Jamie Stern-Weiner, ed., DELUGE: Gaza and Israel from Crisis to Cataclysm (New Texts Out Now)

Jamie Stern-Weiner, ed., DELUGE: Gaza and Israel from Crisis to Cataclysm (New Texts Out Now)

Jamie Stern-Weiner, ed., DELUGE: Gaza and Israel from Crisis to Cataclysm (New Texts Out Now)

By : Jamie Stern-Weiner

Jamie Stern-Weiner, (ed.), DELUGE: Gaza and Israel from Crisis to Cataclysm (OR Books, 2024).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you edit this book?

Jamie Stern-Weiner (JSW): Since Israel redeployed its military from Gaza’s interior to the perimeter, in 2005, it has kept the enclave in a condition of bare humanitarian subsistence while disciplining its occupied and besieged inhabitants through periodic massacres—in Israeli jargon, “mowing the lawn.” The resulting equilibrium was structurally unstable, if nothing else because Israel’s economic blockade rendered conditions in Gaza borderline unlivable. But Israel was able for many years to contain armed resistance in Gaza to levels it considered tolerable. It was clear almost immediately that the 7 October 2023 Hamas-led assault had decisively shattered this status quo, and that developments of long-term, qualitative significance were underway.

The book emerged from a conviction that any serious attempt to understand the significance and causes of the 7 October bloodshed, as well as the genocidal Israeli offensive that followed, had to begin by placing them in historical context. Few Western observers had followed the conditions in Gaza over the past decade—it apparently takes Israeli suffering to command that kind of attention—while much media coverage reinforced the resulting impression that the Hamas assault erupted out of the blue.

When UN Secretary-General António Guterres observed that 7 October “did not happen in a vacuum,” even this banal commonplace attracted controversy. In truth, it was an understatement: the present catastrophe has been decades in the making, while its architects have prominently included leading US and European institutions. The book presents an authoritative yet accessible guide to these critical contexts and uses them to explain the current crisis.

Among the questions answered are: is Israel’s Gaza onslaught merely an escalation from previous rounds, or something qualitatively new?

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

JSW: The book has three main sections. The first establishes the critical backdrop to the current war—historical, economic, diplomatic, and strategic. In his sweeping history of Israel-Gaza relations since 1948, for example, Avi Shlaim argues that Israel has consistently employed violence as a means of first not last resort, in pursuit not of peaceful relations but Palestinians’ permanent subjugation. Sara Roy, the world’s leading authority on Gaza’s political economy, elucidates the strategic logic and devastating consequences of Israel’s seventeen-year-long Gaza blockade. And Colter Louwerse draws on original archival research to show how, were it not for US-Israeli opposition to a diplomatic settlement, the conflict could already have been resolved decades ago. 

The second section provides a snapshot analysis of developments since 7 October, in Gaza, the West Bank, and the wider region. Among the questions answered are: is Israel’s Gaza onslaught merely an escalation from previous rounds, or something qualitatively new? What did Hamas hope to achieve? Why has a second front not opened in the West Bank? And, how will the war end? Contributors include Palestinian human rights activist Musa Abuhashhash, leading Hamas scholar Khaled Hroub, Gazan journalist Ahmed Alnaouq, and Jadaliyya’s esteemed co-editor, the political analyst Mouin Rabbani.

The final section examines reverberations further afield, in Britain, Europe, and the United States. In the book’s closing chapter, for example, the firebrand socialist Member of the European Parliament, Clare Daly, presents a blistering indictment of European complicity in the Gaza genocide. She homes in on the pernicious role played by European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, who conducted a shadow foreign policy that bounced the rest of the European Union into unqualified support for Israel.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

JSW: I have often written about Israel’s criminal conduct in Gaza—in 2018, for instance, I co-authored an article for Vice debunking justifications for Israel’s lethal suppression of the overwhelmingly nonviolent Great March of Return, and in 2020, I made the case that Israel cannot lawfully resort to force in order to prevent Palestinians breaking free of the Gaza prison.

My previous edited book on the Israel-Palestine conflict, 2018’s Moment of Truth, included a section devoted to Gaza, in which many issues were discussed that remain pertinent. Notably, the book featured a back-and-forth between Nathan Thrall and Ghaith al-Omari over whether and in what circumstances Hamas can be part of a diplomatic solution to the conflict, as well as an extended debate—which included a senior Hamas official squaring off against a Gazan academic—on the potential for armed struggle to end the Gaza siege.

My own research has focused in recent years on the politics of antisemitism, specifically, the ways in which that concept has been redefined to encompass legitimate, accurate criticism of Israel. I documented the diplomatic history of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) Working Definition of Antisemitism and wrote a book-length critique of the contrived UK “Labour Party antisemitism crisis.” Deluge does not explore these topics in depth, although the instrumentalization of “antisemitism” to insulate Israel from critical scrutiny has, in fact, escalated the past half-year.  

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

JSW: The book features leading authorities on the conflict, and specialists will find new material here; for instance, the contributions by Louwerse and Yaniv Cogan both draw on original research. But all the chapters are accessibly presented, and the book as a whole is intended for the broadest possible audience. It is intended to be an intervention in an ongoing political, legal, and humanitarian catastrophe whose stakes, as South Africa’s application to the International Court of Justice made clear, could scarcely be more grave. Anyone frustrated by superficial and misleading headlines, wanting a deeper understanding of the ongoing horrors, and seeking a firmer foundation upon which to chart a less miserable path forward, will, I hope, find the book of use. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

JSW: I am finishing up my doctoral research on the “New Antisemitism.” Warnings of a rampant “New Antisemitism” have been prominent since 7 October, but such claims are neither new—the notion was formulated already in the 1970s—nor strictly concerned with antisemitism. Instead, I argue, New Antisemitism discourse is better understood as part-and-parcel of the long-running international legitimacy war over Zionism/Israel dating back to the Mandate period. The key difference is that the “New Antisemitism” concept emerged after 1967, when a broad international consensus crystallized behind a two-state settlement of the conflict, and when the mainstream Palestinian leadership also embraced this framework. New Antisemitism allegations have therefore primarily served to delegitimize opponents of Israel’s occupation, not its existence.

 

Excerpt from the book (from the Editor’s Introduction, pp. 1-7, footnotes removed)

On October 7, 2023, hundreds of Palestinian militants burst the gates of Gaza, overwhelmed military installations, and rampaged across southern Israel. The operation was shocking in its boldness, the ensuing massacre for its brutality. But the conditions that led to the Hamas attack were long-standing. Gaza is a speck of coastline that is among the most densely populated areas on earth. Some 75 percent of its inhabitants are refugees driven from their homes to make way for the State of Israel in 1948, and their descendants. Israel occupied the Strip in 1967 and de facto annexed it without extending rights of citizenship to the inhabitants. After Palestinians revolted against Israeli military rule, in 1987, Israel crushed the uprising and then strengthened its grip on Gaza through various forms of confinement. By 2004, the head of Israel’s National Security Council could describe Gaza as “a huge concentration camp.”  In January 2006, the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, won democratic elections in Gaza and the West Bank. Israel and its allies responded by subjecting the occupied Palestinian population—already enduring the “worst economic depression in modern history” (Sara Roy, 2005)—to “possibly the most rigorous form of international sanctions imposed in modern times” (UN Special Rapporteur John Dugard, 2006).  After Hamas consolidated control in Gaza the following year, Israel tightened the screws further as it put Gaza under a comprehensive closure that has been enforced with varying degrees of intensity ever since.

The siege extinguished Gaza’s economy and reduced its people to penury. “The idea is to put the Palestinians on a diet,” a senior Israeli official explained, “but not to make them die of hunger.” The unemployment rate soared to among the highest in the world, four-fifths of the population were forced to rely on humanitarian assistance, three-quarters became dependent on food aid, more than half faced acute food insecurity, one in ten children were stunted by malnutrition, and over 96 percent of potable water became unsafe for human consumption. 

The head of the United Nations (UN) agency for Palestinian refugees, UNRWA, observed in 2008 that

Gaza is on the threshold of becoming the first territory to be intentionally reduced to a state of abject destitution, with the knowledge, acquiescence and—some would say—encouragement of the international community.

The UN warned in 2015 that the cumulative impact of this “humanitarian implosion” (Amnesty International) might render Gaza “unlivable” within a half-decade. Israeli military intelligence agreed, whereas a subsequent UN analysis judged the projection overly optimistic.

Long before October 2023, then, Israel had turned Gaza into what the Economist termed a “human rubbish heap,” the Ha’aretz editorial board a “ghetto,” the International Committee of the Red Cross a “sinking ship.” It had reduced Gaza to what the UN high commissioner for human rights called a “toxic slum,” in which above two million people were “caged . . . from birth to death.” An Israeli officer stationed on the Gaza border distilled his mission there: “No development, no prosperity, only humanitarian dependency.” He might have added, forever.

Many in Gaza did not share this vision for their future, and so Israel found it prudent to periodically massacre them—what Israeli officials termed “mowing the lawn.” Some of these onslaughts responded to resistance emanating from Gaza; armed, as when Hamas fired projectiles into Israel in May 2021 following settler encroachments in occupied East Jerusalem, or unarmed, as in early 2018, when Palestinians demonstrated nonviolently along Gaza’s perimeter fence—scores were killed and thousands injured by Israeli snipers arrayed on the other side. But Israel’s most devastating offensives, in 2008 and 2014, were motivated by broader political objectives: to inspire fear in the Arab world and to thwart Hamas “peace offensives” that threatened to make Israel’s rejectionist diplomatic posture—its refusal to withdraw from Palestinian territory in exchange for peace—untenable. In the 2014 assault alone, approximately 1,600 civilians in Gaza were killed, including 550 children, and 18,000 homes were destroyed.

Expulsion. Annexation. Siege. Massacre. Injustice layered on injustice, atrocity compounding atrocity, sedimented savagery amounting in sum to a colossal crime against humanity—culminating in the blockade and bombardment of a refugee population, confined in a concentration camp, one-half of whom were children. It would surprise if suffering of this severity were a recipe for long-term stability. Israeli officials knew the “humanitarian condition in Gaza” was “progressively deteriorating”—this being the intended outcome of Israeli policy—and could predict that, “if it blows up, it’ll be in Israel’s direction.” But they apparently believed that by oscillating “between [military] operations and providing that level of aid to Gaza” sufficient to prevent its complete “collapse,” Palestinian eruptions could be contained within tolerable limits. Hamas will “rise up from time to time and hit us,” Israel’s former national security advisor acknowledged in 2018, but “[i]t can’t cause us any real damage.” If the timing, scale, and character of the October 7 attack came as a shock, the fact that people in Gaza would strike out at some point and in some fashion was not just predictable but priced in to Israel’s “conflict management” policy. Indeed, a former deputy to Israel’s national security advisor found in the Hamas-led assault, not proof of Gazans’ irrational barbarism, but confirmation of a historical universal: “Eventually the oppressed will rise against their oppressor.”

If what Amnesty International termed the “root causes” of the Gaza catastrophe were familiar, and if the resort to terrorism by Israel as well as Hamas had ample precedent, still, critical aspects of the crisis marked a departure:

First, there was a radical intensification in the magnitude of death and destruction inflicted. The authorities in Israel reported that Hamas-led militants killed some 1,200 people on October 7, including more than 800 civilians, and took 250 more captive. If these figures are correct, this means Palestinians killed more Israelis in one day than during the entire second intifada (inclusive of the bloody suicide bombings).

In retaliation for the Hamas operation and massacre, Israel turned Gaza into a howling wasteland. Over two months, Israeli forces killed more than 17,000 people, including more than 7,700 children. That’s almost as many children as were killed across all the world’s conflict zones over the previous three years combined. Gazan hospitals developed the acronym “WCNSF”—Wounded Child No Surviving Family—as hundreds of extended family units were wiped out. Nearly 85 percent of the population was internally displaced. More than 60 percent of homes were damaged or destroyed. Northern Gaza became “an uninhabitable moonscape” as broad swathes of the territory were erased. “Beit Hanoun is not only dead,” a correspondent for Le Monde reported in November, referring to a northern town, “Beit Hanoun no longer exists.” In what might have been a first in the annals of modern warfare, Israeli forces systematically targeted hospitals as they “completely obliterated” Gaza’s “healthcare infrastructure.” At the same time, Israel targeted water and sewage facilities and employed “starvation of civilians as a method of warfare” as it prevented deliveries of food, fuel, water, medicines, and electricity to the battered enclave. Inevitably, by mid-December, half the population of Gaza faced “severe hunger” while disease and lack of medical treatment threatened to increase the death toll by “multiples.”

Second, this ramping up of violence reflected a shift in Israel’s strategy. Before October 7, Israel sought to manage its conflict with the Palestinians by deploying economic “carrots” alongside military “sticks” to co-opt as well as deter Palestinian resistance. In the West Bank, many Palestinians came to acquire a material investment in the status quo. The emphasis in Gaza lay more on the “sticks”—those periodic bloodlettings—but there, too, a class of profiteers had congealed, even under the harsh blockade. Crucially, in the years leading up to 2023, Israeli planners thought that Hamas would prioritize control of a territory and ability to govern it over resistance. Hamas’s responsibility for providing public services in Gaza, together with its dependence on Israel for access to the resources needed to discharge this obligation, would induce the movement to abandon armed struggle and acquiesce in Israel’s overarching control.

The October 7 attack was an emphatic refusal of this role. Hamas would not become another Palestinian Authority, policing unlawfully annexed Palestinian territory on Israel’s behalf. Even as the Hamas assault made Israel’s conflict management approach a dead letter, the unqualified support extended by the US and EU in its wake gave Israel an opportunity to, as one member of Israel’s war cabinet declared, “change the . . . strategic reality.” Israel’s strategy accordingly shifted from mowing the lawn in Gaza to salting the earth; from perpetually deferring the Gaza question to definitively resolving it. To this end, Israel systematically destroyed the prerequisites for civilization in Gaza and sought to render the territory uninhabitable, while mobilizing US influence to persuade Egypt to accept masses of Gazan refugees. The refusal of Egypt and other Arab states to cooperate, together with mounting international pressure to limit the humanitarian disaster, may have precluded Israel from achieving these maximal objectives. But with half of Gaza reduced to rubble, half the population crammed into the southern city of Rafah, and Hamas not yet militarily vanquished, it was wholly unclear, at the time of writing, what a viable “day after” might look like. 

Third, the conflict may now have entered a zero-sum phase. The mainstream Palestinian leadership has for decades sought a two-state settlement of the conflict, while Hamas also attempted, after its election in 2006, to achieve this. Meanwhile, previous escalations in Gaza ended with the prospect, albeit never fulfilled, that the siege would be lifted and the possibility, however remote, that some kind of modus vivendi might be found. But after October 7, it is hard to foresee any Israeli government negotiating with Hamas on anything more substantial than a prisoner exchange. Hamas, for its part, may no longer be prepared to coexist with the State of Israel. On the one hand, Israel’s genocidal war will have multiplied ten-fold the bitterness and rage in Gaza, which was already substantial. On the other hand, if Hamas had previously reconciled to Israel’s existence as an immutable reality, the gravity of Israel’s operational and intelligence failures on October 7, together with Hamas’s impressive military performance, may have convinced them that Israel’s defeat is an option.

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New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.