Farzaneh Hemmasi, Tehrangeles Dreaming: Intimacy and Imagination in Southern California’s Iranian Pop Music (New Texts Out Now)

Farzaneh Hemmasi, Tehrangeles Dreaming: Intimacy and Imagination in Southern California’s Iranian Pop Music (New Texts Out Now)

Farzaneh Hemmasi, Tehrangeles Dreaming: Intimacy and Imagination in Southern California’s Iranian Pop Music (New Texts Out Now)

By : Farzaneh Hemmasi

Farzaneh Hemmasi, Tehrangeles Dreaming: Intimacy and Imagination in Southern California’s Iranian Pop Music (Duke University Press, 2020).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book? 

Farzaneh Hemmasi (FH): I was attracted to the topic of Iranian pop music in Los Angeles for several reasons. The first was Tehrangeles (Tehran + Los Angeles) pop’s ubiquitous presence in Iranian diasporic social life and its absence in scholarly literature. Most academic work on Iranian music has dealt with art music and, to a lesser extent, regional folk music. These are unambiguously culturally “valuable” genres that fit comfortably with pre- and post-revolutionary Iranian nationalisms and ethnomusicology’s historical preference for “tradition.” In the mid-2000s, scholars finally began investigating Iranian popular music, but they mostly focused on musicians within Iran and governmental regulations. Banned in Iran and disrespected by intellectuals in and outside the country, Tehrangeles pop was not a likely cultural entity for serious scholarly exploration. I took it on as a challenge and because I believe it is far more interesting and important than it has been given credit for.

I was also interested in the fact that Tehrangeles pop was an unintended consequence of the revolution itself. For several decades prior to the revolution, Iran had boasted a highly developed popular music industry, with pop stars appearing in television, radio, print media, film, and so on. When Khomeini decreed the (never actualized) “elimination” of music within Iran, many pop musicians fled and restarted their careers in Los Angeles. Though their music was banned in Iran, it was distributed widely in the country via audio and video cassette, and eventually via satellite television and the internet as well. Indeed, the ban had the effect of giving Tehrangeles musicians much more access to Iranian “hearts and minds” than they would have otherwise had. Visiting Iran in the 1990s and early 2000s showed me that Tehrangeles had a large domestic listenership. How did Tehrangeles artists achieve popularity in Iran from afar? How could music produced by exiles in Tehrangeles be relevant to people living in Tehran? What could this long-distance relationship tell us about music, media, politics, and diaspora?

Tehrangeles pop complicates the Iranian state’s regulation of the intimate, the moral, the public sphere, and the nation’s boundaries all at once.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

FH: Tehrangeles Dreaming explores the past forty years of expatriate popular music and musicians’ entanglement with national, revolutionary, and exile politics of culture. So much of pop culture emerging from Tehrangeles has been disparaged as trivial and as the opposite of political; its domestic and diasporic critics often dismiss Tehrangeles pop as depoliticizing, distracting, and politically retrograde. At the same time, the fact that so many Tehrangeles cultural producers understand themselves to be in exile, and that the Iranian state banned Tehrangeles media and music while branding Tehrangeles celebrities as enemies of the revolution, makes plain that politics is indeed involved. The book explores how music and media producers respond to their politicization, including avoidance, enthusiasm, and everything in between. The chapters move from case studies of the putatively apolitical performers and materials to those who have enthusiastically embraced politics in exile.

I begin with “The Capital of 6/8,” a chapter about how a traditional Iranian rhythm colloquially known as “shesh-o-hasht” has become a quintessentially Tehrangeles groove precisely as it was prohibited in postrevolutionary domestic music for its festive, immoral, and erotic associations. The chapter takes inspiration from artist Shahbal Shabpareh’s claims that the rhythm is irresistible to Iranians because it is “in their blood.” The second chapter considers the narratives of several of Tehrangeles pop’s founders: producer Manouchehr Bibiyan (Apollon Records, Jam-e Jam TV), producers Vartan Avanessian and Jahangir Tabaraei (Avang, Taraneh Enterprises), and artist Shahram Shabpareh. I show how these figures have grappled with their rejection in the revolution and their subsequent reputation for producing socially irrelevant pop in Tehrangeles by producing narratives in which they depict themselves as modernizers, emissaries of joy, and saviors of Iranian music itself. 

Chapter three links desire for return to the homeland to the erotics of expatriate media, showing how Tehrangeles popular culture revives sexually ambiguous and provocative aspects of Iranian history and transmits them back into the country. The chapter analyzes together the Tehrangeles dancer and choreographer Mohammad Khordadian’s imprisonment in Iran, a fictional film MAXX (2005) about a Tehrangeles cabaret singer’s hijinks in Iran, and the experiences of female vocalist Shahrzad Sepanlou negotiating her sexualized image as perceived by Iran-based audiences. 

The last two chapters zero in on two expatriate musical celebrities and their claims to represent and reach the nation from exile. Chapter four shows how prerevolutionary female pop diva Googoosh has used her personal history of victimization as a provocative metaphor for national suffering. I discuss diaspora Iranians’ metaphorization of Googoosh during her twenty-year period of postrevolutionary “silence,” and Googoosh’s own adoption of these metaphors in her subsequent postrevolutionary comeback. In the diaspora, Googoosh uses her outsized voice and persona to perform as the Iranian nation “herself.”

Chapter five tracks charismatic pop icon Dariush’s transformation from the drug-addicted “sultan of sadness” to a post-recovery “messenger of hope,” as it explores his unique form of celebrity humanitarian activism. I show how Dariush’s activism responds to the addiction epidemic within Iran, working at the intersection of sentimentality, nationalism, and the principles of the US recovery movement to mobilize a notion of “shared suffering.” Dariush’s patriotic songs and videos, the media productions of his nonprofit Ayeneh Foundation, and his live concerts are analyzed in relation to the intimate publics they attempt to produce.

As the book’s subtitle suggests, imagination and intimacy are Tehrangeles Dreaming’s main theoretical frames. I investigate Tehrangeles pop’s participation in “modern social imaginaries” of (trans)nation, publics, and more, via transnational circulation and broadcast media. The book explores how Tehrangeles artists imagine their role in Iranian history, their enduring connection to and influence on Iranians at home, and their fantasies of return. Intimacy appears in multiple guises. One is media-afforded familiarity, the closeness between Iranian fans and Tehrangeles stars that media makes possible in spite of physical distance. Tehrangeles pop can also contribute to a transnational Iranian “cultural intimacy”: the cultural practices that may appear “unmodern” or shameful but nonetheless inspire sociality within a group (see anthropologist Michael Herzfeld’s classic text defining “cultural intimacy”). Finally, intimacy also refers to the sexual or erotic aspects of Tehrangeles pop. Tehrangeles pop musicians rejected women’s compulsory modesty just as they rejected the revolutionary assertion that popular music was inherently corrupting; Tehrangeles videos offer audiences intimate, mass-mediated access to unrelated women’s unveiled bodies and singing voices. In these ways and more, Tehrangeles pop complicates the Iranian state’s regulation of the intimate, the moral, the public sphere, and the nation’s boundaries all at once.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

FH: Tehrangeles Dreaming and my other published work are topically and methodologically linked. One of my favorite pieces is about the media controversy surrounding the victory of Ermia, a veiled female vocalist, on the expatriate Iranian talent competition Googoosh Music Academy (GMA). To show the many tentacles of this case, I moved between social media vitriol, paranoid press reports about velvet revolution via satellite, religious jurisprudence about women’s singing, and the program itself—extremely divergent sources that intersected in a German Iranian woman’s pop music performance. I took a more analytic approach in a 2013 article called “Intimating Dissent” about the prerevolutionary pop music setting of celebrated Iranian poet Ahmad Shamlu’s allegorical “Pariya.” Tehrangeles Dreaming develops some of these ideas and approaches while incorporating more ethnographic fieldwork and first-person narrative.   

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

FH: Tehrangeles Dreaming was written with three core academic audiences in mind: readers in ethnomusicology (my home discipline), Middle Eastern and Iranian studies; and readers from all fields interested in ethnographic and analytic approaches to transnational, mass-mediated culture. This latter category includes readers in anthropology, American studies, sociology, and more. I think the book also provides opportunities for comparative studies of migration and postrevolutionary cultural transformation; during my research, I found much in common between Iranians in Los Angeles and Cuban, Taiwanese, and Vietnamese exiled groups. I also wrote the book to be accessible to university students and lay readers, and I am happy to say it has been assigned in many courses.

J: What other projects are you working on now? 

FH: I am working on something completely different: a collaborative, community-engaged ethnographic research project called “Keeping Kensington ‘Kensington:’ Value, Affordability, and Culture in Toronto’s Kensington Market.” Kensington Market is a historically affordable downtown neighborhood that was a first stop for many waves of immigrants to Canada. It has since become an artistic, activist neighborhood that is both strongly affected by the destructive financialization of real estate, and that has successfully organized to maintain its distinctive identity and diverse residents’ ways of life. I am working with the University of Toronto Ethnography Lab and graduate student researchers on a variety of projects around affordability, art, and activism in Kensington, some of which can be seen here. 

J: How can readers access the sights and sounds of Tehrangeles music and music videos? 

FH: Tehrangeles popular culture must be seen and heard to be fully appreciated. I have created a Tehrangeles Dreaming YouTube playlist of more than seventy selections presented roughly in the order they are discussed in the text. It includes performances and music videos by major stars Shahram Shabpareh, Dariush and Googoosh before and after the revolution; dance aerobics videos by Khordadian; parodies of Tehrangeles pop by younger generation rappers; fan-made videos of the Los Angeles Iranian night club Cabaret Tehran, and more.

Paris-based artist-scholar Hannah Darabi’s forthcoming Soleil of Persian Square (Gwenzigel), a photograph book of Iranian Southern California, is also a wonderful way to access Tehrangeles from afar. Darabi’s work includes a selection of Tehrangeles cassette cover art—amazing images that capture the unmistakable 1980s and ‘90s Los Angeles Iranian aesthetic. I contributed an extended interview about Tehrangeles pop to the book as well. I have loved working with Hannah, and I hope people will read our books together.

 

Excerpt from the book (from the Introduction, pp. 21-25)

The Degenerate Los Ãnjelesi Singer 

Like traveling Tehrangeles music and performers, stereotypes of Tehrangeles Iranians and Tehrangeles singers also circulate between diaspora and Iran. The LA Iranian stereotype is not so different from common perceptions of “Hollywood people” and their shallow money-mindedness. “Persians” in Los Angeles are wealthy or want to be perceived as such; wear flashy, expensive clothes and jewelry; embrace surgical enhancements; drive fancy cars, and live in ostentatious mansions in exclusive neighborhoods. They are anti-intellectual, petty, and superficial. Tehrangeles Iranians have the additional dubious distinction of being obsessed with their pre-Islamic or Aryan roots and at the same time “out of touch” with contemporary postrevolutionary Iran. A plethora of songs, skits, television programs and films made by Iranians elsewhere in diaspora and in Iran play on the Tehrangeles Iranian stereotype. Take the example “Iruni-ye LA” (“LA Iranian”), a song by Iranian-British expatriate hip-hop group Zed Bazi:

Dear wealthy Aunt Fati 

Bought a house on Hollywood Boulevard

I say, “Aunt Fati are you ready to party? 

I’ll come to your house tonight and we’ll go to Café Latin.”

She says, “Don’t call at 5 o’clock because I’m at the gym

Every night I eat salad [because] I’m on a diet,

My eye color is the same as my [blue] jeans

Now, let me check out your six-pack (abdominal muscles).” 

After establishing their superficiality, Zed Bazi describes Tehrangeles Iranians’ confused identity:

Here [in Los Angeles] we’re happy for no reason (alaki khoshim)

We wear sandals, 

We want to be Western (farangi)

We want to be “Vanak kids” [a Tehran neighborhood]

We say, “West Coast, motherfucker” 

Every time we stand up (“Iruni-ye LA,” Zed Bazi)

Since the advent of the American A&E television network’s reality television show “Shahs of Sunset” focusing on a glamorous group of young, wealthy, second-generation Jewish and Muslim Iranians cavorting around Southern California, mainstream American television audiences have had increased access to Tehrangeles stereotypes.

One of the most recognizable and ridiculed figures Iranians associate with Tehrangeles is the “los ānjelesi singer” (khānandeh-ye los ānjelesi) and the music she or he performs, which is also called “los ānjelesi.” Los ānjelesi literally means “of Los Angeles” but also indexes a host of other attributes, especially frivolity, shallowness, cheapness, superficiality, and low quality, crass commercialism. Above all, los ānjelesi pop is dance music meant for parties. While far from everything produced by Tehrangeles artists is dance music, music with danceable rhythms was historically the most profitable and therefore the most prolific style, making the association between Tehrangeles and dance music hard to shake. Having witnessed expatriate television interviews become tense or hostile when it was suggested that a musician was “los ānjelesi,” I never dared to use the term for fear of offending my interlocutors. Calling a musician los ānjelesi has the added insult of inscribing an individual as “of Los Angeles” (its literal meaning) and therefore not primarily “of Iran” (irāni). As an example, Southern California-based vocalist and songwriter Mehrdad Asemani protested on an expatriate talk show that the los ānjelesi moniker was “made up by the Islamic Republic” to insult musicians like himself. “I’m not from Los Angeles,” he angrily exclaimed. “My father’s not from Los Angeles – I’m a kid…from Hafez Street! I fought in the war with Iraq. I wasn’t born in Los Angeles!” The los ānjelesi taint has also extended to me as someone misguided or ignorant enough to consider Tehrangeles pop worthy of study. Confused looks, polite avoidance, and peals of laughter are among the reactions I have received when telling Iranians my research topic. While attending a party in 2006 in Toronto at the home of an expatriate journalist, I was introduced to another well-known journalist who had recently fled Iran following the closure of the reformist press. After a few pleasantries, I told him that I would soon be heading to Los Angeles to study its Iranian music scene. He paused for a moment and then leveled me with a dismissive scowl. “So, you want to study shit-shenāsi?” he growled. His improvised combination of the English word “shit” with the Persian suffix for “-ology” (shenāsi) denigrated my research and me as well. I was, apparently, a “shit-ologist” (“shitshenās”).

Despite their postrevolutionary geographical inscription onto Southern California, the negative discourses surrounding professional performers and the upbeat party music they play have their roots in a national history of religious, elitist, and leftist prejudices against immoral and “degenerate” (mobtazal) entertainments and the professionals who produce them (for more on the terminology of degeneration (ebtezāl) in Iranian culture, see Ida Meftahi’s work) Tehrangeles Dreaming positions these disparaging sentiments as extensions of Iranian national changes, concepts, and politics of culture into diaspora and back again. Today, cultural elites and the postrevolutionary state tar Tehrangeles pop musicians with the same brush as their low-status professional entertainer ancestors known as “motreb,” relocating the negative legacy of the motreb, immorality, and degeneration outside of Iran and into exile. Los ānjelesi music is “bad music” (c.f. Washburn and Derno 2004) and los ānjelesi singers are “bad people” who callously target audiences’ basest desires for entertainment, titillation, and distraction. In official Islamic Republic discourse, Tehrangeles cultural producers are both immoral and “farāri” or escapees—people who didn’t serve their time in the revolutionary courts. They are pathetic, faithless self-exiles who abandoned their homeland at its moment of need, and are now deservedly cursed with permanent separation and irrelevance. At worst, they are agents in a “soft war” who “spread corruption” via expatriate and Western-government funded media, treasonously attempting to undermine the state from afar. This book documents some of the main ways Tehrangeles cultural producers negotiate these charges through cultural production: creating alternative histories in which they are not villains but heroes; making politically committed music and attempting to politically mobilize transnational audiences; and arguing for dance, dance music, and levity as necessary elements of being and feeling Iranian.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.