Golnar Nikpour, The Incarcerated Modern: Prisons and Public Life in Iran (New Texts Out Now)

Golnar Nikpour, The Incarcerated Modern: Prisons and Public Life in Iran (New Texts Out Now)

Golnar Nikpour, The Incarcerated Modern: Prisons and Public Life in Iran (New Texts Out Now)

Golnar Nikpour, The Incarcerated Modern: Prisons and Public Life in Iran (Stanford University Press, 2024).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Golnar Nikpour (GN): I was first drawn to the idea of writing about prisons and prisoners in Iran because, like many Iranians, I have spent my whole life hearing stories about incarceration from friends and family members who have had encounters—some quite brutal—with Iran’s prison system, both before and after the 1979 revolution. Early on, my idea was to write an intellectual history of Iran’s copious archive of political prison writing—to examine these texts not simply as historical sources but as a form of political theory. Very quickly, though, I realized that I had foundational questions about Iran’s modern prisons to which I was having a hard time finding answers. These questions changed the direction of my project dramatically. Most crucially, I wanted to know more about just how Iran could go from a place with very few jailing facilities and very few imprisoned persons at the turn of the twentieth century to a place where prisons and prisoners were at the center of political life and public culture throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first century. How could such a transformative change be institutionalized and naturalized so quickly? Just how did political lives and public cultures change as a result of Iran’s transformation into a modern carceral state? And how have Iranians experienced the profound changes associated with mass criminalization and mass incarceration over the course of the last century?

I show that in drawing the line between good citizen and bad criminal, carceral techniques have shaped Iranian notions of citizenship, freedom, and nationalized inclusion.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

GN: The Incarcerated Modern studies the making of the modern prison system in Iran, the resulting incarceration of millions of people, and responses by Iranians and non-Iranians alike to these new prisons. I argue that the establishment and expansion of the modern prison system in Iran has led to an enduring and elemental transformation in Iranian lives and social worlds. 

The book focuses on what I call “the public life” of the modern prison. I use this concept in two linked senses. The first of these is the more straightforward—the public life of the prison refers to new public conversations that modern prisons and punishment provoked in Iran. As my own interest in the topic shows, prisons have been a topic of major significance for Iranians for decades, eliciting an enormous body of writing, art, music, film, political activism, and more. After legal and carceral centralization—a process that began in earnest under Reza Shah Pahlavi in the 1920s and 1930s—Iranians had to learn en masse how not to get arrested and incarcerated, and what to do if they were. New genres appeared in this era addressing precisely these questions and ideas: prison memoirs, crime fiction, academic criminology, newspaper accounts of crime and punishment, and much more. Of course, most readers of Jadaliyya also know that modern prisons have been disturbingly foundational for political movements in Iran. Political parties, activists, and intellectuals in Iran have routinely had to contemplate the relationship between power, citizenship, and incarceration—often from behind prison walls. 

Yet, as I argue in the book, the public life of the prison does not encompass simply that which Iranian dissidents have said or written in response to modern incarceration. Carceral practices have transformed all Iranian public worlds, not just the ones of those most politically engaged. Throughout the book, I show that in drawing the line between good citizen and bad criminal, carceral techniques have shaped Iranian notions of citizenship, freedom, and nationalized inclusion. Both before and after the 1979 revolution, for instance, state institutions have touted the rehabilitative capacity of Iranian prisons to transform socially wayward individuals into socially productive citizens. Indeed, members of both the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic governments have routinely promised that carceral methods would render Iranian citizens safer, more educated, more progressive, more civilized, and even more properly Muslim. This is the second sense in which I use the phrase the public life of the prison. My argument is not merely that modern carceral practices produced new public cultures in Iran—although of course they did—but rather that modern incarceration has shaped the very notion of the public and membership in that public.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

GN:  The Incarcerated Modern is my first monograph and grows out of earlier research and writing on Iranian state institutions and political movements. The book expands on two prior published essays. One essay is on the emergence of a large and diverse transnational movement in the 1960s using the nascent language of “human rights” to advocate on behalf of Iranian prisoners. This movement was crucial in transforming the global reputation of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the then-king of Iran, from progressive monarch to the much-derided “king of torture.” The second essay is on the rise of criminological discourses in Iran and their imbrication with technocratic state-led efforts to run prisons “scientifically,” all in a nominal effort to reform prisoners and—according to these discourses—even end criminal behavior for good. The book expands dramatically on both of these histories and adds further chapters on other topics of importance for my research: the 1970s guerrilla movement in Iran, the 1980s era of post-revolutionary state consolidation and political violence, and contemporary efforts to transform Iranian carcerality yet again with the use of biometric surveillance and ankle monitors—what scholars in a different context have called “prison by another name.”

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

GN: I am genuinely thrilled to see anyone engaging with the book! That said, I hope that beyond reaching those who are interested in the history of modern Iran and the modern Middle East, the book reaches people interested in critical histories of prisons—or abolitionist approaches to prison studies—globally. The history that this book covers fundamentally transnational. I argue that Iran’s carceral story must be told as part of a worldwide trend in promoting carceral solutions—surveillance, policing, and mass punishment and imprisonment—to a wide host of social issues. As such, the book uncovers shared but hidden architectures, geographies, economies, and discourses of modern prisons and punishment. For instance, several prisons in the contemporary Islamic Republic of Iran were built in the 1960s from blueprints taken from USP Marion in Illinois, now part of the US federal supermax system. The same blueprints were used around the world, from Israel to New Zealand to Iran. This history undercuts neo-Orientalist views that imagine that the Islamic Republic’s legal and penal systems have a singularly sharia-based pedigree unlike those found anywhere else in the modern world. For me, these global links and histories demand analysis for everyone interested in a horizon of freedom beyond the prison. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

GN: I have begun work on a second book project about what I am calling the “ephemeral archive” of the 1979 revolution in Iran, in which I analyze fleeting revolutionary material cultures: revolutionary broadsides, Xeroxed pamphlets, hand-dubbed cassettes, clandestine papers, and more. This ephemera was often hastily copied and furtively circulated in its day and is now scattered across the world, if not lost or destroyed. This means that this is also a history of an archive that is by definition forever incomplete. I am also researching another ephemeral archive of the revolution: that of revolutionary feeling, particularly the sense of openness and possibility experienced in the earliest days of upheaval, what some Iranians called the springtime of revolution. 

 

Excerpt from the book (from pp. 16-20)

Which Prisoners?

Throughout the book, I interrogate received wisdom on different forms of incarceration and different populations of prisoners. Despite the significance of political prisoners to Iranian carceral modernity, The Incarcerated Modern does not limit its analysis to prisoners of conscience (to use the language founded by Amnesty International) or prisoners of politics detained by subsequent Iranian governments. Instead, in distinction from most of the extant scholarship on Iranian prisons – which has largely taken political incarceration and/or torture as its major focus – I look at Iran’s prisons more broadly and also include a closer look at those who in Persian are typically referred to as Iran’s “ordinary” [zendani-ye ‘adi], or common law prisoners. This long-standing historiographical focus on incarcerated political dissidents in Iran has arisen in no small part from the herculean efforts undertaken by these same prisoners – often under profound physical and psychological duress – to have their stories heard. In some cases, former imprisoned dissidents have become scholars, and have written moving and insightful accounts of their experiences of incarceration. In other cases, scholarly and philosophical work about torture in Iran has been produced by former prisoners. Still other works, particularly on the brutal prison massacre of 1988, represent the joint efforts of activist-scholars and former prisoners to shed light on those stories the Iranian government has tried to suppress. The most detailed historiographical excavation on prisons in Iran to date – a pathbreaking monograph by historian Ervand Abrahamian –focuses on the history of torture, forced confessions, and public recantations of incarcerated political dissidents in both pre- and post-revolutionary Iran. In the past decade, there have also several important new works by Iran-based scholars written in Persian, many of which analyze histories of both political and common law incarceration in Iran. These texts invariably end the story at the 1979 revolution, however, presumably a direct result of the political climate in the Islamic Republic.

Despite the public focus on political prisoners, it is common law prisoners who have always represented and continue to represent the vast majority of Iran’s incarcerated population, both in the Pahlavi and now in the Islamic Republic periods. It is not simply because large numbers of prisoners have been held on ostensibly “non-political” charges – drug offenses (which both before and after the revolution represent the overwhelming majority of Iran’s detainees), sex work and sexual deviance, vagrancy, theft, brigandage, border crossing, corruption, murder, etc. – that I turn part of my attention to those detainees or what has been said about or done with them. Beyond the practical fact of their large numbers, I argue that we must work to denaturalize the entrenched logic through which we conceptually (and thus politically) separate these two populations of prisoners.

The taxonomic divide between “political” and “non-political” prisoners in Iran has historical roots in the different way these detainees have often been treated by subsequent Iranian governments, as well as by the way political movements have advocated on behalf of certain detained populations. The divide has its roots partly in the institutionalizing efforts of the early Pahlavi state, which typically grouped and housed Iranian prisoners into two distinct if uneven categories: “ordinary” prisoners (or zendani-ye ‘adi), who comprised the vast majority of Iran’s incarcerated population, and “security” prisoners (or zendani-ye amniyati), the smaller but significant population typically understood by dissidents and human rights organizations alike to be Iran’s political prisoners. So important is this division that political prisoners, who are typically (though not always) housed separately, have been sent to general holding or to small provincial prisons with no other “politicals” as a form of punishment since the late Qajar era. The “divide and conquer” strategy of sending lone dissidents to less central or provincial prisons housing common law prisoner populations, typically against the protests of the detainees, remains in use as punishment today. Resultantly, this division perseveres not only in the carceral institutions of the Islamic Republic – which polices the boundary between detained populations while nonetheless continuing to avow, as then-Chief Justice Ayatollah Amoli Larijani did in 2019, that there are no “political prisoners” in Iran – but in the political work and imaginations of those global human rights advocates and organizations who campaign principally on behalf of Iran’s incarcerated dissidents.

Human rights organizations like Amnesty International have a longstanding record of advocating on behalf of their preferred category of non-violent “prisoners of conscience,” largely bypassing the hundreds of thousands of incarcerated Iranians – not to mention millions of global detainees – who do not fit this narrow classification. (Even Nelson Mandela famously and controversially did not fit AI’s definition of the category.) This logic perseveres among Iranian writers and activists who have dedicated their prison writing and advocacy to “Iran’s unknown prisoners of conscience.” The widespread public focus on Iran’s political detainees comes despite the fact that “political prisoners and prisoners of conscience constitute a tiny fraction of prisoners in Iran,” a fact noted by the widely cited (and State Department-funded) Iran Human Rights Documentation Center in its 2015 report on Iranian prisons. Yet despite the enduring view that would divide prisoners into hermetically sealed categories of “political” and “non-political” – a logic that tacitly (if not explicitly) imagines common law prisoners as the “real” criminals, just as it imagines that political imprisonment is only a problem “over there” in illiberal places like Iran – many of the ostensibly non-political charges for which people are detained in Iran, as elsewhere in the world, stem from self-evidently political issues. In other words, the historical processes through which all modern states including Iran have naturalized the notion that social issues from drug use to sex work to refugee border crossings to certain (but not all) forms of violence demand carceral intervention – as opposed to investment in mental and public health, education, community-building, a stronger social safety net, or various forms of accountability or reparative justice – have themselves been a product of profoundly political processes, and relatively recent ones at that. In the words of France’s Groupe d’Information Sur Les Prisons (GIP), a prison activist group co-founded in the 1970s by French philosopher Michel Foucault, prison is by definition “a political experience, a hostage experience, a concentration camp experience, a class warfare experience, a colonized experience.” Thus, while this book centers the particularities of this story in Iranian history, it also endeavors to push our thinking about prisons and prisoners – and what political horizons we struggle towards with and on behalf of prisoners – all over the world. 

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.