a certainty that we will eventually learn – probably later than sooner – that there was never any reliable US intelligence, collected independently of Israel, that concluded there was anything of significance below Al-Shifa Hospital, let alone a Palestinian Pentagon. Is this Biden’s 2003 moment? No, he already had that in 2003 when he was an enthusiastic sponsor of the illegal invasion of Iraq.
15 November: United Nations in the Dark
In response to the 2003 Canal Hotel bombing in Baghdad, in which approximately 20 United Nations personnel were killed, the UN launched a thorough review of its security procedures, which in 2004 resulted in the establishment of a Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS). To date, UNDSS still hasn't been able to identify the state responsible for the killing of even one of the more than 100 UN staff killed by Israel in the Gaza Strip during the past month. Everyone else seems to have figured it out, including Israel, but not UNDSS. This has put UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in the extraordinarily embarrassing position of being unable to tell anyone who is responsible for killing the largest number of staff in UN history, or even confirming that they were killed rather than died of natural causes, joined a cult and committed collective suicide, or perished in a natural disaster. Guterres clearly needs to fire the head of UNDSS forthwith and replace him with a more competent director who can at least read a newspaper and inform him who is killing his staff in record numbers at a record pace.
12 November: The Al-Shifa Pentagon
I have never been underneath Al-Shifa Hospital and have no idea what is or isn’t there. It is however clear that Israeli accusations regarding the hospital are 80 per cent assertion, 20 per cent drawings, and 100 per cent unverified. The enthusiastic confirmation of Israel’s assertions by US intelligence officials and European politicians, with zero additional evidence provided, add nothing to the accusations. The confirmations provided by Hamas prisoners can also be safely dismissed. Both because torture in Israeli prisons is systematic, and because as a matter of elementary logic there is no reason ordinary cadres would possess detailed information about the clandestine headquarters and movements of their secretive leadership.
Hospital staff, foreign doctors, and others have all vigorously disputed Israel’s claims of numerous – indeed of any – tunnel entrances/exits within the hospital compound. Logically this makes sense. A hospital is a public institution open at all hours 24/7/365 to members of the public, including inquisitive journalists, spies, and Israeli intelligence agents who could easily collect photographic evidence of Israeli assertions rather than resorting to drawings and graphics.
The argument about human shields also makes little sense. The claim that non-combatant casualties restrain Israeli military operations has zero evidence in the historical record, and those allegedly hiding below Al-Shifa Hospital know this. By contrast, there is ample evidence of Israeli campaigns deliberately and/or indiscriminately targeting civilians to generate pressure on combatants and their leaders.
This entire debate can be easily resolved by an independent investigation. Tellingly the Palestinians, including Hamas and the Gaza authorities, have repeatedly invited this, suggesting that the ICRC or other international organisation carry it out. Israel has not supported an investigation that is not carried out under its auspices, and has additionally prevented the entry of any journalist or investigator into the Gaza Strip.
Pending such an investigation, the conclusion that Al-Shifa Hospital is being targeted because Israel needs a symbolic victory after elevating it to the status of Iwo Jima, and has convinced itself that conquering Al-Shifa will terminate Hamas governance in the Gaza Strip, seems reasonable. If and when Israeli forces enter Al-Shifa, expect to see evidence exceeding Israeli claims provided by the Israeli military, faithfully parroted by Western media but denied independent verification. The reality, I suspect, will prove as substantiated as Iraqi WMD.
Speaking of Iraqi WMD, NYT reports, "Senior Israeli intelligence officials allowed The Times to review photographs that purported to show secret entrances to the compound from inside the hospital. Signs identifying the location as Al Shifa were clearly visible in the photographs, though their authenticity could not be independently verified." NYT has been awarded numerous Pulitzers for its investigative reporting, and takes great pride in it. What prevented NYT from sending a reporter to the hospital, comparing the photographs with the entrance inside the hospital clearly marked by "signs," and then taking a peek at what's inside?