Sofia Rehman, Gendering the Ḥadīth Tradition: Recentring the Authority of Aisha, Mother of the Believers (New Texts Out Now)

Sofia Rehman, Gendering the Ḥadīth Tradition: Recentring the Authority of Aisha, Mother of the Believers (New Texts Out Now)

Sofia Rehman, Gendering the Ḥadīth Tradition: Recentring the Authority of Aisha, Mother of the Believers (New Texts Out Now)

By : Sofia Rehman

Sofia Rehman, Gendering the Ḥadīth Tradition: Recentring the Authority of Aisha, Mother of the Believers (Oxford University Press, 2024).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Sofia Rehman (SR): The book is born out of my PhD thesis, which in turn was a translation and critical study of Imam Badr al-Din al-Zarkashi's fourteenth-century work, al-Ijaba li-Iradi ma Istadrakathu Aisha Ala al-Sahabah - The Corrective: Aisha's Rectification of the Companions. The book is a compilation of over two hundred statements of the wife of Prophet Muhammad, Aisha bint Abu Bakr, in which she corrected, refuted, and sometimes corroborated statements being attributed to her husband by male Companions of the Prophet Muhammad. The implications of these were many, not least in the genres of the Prophetic tradition (hadith), Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), and Qur’anic exegesis (tafsir), to name a few. It allows for the voice of a woman to be at the very heart of one of Islam’s most sacred sources, the Prophetic tradition, and to echo into a range of disciplines the lived experiences of women and the emergent methodology of Aisha in hadith criticism.

While my topics range from feminism and migration to decolonization and environmental justice, the unifying thread is the question: who is being neglected?

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

SR: Gendering the Hadith Tradition is quite vast in the topics it covers. It gives a biography of Aisha bint Abu Bakr, presenting her in a light that is not restricted by patriarchal impositions of what an “ideal Muslim women” is; a history of the development of the hadith tradition; and a translation methodology for the hadith tradition—something I was surprised to find was absent in academic works. Further to this, the book presents Aisha as the rightful authority she was in hadith and Islamic jurisprudence, as well as presenting her ethic of care towards all members of the Muslim community. 

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

SR: I have always been drawn to exploring who sits at the margins and how Islam serves—or fails to serve—these individuals. When the principles of mercy, justice, and compassion that the Qur’an mandates are not felt by all, it reflects a failure on the part of the community and scholars. This theme is a constant across my work. 

In Cut From the Same Cloth? (edited by Sabeena Akhtar), my piece’s focus was on Muslim women and their rights and experiences. In my essay in Violent Phenomena: 21 Essays on Translation, I discussed decolonizing the translation of Arabic Islamic texts. In Gathering: Women of Colour on Nature, my essay engaged with the Qur’anic obligation to care of the earth and tackle the climate crisis. 

While my topics range from feminism and migration to decolonization and environmental justice, the unifying thread is the question: who is being neglected? And how can we build an inclusive framework that ensures these forgotten voices are heard and empowered? 

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

SR: While writing my PhD thesis, I envisioned both scholars and everyday Muslims engaging with it—those who seek to root their practice of Islam in the Qur’anic principles of ‘adl (justice), rahma (mercy), and ihsan (beauty). My hope is that by re-centering the scholarship of Aisha bint Abu Bakr, this book reaffirms her critical contributions and encourages contemporary scholars to revisit her interventions. It could serve as a catalyst for re-examining interpretations of Islam that either no longer resonate with our current realities or have historically overlooked groups such as women, children, and people with disabilities.

Aisha’s contributions demonstrate the vital role women have always played in shaping Islamic thought, even if their voices have not always been given equal recognition in later interpretations. Her authority in hadith criticism, her ability to engage with and correct male Companions, and her intellectual rigor offer a blueprint for how women can contribute to religious scholarship. Today, her legacy challenges us to re-examine the gendered hierarchies within Islamic scholarship and to create more space for women’s perspectives in shaping religious discourse. By revisiting and uplifting voices like Aisha’s, we can encourage a richer, more diverse, and inclusive understanding of Islamic teachings that speaks to the needs of all believers.

Ultimately, I hope this work sparks deeper reflection and inspires a more compassionate understanding of Islamic teachings, not only in the realm of practice but also in scholarship. By engaging with Aisha’s interventions, I aim to encourage a broader rethinking of traditional interpretations and to foster scholarship that better serves the diverse needs of the Muslim community today.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

SR: I am currently exploring how autistic experiences can shape and deepen our theological understanding of God. In particular, I am intrigued by how autistic perspectives on gender, time, and verbal communication might align with Islamic concepts of God as non-gendered, existing beyond time, and communicating with humanity in limited, non-verbal ways. These aspects of God’s nature seem more closely mirrored in autistic experiences than in neurotypical ones. I am investigating what these parallels could mean for Islamic theology and how they might encourage greater inclusivity within our communities, especially for autistic believers whose unique ways of experiencing the world may offer valuable insights into the divine.

J: Could you give us two concrete examples of ‘Aisha correcting the Companions?

SR: This is actually the hardest question because there are so many great offerings to pick from, but I will present two of my favorite instances.

First, Al-Zarkashi states: Aisha was informed that Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī said, ‘The Messenger of God forbids a woman from travelling unless she is accompanied by a maḥram (male guardian).’

ʿAmrah said, Aisha then turned to the womenfolk and said, ‘Not all of you has a maḥram!’

This statement always endears Aisha to me, I imagine her sitting amongst a group of women and then she is told of this statement being made in her husband’s name restricting women’s movement. Instead of engaging the one who relayed the statement or entering into a polemic about the rights and wrongs of that assertion, she turns to her audience, the very women who will be affected by this statement in provocation. This is a pedagogical approach one sees Aisha enact numerous times. She puts the problem to those who will be worst hit to rise up. To not just accept “difficulties” as part of the course of being good Muslim women, but to speak up and say no to authority when it is behaving unjustly. Whilst even al-Zarkashi tries to argue that, in fact, Aisha was in fact validating what Abu Sai’d al-Khudri had said and was repeating it as an emphasis for the women, this is unlikely as she is known to have travelled without a male guardian and makes no apologies for it. 

My second example must be one where she is refuting the verbose Abu Hurairah:

Al-Zarkashi states: The Messenger of Allah said, ‘Bad luck is found in three things: the house, the woman, and the horse.’ Aisha responded, ‘Abū Hurayra has not remembered. He entered upon the Messenger of Allah as he was saying, “May Allah curse those who say bad luck is found in three things: the house, the woman, and the horse.” He heard the last part of the statement but not the first.’

Al-Zarkashi further supports Aisha’s stance by citing another narration in which it is said, ‘Aisha became visibly enraged and said, ‘By the One who revealed the Quran upon Abū al­Qāsim, he never said such a thing, but rather the Prophet of Allah would say, “The people of ignorance used to say, calamity lies in the woman, riding beast, and home”.’ Then she recited, ‘No calamity can ever befall the earth, and neither your own selves, unless it be [laid down] in Our decree before We bring it into being: verily, all this is easy for God.’

In the first statement she gives Abu Hurayrah the excuse of not having heard correctly, whilst in the second she does not offer him that grace but corrects the statement by completing it. She then also offers up a verse of the Qur’an that rejects such superstition, which, in lieu of having the full hadith, should have been enough cause for Abu Hurayra and others to have known there was a deficiency in that narration—either there was information missing or it was a fabrication. For Aisha, the Qur’an is the criterion by which the hadith are to be measured.

 

Excerpt from the book (from Chapter 1: The Woman, the Man, the Text, pages 18 to 22)

Aisha was the third wife of the Prophet, marrying him after the death of his first wife Khadīja, at the suggestion of Khawla bint Ḥakīm, an early convert to Islam. Aisha did not live with him until after the migration to Medina. She was to become famed as his most beloved wife, exemplified most poignantly in his final days of illness when he pined to be with her, as well as in the stories of a relation- ship which was playful and mutually enriching. In his last few days, she was to nurse the Prophet dutifully, and he was to then be buried in her chamber upon passing. 

After approximately twelve years of marriage, she became a widow. During the Caliphate of her father, and then the ten-year rule of ʿUmar b. al-Khatṭạ̄b, she appears to have remained disengaged from political affairs, though she remained active within the Muslim community, responding to their questions and queries pertaining to the faith. However, during the unrest of ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān’s Caliphate, she joined the dissenting voices against him, but was outraged at his murder. Feeling that his murderers had not been brought to justice, she raised an army of a thousand men from Medina, flanked by Ṭalḥa and al-Zubayr, and marched against the fourth Caliph, ʿAlī b. Abū Ṭālib to Basra. They seized control of Basra, and a battle was to ensue between the two camps that came to be known as the Battle of the Camel (Ḥarb al-Jamal), due to Aisha’s presence on the battlefield in the litter of a camel. Aisha was not to find victory on the battlefield though, and while Ṭalḥa and al-Zubayr lost their lives, she returned to Medina and lived out the rest of her life in relative quietude. She passed away in the year 58/678, in Ramadan, twenty years after the defeat. Though it had been her wish to have been buried beside her husband and father, ʿUmar had been buried in that place and so she took her final resting place in al-Baqīʿ cemetery. 

Reconstructions of Aisha

Aisha, much like any iconic figure, including the Prophet, has seen her persona constructed and reconstructed repeatedly over time in response to a plethora of demands on her character.3 Whether it is intra-Muslim conflict such as that between Shiʿas and Sunnis, or external criticisms, political pressures, or internal questioning, the image of Aisha has been revisited and reassembled to meet these demands. Particular key flash points appear in the story of her life which are often first to be subject to some revision. These are her age at marriage to Muḥammad, the case of the slander against her, and her involvement in the Battle of the Camel. It is useful to consider how each of these incidents has been revised in light of contemporary pressures. This revision that is often engaged in by scholars as they grapple with newly evolving challenges to Muslim praxis and religious literacy starkly illustrate how the ḥadīth canon, despite the claim for its rigidity, is in fact informally laid open. To meet these needs, the canon is compromised, though this is never overtly admitted, as shall be demonstrated, but until this translates into a flexible position towards the ḥadīth canon, extra-canonical ḥadīth collections remain outside the discourse and alternative readings are still not privileged with scholarly attention, let alone a normative position in the life of the community. Observing these reconstructions of Aisha both illustrates the critical engagement that does take place with the canon as well as affirms the need to scrutinize narrators of ḥadīth traditions from among the Companions.

Such an endeavour additionally exposes the tragic removal of Aisha’s agency— the voice may be hers but the pen that recorded it and wrote its explanation belonged to someone else. As Denise Spellberg notes, while a ḥadīth may be reported as the word of Aisha, and its chain of narrators (sanad) may present her as the source origin for the tradition too, ‘ḥadīth and khabar represent the triumph of both selectivity and the pen as the arbiters of communal Islamic truths’. In other words, while Aisha may appear doubly bound to a tradition by being both the subject of the tradition and the authoritative seal in its chain of narrators, the process of ḥadīth collection and the subsequent canonization process means that the selectivity of scholars engaged in the process have the winning hand. Noting then that the process has been entirely dominated by men further skews the readings that will have been created of her statements. By observing these flash points from her life, and observing their periodic reconstructions, including the disparities in the narratives, it is hoped that something of a more authentic understanding of Aisha can be achieved. The translation of al-Ijāba will take the emerging character of Aisha into consideration then, when translating her words.

Furthermore, these particular case studies allow pause for reflection on the variance that exists between the accountability of prominent male Companions and the accountability of prominent female Companions. In the case of lesser-known Companions and their narrations, it would be fair to assert that the gender of the Companion was inconsequential—all that was required was confirmation of their having been in the company of the Prophet. Aisha was the most beloved wife of the Prophet, honoured with the title of Mother of the Believers; she experienced a personal intervention from God exonerating her in the face of a suspecting community; her intelligence and intellectual inquisitiveness were praised by the Prophet; and yet there are far too many instances where her statements are overlooked in favour of those of male Companions who seem above scrutiny. It could be argued that, as a prominent wife of the Prophet, one should expect her to be the subject of more scrutiny, especially with respect to ḥadīth transmission. Yet the scrutiny is not applied fairly. Instead, it appears to be the case that Companions such as Abū Hurayra for example, who was marked for the shortcomings in his memory, or Abū Bakra, who had been flogged on the orders of ʿUmar b. al-Khatṭạ̄b for contempt of court due to false testimony, find themselves absolved of shortcomings that otherwise render one impugned, while Aisha, who is never charged on any such grounds, is side-lined. There is a kind of collective amnesia when it comes to the indiscretions of male Companions while the misfortunes of a female Companion are fortified as opportunities through which to attack the Prophet, as in the case of the age of Aisha upon marriage or as instances of suspicion which forever negatively impinge on Aisha’s reputation, such as resulted from the slanderous campaign against Aisha or her defeat at the Battle of the Camel. Only Aisha’s defeat becomes a cause for humiliation and embarrassment, both for her and by extension for all women seeking or in a position of leadership. The misdemeanours, failures or shortcomings of her male counterparts are never taken as defects rooted in their biology. With sectarian polemics thrown into the mix too, resulting in heavily iconic depictions of key Companions, Aisha is once again either valorized, such as in Sunni Islam, or denigrated, such as in Shiʿa Islam; both sides constructing images of key Companions in response to the other’s praise or criticism of an individual, as well as in line with their own episteme.

Additionally, it appears that male Companions are allowed to be multifaceted and complex without relinquishing their authority or reliability, while the female Companions are projected as uncomplicated, a homogenous group with few distinguishing markers between them. Perhaps it is because of attitudes like this that sweeping statements regarding women are found littered throughout the ḥadīth corpus, such as the supposed statements of the Prophet claiming that at the end of time, when the anti-Christ appears, the majority of his followers will be women, or that the Prophet witnessed Hell and found most of its inhabitants to be women. By analysing the three key issues in the telling of Aisha’s story, I will not only be mapping the journey that the construction of her persona travels, but also attempt to retrieve her voice and consider how these key events are framed in the Muslim imaginary on the basis of her gender. 

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.