Amal Sachedina, Cultivating the Past, Living the Modern: The Politics of Time in the Sultanate of Oman (New Texts Out Now)

Amal Sachedina, Cultivating the Past, Living the Modern: The Politics of Time in the Sultanate of Oman (New Texts Out Now)

Amal Sachedina, Cultivating the Past, Living the Modern: The Politics of Time in the Sultanate of Oman (New Texts Out Now)

By : Amal Sachedina

Amal Sachedina, Cultivating the Past, Living the Modern: The Politics of Time in the Sultanate of Oman (Cornell University Press, 2021).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book? 

Amal Sachedina (AS): This book was a product of both personal and intellectual cogitation and experience. Growing up in Kuwait, I was sharply aware of the inundation of heritage icons and imagery as the basis for substantiating the modern nation state in a region where there had been none prior to the mid-twentieth century. Scholarship has seized on this observation to examine how socio-political elites have waded through entangled pasts and disparate relationships, with the help of Western professionals, to carve out and entrench a singular sanctioned national history. From this scholarly vantage, the influx of oil revenues in the 1960s and ‘70s is seen as having led ruling families in Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Oman to create a network of institutional media—museums, textbooks, heritage festivals, and sports such as falconry—to forge a national imagination and displace sectarian and tribal affiliations. Heritage production was deemed as delineating an exclusive citizenship grounded in an indigenous sense of belonging to the Arabian Peninsula and patrilineal tribal relationships, to differentiate locals from the overwhelming number of foreign migrant residents. But moving beyond the auspices of statecraft, the question always remained as to how institutional heritage was informing local citizens’ notions of history and time in the midst of a transformative social and political landscape.

Growing up in a society whose great oil wealth had generated its modern prosperity, I was also aware that foreign resident and migrant workers greatly outnumbered Kuwaiti citizens and that a ubiquitous but unspoken hierarchy was deeply imbricated in the everyday rhythms of private and working life. This hierarchy was undergirded by socio-political status—linked to occupation, on the one hand, and ethno-nationalism on the other. South Asians, by way of example, were made aware of their low place in that hierarchy through daily routines and interactions established on the autochthonous notion of “Arabness” and the Arabian Peninsula as central elements of Kuwaiti nationality.

My experience of Oman was different; there was greater fluidity in the ethno-racial makeup of neighborhoods in Muscat and Nizwa, and occupations did not tightly correlate to ethno-racial backgrounds. One was just as likely to see Omanis in lower-income jobs—shopkeepers, supermarket cashiers, or security guards—as Indians or Pakistanis. Moreover, unlike the UAE, Oman offered a public and proud exposition of a rich maritime history and coastal empires as part of the Indian Ocean trade network right into the nineteenth century. Communities of traders, soldiers, and sailors from Gujarat, Sind, Baluchistan, Iran, and the Kutch region had settled along the coast, retaining connections and relationships with their homelands while participating in the creation of diasporic societies, ports, and even new peoples along the Omani coastline and major trading centers. While the Omani population remained slightly higher than foreign residents and although Arabic was the official language, it was not uncommon to hear Omanis speaking Urdu, Baluchi, and Swahili. One of the central questions that arose for me from these nascent experiences was: how did non-Arab communities negotiate their sense of belonging to the history and heritage of the Sultanate of Oman in the midst of the state’s emphasis on Ibadi Islam and Arabness? The answer lay in the realization that the very act of incorporating different ethnic groups—both Arab and non-Arab—into the history of a national people is an exercise of selectivity inasmuch as, in the Oman context, it is grounded in such categories as the “Arab tribe” and a “generic Islam.” History-making involves gaps, disjuncture, and diversity at the core of what passes as a unifying history and religiosity of a sovereign nation. This understanding forges the central tenet of my work.

But how and why has heritage emerged as a prevalent force in nation building in Oman, and how is it experienced?

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

AS: Since the inception of the Sultanate of Oman as a nation state in 1970, material forms—ranging from old mosques and shari’a manuscripts to restored forts (now museumified), national symbols such as the coffee pot or the dagger (khanjar), and archaeological sites—have saturated the landscape, becoming increasingly ubiquitous as part of a standardized public and visual memorialization of the past. But how and why has heritage emerged as a prevalent force in nation building in Oman, and how is it experienced? My book addresses this question by bringing together histories of nation building with scholarship on the politics of time and history making. I show how institutional heritage not only becomes integral to a policy of national integration by smoothing the region’s political cleavages, but it also transforms discursive histories into pedagogical, ethical, and aesthetic practices that in turn reshape socio-political realities on the ground.

While scholarship has examined the impact of modernity on contemporary Muslim societies in the realms of education, law, and the media, this project is a study of how forms of history and the institutionalization of material heritage (turāth) recalibrate the Ibadi Islamic tradition to the requirements of the modern political and moral order in the Sultanate of Oman. I demonstrate that even as the modern Omani state diagrams an orientation towards the past, in forging this national imaginary, it also effectively transforms the modality of the relationship between politics and religion, enabling new and different ways to perceive and organize historical experience.

Based primarily on over twenty months of ethnographic fieldwork in Muscat, the capital, and Nizwa, once the administrative and juridical center of the Ibadi Imamate, Cultivating the Past analyzes the relations with the past that undergird the shift in Oman from an Ibadi shari’a Imamate (1913-1958) to a modern nation state from 1970 onwards. The book explores the material, ethical, and social significance of key objects and sites and the dynamic changes in the work they do over the course of the twentieth century. These become sites for tracking transformations in forms of history, religious, and political authority, and modes of sociability. This ethnographic investigation documents the implications of shifting history away from a form of cognition and toward institutionalized material practices that become points of tension and ambiguity that condition daily life. In Oman, establishing the nation has involved an operation in which material remains, sites, buildings, and daily objects become part of a process of “purification” that effects separations between material forms and the concrete ties that have bound them to the world. This process of “liberation” opens up a space for the material of old objects and sites pre-dating the nation to be reconfigured, occasioning the transformation of the very boundaries between politics and religion, thus remapping the terrain of the Ibadi Imamate.

Many recent works have studied material heritage in the Gulf states as part of national projects of citizenship and collective belonging. These studies often argue that, in the Arab-Persian Gulf, certain cultural practices and symbols of recent origin are mobilized to provide a sense of belonging for those subjected to the ravages of a Western-oriented modernization. Examples include the built form of the National Museum of Qatar in the shape of the desert rose, historic restoration projects such as Dubai’s al-Bastakia quarter, or the phenomena of newly invented televised traditions of camel racing in the UAE or pearl diving in Kuwait. What tends to get lost in such scholarly accounts is how the pedagogical circulation of material objects, sites, and architectures engenders forms of public history that substantiate new realities. The book challenges such accounts by showing how the systemic public visibility of these material forms has the potential not only to overcome violent differences, but also to delineate new modes of sociality and the ethical sensibilities of the national audience in ways that become integral to the norms of modern daily living.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

AS: This book continues my previous scholarship in Islamic art history and archaeology on how material objects and architectures produce a unique register for the exploration of time through their embedded roles in connecting past, present, and future as an integral basis for establishing the norms of daily life. 

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have? 

AS: Cultivating the Past is the first ethnographic study on the social implications of heritage practices in the Arab-Persian Gulf region. Interdisciplinary in scope, it engages in debates about shifts in authoritative time and social subjectivity in the field of Middle East anthropology, while also contributing to the literature specific to material heritage and museum studies. The book moves well beyond appealing to readers interested in the politics of heritage and nation building in the Arab-Gulf region. The scope of its topics would be of interest to students, scholars, and activists in the disciplines of anthropology, history, development studies, heritage and museum studies, secularism and religiosity, and modern nation state building, as well as the broader Middle East.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

AS: My work on material heritage in the Arabian Peninsula continues with my latest project in Saudi Arabia. My current research project, entitled Conservation as Transformation: History and Memory in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, explores how quotidian encounters with national heritage practices have transformed local people’s sense of time and the significance of their past in the old city of Jeddah, now a World Heritage site, as part of daily lived experience. It is an ethnographically grounded account of how the transformation of Jeddah into World Heritage status has opened up new experiences for different local actors and their relationships with tangible urban history, nation building, and imaginings of the future.

 

Excerpt from the book (from Chapter 4, The Ethics of History Making, pp. 110- 114)

In the depths of the new fruit-and-vegetable souq in Nizwa’s city center is a series of underground storage areas I visited frequently during my fieldwork. The facilities were usually shut, their metal gates fastened. It was a glad sight when the one closest to the basement steps was open, because it meant Said was in his workshop. Among the clutter of tools, old metal cooking vessels, ceramic dishes, and plastic receptacles of all sorts, I knew I would find him sitting near the entrance, hammering a piece of copper into shape. There was always a bowl of water filled with small coffee cups, a plastic thermos, and a covered dish of fresh dates — the necessary accoutrements for receiving visitors. We talked about the transformations he had witnessed and been a part of since the advent of the nahda in 1970. Said was ninety-two, he proudly informed me, and his work was part of a family tradition that went back two and a half centuries. He was one of the last craftsmen of the region who made the dalla in the old way. When I asked him what changes the dalla had undergone since the nahda, he gestured toward cans of silver and gold spray paint: 

My grandfather, my father and then after me, for ninety years we have been making the dalla with no changes. … These types of colors, gold, silver, red, never sold before the nahda. These are new demands. But now ordinary people want it for decoration and not for cooking or anything. In the old days, they would use a big dalla for cooking the coffee and leave it there. When guests or people entered the majlis or sabla, they would transfer the coffee to a small dalla and bring cups to pour the coffee … The dalla that I now make for decoration can never be used for cooking. 

I asked him to clarify, and he explained that during the Imamate, the ‘ulamā’ considered silver to be makruh (disliked or offensive). The imams were known to be abstemious (zāhid) in their dress and lifestyle. Silver was not used for the dalla because of Islam. Said told me, “The dalla that I now make for decoration can never be used for cooking. If you want to use a dalla for cooking or serving, the inside has to be white.” Extremely confused, I asked for further explanation. He put his hand inside one of his newly made coffee pots and withdrew it, showing me a hand covered with black streaky dirt: 

Drinking coffee from it would not be good for the stomach. You need white [abyad] for it. … to prevent dirt and rust [ṣada’] from adhering to copper vessels, you need to put a coating of lead [raṣaṣ] on the inside surface. Otherwise, it becomes a poison and is very bad for the stomach. But because this is for décor, you don’t need to cook with it or serve with it. So there is no need for anything white inside. Only if you want to use it for cooking or serving hot coffee, you must put lead inside.

Since the late 1970s, the introduction of the plastic thermos as a coffee server has meant the dalla is increasingly encountered only as a display piece — behind museum glass, on a drawing-room shelf, in a street sculpture in Muscat, or as an illustration in a textbook. Physical changes during the nahda have transformed it from a utilitarian vessel to a decorative canvas to contemplate. What once was formed with thick layers of metalwork is now lighter and thinner, and color is a priority, but these decorative changes make it unsuitable for daily use. Instead, it now belongs to what Stewart terms, “the world of surfaces … whose physical aspects give way to abstraction and a nexus of new temporalities” (1993: 37). The dalla, along with silver jewelry, trading dhows, the khanjar, incense burners, and water jugs, have spilled out of the museum setting to become part of the quotidian landscape of Omani national life. The hulking outlines of forts and watchtowers have become interchangeable as they are distilled into a series of prominent features — crenellated towers, arched windows — creating a generic, portable form. The great highways of Muscat and Oman’s regional capitals are punctuated by visible copies of these objects and sites as montages on street roundabouts, bridges (figures 5 and 6), architectural facades, and park landscapes (figure 7). These ubiquitous icons in educational, print, and audiovisual media become a national heritage vocabulary through the systemic mechanical circulation of currency or postage stamps, dress codes, textbooks, and heritage festivals, and in popular design motifs for keychains, fridge magnets, and other kitsch items (figure 8). In the process of extending museological values and methods (collection, documentation, preservation, presentation, evaluation, and interpretation) to objects, knowledge, and practices, heritage practices have produced artifacts, landscapes, architectures, historical vistas, and living spaces. 

If Imamate authority was established through the physical and geographical concentration of knowledge as embodied by the fort, a shared corpus of legal-historical texts, and the personal mediating efforts of a group of religious scholars, teachers, and administrators, then the imagery circulated in audiovisual and print media has engendered a very different order of pedagogical learning — one grounded in the need to systemically disseminate, ritually repeat, and thereby standardize. Continual reproduction has made these once-daily objects and sites into a national visual language. The structuring of the public arena in such a manner is the result of the concerted efforts of several state ministries with overlapping concerns, including the Ministry of Heritage and Culture, different municipalities, the Ministry of Information, the Diwan of the Royal Court, the Ministry of Education, and the Public Authority for Craft Industries. The state has also created a heritage saturated focus through its control of television, radio, and newspapers.

This chapter explores the underlying reasoning behind the sheer ubiquity of heritage imagery and the social reality it creates. Ethnographic investigation into this question led me through a state wide bureaucratic network and a hierarchy of cultural advisors, undersecretaries, architects, urban planners, preservationists, heritage managers and curriculum designers. Their offices became interchangeable as they all assumed a certain type — expansive rooms with a large desk and chair at one end, glass cabinets displaying state awards, heritage objects, and iconic symbols of Oman, walled photographs of the sultan, and, usually, a set of dark, plush sofas around a small coffee table where officials could talk with their guests over — of course — coffee. At first, the official language I heard was repetitive, a standardized authoritative discourse that appeared predictable and could be argued away as mere officialese. However, it became increasingly clear that the mandate of heritage was being placed within a bureaucratic structure and was deployed in order to cultivate a certain set of dispositions toward the past that was constitutive of Omani public life. Their talk also yielded insights into how heritage discursive imagery was seriously considered as a prophylactic against the twin anxieties of Westernization on the one hand and Islamist revivalism on the other. 

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.