Nicole F. Watts, Republic of Dreams: Ordinary People, Extraordinary Struggles, and the Future of Iraqi Kurdistan (New Texts Out Now)

Nicole F. Watts, Republic of Dreams: Ordinary People, Extraordinary Struggles, and the Future of Iraqi Kurdistan (New Texts Out Now)

Nicole F. Watts, Republic of Dreams: Ordinary People, Extraordinary Struggles, and the Future of Iraqi Kurdistan (New Texts Out Now)

By : Nicole F. Watts

Nicole F. Watts, Republic of Dreams: Ordinary People, Extraordinary Struggles, and the Future of Iraqi Kurdistan (NYU Press, 2025).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Nicole F. Watts (NFW): Republic of Dreams is written as narrative nonfiction and is told largely through the eyes of one young Kurdish man. The book developed out of my scholarly research on protest and campaigns for political change in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, where I have been working for about fifteen years. As I did this work I met a lot of people who—though they had come through deeply traumatic events—continually impressed me with their courage, resilience, and generosity. Many were working class, with perspectives that are not the ones that usually make it into print, especially in the United States. I wrote the book the way I did because I thought their ideas and stories mattered, and I did not want to bury them under an academic argument. Also, I very much wanted to write something on Iraqi Kurdistan for a nonspecialist audience, to share something of this place—and of the warmth and humanity of all these people—with Americans and others who had no idea about what life was like in this part of the world. I always thought, if they could just meet people like Peshawa (the book’s protagonist) and his family and friends, they would like them and care about them.

... this book builds on my decades of research in Kurdish studies and on my expertise in state-society relations, mobilization and protest, democratization, and struggles over national identity.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

NFW: I spent the first half of my academic career studying and writing about Kurdish activism in Turkey. After I began working in the Kurdistan region of Iraq in 2009, I published a number of articles and book chapters on protest and campaigns for political change under the Kurdistan Regional Government, especially in towns like Halabja. Intellectually, this book builds on my decades of research in Kurdish studies and on my expertise in state-society relations, mobilization and protest, democratization, and struggles over national identity. However, it departs from my previous work in its genre: narrative nonfiction, rather than an academic book. It is deeply researched nonfiction, but I use the techniques of fiction—character, plot, dialogue, setting, suspense, and the like—to immerse readers in the world of Iraqi Kurdistan between 1988 and 2022.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

NFW: As I have said, the book is written as narrative nonfiction, so it does not fit a typical academic mold. It tells three intertwined stories: of a boy (Peshawa) trying to do something big with his life, when all the cards are stacked against him; of a community (Halabja) trying to rebuild itself after a series of devastating attacks; and of a people (Iraqi Kurds) trying to govern themselves in the face of enormous internal and external challenges. It is a book that explores the limits and opportunities of human initiative in the face of sweeping historical and political forces. I ask what happens when people like this—who have so little in the way of advantages and material resources—go out into the world and demand a chance at a better life. 

On the more academic side of things, the book is informed by scholarship on ethnicity and nationalism, social movements and mobilization, state-building, historical memory, and democratization, along with Kurdish history and politics. It is also a book that drops us into everyday life in a place like Iraqi Kurdistan: it shows what it is like to go to a public high school in Halabja and attend a new English-language university when you barely speak a word of English; tells us about courtship and marriage in a pious Muslim family; about employment; the challenges of what scholars call “border bureaucracies” and visa applications; family life; emigration and return.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

NFW: I wrote this book primarily for nonspecialist audiences: for ordinary people who do not necessarily know much about the Kurds or Iraq or the Middle East and do not normally read nonfiction. So far, they say they’re enjoying it! At the same time, I wanted this to be a book that scholars and specialists could appreciate because of its original research, and because it was the kind of book professors could assign in classes and have students want to read. Finally, I wanted it to honor the experiences of the people in the book, even if some of them are illiterate, and I do not expect them to actually read it, in any language.

Most fundamentally, I want people to take away from it a message of hope, about how ordinary people can find the resilience to keep going even when things get very bad. I think that message is especially important right now, for all of us. I want readers to come away with an appreciation for the humanity of the people in the book: of Kurds, Iraqis, Muslims, and people from this region. I want them to learn something about the cultural, social, and political diversities within Iraqi Kurdistan and among Kurds more generally. I would also like readers to take away from it a deeper understanding of the power of home. So many of the narratives we have of peoples from this region are ones of illegal immigration and refugees drowning at sea. This story shows another side to that: how hard people will struggle to remain at home, to rebuild and return home, even when they have been forced out, and even when they encounter opportunities to go elsewhere. Through all of this, I hope the book will help shape readers’ views on the Kurds and the region in a positive way. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

NFW: Mostly I am working on producing an audiobook of Republic of Dreams and getting a Kurdish-language translation off the ground! However, I am also exploring another narrative nonfiction project about a small group of Western news reporters who teamed up with local Kurds to make the world do something to protect Iraqi Kurdistan after the collapse of the 1991 uprising and its population’s mass exodus to the borders that spring, at the end of the first Gulf War. On a very different note, I am considering a sort of historical memoir about my time as a political science department chair in the run-up to what might be termed the crisis of American democracy.

J: In what ways does the book connect the personal journey of Peshawa’s family to the larger political history of Iraqi Kurdistan?

NFW: Put simply, they were there and had their lives transformed by all of them, and I write these events largely through their eyes. Their experiences let us see these events from a front row seat. Often, they were not personally invested in the events themselves and so give us a sense of how someone simply trying to lead their life would view them. At the same time, they show us that people are not simply victims of their circumstances. They are victims, yes, but they also find ways to push back and reclaim some level of agency. They do not necessarily simply accept the script that is handed to them, and they will often try and find ways to rewrite it. And in so doing, they can change the balance of power.

The book walks us through those events largely through their point of view and, I hope, helps us better understand what happened and why. For example, Peshawa and his friends’ involvement in the 2011 pro-democracy protests helps us break up essentialist ideas about “nation” and “the Kurds,” and shows internal struggles over the future of Iraqi Kurdish governance. Their considerations over how to vote in the 2017 Kurdistan Independence Referendum take us behind the scenes, showing us that—even if ninety-five percent of Kurds voted “yes” for independence—there was a a great deal of concern over how the referendum took place and the potential impacts of such a move.

 

Excerpt from the book (from Chapter 1, pages 3 to 5)

Peshawa survived the 1988 chemical gassing of Halabja by hitching a ride. Not in a pickup truck, whose passengers lived or died according to the will of God and the way the March winds blew through Kurdistan that morning, but as a pigeon-sized infant curled in his mother’s womb. Still, in the trajectory of his life he could mark it as his first notable achievement, since he might have been erased before he began, without even a name to inscribe among the 5,000 victims on the black marble wall inside Halabja’s Monument of Martyrs. 

That he lived, and was born to be given a name, could be chalked up to the forces of luck and determination. He couldn’t have said exactly how the two negotiated the fate of his mother, and thus his own existence. A man named Omar Khawr who lived just a few blocks from Peshawa’s house had tried very hard to save his own family, but he died anyway. When the gasses cleared, photographers found Omar Khawr face down on the street clutching the body of his infant son. If the Iraqi pilot had released the bomb just a fraction of a second later, or if the breeze had blown just a little harder, perhaps instead of Omar Khawr and his baby it would have been Peshawa’s mother and sister’s photograph published in newspapers around the world as evidence of the worst-ever chemical bombing against civilians in human history, and it would have been his mother and his sister’s cement statue lying prostrate in the center of the traffic roundabout they built years later. Peshawa never let himself think about it like that; it would have been too horrible, but you couldn’t grow up in Halabja, Kurdistan region of Iraq, without being at least dimly conscious of the perplexities of happenstance.

Neither of his parents had talked much about this when he was little, so it wasn’t until he was in his teens that he stitched together the story of how his family dodged martyrdom and how he, Peshawa of Halabja, came to be born under a tree in an Iranian refugee camp in the summer of 1988.

***

Peshawa’s mother Mahbubeh never went to school, but she didn’t need history classes to understand that being an ordinary Kurdish person meant that life could be upturned in the heartbeat between bathing a daughter and making bread; that, once again, Kurdish struggles to govern themselves were ending very badly. She knew it then, just as she had known it growing up in an Iraq where hundreds of thousands of Kurdish men were corralled onto trucks and driven away by soldiers, never to return, and where so many Kurdish villages had been flattened by Iraqi army bulldozers. As many as 4,000 towns, razed between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s. Officials in Baghdad called the Kurds traitors, if they bothered to say anything at all. 

On that morning of March 16, 1988 Mahbubeh was 23 years old, already a mother of three and with the baby-who-would-become Peshawa on the way. She had just begun cooking the dough over the open flame in the house’s courtyard when she heard the approaching aircraft. The planes sounded as if they were heading straight for Halabja. She threw down the bread bowl and ducked inside the house, scooping up two-year-old Shayma in one arm, catching little Taban by the hand, urging eight-year-old Shadan to hurry, hurry, hurry. They bolted down the street to her brother-in-law’s home, where she pushed open the front door and flung herself and the girls down the steps into the cellar. The cinder-block basement, normally filled with sacks of vegetables, was already crowded with family members. 

Her eyes found Ahmed, sitting against the wall on a bed mat. Peshawa’s father was in his 30s, twelve years her senior, but he remained lean and muscled, a coiled spring of a man with a square chin and chiseled features that belied the many years of his life spent in hard physical labor. Now his tan face looked drained of color. Two days earlier a bomb had fallen near him as he walked in their neighborhood. One man lost his life. Ahmed lived, but the shrapnel blew through his right leg just below the knee, leaving mangled tendons and a big hole. 

When Mahbubeh found him at the hospital the doctors insisted grimly that he’d be safer at home than in the large ward, which gave the Iraqi aircraft too easy a target. She had hesitated. Their small cinderblock home offered little protection from aerial bombardment.

“Bring him to my place,” her brother-in-law suggested. “The cellar’s safer, and at least that way you won’t have to move him if the bombers come back.”

There were rumors earlier in the week, warnings from those who whispered of terrible Iraqi retribution for the Kurdish alliance with Iran. Some townspeople had left, following the Kurdish peshmerga fighters who had filled the streets just days before. The others remained, hoping President Saddam Hussein wouldn’t punish ordinary citizens for the choices Kurdish leaders had made, hoping the regime’s wrath would blow over. It hadn’t. Now the clouds were raining bombs.

[…] (from Chapter 13, pages 129 to 131)

Peshawa woke early to his neighbor Karwan tapping on his door. 

“Let’s get over to the square and see what we can learn,” Karwan said. Peshawa nodded and threw on some clothes, relieved to have Karwan at his side. Some of his friends would be useless in a crisis, but Karwan was fit and smart and always acted with cool professionalism. When they arrived at the square he could see that the protesters’ tent had been torn down, and there were flyers and banners strewn underfoot where the security guys had tossed them. It didn’t seem to have deterred anyone; if anything, it seemed to him there were more people than the day before, even if there were more security forces than demonstrators.

No one knew what had happened to Dana, but a helpful student suggested they try the security headquarters. It was only a few minutes’ walk from the square, so they headed there.

Peshawa looked thoughtfully at the old building and its high walls topped with barbed wire, and then at the knots of people gathered out front. Civilians and uniformed police, asayish, and peshmerga streamed in and out. Many of their forces were out on the streets, and their offices were busy; they had detained a lot of protesters. 

“Follow me,” he told Karwan.

“What are we going to do?” 

“Just play along,” Peshawa said, hoping the idea forming in his mind wasn’t as ridiculous as it seemed. 

He strode up to the burly guys near the front doors of the building. “Good morning—we need to see the director. We’ve got some important business to deal with.” 

They looked him up and down, and he gazed steadily back at them. Calm and confident. If he played it right, they wouldn’t see an anxious student trying to get his friend out of jail before he was tortured; they would see a young bureaucrat in trousers and a button-down shirt who was accustomed to getting his way. In normal times there was no way this performance would have worked; the guards would have been bored and asked him lots of questions. One week into the protests, though, they were exhausted and the security directorate was in chaos. They didn’t have time to be suspicious.

The guards nodded brusquely and waved him and Karwan through.

Peshawa ignored Karwan’s sideways look of incredulity and hustled them through several sets of checkpoints so casually and with such an air of “of course you’re going to let us through” that the guards didn’t even ask him to leave his cell phone. He didn’t dare let down the act, even for an instant, and when they arrived in the central reception area he marched up to several people he saw working around a large table. 

“Who’s in charge here?” Peshawa asked a middle-aged man wearing the traditional camouflage of asayish security.

Lieutenant somebody or other, the man said. Peshawa didn’t quite catch the name.

“Can you please tell the lieutenant I’m here from the American University, on behalf of Prime Minister Barham Salih.” He flashed his American University student card, hoping they wouldn’t notice that it said nothing about him working with the prime minister. 

The man nodded, barely glancing at Peshawa’s identification card, and returned with the lieutenant.

Peshawa said hello to him in a casual sort of way. The way that said hey, we don’t want to be very formal, because you are important, but I am important too. “I need to find one of Dr. Barham’s students,” Peshawa told him. 

“Ok, sir. Let me go and check. What’s the student’s name?”

Peshawa told him, and the lieutenant disappeared for a moment. Peshawa made a show of chatting with Karwan, running down the rest of their Prime Ministerial “to do” list, as if this was just one errand among many. The lieutenant returned, looking distressed.

“Sir, I’m really sorry, but he’s not here.”

Peshawa swore quietly to himself. “Well, where is he? Wherever he is, if he is not released by 4 p.m. there will be a price to pay,” he said, doing his best to furrow his eyebrows and glare at the poor lieutenant.

The lieutenant scurried off again. Peshawa could hear him talking to a couple of men in another room. Then he came back. “He’s being held at Muaskar Salam Prison.”

Peshawa tried to hide his dismay. He and Karwan glanced at each other. This was bad news. Most of the time detainees at the security directorate were released quickly. But Muaskar Salam Prison was a different story. Located just outside Sulaimani, it had been Saddam Hussein’s military base before Kurdish authorities turned it into a prison. Once jailed behind its walls, it was difficult to get out.

Peshawa thanked the lieutenant and gestured to Karwan to follow him. They left, passing through the series of checkpoints the way they had come.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.