Harry Pettit, The Labor of Hope: Meritocracy and Precarity in Egypt (New Texts Out Now)

Harry Pettit, The Labor of Hope: Meritocracy and Precarity in Egypt (New Texts Out Now)

Harry Pettit, The Labor of Hope: Meritocracy and Precarity in Egypt (New Texts Out Now)

By : Harry Pettit

Harry Pettit, The Labor of Hope: Meritocracy and Precarity in Egypt (Stanford University Press, 2024).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Harry Pettit (HP): In Cairo back in 2014, after reaching out to youth employment training initiatives at the beginning of my fieldwork, I met a group of young, educated, but un/underemployed men and women who were aspiring after Egyptianized neoliberal capitalist dreams of successful careers, high-end consumption, and global mobility, but finding few paths to reach them as they struggled in precarious, low-paid call center jobs. 

At this time a lot of writing on Egypt was focused on locating “revolutionary subjects” in response to the 2011 uprising, whereas this group—despite being acutely aware of structural inequities in Egyptian society—were noticeably disengaged from this collective radical hope. Instead, they held an attachment to forms of hope that placed faith in the capitalist system to fulfil their dreams.

I wanted to understand why that was, and through spending time with them I also wanted to share the intimate pain that this group experienced as they attempted to chase a meaningful life. But, to avoid individualizing and exceptionalizing this pain, in writing the book I also wanted to place the spotlight on what I saw as producing that pain: a capitalist system in Egypt and a global political and economic system that produces extreme inequality while also selling the cruel meritocratic promise that a good life is realizable for all.

I consider the everyday practices through which young, educated, underemployed Egyptian men keep going as a form of emotional labor.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

HP: The book provides an intimate look at the experience of changing economic and social relations in Egypt as a result of neoliberalization. It plots the emergence of a disconnected middle class who are exposed to the upper-class lifestyles of the economic elite, but who are pushed into a decrepit public education system and low-paid, precarious jobs. Building on previous work on Arab masculinities by scholars like Farha Ghannam and Nafissa Naguib, it reveals the intimate, emotional struggles of young men to live up to markers of middle-class Egyptian masculinity in the realm of work, family, and relationships. But the main focus of the book is the workings of a meritocratic moral economy—produced by a globalized industry of training, entrepreneurship, self-help, and recruitment, but circulated among middle-class Egyptians as well—which embeds the notion that success and social mobility is open to all. 

The book also speaks to broader literatures examining the lived experience of capitalism that is producing large-scale inequality, insecurity, and impoverishment. It considers how neoliberal economic systems are producing a simultaneous diminution of employment pathways, alongside a structural raising of aspirations in the context of globalization, expanding education, and technological advancement. Scholarship has responded to this by examining how this produces racialized and gendered forms of “waithood” or “timepass,” especially among youth (Honwana, 2012; Jeffrey, 2010). Some literature (e.g. Miyazaki’s The Method of Hope) has examined how, in response, marginalized communities enact alternative hopes through overt resistance or sustaining life outside capitalist regimes of value. This focus, I argue in the book, sidelines the empirical reality that, despite the production of disconnection and precarity, most people continue to invest in the hopes and dreams offered by capitalism. Thus, drawing on feminist literature on emotion by Sara Ahmed, Eva Illouz, and Lauren Berlant, I develop a political economy of emotion and hope that traces how capitalist systems continue to capture the attention of the very people harmed by them. I consider the everyday practices through which young, educated, underemployed Egyptian men keep going as a form of emotional labor. This takes the concept of emotional labor into the realm of social reproduction, into homes, cafes, shopping malls, in order to understand the psychological work enforced by labor markets as they produce poverty and precarity. 

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

HP: The book represents my first research project! It emerged from my PhD project and subsequent postdoctoral positions, with the theoretical framework of labor being developed after the PhD. 

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

HP: Firstly, I hope Egyptians read the book. Perhaps they will recognize the pain created by an economic system in Egypt and a violent global border regime, which sell the idea that dreams are realizable while putting up barriers that prevent people from living a dignified life. But this pain is not unique to Egyptians. Globally, there are populations who are encouraged to develop grand dreams but prevented from achieving them through political and economic regimes that restrict movement. I hope that this book contributes in some small way to breaking down those regimes. 

The book should appeal to people who are interested in the predatory face of neoliberalism in Egypt and its influence on the labor market, gender and class relations, and forms of morality. It takes an in-depth look at Egyptian masculinity and middle-class life. It shows the intimate struggles and pursuits of middle-class men as they chase jobs, careers, relaxation, intimacy, marriage, and migration. 

More broadly, I hope the book appeals to students and researchers who are interested in the intimate life of contemporary capitalism, and in particular the power of ideologies of meritocracy. It should also appeal to people interested in the political workings of affect and emotion, and in rethinking our understandings of labor. 

In terms of impact, first I hope that the book shows the humanity of Egyptian and Arab men, a group who are portrayed as violent and threatening over and over again by Western representations in order to devalue their lives. Second, the book reveals the powerful ideological attachments that capitalism creates. In doing this, it also forms part of a project that is attempting to reveal how forms of power work on and through affect and emotion, and a project that is breaking down narrow understandings of the labor involved in making a livable life in precarious contexts. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

HP: I am working on two other projects at the moment. The common thread across these projects and the book is an empirical commitment to examine ethnographically the diverse practices through which people are surviving within late-capitalist systems that are producing high levels of precarity and impoverishment. Through a close analysis of these practices, I want to break down narrowly economistic, productivist approaches to the work and labor necessary to maintain livable life—and the violent structures which underpin them. The first project applies these questions to the context of people who rely on foodbanks in London for welfare and as a form of work. The second and current project examines the attempts of undocumented Syrian, Filipino, and Cameroonian migrant workers in Lebanon to access cash in the context of prolonged economic crisis and the extractivist practices of the state and economic elite.

J: How did the young men in the book view you as a white, Western researcher?

HP: This is a question I have been thinking about a lot lately, especially in the context of the current genocide in Gaza where the mainstay of Western academia is turning the other way, even many of the people who have extracted data from Palestinians and the wider region for years. This leads to the question of how, or indeed whether, white, Western researchers should engage with postcolonial contexts. Personally, in the last few months I have sidelined my research and tried to put energy into forcing our universities and society to take a stand. 

But I am also reconsidering the way I will go about doing research in the future. I have written about the often uncomfortable experience of doing the fieldwork that went into this book. Some of the young men and women I met initially became frustrated with me because, while I wanted to do research “on” them and learn about their experiences, they wanted to interact with me as a friend and as someone who could potentially help them in their pursuit of their aspirations. For some, this led to them ending our relationship. For others, we managed to openly discuss this tension, and become friends over time. This involved me sharing my own vulnerabilities as they were sharing theirs. It also involved me helping them materially in ways that I could. 

But this was a messy, imperfect process. Indeed, it is impossible to overcome the structural relations of racialized and colonial power that govern the research relationship. I have and continue to learn from critical anti-colonial scholarship on how to navigate this. It involves difficult but necessary choices. This necessarily includes the admission that some research should not be done. But when it is done, research must involve a commitment to breaking down these relations of power representationally, through decentering the white, Western voice, and breaking down violent stereotypes of the non-Western other. But it must also involve material action, through our hiring practices, through the support we offer to the people we do research with, and through taking actions towards breaking down violent structures of domination.

 

Excerpt from the book (from “Chapter 3: Without hope there is no life,” pp. 97-101)

I said it would be different

When I left Cairo in August 2015, Adel, Eslam, and Mohamed felt positive about their trajectories. Adel insisted that when I return in October, he will have left the call center and taken an accountancy course. But when I returned, Adel had neither left the job nor done an accountancy course: “I said I would be in a different place, but it is so hard, taking a course takes money.” He admitted struggling to find an affordable course but declared he would leave the call center to look properly: “you can earn 20,000LE as an accountant!” he exclaimed. Adel had finally taken the English course, but the lack of improvement punctured any euphoria. The classroom was overcrowded, so he did not have chance to speak. He showed me an old Charles Dickens book he had brought from home: “I am still trying, God make it easy, we need to do what is on us (rabbina yisahhil, lazim naʿmil illy ʿalina)”. In this moment of anguish and regret at his immobility, Adel called on God to smooth his passage. He was trying to do his duty in return. But Adel was upset with himself. After lamenting how much money Egyptians need for everything nowadays, he again focused on his laziness: “if I wasn’t lazy I would have left the job and looked for other work already, I could have found it and saved money for a course.” Adel then told me about a self-help book he downloaded by Zig Ziglar, an American guru who helped Egyptians “keep positive and not get fed up with trying.” He was shocked I did not know him: “he is an inspiration to youth, you should ask, they will all know him.” He described his favorite passage: 

“Two guys are trying to get water from a well, it is really hard to do, and the guy was struggling when it got near the top, and wanted to give up. But if you let go you have to start over again. So it is a metaphor for life that you shouldn’t let go, you should keep struggling until you reach your goal.”

Adel then told me about an Egyptian guru, Ibrahim al-Fiky, who had written books in Arabic. He started as a waiter and ended up owning a chain of restaurants. One of his best lessons was that the worst thing to do is “talking only, talking about your goals and not doing them.” Adel recognized himself in this. He was lazy, talking about doing accountancy courses, changing jobs, or learning English, but never doing them. 

Once again Adel reoriented consciousness away from structural barriers. This time he referenced US and Egyptian self-help books, spread through friends, which have increased in popularity since Egypt’s economic liberalization. This industry, alongside Hollywood film, profits from the promotion of the hopeful promise of rags-to-riches mobility. The narratives extended by self-help are affective because they easily relate – Adel had talked repeatedly about his goals without reaching them. His lack of money, education, and connections in a weak labor market ensured this. All he could do was talk, plan and plan again. However self-help directs people away from structural issues, submitting them to individual character faults. They become powerful because people keep investing in them. Adel actively sustained an injurious meritocratic moral economy between successful and failing individuals because it enabled him to hope he might change, again. His attachment becomes ‘cruel,’ as Lauren Berlant argues, because he cannot detach from the meritocratic terrain. It is the only way to maintain his ability to engage with the world. The alternative of letting go is too much to bear. This requires constant deferral of the relief that might be enabled by the object that is hoped for, in this case a fulfilling job. 

Two days before my departure in November, I found Adel on the sofa in the morning studying from a battered Arabic accountancy book. It was a first-year university textbook that he had brought from home. However, he was struggling to remember the material, and in any case needed to learn accountancy in English. On this day, another roommate joined. Mostafa used to work in the call center but had been fired due to an injury lay-off. He spent six months looking for a call center job with regular daytime shifts so he could take an evening HR course, which he was now doing. His long-term ambition was to travel abroad to do a master’s on a scholarship, for which he had applied and been rejected several times. Each time rejection came he became dejected for a few days before searching for the next opportunity and considering how he can be more competitive. This time, he thought his HR course would make the difference. Mostafa also took advantage of my presence, asking me to find a language-exchange partner who could teach him English. During intense conversations in these two days, despite acute awareness of the structural barriers facing Egypt’s youth, Mostafa expressed optimism he will make it:

“Allah has promised if you make a certain amount of effort, he will make sure you have a something in return. So you have to work hard and you can make it. I regret only that I didn’t develop myself sooner, I regret that I will arrive at my goal late, but I will get there, I am working hard to make sure that happens.”

When I asked why Mostafa felt regret when he knew the barriers facing Egypt’s youth, he replied: “I have to blame myself, if I just look at the hard circumstances, I would not be able to keep my goal alive.” He described how there are two kinds of people in Egypt, those who have it easy, and those who need to struggle to achieve success. Of those who struggle, there are those who sit and complain about the conditions and those who believe they can make it through hard work. Some get fed up with trying and give up, and others keep going. Mostafa was someone who keeps going: “you have to go out and search, go out into the streets, not just stay in your house and watch TV and expect something to come, you have to go into the streets and grab it, that’s how God will reward you.” He quoted Thomas Edison as evidence of the ability of individuals to overcome failure: 

“it took him 1000 attempts to find the right answer for the lightbulb. People saw his 999 previous attempts as failed attempts, but he said no, they were vital to learning and reaching the successful last attempt, even if I go through lots of failure I can reach it eventually. I have had bad experiences which have returned me back to the start of the journey. But I am ready to keep going.”

Adel looked to Mostafa with jealousy, perceiving that he was marching towards success. His presence stimulated more regretful lamentations regarding Adel’s perseverant friend in the Saudi company and his rejection from the New Horizon’s training course long ago. I asked Adel why he could not leave the job and do courses for a while. He replied: “I wish they would make me leave, fire me, so I am pushed into doing something!” After pushing further, he reluctantly admitted this would cause financial problems. 

 

Adel struggled to admit his structural predicament. Instead, he cried out to be fired. This is the destructive cry of those who have no choice but to endure stagnation. I then reminded Adel that he previously said he was lazy. “Yes, I am,” he replied. I said I did not agree with the idea that youth are lazy. He agreed, asserting that he knows youth work hard, before pondering: “I am unsure if people are lazy, or if it is the conditions here.” This exchange demonstrates the cracking of the meritocratic myth, and an acknowledgement of the overwhelming structural barriers facing young men like Adel in the pursuit of dignified work. But Adel was always shifted back towards individualizing narratives. On my final evening, he asked what piece of advice I would give him from my research. I struggled to answer, not wanting to fuel the meritocratic moral economy. After saying I did not really know, I let out in a comical voice: “find wasta or money, or travel!” This was not enough for Adel: “that’s all you have out of your research?!” I scrambled and said he should look for a job with fixed shifts so he can take courses like Mostafa. This answer was better received. It reintroduced hope.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.