What New Challenges is Lebanon Facing? An Interview with Eric Verdeil and Ghaleb Faour

Cover image of Atlas of Lebanon Cover image of Atlas of Lebanon

What New Challenges is Lebanon Facing? An Interview with Eric Verdeil and Ghaleb Faour

By : Eric Verdeil and Ghaleb Faour

Eric Verdeil Ghaleb Faour, and Mouin Hamzé recently published the Atlas of Lebanon. New Challenges with Presses de l’IFPO. Originally released in French and Arabic, Atlas of Lebanon provides a unique vision of the country through maps, pictures, satellite images, and infographics, as well as texts assessing the main challenges the country faces today. Whether a result of historical violence, current conflicts in neighboring countries, or massive urbanisation, the authors analyze these new challenges in connection with a certain retreat of the state to the benefit of other, sometimes new, actors. In the below interview Verdeil and Faour answer questions on this collaborative project and some of its findings.

Miriam Périer (MP): What is the genesis of this international endeavour? Who is part of the research team and how did you work together?

Eric Verdeil and Ghaleb Faour (EV & GF): The genesis of this atlas dates back to the end of the 1990s. The CNRS-L (or National Centre for Scientific Research-Lebanon) created its Centre for remote sensing in 1997 (where Ghaleb Faour had his first position) that started to produce a wide range of new geographic and environmental data using Geographic Information Systems. At the same time, researchers at the Urban Observatory, IFPO (where Eric Verdeil worked between 2000 and 2003) sought to structure the accumulated documentation into a geographic database. The project of an atlas of localities in Lebanon resulted from the encounter of these two institutions. We produced a database of local geographic units (limits, names of villages), thanks to archival work as well as digitization and coding of land registry and army maps.

This project was boosted when the Lebanese government launched a study for the National Master Plan of Lebanon. CNRS-L and IFPO collaborated with consultants and administrative bodies in charge of this study. One of its outcomes was the enrichment of the existing database with statistics and geographical data thanks to unusual and large-scale cooperation efforts among experts and administrations. While the consultants produced their own documents oriented towards a national master plan (2004), we prepared the first version of the Atlas of Lebanon: territories and society (2007). It analysed territorial dynamics through two timescales: the process of construction of a state out of the dismantled Ottoman Empire and through the French colonial rule, during the twentieth century, marred with recurrent conflicts and migration waves, and the changes since the civil war, including physical damages, displacements, urbanization and environmental degradation.

This first atlas was well received and in 2013, while preparing the fiftieth anniversary of the CNRS-L, its General Secretary Mouin Hamze took the initiative of a second edition. Rather than just updating the data, it aimed at exploring news facets. Among them, the issue of water scarcity is one of the most conflictual in the relation with neighbouring countries. New challenges have also arisen from the renewed conflicts after 2006, and accentuated even more from the start of the conflict in Syria after 2011 that caused an unprecedented wave of refugees in Lebanon.

Over the years, the team of partners has widened. In addition to the editors, the second edition gathered a geomatics and graphic design specialist, three young French doctoral students, as well as Lebanese scientists from the Centre for Remote Sensing and a professor and his students from the Urban Planning Department at the Lebanese University—hence a multidisciplinary collective. This process shows the strong dynamism of geographical and environmental research in Lebanon, as well as the benefit of relying on IFPO’s publishing and documentary infrastructures, which was pivotal for international cooperation with French research centres.

MP: Did you face specific difficulties and how did you overcome them?

EV & GF: Collecting and accessing geographical and statistical data in a country such as Lebanon is a very difficult task. First, Lebanon does not conduct population census. Since the last census in 1932, various institutions have made several estimations following diverse objectives and methodologies, which do not allow for easy comparison between them and across time. The availability of the existing data is also questionable, and their geographical precision is uneven. The same goes for social and economic data (e.g., jobs, production) and this has worsened since the beginning of the 2000s. Indeed, state administrations then relied on surveys implemented in view of the reconstruction after the civil war, with more exchanges among administrations than is now the case.

The episodic violent conflicts in several Lebanese areas of course add to the difficulty to produce updated information. It does not mean that state institutions produce no data, but they are hard to locate, sometimes flawed. At times, however, they are very interesting. A good example is the dataset on illegal encroachment we were able to use to map illegal occupation of the shoreline.

Producing our own data based on remote sensing technologies or field surveys is an alternative way to document territorial dynamics, such as urbanization or environmental degradation. Here, the wide knowledge and expertise within the CNRS-L and in particular the Centre for Remote Sensing proved particularly useful.

The process of data collection also showed that state institutions do not have a monopoly over geographical information. Not to mention armed groups who operate beyond state sovereignty in some regions, and whose data are inaccessible, international organizations as well as non-governmental organizations produce maps and statistics. More original, several associations and civic groups also process and generate their own data, in order to document and contest state policies. A few of them agreed to share some of their findings with us, which allowed the atlas to convey more than just the state’s view of its territory, as is the case with most atlases, but also competing views and claims on space.

MP: What is the main originality of this edition?

EV &GF: Lebanon is one of these countries that are mostly depicted through sectarian and geopolitical lenses. These traits are not forgotten nor neglected in our book, even if it is very difficult to follow the pace of local and regional conflicts. Hence, the data on the Syrian conflict spill-over, and the issue of refugees are already outdated! Also, we refrained from overusing the religious or sectarian lens, which is one among many other factors in the political stalemate the country is facing.

Other dimensions are equally important to understand everyday life in this country, despite being less discussed in international media. A case in point is the environmental crisis triggered by the massive urbanization process and aggravated by the chronic failures of public infrastructures, which are a massive concern within the country. The atlas documents in depth the mounting water crisis, which is not only caused by competition with Syria and Israel for water harnessing. It is also the result of bad management of existing resources and lack of maintenance of the dams and water pipes. The absence and mismanagement of sanitation infrastructure also translate into aquifers and sea pollution. The open crisis of solid waste management since 2015, following years of inaction by the state, has added new sources of water and air pollution and triggered unsustainable responses, such as disposing waste in newly built landfills on the shore, with no compliance whatsoever with environmental procedures and norms.

The electricity crisis, with nearly twelve hours of daily power cuts in most parts of the country (except in the municipality of Beirut) increase sanitary issues (particularly air pollution because of diesel generators) and also weigh heavily on the budget of families and on the economy altogether.

Environmental issues also comprise earthquake threat, which is badly understood but will most probably result in massive damages, as well as the looming climate change, of which the atlas tries to offer a preliminary assessment.

MP: You mention that local territorial management is marked by a retreat of the state. How does the atlas allow for the understanding of this phenomenon?

EV & GF: Our colleagues from the Department of Urban Planning at the Lebanese University have indeed analysed in detail the shifting territorial governance. For the last two decades, municipalities and unions of municipalities have played an increasing role in managing not only local issues, such as services or construction, but also major national issues such as the settlement of more than one million Syrian refugees, who represent about one quarter or one third of the resident population today. This is the result of several processes. The decision of the Lebanese government to dissociate itself from the Syrian conflict meant that it left municipalities with the duty to cope with the increasing population. The Lebanese government is now handling this issue mainly through a repressive approach.

The rise of local institutions can also be explained by the actions of foreign governments and international organizations that have tried to bypass government bodies and that have considered that local actors would be more efficient for designing and implementing local development projects and fighting poverty. The result is mixed, to say the least. Local governments lack funding and human resources, and legal framework often prevent them from successfully implementing their objectives. There are also many conflicts at the local level, which often results in unachieved or unsustainable policies.

MP: Who is this atlas destined to?

EV & GF: The atlas is indeed a useful format for sharing results of scientific research with a wider audience in order to put facts on the table and to visualize them. The first two versions were written in French, hence the need to translate them into Arabic. They are available in open access thanks to IFPO publishing policy (20072016). This has allowed for a wide dissemination locally, in particular to universities and schools.

The current English translation aims at widening the readership towards international NGOs and scholars. It should also be acknowledged that Lebanese universities increasingly use English as a teaching language, while French recedes. Even though maps and infographics are making their way in several Lebanese press outlets or local think tanks, no similar book was available in English. Therefore, providing a translation of the latest version of the atlas in addition to a selection of the first one aims at filling a void.

[This interview was originally published on the CERI's website.]

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Further Readings:

Verdeil, Éric, Ghaleb Faour, and Sébastien Velut, Atlas du Liban. Territoires et société (Beyrouth: IFPO, 2007). Access French and Arabic versions

Verdeil, Éric, Ghaleb Faour, Mouinn Hamze (eds.), cartophy by Claire Gillette, Atlas du Liban. Les nouveaux défis (Beyrouth: IFPO, 2016), French and Arabic

We Made Every Living Thing From Water: An Interview with Karim Eid-Sabbagh

Since the garbage crisis began in Lebanon in 2015, the country's environmental credentials have been repeatedly called into question by the international community and its own citizens. The ecological crisis exacerbated, and was exacerbated by, problems of water resource management. The sorry state of water infrastructure is at the root of Lebanon being among the world's top-fifteen per-capita consumers of bottled water. This plastic can be found everywhere, literally covering beaches, degrading in open dumps across the country, and burning with other garbage as seepage and toxins intensify pollution. Breaking out of this cycle of consumption, pollution, and exploitation will require a restructuring of socio-natural metabolic relations. This is as urgent as it is inescapable if Lebanon is to move toward a more sustainable future in terms of the environment and health.

The Europe and the World Center at the University of Liverpool recently screened Karim Eid-Sabbagh’s We Made Every Living Thing from Water. The documentary, co-directed with Paul Cochrane, is an adaptation of Eid-Sabbagh’s 2015 doctoral thesis in the Development Studies Department at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS): A Political Economy of Water in Lebanon: Water Resource Management, Infrastructure Production, and the International Development Complex.” Below is an edited transcript of a conversation with Eid-Sabbagh during his visit to the University of Liverpool. 

Kieran Garrard (KG): Good afternoon Dr. Eid-Sabbagh, and thanks for speaking with me. So, what was your PhD thesis about?

Karim Eid-Sabbagh (KES): In short, my PhD looked at the intersection of what I call the international development complex—the network of international development actors and discourses—and the Lebanese water administration. I am particularly interested in how that interaction produces a specific form of water resource management, both ideologically and materially. Ideologically, it is a market-oriented supply-side approach that aims to create the highest financial return on any water use. This approach maximizes water production to maximize profits. Consequently, policies of large investments and major infrastructure, such as dams, are favored. This, in turn, allows the distribution of state funding to politically connected companies. 

[Beach close to Costa Brava dump covered in plastic bottles (March 2017). Image by Paul Cochrane.]

KG: You recently developed your findings into a documentary—We Made Every Living Thing From Water—to help disseminate your research. What were the main challenges in adapting a PhD thesis into a documentary? 

KES: The biggest challenge was that of making it accessible. The documentary is aimed at a Lebanese audience, as an educational tool and an awareness-raising project, addressing a fairly wide audience. So I think the biggest challenge was to take something that is fairly nuanced and has a lot of information and transmit as much as possible in a constructive way to a lay audience, while taking the audience seriously. We did not want to simplify it to the point where it becomes meaningless, but rather keep enough detail to get across the key points.

There was also the challenge of transforming a largely textual project (i.e., the thesis) into an audio-visual project (i.e., a documentary film). Scenes of pollution can be relatively easy to include, such as when rivers are overrun with trash. Other aspects were much more challenging to illustrate visually, at least for us first-time filmmakers. We relied on a rather straight forward narrative structure. There was also the issue of accessing sites. We secured permission from General Security in Beirut. But some of the team members would have needed permission from Military Intelligence to go to certain places south of the Litani River, and we never got a response from the media office of Hizballah. So we decided against going too far south. We nevertheless managed to show how the question of water is a problem that concerns every corner of the country. In some cases, our cameraman just barely evaded certain forms of harassment. Filming in and around trash for such a prolonged amount of time also resulted in our cameraman falling ill for a few days.

KG: The thesis was completed before the 2015 garbage crisis and subsequent protests. Including this in the documentary meant some divergence from the thesis, with more emphasis placed on the pollutants and the social movement. This perhaps moved the documentary away from being merely a dissemination of the thesis and more toward a piece of journalism in its own right. What motivated this decision?

KES: Since the trash crisis had just happened, and there were on-going protests when we started filming, there was not even much of a discussion about whether we would address some of the issues that came out of the crisis. As someone who has worked in political ecology for some time, it was clear that waste management—and therefore the trash crisis—was politicized. So we thought a narrative that highlights the politics of environmental resource management would be a good contribution to the larger discussion. Water offered a particularly illustrative entry point to do so, and the doctoral research made the choice all the more sensical. 

KG: One thing conspicuous by its absence from the documentary is a defense of water and waste management policy from the Lebanese government. Did you approach the administration for a comment?

KES: We did. But having talked to many administration officials during the research for my thesis, I knew we would not get anything useful on tape, or anything quotable, because the only time people talked to me in earnest was off the record, and even then very rarely. What they would produce is your standard market environmentalist discourse: that the market is the only alternative and Lebanon has so much debt that it has to be the users that pay. The government has enough outlets in that discussion. Their discourse dominates. It is completely hegemonic on this issue, and so we decided very consciously to bring out the other voices. We had to try to find a balance between experts and people living the crisis and experiencing it, so we tried to include as much as possible other voices that are not usually heard, to show that maybe one needs to think about alternatives.

[A truck and workers dumping waste into the Abu Ali river in Tripoli (April 2016). Image by Paul Cochrane.]

KG: The fiscal problems of the state—including public debt above 150 percent of GDP—have led many to present privatization as the only solution. Would you support further government borrowing to invest directly in water infrastructure projects? 

KES: It is a difficult question. The film talks about it very briefly, but if one looks at it historically, the post-war development scheme did envision Lebanon as being this banking hub. Therefore, early on, money was borrowed from local banks at tremendous interest rates. Two-year Treasury bonds at some point were earning an interest rate of thirty-eight percent if I am not mistaken. That brought a lot of capital to the bank: in the hundreds of percent growth in the first couple of years. A lot of this debt should be considered odious. It is basically banks and the capitalist class ripping off, through the state, the general citizenry. In that context, it becomes very difficult to say how to manage that debt. A lot of projects are being implemented in a way that provides very little benefit to the people, especially if one compares it to the cost. So I think there should be, and is, room for the government to invest in infrastructure and do so properly. However, it would require a whole different approach to public finances and economic policy: one that taxes more progressively to start with. At the current moment, the capitalist elite have captured the administration so thoroughly that this is far from happening.

KG: Is it fair to say there was no consideration or discussion either within the Lebanese administration or from any of the international actors involved of water being developed as a nationalized industry?

KES: None. Definitely not. In the post-civil war era, the discussions have focused on how much could be privatized. Most water services were run by some twenty local water offices, supposedly under the purview of the ministry—but individual municipalities were also running services. As one can imagine, the civil war required communities to be creative in how they managed water and water service provision was very uneven across the country. Bad water quality and intermittent or absent public supply characterized most areas. After the war, the general push by relevant state institutional actors and the international aid machine has been for privatization—spearheaded by the World Bank. A lot of pressure was applied, and there was some resistance in parliament—some of it principled and other opportunistic. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, water office workers across the country often struck in opposition to the proposed reforms and out of fear for their jobs. The reform of water administration in 2000 did not end up privatizing the water sector in its totality, even if it that was the intention. This was a function of the state of infrastructure and the existing legal framework. Legal uncertainty and massive capital investment requirements meant that only Beirut and Mount Lebanon offered potential profits at the scale those leading the reforms were interested in. Nevertheless, the sector has been privatized through what we can call backdoor means. A number of functions, such as accounting, bill collection, and wastewater treatment plant operations, etc, of the newly created regional water establishments were outsourced to private contracting companies under the guidance of international development agencies. The French AFD and US AID are important drivers of these efforts.

KG: It is clear that the prevailing view of water is as an instrumental good, deemed important because of its necessity for economic growth and productivity. Is there a need for reconceptualization of water, and the environment more generally, as an intrinsic good? And, is such a reconceptualization realistic in the short term either in Lebanon or among the international development complex?

The extent of the environmental crisis is tremendous.

KES: I think that it is highly unlikely in the short term that policymakers and that the international development complex will actually adopt a different approach to water. There are a number of interrelated reasons for this. First is the overall normative preference for core capitalist investment and value extraction. Suez Environment and Veolia are two transnational corporations that have played a role in Lebanon, and incidentally, both have French origins. They generate profit through infrastructure construction or service management. Second, there is a myriad of actors, including development agencies, NGOs, and policy networks, that propagate discourses centered on markets, profitability, efficiency, and scarcity. “Integrated Water Resource Management” and the “Energy Food and Water Nexus” are the headings under which this is being peddled. All of this comes with loans and grants for infrastructure, technical and administrative support, consultancy contracts, and access to various promotions and jobs in the non-profit sector, the private sector, and the development sector. Third, the ideological differences between old guard water officials that started their employment prior to the civil war and the newer generation are striking. One should add here that this is also related to the nature of university training, especially in engineering and water-related fields of study. Most young graduates do not recognise the degree to which they are depoliticised and made to uncritically regurgitated these market environmentalist discourses. There is very little training in terms of critical social sciences. A fourth factor is the clientelistic networks of the Lebanese political economy: the ability of political elites to direct funds to clients and political allies that depend on public spending and development investment. These are some of the more important ideological, structural, and material incentives that work against the emergence and development of alternative discourses and practices in Lebanon.

However, I would argue that it is of the utmost importance that change happens sooner rather than later. The extent of the environmental crisis is tremendous. One should not paint too bleak a picture, as there is an increasing politicization and mobilization around progressive ideas. I think it is very important to remember and support this. 

[Litani river bridge with turtles caught in a tire (July 2016). Image by Paul Cochrane.]

KG: The documentary contains criticism of privatization of the water supply, as well as criticism of the lack of regulation concerning the drilling of private wells. Is there a pragmatic alternative to well-drilling or the purchase of bottled water for those who are not yet connected to national infrastructure?

KES: No, there is not. Realistically at the moment if you can get bottled water, you should and will. Simply because that is the cleanest water that you can get. There are very few accessible studies on what kind of heavy metals or potentially carcinogenic or bacterial contaminants are actually in water from the network. Nor were there correlations that relate water pollution to public health, though it is very likely that the high cancer rates in Lebanon are related to the massive pollution.

KG: Many of the international development actors are focused on coastal areas due to concern with pollution in the Mediterranean, and there is less concern with inland sources of pollution. Has this led to socially unjust outcomes?

KES: Yes and no. On the one hand, the largest part of the population is on the coast, and initially, international actors with regard to wastewater treatment were focusing mostly along the Mediterranean. However, all the projects that were done in terms of waste-water treatment plants were highly inefficient because the ones that operate, operate only pre-treatment. So it is just taking out the chunky trash but not much more. A lot of these waste treatment plants did not work for decades. They were constructed for a lot of money and then never actually connected to the network. Or when they were connected to the network, not enough waste-water was coming to the plant for it to actually operate. So a lot of waste-water was just put into the sea directly. In recent years there has been more effort to expand waste-water treatment infrastructure inland. The Beqaa Valley, for instance, now has two small operating treatment plants and a larger treatment plan, but again, I think that is only running pre-treatment and not tertiary treatments.

KG: What has been the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on the water shortage and waste management problems?

KES: One has to understand that we are talking about one to 1.5 million–so, more than a quarter of the population. One refugee for every three to four Lebanese, which is a tremendous amount. So there is obviously more waste-water generated and a higher need for domestic water, but I think it is important to highlight that refugees living in tented settlements get a ration of thirty-five liters per person, which is not a lot of water, through humanitarian agencies. These make up fifteen to twenty percent of refugees and are mostly in the Beqaa. The majority of refugees rent places in varying states of disrepair. It certainly has increased the pressure on the water infrastructure, but it has also not been mitigated by the government, which has taken a very hands-off approach to managing the Syrian refugees. It has an impact, but I do not think one should overstate it. Syrian refugees are used as scapegoats to hide that these problems are rooted in longstanding policies or their purposeful absence. In both cases, they predate the first refugee flows from Syria.

[Litani river close to a tented settlement of Syrian refugees. (July 2016) Image by Paul Cochrane.]

KG: Do you expect the scale of the problems highlighted in the documentary to come as a surprise to Lebanese citizens?

KES: I think the scale, yes. Some of the issues involved I think a lot of Lebanese know to a degree that this is happening in parts. People do talk about it. I am hoping the documentary shows how these things are interconnected. We talk about pollution in how it affects productive activities, how it affects health in terms of domestic consumption, how water relates to rural development. We talk about the economy; we talk about the politics of it; we talk about social mobilization all around the issue of water. We are trying to show that politics are a central aspect, and I do not think that is widely recognized. I think a lot of people fall into this allure of the technocratic expert who says “No, no, it is just a question of management.” 

KG: What lessons can be learned by the rest of the world and international development actors from the problems in Lebanon?

KES: I do not assume that they want to learn or can actually learn from it. The issues are political to the core. I think the politics is about spreading market-based solutions because they end up working to the advantage of the core capitalist countries, with the United States at the top, and with the European Union also being involved. So I do not think there is much of an interest in that. There is an interest in saying that they do development. They spend money on it, but the actual goal of it is still opening up markets and creating spaces for profit generation.

KG: Dr. Eid-Sabbagh, thanks for your time.

We Made Every Living Thing From Water


[We Made Every Living Thing From Water will be available for free online viewing on YouTube in English (https://youtu.be/reJEh0jM5-8) and Arabic (https://youtu.be/wO9yfG6H1Ws) or on Vimeo in English (https://vimeo.com/259600292) and Arabic (https://vimeo.com/285329026).]