Susan Slyomovics, Monuments Decolonized: Algeria’s French Colonial Heritage (New Texts Out Now)

Susan Slyomovics, Monuments Decolonized: Algeria’s French Colonial Heritage (New Texts Out Now)

Susan Slyomovics, Monuments Decolonized: Algeria’s French Colonial Heritage (New Texts Out Now)

By : Susan Slyomovics

Susan Slyomovics, Monuments Decolonized: Algeria’s French Colonial Heritage (Stanford University Press, 2024).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Susan Slyomovics (SS): In writing this book, I took on monuments that I kept seeing in France and Algeria, ubiquitous presences that made me stop and look. For example, in 1990 when I first came to Oran, Algeria’s second largest city, I lived near the magnificent monument to the martyrs of the Algerian War of Independence (1954-62). In 2013, when I lived in Lyon, France, I stood in front of a statue whose origins, inscribed in gold letters, were the war memorial in Oran. So, I wondered if I could understand forms of colonization and decolonization through statues, their locations, material, and visual impacts on people most affected by them. This also meant trying to comprehend material formations of France’s settler colonialism in Algeria because these memorials, statues, and monuments all register harms and losses inflicted by conquest and wars in the past. But because so many colonial-era monuments remain (and I found many were beautiful sculptures) both in France and Algeria, things can be done to them in the present—repurpose, preserve, destroy, move elsewhere, and so on.

How and when were Algeria’s French colonial war memorials and statues constructed, for what purpose, where, and if possible, how many?

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

SS: How and when were Algeria’s French colonial war memorials and statues constructed, for what purpose, where, and if possible, how many? Around thirty-six thousand monuments were erected between the two world wars in France (which included Algeria, whose three northern regions of Oran, Algiers, and Constantine were integrated as French provinces) as well as France’s other overseas departments. Monuments memorialized those who fought and died for France in two world wars. Unlike the so-called indigènes elsewhere in the French empire, only the “Muslim” natives of Algeria (more colonial terminology) were drafted as French subjects but never citizens beginning in 1913. The figure for World War II is some 343,000 conscripted Algerians. Monuments to the war dead, statues, church bells, and more crossed the Mediterranean Sea during the nineteenth-century imperial drive to colonize North Africa and then around 1962 in the other direction at Algerian independence. The French military, the Catholic Church, and elements of the European settler-colonial population transferred a mountain of stuff to France with their presumed owners, while post-independence Algerians preserved, vandalized, and repurposed their difficult French monumental heritage. I draw on the anthropology and folklore of art, critical heritage studies, and settler-colonial studies to examine France’s monuments in and from Algeria on the move. They are central components for envisioning the history of France’s colony in Algeria as the study of the region’s society and politics that could call for, following Kirsten Scheid, a MENA ethnography to “start with art.” 

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

SS: My 1998 book, The Object of Memory: Arab and Jew Narrate the Palestinian Village, is an ethnography about the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of the village of Ayn Houd, south of Haifa, who were forcibly expelled in 1948, some dispersed to a village two kilometers away deemed illegal by Israeli authorities for decades, others deported to the Jenin refugee camp in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, or further east to Irbid, Jordan. In the early 1950s, the Romanian Jewish architect Marcel Janco, one of the founders of the Dada movement, salvaged, saved, appropriated, spoliated the emptied Palestinian village—these are the many opposing terms to describe Janco’s project for a Jewish Israeli Ein Hod, an artist village and a museum which still flourish. I found theoretical, architectural, and material through lines that resonated for me again, but this time between France and Algeria in my recent book, Monuments Decolonized, to consider a related situation: who uses, repurposes, moves, destroys the difficult heritage of European settler colonialism, and when and why?  For French monuments in Algeria, I claim that statuary, war memorials, and monuments were not merely aesthetic, but literally a structural component of colonial power and violence. And a monument is a structure. I ask, what happens to French colonial monuments and sculptures after Algerian independence in 1962? Do monuments decolonize and how? In between these two books, I was influenced by a series of imagined and future decolonization projects by a trio of architects, Alessandro Petti, Sandi Hilal, and Eyal Weizman. They envisioned back in 2006 possibilities for the partial evacuation—or dared to speculate about a complete evacuation of Israeli settler colonies and military bases in the Occupied West Bank. For these three architects, such sites would become liberated zones in Palestine, free from direct Israeli presence, as crucial laboratories for studying the reuse, re-inhabitation, or recycling of Israel’s colonial military architecture. Aspects of my two books have focused on the afterlives of architecture, now adding monuments, to a settler-colonial present merely imagined in Palestine as over, while in Algeria considered as a settler-colonial past, in fact, geopolitically over and done with.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

SS: There are one hundred and ten color images, so anyone who likes reading and looking at statues, monuments, architecture, and Algeria. The book addresses the political sensibility, rhetoric, and material traditions that underpin the global history of settler-colonial expansion. Settler-colonial traditions are resilient and continue to shape the global present. For example, memories of the Algerian War enacted in France have real everyday consequences: settler “nostalgeria” (nostalgia plus Algeria) fantasizes and rewrites Algeria as a place where Muslims and Europeans got along, a brotherhood of races and religions mixing all the while it reproduces in France the actuality of colonial Algeria divided by race and religion.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

SS: I am currently researching the kouloughli—offspring of Ottoman soldiers (janissaries) who married local Algerian women and were linked to the native population through maternal lineages. I look at connections between biographical knowledge and pride among Tlemcen families who claim this heritage and the large-scale socioeconomic transformations of the family in Algeria. As an example, the Tlemcen municipality maintains genealogy archives in Arabic, only through the male line for kouloughli families. These documents are in opposition to France’s colonial archives based on deformations of Algerian male surnames and reconfigurations of native households through population censuses, compulsory French colonial identity cards and forced military conscription. How did the dynamics of French metropolitan domination and Algerian resistance emerge through claims to Ottoman heritage? Who guards (perhaps invents?) and who practices and recounts the genealogical memory, marriage customs, built environment, and kinship patterns related to an attachment to pre-colonial Ottoman Algerian traditions to this day?  

J: In reflecting on fieldwork in Algeria, why was deltiology, or the collection and study of colonial postcards, so essential to this study?

SS: Colonial postcards contributed to creating meaning and signification through the everyday, repeated, and systematic practices of picture-taking by the French in Algeria. While these images are inventories of races, peoples, tribes, architecture, statues, and monuments then, they continue to circulate in Western museums and publications to this day, a century after their initial production and circulation. Even more, contemporary North Africans have become consumers of their former colonial visual histories decades after Algeria's independence. I re-photographed the sites of colonial postcards—my visual portal to monuments, statues, and war memorials—and then juxtaposed them with my own photos to create a “before-and-after” method of visual comparisons. When monuments are moved or altered, photographic fieldwork offers a visual ethnography about remnants of Algeria’s colonial heritage in France and Algeria. For example, many exceptionally reusable, unadorned, free-standing colonial-era columns commemorating the Algerian dead of the two World Wars became artistic commemorations to the Algerian War of Independence.

 

Excerpt from the book (from Chapter 5, pages 193 to 196)

It was easy to take from those that one could not see, to become the owners in charge, to not see the new owners in charge. After many statues and monuments were illegally transported to France, they were seen as part of French Algeria’s specific patrimony, an assertion of a settler community's distinct sovereign prerogative as Pieds-Noirs in the hexagon. Thus, settler collectives were constituted or reconstituted in displacements going in both directions: from the French metropole to the Algerian colony under the empire and back to the metropole from the colony after its independence.

The tenacity of repatriates to recuperate and display publicly a colonial French monument from Algeria is reflected by the most recently retrieved statue, that of Jerome Bertagna (1843-1903), sculpted by François-Léon Sicard (1862-1934). Bertagna was the colonial mayor of the eastern Algerian port city of Bône (now Annaba). His statue was inaugurated in 1907 and removed by the French army at Algerian independence. Minus its tall ornate pediment of an Algerian girl proffering a cornucopia of fruits and a young sailor in his skiff, the Bertagna statue was relocated to the Bertagna’s Beaujolais wine domains in Burgundy. When the last Bertagna descendant died in the twenty-first century, the statue was donated and again moved at the behest of a Pied-Noir hometown association of repatriates from Bertagna’s city of Bône (L’Amicale des Enfants de Bône). By 2019, funds were raised to transport and erect it in Aix-en-Provence in the courtyard of the Centre de Documentation Historique sur l'Algérie (CDHA), the Pied-Noir documentation center, library, and museum. The by-now familiar process of French statue removal was complemented by an Algerian replacement memorial to the combatant-martyrs of Annaba who died in the war of independence.

On the Algerian side, the disappearances of statues or the remains of war memorials in Algeria were attributable to France and to Algeria whose disassembly and modifications sometimes implicated the Algerian state, the municipality, and the participation of well-known artists. Early iconoclastic acts by individuals and the state after 1962 resumed during the Dark Decade of the 1990s. Targeting statues for destruction, defacement or removal is a highly performative act and one way to manage a difficult heritage. Then, the state and local associations defended French monuments and promoted new Algerian ones. Monuments in Algeria have differential rates of survival and creation even if they are not living organisms. They are metaphors in many ways. They celebrate an individual -- for particular acts or events at a particular moment in time with particular stakes for specific balances of power -- whose name is set in stone as if its story were forever cast. They celebrate events that have changed lives, usually by taking them. Once in place, a monument orders the world around it until that world changes and another story must be told, one statue destroyed and another erected.

In this book, these monuments have provided a lens on European settler spaces in Algeria, on colonizing power, destruction and preservation, on patrimony and presumed ownership, on memory and history writing. The French colonial monuments that remain standing in Algeria today often elicit care, memory, and community or state decision-making to preserve and repurpose. As well at play are the productive roles of destruction and replacement by another statue. Since 1962, Algerians have reflected on their French monumental heritage and how to decolonize it. The country adapted the material objects and institutions of colonial France to its needs by repurposing sculpture and monuments in a generative confrontation with European art.

Many scholars address this knot of French-Algerian artistic influences and cross-cultural exchanges and contacts. Some like Fanon, in his essay “On National Culture,” insist on looking to “the native intellectual who wishes to create an authentic work of art and must realize that the truths of a nation are in the first place its realities. He must go on until he has found the seething pot out of which the learning of the future will emerge.” Writer Abdelkebir Khatibi argues for a plural Maghreb (Maghreb Pluriel) in which hybrid cultural spaces are mediated through a “third tongue” (une langue tierce) aware of the perspective of the Other. Art historian François Pouillon notes Algerian receptivity to the art of the “colonizer Other” and suggests that Algerian art and art historical processes are attentive to “complicities,” to the “internal fissures and the interaction processes that are part and parcel of all relations, including those between dominating and dominated.” Art historian Nadira Laggoune-Aklouche considers “appropriations, transfers, borrowings and graft” constitutive of post-colonial Algerian art, a “dialectic about identity and alterity.” Similarly, Virginie Rey describes as a catachresis when post-colonial Tunisians knowingly borrow, mix, and misuse Western concepts and models to achieve self-determination and reconceptualize the independent Tunisian self.

French-Algerian aesthetic entanglements have been described in many ways. French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and Algerian sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad reflected on the cultural “sabir”: “the alienating hybridity of those caught between two worlds condemned . . . to interferences and incoherences”; and draw on linguistic analogies of cultural infiltration derived from the lingua franca Mediterranean ports sabir language of North Africa. For historian David Prochaska, state practices of replacement, repurposing and recreation of war memorials to memorialize Algerian independence on the same site where a French statue once stood speak to a “clear-cut case of a cultural pattern which has been transferred to a different social and historical context and filled with a different but analogous content.” Other scholars point to mimesis, transvaluation, sedimentation and appropriation with colonial monuments as “objets trouvés of the postcolony.” Andreas Huyssen finds the “memory art” of the Global South penetrated and transfixed by visual traces of political violence and trauma to produce a hybrid temporality that acts on and is animated by viewers. Paul Basu’s terms new post-independence monuments erected in Sierra Leone, a former British crown colony, “palimpsest memoryscapes” and the “postcolonial pastiche,” in which “pastiche” is a “collage” never a postmodern mimesis or an act of “shallow imitation, forgery and travesty. To concepts of doubling cultural patterns and their mirror images by the formerly colonized,anthropologist Anne Stoler modulates with analyses of “resilience” and “recursion”:

It’s not that the postcolonial world mimics colonial norms, structures, and relations. We need to ask what forms are resilient. Are they embedded in habits of privilege or in those of acquiescence? Are they found in what is perceived as humiliation or in what counts as duress? What conditions the possibility of some elements becoming available and not others? I think of recursivity as refoldings that expose different (social) surfaces and historical planes. Recursion is neither a faithful copy nor a direct “translation” … Recursive histories include reworkings that neither look or feel quite the same.

Each thinker has in mind new forms of thinking about art by mastering, assimilating, recombining, transforming, negotiating, absorbing, borrowing, and perhaps mimicking rather than rejecting. A sort of cross-pollinating métissage – the preferred term of Francophone Martinican writer Edouard Glissant -- seizes material and symbolic contents, forms, and mechanisms of colonial violence. Many inherited French forms -- and Algeria offers more examples than any other former French colony – have been adapted to Algeria in myriad ways. In a sense, if French colonial monuments in Algeria stood for the vast spatial appropriation by the colonizers that restrained the Algerian natives to the margins of the settler colony, they also generated something new: agency and creativity by the formerly colonized. Philosopher Bernard Stiegler calls this phenomenon the pharmakon, the pharmacological antithesis that demonstrates that each poison creates its own cure. Statues and monuments became so powerfully omnipresent, so much part of an Algerian lived experience of place and environment that the formerly colonized could refashion these imperial objects for and by themselves for decolonizing ends.

The Algerian people sometimes formed an intimate connection with a French statue or a war memorial. In effect, the history of Algerian conscription and army service during two world wars are reflected in attachments to France’s war memorials on the Algerian landscape which still evoke both national and local, colonial and post-colonial emotions on both sides. This complication involves counterintuitive perspectives about monument-making in post-independent Algeria. Public art and sculptures make tangible and visible the shift from colonial French presence to Algerian monument-making. Generated from, and generative of, Algerian cultural decolonizing projects regarding French imperialism and colonialism, public art projects often add something to the experience of the present by never ignoring the past violence. Algerian decolonizing projects address the control over the redistribution of aesthetic resources in the same spaces, as defined by Lorenzo Veracini. His description is applicable to the vast heritage of the former colonial overseers: “Decolonisation also means committing to emplaced transformation – to changing the way we live without moving.”

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New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.