Meryem Belkaïd, From Outlaw to Rebel: Oppositional Documentary in Contemporary Algeria (New Texts Out Now)

Meryem Belkaïd, From Outlaw to Rebel: Oppositional Documentary in Contemporary Algeria (New Texts Out Now)

Meryem Belkaïd, From Outlaw to Rebel: Oppositional Documentary in Contemporary Algeria (New Texts Out Now)

By : Meryem Belkaïd

Meryem Belkaïd, From Outlaw to Rebel: Oppositional Documentary in Contemporary Algeria (Palgrave Macmillan, 2023).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Meryem Belkaïd (MB): After several years working and teaching in France, I felt, in the United States, more encouraged to develop an active research agenda focused on North African literature and cinema through a decolonial perspective. While acknowledging the legacies and traumas of colonialism, I wanted to showcase North African cultural productions and analyze Algeria not systematically or exclusively through the lens of its colonial past but as a dynamic place of knowledge production and artistic creation, despite the many challenges the country must navigate. I wanted to insist on the importance of considering the country and the region as a thriving center and not as a mere periphery. I also wanted to showcase Algerian texts and films and to link them to current socio-political realities on the ground with the hope of (re)affirming Algerian agency. And among all the works produced in Algeria, documentaries stood as a dynamic and engaging genre while often under-analyzed and under-appreciated, as is the case for documentaries in general.

... documentaries allow the introduction of new languages, techniques, and interpretations into the public sphere.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

MB: I examine the political significance and the esthetic power of some of the most influential Algerian documentaries produced since the 2000s. My first chapter is dedicated to the history of the documentary in Algeria, a chronology and presentation that has never been comprehensively realized before. In the following chapters, I use case studies to highlight the works of four Algerian filmmakers: Malek Bensmaïl, Hassen Ferhani, Djamel Kerkar, and Karim Sayad. My central claim is that the documentary genre—born an outlaw during the Algerian war of independence—continues to craft complex and relevant work on modern Algerian citizenship and convey a broader understanding of Algerian society and identity. The title of the book is a homage to Mouny Berrah, an important Algerian female critic in the field of Arab cinema, who wrote that Algerian cinema was born an outlaw and remained a rebel. By deconstructing and opposing the mechanisms that make the mythological machine of the official discourses so effective, documentaries allow the introduction of new languages, techniques, and interpretations into the public sphere. 

In independent Algeria, films sponsored by the state often functioned—and still function—as a glorification of the past. This did not prevent some filmmakers from crafting alternative images and discourses in the early sixties and throughout the following decades. After the civil war a new critical mass has been reached in Algerian documentary filmmaking with what I call immersive and oppositional documentaries. Filmmakers like Bensmaïl, Ferhani, and Kerkar, as well as Tariq Teguia and Habiba Djahnine, constitute a new political generation that has freed itself from the obligation to produce works aligned with any hegemonic or imposed discourse about Algerian identity. That is why I call their work oppositional. I look also more closely at documentaries whose directors have chosen immersion and observation as a main strategy of formal experimentation in the field of nonfiction filmmaking. They provide a more immediate, intimate, and sensory representation of particular people, territories, and environments. This emphasis on senses and sensory representations led the Tunisian cinema expert Insaf Machta to coin the expression “aesthetic of immersion,” which I find relevant for the Algerian documentaries analyzed in this book. These films’ emphasis on the material, physical, affective, and sensory qualities of lived experience suggests that some Algerian filmmakers are interested in conveying a different kind of knowledge, one that is not communicated solely via discourse and clear political statements. For example, the films’ refusal of voice-over (“the voice of God,” as critics call it) is a strong invitation to the audience to observe and immerse itself in the universe as filmed.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MB: Before my book on Algerian cinema, I worked on Francophone crime fiction. While these dual pursuits may seem disparate, they jointly reflect my interests in the ways political, social, and cultural change are reflected in the works of contemporary writers and filmmakers. In addition, these two different pieces of research consisted of a similar scholarly approach that combines close analysis; historical, sociological, and political contextualization; and critical and theoretical engagement. Francophone studies also has an intrinsic relationship with the history of colonialism and its aftermath.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MB: Palgrave Studies in Arab Cinema presents intimate analyses of Arab cinema and focuses on well-known and new authors, historical and contemporary movements, specific films, and significant moments in Arab and North African film history. The series encourages multi-disciplinary methods that create a close contact with the diverse cinematic modes and genres of the Arab world. The format of the series insists on concision, and I chose the press for the promise of accessibility and perhaps wider academic and pedagogical distribution. I have been encouraged by the reaction of peers in my field who have responded enthusiastically to the book as a source of both scholarly and pedagogical value: it appears to have potential for both experienced and emergent researchers in the field. It should be of interest for students and scholars of cinema studies, Francophone studies, and MENA studies.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MB: My other work is for a broader audience (journalism, blogging, podcasting, and creative writing) and is intimately tied to my scholarly pursuits. It allows me to keep commenting upon current events, culture, and politics in Algeria and the Arab region more broadly. My first novel in French, Ecris et je viendrai, is about to be published in Algeria in October 2024. 

I am also currently working on a new book that examines the representations and narrations of colonial crimes. History is often the fruit of power, and we can be hostages of discourses that power has created. Literature and cinema produce alternative narratives, especially by giving voice to the silenced and the marginalized—those who have been dominated by colonialism, authoritarianism, and patriarchy. My main goal is to keep looking for these voices and to make them heard. Western historiography often omits the points of view and accounts of the victims. It emphasizes the scale of the violence, the cover-ups, and the military and political failings, but does not dwell on the stories, trajectories, and beliefs of indigenous people. My book aims to explore their side of the story. It will have a comparative approach with narratives from Algeria, Arizona, New Caledonia, Palestine, and elsewhere.

J: You mentioned Palestine. How is your current work impacted by what is going on in Gaza since October?

MB: First, as many scholars, I am outraged to see the international community sit by and continue to allow the destruction of the Palestinian people in Gaza. In From Outlaw to Rebel, I wanted to showcase Algerian agency after independence and highlight stories that are not always linked to the colonial past. I think it is important, as I wrote in an article for Romanic Review recently, to take Algerian agency seriously despite the political challenges the country faces. But the fact is that colonialism is far from being over and that means that all who deny the colonial dimension of what is happening in Gaza have not learned from the past. As an academic and a teacher, I feel that the least I can do is keep sharing stories of resistance and resilience to colonial domination and violence. The more the colonized are dehumanized the more I will look for stories that humanize them.

 

Excerpt from the book (from Chapter 2)

One day early in my research for this book, I was having coffee in Paris with Hassen Ferhani and Djamel Kerkar. Both are Algerian filmmakers, and later chapters in this book will focus on their respective films. We were discussing the history of Algerian cinema and talking about some of the more influential Algerian documentaries made in recent decades (I was already thinking about this chapter) when Kerkar asked a question that has been on my mind ever since: Why have the Algerian state and the national structures and institutions that fund the arts in Algeria always privileged fiction over documentary? He added—not without irony, since he is a documentary practitioner himself—that the omission was surprising “because documentary can be an efficient form of propaganda.” We laughed and then continued our conversation, trying to understand why documentaries have failed to thrive in the national cinema, and especially how the documentary could languish as a form, even as the state and the leaders of public institutions insisted on the educational aspect of Algerian cinema and understood it as a tool.

In fact, as early as 1964, with the Centre National de Cinéma (CNC) and the Office des Actualités Algériennes (OAA), and in 1968, with the Office National pour le Commerce et l’industrie Cinématographique (ONCIC) and The Centre des Actualités Cinématographiques (CAC), all cinematographic activities, including production, distribution, programming and exhibition were handled by the state. As Mouny Berrah wrote in 1984, the orientation of the Algerian national cinema—as claimed by those in charge of cinematic institutions—has inarguably been one of “educational cinema.” That educational label should be understood in the broad sense of a cinema created for the benefit of the Algerian people as, after independence, they collectively grappled with the need to emerge from underdevelopment and the hardships of colonial rule. Algiers, with its dynamic Cinémathèque created by the state in January 1965, was throughout the 1960s the hub of Third World cinema. Fernando Solanas and Octavio Getino’s Third Cinema Manifesto, which attracted a worldwide following, was well known in cinephile circles in Algiers, and Third Cinema filmmaking practice explicitly favored documentary:

The cinema known as documentary, with all the vastness that the concept has today, from educational films to the reconstruction of a fact or a historical event, is perhaps the main basis of revolutionary filmmaking. Every image that documents, bears witness to, refutes or deepens the truth of a situation is something more than a film image or purely artistic fact; it becomes something which the System finds indigestible.

If during the Algerian War of Independence documentaries were perceived as a revolutionary tool, competing with colonialism’s official narrative, in the years immediately following independence in 1962, Algerian filmmakers did little to exploit the political potential of documentary as Solanas and Getino had theorized. In considering what circumstances might have allowed fiction to flourish more than documentary in national cinema production, Djamel Kerkar, Hassen Ferhani, and I wondered if this orientation toward fiction had in fact been chosen consciously. We pondered whether perhaps this preference for fiction, the neglect of forms like documentary, derived from a long-standing dichotomy between commercialism and critical social commitment. Did the commercial imperatives imposed by the ONCIC, and its officials’ rather conservative understanding of cinema, indicate that public institutions privileged fiction because they thought action films and to some extent comedies were more likely to satisfy the tastes of larger audiences? We surmised that documentary had rapidly been considered as a genre more appropriately screened on television and financed by the public Television and radio channel, la Radio et télevision algérienne (RTA), rather than by the ONCIC, which funds nearly all cinematic production in Algeria. And yet, were there perhaps deeper reasons why, in a nascent nation, documentary seemed inadequate, despite its recognized importance as a genre during the recent war of independence? 

In the months after this conversation, as I immersed myself in scholarly work about documentary production over the past thirty years, I was struck by the theory of documentary as primarily focused on the complex relationship between reality and representation, with documentary film often seen as a genre that strives for an objective relationship to reality but always fails to realize it. Documentary can never be objective, can never sustain a straightforward relationship between the image and the real. As Stella Bruzzi explains, this missed objectivity has been seen as problematic: “Too often in the past documentary was seen to have failed (or be in imminent danger of failing) because it could not be decontaminated of its representational quality (…)”. And yet debates over what reality means, whether reality in fact exists and whether or not documentaries can represent it, were not exactly what I had in mind when I began my work on Algerian documentaries. I had a rather different take on the genre: whatever documentary’s relationship to reality, it seemed to me more important to explore the organic relationship between documentary and freedom, and perhaps even documentary and democracy. Much later in my research, during an interview with Malek Bensmaïl, I found this intuition confirmed. Bensmaïl offered that he sees documentaries as a barometer for democracy: “On a scale from one to ten, ten being democracy, I would say that in Algeria today, we are at four. Because even if you manage to overcome all the difficulties related to censorship, even if you obtain permission to film, our films are very rarely distributed and seen in Algeria. Documentaries are indeed a barometer of democracy, and we still have a long road ahead of us.” In Bensmaïl’s mind documentaries thrive together with freedom—they get made when the powers that be are not nervous about the truth and competing narratives.

Documentaries may vary in their form, their intent, their treatment of reality, but every documentary brings a fresh and personal eye to events as they take place in a specific setting. When I went back to the simple and straightforward definition of documentary offered by an early practitioner, John Grieson, in the 1930s—that documentary is “the creative treatment of actuality”—I realized that documentary theory often took for granted an idea implicit in that definition. For a filmmaker to be creative with actuality – however “creative” and “actuality” are understood– the filmmaker needs a minimum of leeway and freedom to engage in that creative work. It is with this basic premise in mind that this chapter will tell a brief history of documentaries in Algerian cinema. This is not to sidestep important questions about objectivity, reality, and representation: it is always possible for filmmakers, in whatever the political context they work, to treat reality with more or less honesty, to play with codes, to tell stories through editing, to bring formal innovations, to be close to “cinema direct”—or, on the contrary, to stage and rehearse situations and then present them as natural. But in postcolonial Algeria, it seems of much greater importance to consider the conditions in which this representation of reality—authentic or not—can freely occur. 

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.