Emanuel Schaeublin, Divine Money: Islam, Zakat, and Giving in Palestine (New Texts Out Now)

Emanuel Schaeublin, Divine Money: Islam, Zakat, and Giving in Palestine (New Texts Out Now)

Emanuel Schaeublin, Divine Money: Islam, Zakat, and Giving in Palestine (New Texts Out Now)

By : Emanuel Schaeublin

Emanuel Schaeublin, Divine Money: Islam, Zakat, and Giving in Palestine (Indiana University Press, 2023).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Emanuel Schaeublin (ES): The book is the result of almost twenty years of engaging with Palestine and Islamic almsgiving (zakat). From 2004 to 2005, I studied for one year at the Palestinian University of Birzeit. After completing an MA in Arabic from the University of Geneva, a position at the Graduate Institute Geneva enabled me to think about the negative consequences of the US-led “War on Terror” for humanitarian assistance. The US government had launched a policy of “countering terrorist finance” and started putting Islamic charitable institutions on so-called terror lists preventing their access to international banking.

The repercussions of such counter-terrorist policies were felt across many villages and city neighborhoods affected by armed conflict. In 2008, the Palestinian Authority (PA) governing the West Bank under the tutelage of the Israeli army forcefully shut down more than ninety locally rooted committees collecting and distributing zakat to people in need. The aim was to bring the Islamic charitable sector under centralized control to prevent its abuse for “terrorist funding.” Among Palestinians, these measures were very controversial. Certain observers praised them for limiting the influence of Hamas after its rise to power in the Gaza Strip in 2007. Others highlighted the political diversity of the committees and the high degree of confidence they enjoyed among their respective communities—contrasting with a general perception of the PA as corrupt.

As a researcher from Switzerland who had learned Arabic in Palestinian cities, Damascus, and Sana‘a, I was able to conduct interviews with the people running zakat committees before and after the closures and to document the destructive effects of the crackdown. This led to publications in Arabic and English situating the zakat sectors in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip in their historical and social context and explaining different perspectives on their evolution. At the time, people told me that the flow of zakat cannot be obstructed. When faced with obstacles, zakat funds would find new channels including informal face-to-face distribution. 

This image of widely ramified acts of giving in an otherwise opaque and repressive political landscape stuck with me. The issue turned into the focus of my doctoral research in anthropology at Oxford and long-term ethnographic fieldwork in the Palestinian city of Nablus (2013-2014), ultimately leading to publication of this book.

The duty to pass on part of one’s wealth is to a certain extent enforced by lateral disciplining.

J: Which topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

ES: To understand practices of mutual aid in small city that has been under foreign occupation and military rule since 1967, the book draws on (mostly) anthropological literature on Islam, giving, ethics, social interaction, and political economy. I also occasionally refer to Palestinian and Arab literary texts that resonate with the ethnography presented in the book.

The book owes a lot to Talal Asad and his students, such as Saba Mahmood, and their project of studying how people draw on the Islamic tradition to cultivate historically situated forms of selfhood. Given the relational character of zakat giving, I pay particular attention to the embodiment of virtues and piety in social interactions. In this regard, I found the work of Erving Goffman helpful. In the Islamic textual tradition, social interactions play an important role in discussions on how to live a good life. The display of virtue and piety in interactions, however, also has a disciplinary effect on others. To capture casual corrections and encouragements to embody virtues occurring in encounters between people without formal authority, I introduce the notion of “lateral disciplining.”

With a view to discussions about gift giving, I argue that zakat has a dual character as “loan to God” (highlighting spiritual merit) and as a “social duty” (foregrounding the obligation to pass on part of one’s wealth to others). The duty to pass on part of one’s wealth is to a certain extent enforced by lateral disciplining. Zakat is thus cast as the “just share” (haqq) one owes to a person in need in one’s proximity, but also as “God’s wealth” (mal allah). In the final chapter of the book, I reflect upon how such thinking about transactions relates to the political economy of military occupation. 

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

ES: The book is written from an outsider’s perspective. Since moving back to my hometown Zurich in 2015, I have recognized many things that I learned to attend to while in Nablus: utmost discretion and feelings of shame surrounding abundant wealth or the lack of it, lateral disciplining among neighbors as a constant part of social life, and subtle hints at some form of ultimate justice underpinning financial dealings of all kinds. All this also shapes life in a post-Protestant city such as Zurich. Initial attempts to conduct an ethnographic study of such themes in Switzerland and its political economy, and comparing this material with my findings in Nablus, have not yet come to fruition. 

Reflections on how ethical and political concepts are invoked in casual interaction, however, found their ways into the screenplays of two fiction films set in Switzerland that I have co-authored with my brother Cyril: THOSE WHO ARE FINE (2017) explores everyday financial transactions and fraud in contemporary Zurich; UNREST (2022) documents the struggle for hegemony between the anarchist movement and nascent nationalism in Swiss watch factories in the 1870s.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

ES: I foremost hope that this book will contribute to ways of talking and thinking about Palestine that contribute to putting an end to current war, as well as to the ongoing displacement and annihilation of Palestinians. Consequently, I hope that the book will be read by people seeking ways to imagine political possibilities for organizing human live beyond the ongoing division of populations into different zones that are securitized with a growing arsenal of technologies. It is written in a language that should be accessible to students, teachers, researchers, activists, and analysts. The discussion of how transnational zakat flows become locally accountable through gossip about those distributing them (chapter two) seems particularly relevant to people working in the humanitarian aid sector.

As my findings result from the specific and problematic perspective of a white and foreign (ajnabi) ethnographer (discussed in the book), they should be put to the test by anthropologists with different positionalities conducting research on zakat practices in the towns and villages of the northern West Bank and Palestine more generally.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

ES: Currently, I co-direct a research project exploring the role of Islamic legal scholars in shaping how armed groups conduct hostilities, how they govern populations, and how they negotiate with other conflict actors. In parallel, I am working with my brother on the screenplay for a science fiction film about a high-level political meeting in Switzerland.

 

Excerpt from the book (pp. 77-79)

… [A] gift of zakat inevitably marks the recipient as needy, and it can have a wounding effect. Given the general reticence to talk openly about material need, the first problem that arises for zakat givers is how to locate and assess the needs of poor households in their proximity. The same reticence also made it difficult for me to study acts aimed at covering people’s urgent needs. To avoid roping my interlocutors into shameful situations, I let myself be guided by the same ethics that my interlocutors relied on when looking out for poor households and assessing their needs. I gradually learned that my interlocutors were reading signs of need in the behavior of others to detect poor households and assess their degree of need. This sign reading relied on observations made during face-to-face interactions and visits. Signs were given implicitly and registered silently, to be passed on with great discretion to those wishing to give their zakat to a household in need. The point of discretion is to avoid embarrassing and shaming anyone by publicly exposing material want.

Detecting People’s Needs

Reading the subtle signs of poverty in public is crucial for determining whether other people are eligible to receive zakat or sadaqa. Those wishing to give zakat usually look to women’s gatherings, shopkeepers, or mosques to generate knowledge on material needs in Nablus. This knowledge is then discreetly shared among various social networks.

The women my research assistant Marah interviewed told her that they would detect signs of need when visiting one another’s homes by inspecting the state of the furnishings and occasionally going into kitchens to examine the contents of refrigerators. An empty refrigerator, for instance, was a clear sign of financial scarcity and incited giving. Maryam, a married woman living with her family in a village outside Nablus, one day went to visit one of her in-laws, a widow with three children. After some time, Maryam sneaked into the kitchen and saw that there was no food in the refrigerator. The next day, Maryam bought groceries and went to the widow’s house to fill her refrigerator. The woman reacted with surprise: “Were you spying [tfayyidī] in my fridge?” Maryam replied, “No, I just wanted to get something out of the fridge when I visited you yesterday. Then I saw that it was empty.” After this incident, Maryam called one of her wealthier relatives abroad and convinced her to start providing monthly payments for this widow and her three kids.

Other women could detect signs of need in public. Women living in villages would occasionally go to the central markets in Nablus and look around for women who appeared to be in need. One woman claimed to be able to spot financial distress by examining facial traits or bodily movements of strange women in the streets and looking for signs of worry or fatigue. When these women found a likely candidate for assistance, they would start talking to her. If it turned out that she was poor, they would try to help as much as they could afford. They claimed only to talk to other women in the street, never men. Occasionally, however, they would ask men shopkeepers in the old city if they knew of any poor women nearby who needed help. If there was one, they might go to her home and offer zakat or sadaqa.

Dina, a member of the Palestinian Parliament for the Fatah Movement, ran a charitable society in Nablus. She recognized that asking people directly whether they needed assistance often led nowhere, as many destitute families would tell their neighbors, “We do not need anything!” She recommended that potential zakat givers ask the “most influential lady of the neighborhood” … if they wanted to know the whereabouts of poor households. According to Dina, these ladies play a leader role in the neighborhood. Other women show them reverence (hayba) and listen to them in important matters. An influential lady’s position allows her to centralize information considered very sensitive. Everyone knows her, and everyone talks to her. Dina thought that such women are even “better than the Ministry of Social Affairs” as sources of information about the people in need, as they are aware of the tiniest details related to private matters.

Knowledge of poor households circulated swiftly among social networks in Nablus, even though most people were hesitant to reveal their needs. Outsiders like myself walking through the old city of Nablus would not think that many families behind the walls of these buildings had no access to regular meals or necessary medical services. A young man told me that very few people in Nablus knew the extent of poverty and the whereabouts of the poor families in the old city: “There are some respectable men of a certain age who know where they are. They are able to distribute zakat. Unmarried and young men like you and me cannot know such things.” The men I talked to relied on interactions outside of homes to generate knowledge about households that had run out of money. The two main places for detecting signs of need were grocery stores and mosques. Nablus only had two large supermarkets, but street-corner shops selling groceries were widespread. These small grocery stores played an important role in the social perception of a family’s material scarcity since shopkeepers were well situated to observe and interpret the consumption patterns of their customers. One day, for example, I was chatting with Kamal, the owner of a little grocery store who had spent many years working in the Arab Gulf. A small boy walked into the shop and asked him, “How many eggs can I get for two shekels?” Kamal silently placed three eggs in a plastic bag and handed them to the boy while taking two coins in return. After the boy left, Kamal turned to me and said, “Did you see this? This boy’s family is broke. If they still had money, they would send him to buy a whole box of eggs to get a better price.” Like many other shopkeepers, Kamal would keep track of the consumption patterns of his neighbors and, thereby, generate reliable knowledge about poverty in the vicinity. People’s patterns of buying food allowed shopkeepers to infer the financial situation of families. While this information remained hidden to strangers moving through public space, shopkeepers administered this knowledge carefully, disclosing it tactfully to discreet givers. 

People wishing to give zakat often turned to shopkeepers such as Kamal to find families in need of support. The mosque is another social sensor for financial hardship because it is a space where men struck by poverty can spend time when they do not have much else to do. In the mosque, one can pray, rest, and occasionally receive support from fellow Muslims. This meeting space allows merchants to socialize with men from poor households living in the old city. Merchants sometimes help these families by giving them money and helping them pay for medical operations.

In-text citations removed.

Open access link here.

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.