Tine Gade, Sunni City: Tripoli from Islamist Utopia to the Lebanese ‘Revolution’ (New Texts Out Now)

Tine Gade, Sunni City: Tripoli from Islamist Utopia to the Lebanese ‘Revolution’ (New Texts Out Now)

Tine Gade, Sunni City: Tripoli from Islamist Utopia to the Lebanese ‘Revolution’ (New Texts Out Now)

By : Tine Gade

Tine Gade, Sunni City: Tripoli from Islamist Utopia to the Lebanese ‘Revolution’ (Cambridge University Press, 2022).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book? 

Tine Gade (TG): My research for this book started as a PhD thesis, which I defended at Sciences Po Paris in 2015. I consider it important to publish a book about Tripoli, a city long neglected in the literature—the most recent English-language book on Tripoli appeared in 1967!

Most studies of Lebanon’s second largest city have focused on its alleged role as a hotbed for radical Islamist movements. I wanted to provide another perspective, focusing on the weaknesses of the Lebanese state in peripheral areas, the failings of the public school system, and the many networks of dependency between wealthy leaders in Tripoli and the generally deprived local population.

Can radicalization be explained as due largely to ideological factors (Islamist ideology)? Or are social and sociological explanations more relevant?

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

TG: The book analyses a century of political socialization in Tripoli (1920–2020), focusing on the post-2005 period. When I started my fieldwork in Tripoli in 2008, sectarian political discourse (anti-Shi‘i or anti-Hizbullah discourse) had begun with the war in Iraq, later peaking in 2012/2013, influenced by the war in next-door Syria. Further, Tripoli experienced the rise and fall of several non-state armed groups claiming adherence to Islamism and, often, jihadism. However, when I conducted interviews in Tripoli starting in 2008, many said that Islamism was on the decline and that people were increasingly becoming secular. Moreover, most Islamist movements were moderate and accepted the Lebanese state. 

Rather than taking any of these phenomena (Islamism, sectarianization, etc.) for given, I analyze their importance in Tripoli society, drawing on rich description, narratives, and social and political history. My analysis is informed by research on the crisis of the Lebanese state and its governance and by studies of Sunni leadership strategies in Lebanon (for example, Michael Johnson’s classic Class and Client in Beirut). I also take interest in studies on the proclaimed crisis of religious authority in Sunni Islam (Bernard Rougier’s excellent The Sunni Tragedy in the Middle East, for instance). Finally, I draw on urban studies from the Middle East and studies of sectarianization, and relate to current debates about Islamism. One important debate concerns the causes of radicalization: Can radicalization be explained as due largely to ideological factors (Islamist ideology)? Or are social and sociological explanations more relevant? I can only speak for the case of Tripoli, and here I found that the Sunni crisis in Lebanon is really a state crisis—a crisis of governance. The issue of religious authority would not have mattered so much, had it not been for the gaps and structural inequalities in Lebanese state governance.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

TG: My PhD thesis was on Tripoli, and I have done fieldwork there since 2008, as well as intermittent fieldwork in northern Iraq since 2016. Most of my articles have concerned topics related to my PhD thesis; one article, for example, analyses the continuity of social movements in Tripoli from the 1970s until today. I have also published on clientelism, and on the Lebanese resilience in the face of spill-over from the Syrian conflict. I point out that, despite the geographical proximity to the Syrian conflict theater, the number of Lebanese jihadis who have travelled to Syria is relatively low, and I try to explain why. Recently I have also published on Kurdish Islam (with Kamaran Palani), analyzing the relationship between ethno-nationalism and religion in the Kurdish case. Finally, I have recently completed a book chapter on refugee-host relations in Erbil city (co-authored with Khogir W.Muhammad). Since almost all the Syrian refugees in Erbil are Kurdish, this is an interesting case of intra-ethnic (Kurdish-Kurdish) relations. 

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

TG: I hope that many Tripolitanians, Lebanese, and scholars of Lebanon will read the book and take note of my analysis of Tripoli as a secondary city. I argue that the dethronement of Tripoli when the Lebanese state was created in 1920 largely explains the historical and current propensity for protest in Tripoli.

I see Tripoli as one in a larger universe of secondary cities, like Aleppo in Syria and Mosul in Iraq. Secondary cities are often marginalized within the state. Tripoli, Aleppo, and Mosul are all dominated politically and economically by elites in the capital. Such cities tend to have a more protest personality than (non-secondary) capital cities that are tightly controlled by state security agencies. 

Many of Tripoli’s Sunni elites refused to acknowledge the Lebanese state. When they finally did, they felt that the Lebanese state saw them as second-class citizens; in their view, Tripoli did not receive its legitimate share of state resources, and its history and identity were often neglected by historians of Lebanon. To protest what they perceive as their city’s continued marginalization within the Lebanese state structure, Tripoli’s population has rallied behind the popular Arab ideologies of the times: pan-Arab nationalism, Nasserism, Ba‘thism, Islamism, and so on. By focusing on the perspective of secondary cities, on governance, history, and geographical and political economy factors, I seek to nuance the recent focus on Islamism and sectarianism that has dominated analyses of Tripoli and Mosul. Further, I stress the pluralism found within Tripoli, especially in terms of class. 

J: What other projects are you working on now? 

TG: My latest research project concerns the rise of female religious authority in Saudi Arabia. In 2013 women were for the first time appointed to the Council of Senior Clerics, and in 2017 female Muftis emerged. Moreover, some Saudi female da‘iyyat preachers have reached large audiences through social media platforms such as Twitter. This rise of female Muslim religious leaders is a regional and transnational trend. As Islamic studies as a discipline is becoming increasingly feminized across the world, I investigate how the growing role of women may have an impact on how religious authority is performed. 

J: How does Tripoli compare to other cities in Lebanon, and why is Tripoli interesting?

TG: The old city of Tripoli is Mamluk, similar to Cairo, and has an Arab feel in architecture, culture/lifestyle, and identity. Compared to Saida in southern Lebanon and the capital Beirut, Tripoli is a more genuine and intact old city. However, many parts are very dilapidated due to war damage and long-time neglect. 

Although eighty to ninety percent of Tripoli’s population share the same religion (Sunni Islam), the city is deeply divided politically and socially. These divisions underscore how Sunni Islam is not monolithic. Sunni identity must be recognized as intersecting with other important identities such class, education, region, sect, religious and political belief, and lifestyle.

With its rampant inequality and poverty rates, Tripoli can be seen as a microcosm of Lebanon’s current economic, financial, and political crisis. Political ties between wealthy elites and voters are often based on clientelism and patronage, and even vote buying. This occurs across Lebanon, but is particularly accentuated in Tripoli because of the material needs of the population.

Moreover, urban development and road development have led to the isolation of certain urban areas in Tripoli, now deemed “dangerous.” Young urban Muslim males are especially often subjected to police controls and arrest. Tripoli is an example of how city development in Lebanon often occurs without proper planning and leads to the marginalization of certain populations.

It may also be argued that Tripoli’s city identity is more conservative than that of Beirut. Indeed, many have characterized it as a city of religion and religious scholars. This may have begun to change in recent years, especially after people from all social backgrounds, sects, and regions mingled at al-Nour Square during Lebanon’s October 2019 revolution. Finally, it should be noted that Tripoli’s civil society is also becoming increasingly active, with many women involved.

 

Excerpt from the book (from Chapter 5, pp. 158—62)

The Image of Tripoli as a Citadel of Sunni Hardliners

The proponents of the ‘sectarianization thesis’ see sectarian identities as the result of manipulation by political elites eager to maintain political and economic power over their constituencies. In this view, Lebanese political elites control sectarian expressions in their communities by giving a red light or a green light for sectarian expressions in the media outlets they control. State leaders, according to this argument, accentuate the salience of sectarian identities by stirring up local sensitivities. 

However, a bottom-up–top-down distinction in the study of collective action is not helpful when analysing sectarianization. Indeed, elite manipulation from above would be impossible if sectarianism did not appeal to existing identities and expectations from below. Lebanon’s sectarianism is as much due to the sum of individual needs for belonging that grew out of the insecurities, anomie, and displacement created by Lebanon’s wars as to manipulation by elites and qabaḍāyāt, who seek to prevent the formation of a self-conscious working class.

In my interviews with a number of high Future Movement officials, they refused to see themselves as responsible for sectarianism, and blamed it on the lack of education of the Sunni masses. Referring to the multi-sectarian composition of the Future Movement’s political bureau, the Movement’s elites cast themselves as non-sectarian, and accused the humbler layers of society of not being ready for civic identities. However, to take politicians’ self-justification at face value would be a mistake: sectarianization arises due both to demands from below and to strategizing from above. One major reason for sectarianization was that the Future Movement gave political cover to sectarian street leaders and identity entrepreneurs in Tripoli, who had their own motivations for turning the Lebanese conflict in a sectarian direction.

The Future Movement gave a green light to sectarian rhetoric in 2006, as a response to the beginning of Sunni-Shiʿa tension in Beirut. It intensified its recourse to sectarian slogans about a year prior to the 2009 parliamentary elections. Then, after the elections, it attempted to defuse sectarianism, but easing sectarian tensions was more difficult than creating them in the first place. The Future Movement could no longer control the sectarian ‘Frankenstein’ it had brought to life. Moreover, as the Future Movement refused to take responsibility for its sectarian Sunni constituents, it came to be seen as disloyal to its supporters.

Regional and Historical Influences

The toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Baghdad and its replacement with an Iranian-dominated Shiʿa majority regime victimized Sunni Arabs in Iraq and sparked Sunni sensitivities about Iran’s regional role in the entire Levant and the Arab Gulf region. Sunni leaders in the Middle East responded by ‘sectarianizing’ the regional conflict, inventing a myth that Saddam had been a ‘Sunni martyr’ who had fought Iran, not just a dictator who oppressed his people.

Sectarianism had always been more visible in Lebanon than in Syria and Iraq, since it was institutionalized through political representation. Sunni identity was for a long time contrasted against Christian identity. Until 1982, sectarianism was expressed in ideological terms. Muslim-Christian conflict was expressed as a conflict of pro-Westerners (mostly Christians) against those who wanted to safeguard Lebanon’s Arab identity (predominantly Muslims). Muslim Arab identity also became identified with support for (Arab) Palestinians.

Sectarianism in the sense of Sunni hostility to Shiʿism began in Beirut in the 1980s. The Lebanese capital, a melting-point of all the religious and political cleavages existing in Lebanese society at large, was a frontline between Sunni and Shiʿa areas. In the Sunni fortress of Tripoli, meanwhile, Sunni anxieties about growing Shiʿa power did not come to the forefront. The main factor was the Shiʿa demographic rise in Beirut, which made Sunnis feel more vulnerable, especially in a context of rising property prices. A Sunni sectarian myth began with the Amal militia’s fight against the PLO in the Palestinian camps south of Beirut, known as the War of the Camps (1985–1988). The narrative transmitted to a new generation was of a Shiʿa military attack against Sunnis who had become exposed after the 1982 PLO withdrawal which had left them without a military force.

A Sunni sectarian undercurrent also existed in Tripoli, although the Sunnis saw the ‘other’ here as Maronites in Zgharta and as political Maronitism, rather than the Shiʿa. Sectarianism against Christians had led to clashes in support of the Palestinians during the 1970s. However, the Sunni-Maronite struggle was over access to state resources and power, rather than differences in religion. Most of Tripoli’s well-to-do sent their children to Christian schools. Until the civil war, Christians had constituted a larger portion of Tripoli’s population.

Sectarianism was also a cause of Tripolitanians’ opposition to the Syrian regime, which for so long had repressed Sunni groups and individuals in northern Lebanon. It was certainly also present in the tension between Bab al-Tibbeneh’s Sunnis and the ʿAlawites in Jabal Mohsen. The narratives of the December 1986 massacre at Bab al-Tibbeneh (described in Chapter 2) were transmitted to new generations through incomplete accounts of the history (as was typical in Lebanon, since contemporary history was not taught in the schools), and in popular nashīd (Islamic songs or chants) of artists who were close to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.

Most people in northern Lebanon distinguished, however, between the Syrian army (and its corrupt practices) and the ʿAlawite civilians of Lebanon and Syria. Moreover, ʿAlawite identity was not seen as linked to Shiʿism until Hizbullah began aiding and abetting the Arab Democratic Party in Jabal Mohsen in 2005.

Sunnis in Beirut and in Tripoli often felt that they belonged to something larger than just Lebanon. Although they accepted the state, their cultural identification with the Muslim umma and with Muslim Arab history was generally strong. This view of history made many Sunnis see themselves as superior to other religious groups, and as more entitled to rule. The Sunnis viewed the Shiʿa as rural ‘third-class citizens’. The Shiʿa had long faced both Sunni and Christian racism.

Many Sunnis saw the Hariri assassination in 2005 as a decapitating attack aimed at depriving the Sunni sect of its leader. Manipulation from above, building on sectarian vulnerabilities from below, portrayed Hariri’s murder as the latest example of a systematic elimination of Lebanese Sunni leaders, including Khalil ʿAkkawi in February 1986, sheikh Subhi Saleh in October 1986, and Mufti Hasan Khalid in May 1989. The sectarian myths about these figures conflated the historical contexts to argue that Syria’s al-Assad regime wanted to leave Sunnis in the Levant without a leader, to keep Syria’s Sunnis down and help the ʿAlawite-dominated Assad regime stay in power.

The 2006 between Hizbullah and Israel war further increased a Sunni sense of victimization in Lebanon. Hizbullah, led by Hasan Nasrallah, framed the outcome of the war as a ‘divine victory’ and gained immense popularity among youth across the Middle East. 150,000 Lebanese Shiʿa fled from Lebanon’s south to Beirut, and 70,000 displaced came to Tripoli. In the capital, the displaced took over buildings in Burj Abi Haidar and other Sunni areas, sparking Sunni anxieties. 

Future Movement officials described Shiʿa demographic expansion (and even the building of some new roads) as a deliberate Shiʿa strategy to take over Sunni areas. In Lebanon’s ‘Sunni fortress’ of Tripoli, the continuing clashes between the Sunnis of Bab al-Tibbeneh and the ʿAlawites of Jabal Mohsen re-activated civil war memories.

 

Note: All citations have been removed, please see Sunni City, pp. 158—162 for the full overview.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.