Madawi Al-Rasheed, ed., Salman's Legacy: The Dilemmas of a New Era in Saudi Arabia (New Texts Out Now)

Madawi Al-Rasheed, ed.,  Salman's Legacy: The Dilemmas of a New Era in Saudi Arabia (New Texts Out Now)

Madawi Al-Rasheed, ed., Salman's Legacy: The Dilemmas of a New Era in Saudi Arabia (New Texts Out Now)

By : Madawi Al-Rasheed

Madawi Al-Rasheed, ed.,  Salman's Legacy: The Dilemmas of a New Era in Saudi Arabia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Madawi Al-Rasheed (MAR): This is a multi-disciplinary edited book, with contributors exploring the challenges facing Saudi Arabia under the leadership of newly crowned King Salman ibn Abdulaziz (who assumed the throne following the death of Abdullah in 2015). In the introduction of the book, I introduce the domestic, regional, and international pressures facing the new leadership. To begin with, King Salman is in his eighties. Soon after taking the thrown, the aging monarch quickly reordered the existing horizontal line of succession into a vertical line, a move that benefitted his son Muhammad (who was swiftly elevated to the position of crown price), but angered the few surviving sons of the founder of the kingdom, Ibn Saud, who were eligible to become kings under the previous horizontal model of succession.

This historical moment arrived at a time when Saudi Arabia was still under the shock of the 2011 Arab uprisings that threatened the status quo, both domestically and regionally. While the kingdom did not witness the same level of mobilization and protest akin to other Arab countries, many Saudis were invigorated by the images of protesters in Arab capitals, and many activists appeared in the streets of the Eastern province, Qasim, and Riyadh. They did not demand regime change but focused their attention on the plight of political prisoners and the inadequacy of the welfare services, government bureaucracy, and unemployment. A new wave of repression followed, forcing many activists to flee the country. A nascent civil society and women’s movement demanded political participation and empowerment. Unfortunately, these young movements faced repression, and the activists ended up in detention.  

Moreover, the sharp decrease in oil prices since 2014 meant that the leadership was not able to maintain the level of spending on welfare service as before. King Salman and his son introduced a reform package that was meant to lessen the country’s dependence on oil, diversity the economy, and increase employment opportunities. Social reforms included lifting the ban on women’s driving and allowing them greater visibility. However, political reform continued to be neglected, thus creating the semblance of openness and tolerance without undermining the old structures of power and exclusion.

There is also the thorny question of religious reform, especially after Saudi Arabia’s religious tradition, namely Wahhabiyya, came under fire again, as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria appeared to be inspired by the Saudi version of Islam.

Regionally, Saudi Arabia emerged after 2011 as a counter-revolutionary force, desperately trying to return to the status quo ante in places like Bahrain, Egypt, and Yemen. The level of violence around the kingdom intensified as a result of the turning of the uprisings into sectarian civil wars. Saudi interventions in Bahrain and Yemen had stated objectives, amongst them is to curb Iranian expansion in the Arab region.

King Salman also faced the challenge of mending relations with the US after the relationship went through a troubled period under the Obama administration. While continuing to develop new ties with China and the Far East, the king’s main occupation was to court President Donald Trump and secure his support for the Saudi regime.

These are the challenges that the book addresses with a view to move beyond the very pessimistic or the very optimistic perspectives that dominate most discussions about the kingdom and its future.

I try to position the book in between these two approaches and critically assess the challenges facing the kingdom in both the short and long terms.

J:  What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

MAR: First, there is the theoretical positions that assure readers about the stability of the Saudi regime. In this literature, the kingdom is portrayed as an island of stability in a turbulent Arab world. Its regional interventions, for example in Bahrain and Yemen, are seen as a stabilizing force, maintaining security. Yet, there is another literature that forecasts doom and destruction as it anticipates the Saudi regime to wither away very soon.

I try to position the book in between these two approaches and critically assess the challenges facing the kingdom in both the short and long terms. Equally, contributors to the volume refrain from directly addressing the question about the durability of the Saudi regime. Instead, they explore the political, social, religious, and economic obstacles that may undermine stability.

Therefore, readers should not expect quick and easy conclusions. They are invited to reach their own conclusions after assessing empirical evidence and analysis that is offered by the experienced authors of the chapters in the book.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MAR: Although this is an edited volume, I continue to explore in my introduction and my own chapter the dynamic of succession that I have dealt with in previous publications. I take a historical perspective to highlight continuities and discontinuities in the transfer of power from one king to another. I also discuss a new approach to studying political rumors, especially those that circulated around the time King Salman made several shuffles at the very high level of leadership. He sacked several senior princes and promoted his son to the top leadership. Applying a political anthropological approach to the study of rumors, I considered them an attempt to insert disenfranchised populations in the political narrative of the kingdom. With the widespread use of social media and the silencing of open critical voices, Saudis produced an unusual phenomenon in the character of the famous Mujtahid. Mujtahid is a popular anonymous source of information that kept forecasting news about royal intrigues. He became so famous that most international media followed his statements and predictions. Most his predictions were initially considered nothing but “fake news,” but they all came true, especially the sacking of Minister of Interior and Crown Prince Muhammad bin Nayif, the detention of National Guard Commander Miteb bin Abdullah, and many other princes.

Other chapters build on contributors’ long research interest in Saudi Arabia. This book includes contributions from Gregory Gause to Stephen Hertog, to new scholars such as Nora Duaiji, Sultan al-Amer, and Cole Bunzel, and covers topics such as new perspectives on the Saudi economic future, regime stability, urban dissent, ideological affinity to the Islamic State,  the gender movement, and relations with China, among other topics, are covered in the book.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MAR: The book should primarily appeal to specialists on Saudi Arabia and an informed readership among policymakers, journalists, and non-government organizations. Although all contributors are political scientists, economists, historians, and international relations experts, the book is written in accessible language free of jargon.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MAR: I am working on several aspects of the so-called transformation of Saudi Arabia under the new leadership of King Salman and his son. I have an interest in the new "fun" (concerts, theater, and cinema), all promoted as the face of a modern and "normal" Saudi Arabia. I am also working on the new Saudi nationalism that is meant to replace the old religious nationalism of the Wahhabi movement to turn Saudis into modern homo economicus.

 

Excerpt from the Book:

Introduction: The Dilemmas of a New Era (Madawi Al-Rasheed)

King Salman began his rule in 2015 with a series of unprecedented challenges. From leadership shuffles and falling oil prices to regional and international upheaval, he faced new dilemmas. This book focuses on this era and provides analysis of previous troublesome historical episodes and contemporary challenges. Although King Salman is old and looks frail, he has brought in several measures to deal with succession issues, the oil crisis, the Arab uprisings, regional rivalries with Iran and other troublesome Arab and Gulf neighbours, reached out to Asia to seek new opportunities, and finally mended relations with the USA under President Donald Trump. Whether his policies, viewed over a very short period – just over two years at the time of writing this introduction – have saved the kingdom from serious upheaval is yet to be seen, but no doubt that a new kingdom is emerging, rightly referred to in the title of this volume, Salman’s Legacy, as a result of his actions. However, Salman’s kingdom – or that of his son – may not be so drastically different from previous incarnations, as there are continuities and historical precedents to some but not all the decisions that Salman and his young son Muhammad have made since 2015. This book is an attempt to provide historical depth and insights into the contemporary challenges that Salman’s kingdom has faced, and is likely to continue to face, in the near future.

Since its creation in 1932, the Saudi regime continues to divide opinions. Among analysts and scholars, speculations about its resilience or imminent collapse remain abundant. But so far it is managing to hold on to power amidst two contradictory narratives. At one end of the spectrum there is a narrative that highlights its resilience and ability to contain shock and challenges at different historical moments.[1] In contrast, at the opposite end there is the story of the imminent collapse of the house of Saud, and even the fragmentation of the kingdom into smaller entities along sectarian and regional lines.[2] But the truth about Saudi Arabia may actually lie between these two scenarios. The triumphalist tone of the first narrative needs to be assessed against the wishful thinking that underlies the second one. In between, observers map the consequences of the collapse, described as potentially cataclysmic.[3]

Based on new research that moves beyond the two diametrically opposed narratives, contributors in this volume engage with Saudi history, contemporary social, political, and economic challenges, and foreign relations. The rich and nuanced studies offer a balanced understanding of the country and sophisticated interpretations of its domestic, regional, and international choices that may appear to outsiders as shrouded in secrecy and speculation. Several contributors engage in diachronic analysis that uncovers the recent past but also identify continuities and discontinuities emerging from both leadership and societal changes. While the contributors may not agree with each other on all matters related to Saudi Arabia – in fact, a few are critical of each other’s work – they nevertheless engage in conversations that generate a better and balanced understanding of the country, its political dynamics, religious tradition, and new directions in its foreign policy. The value of an edited volume is enriched by the potential inherent both in the contrasting views of the contributors and in their criticisms of each other’s work in ways that enhance understanding of the subject.

Observers who draw attention to the challenges facing the kingdom rightly list numerous problems that may undermine future stability. In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings in 2011 the kingdom is often believed to face several domestic concerns that need to be immediately addressed. The rivalry between disgruntled princes, the demographic youth bulge, the new class of educated women, the terrorists, the radical Wahhabi preachers, the aspiring middle classes, the marginalized poor, the unemployment crisis, the repressed minorities, and more recently the dramatic fall in oil prices are often among the list of potential structural problems that the kingdom will have to deal with sooner or later.

In addition, the advent of the internet and new communication technology from Twitter to Facebook are believed to open new avenues of dissent and resistance. Monitoring Saudi users of the new social media allows commentators to map and assess opinions that circulate widely and reach all citizens inside and outside the country. The new voices that are now heard in the virtual sphere are unusual in a country with no experience of an open and free press. Tapping into the voices of dissent among both men and women, even though the most critical remain virtual, points to a changing public sphere where Saudis assess the performance of their leadership and dare to launch criticism of their shortcomings online. They request more rights and entitlements, from women’s driving campaigns to demands for better infrastructure in cities.

Since the Arab uprisings most virtual Saudi campaigns have focused on local demands for higher government salaries, and better welfare services such as health facilities, education, and housing.[4] Other campaigns have had overtly regional political objectives – for example, criticizing Saudi intervention against the elected Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt in 2013, or the increase in subsidies to other monarchies such as Morocco and Jordan, or in 2017 the rift between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. But the corruption of government officials and the confiscation of land by senior princes remain topics hotly debated in the virtual world among active Saudi citizens with YouTube clips spreading news about local demonstrations, sit-ins, and resistance. Since the Arab uprisings women’s rights issues, especially lifting the ban on women driving and abolishing the male guardian requirement, have attracted a lot of attention among local women, as well as in the international community.[5] Those who predict trouble in the kingdom often point out that the combination of economic, political, and social problems on the one hand and more active citizenry on the other is likely to produce serious internal upheaval in the future.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.