Dania Thafer, Creative Insecurity: Institutional Inertia and Youth Potential in the GCC (New Texts Out Now)

Dania Thafer, Creative Insecurity: Institutional Inertia and Youth Potential in the GCC (New Texts Out Now)

Dania Thafer, Creative Insecurity: Institutional Inertia and Youth Potential in the GCC (New Texts Out Now)

By : Dania Thafer

Dania Thafer, Creative Insecurity: Institutional Inertia and Youth Potential in the GCC (Oxford University Press and Hurst, 2023).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Dania Thafer (DT): The accelerating pace of innovation has been a defining theme in my research and professional journey, shaping how I understand and approach challenges in the Arab Gulf states. Innovation has not only transformed industries, economies, and societies globally but has emerged as a critical element of national security and sustainable development. For me, this realization underscores the boundless potential innovation brings: it unlocks new products, start-ups, industries, and—most importantly—opportunities to achieve true economic diversification.

In my work, I have seen firsthand how three seismic shifts—the youth bulge, the energy transition, and the Fourth Industrial Revolution—are poised to reshape the future of the Gulf. These changes have not only become central to my research but have deepened my commitment to understanding how the region can harness its greatest asset: its people.

Growing up between the Gulf and the United States and witnessing the newest generation emerge as the most educated in history, I have been particularly inspired by the power of youth. It is the young people in the Middle East who have driven societal transformation and redefined the possibilities for their nations. But their contributions must go beyond inspiration; they must become the center of economic reform plans. My research has made clear that youth represent both the greatest challenge and opportunity for the region. At this critical demographic moment, I see a unique chance for Gulf states to nurture this generation, unlocking a demographic dividend that can fuel economic productivity. Without innovation and targeted investments in human capital, however, this opportunity could turn into an economic and social challenge.

Similarly, the energy transition is no longer a distant idea; it has become a tangible part of Gulf economies’ realities. My work in this space has reaffirmed that transitioning to low-carbon economies requires not just technological shifts but deep societal, economic, and political commitment. From renewables and hydrogen to carbon capture and climate resilience, innovation-led development—driven by youth—is at the heart of this transformation. I have watched with optimism as GCC countries make net-zero pledges, recognizing that their future stability lies in balancing sustainability with economic diversification.

The Fourth Industrial Revolution is another critical turning point that has captivated me in my research journey. While the Gulf missed the economic boom of the Third Industrial Revolution, the current technological era—one of artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, and digital disruption—presents a second chance. Standing at the edge of this technological transformation, I see the GCC states as uniquely positioned to lead if they prioritize innovation. With a large youth population eager to contribute, the opportunities are vast, but only if governments invest in creating inclusive, transparent, and dynamic economies.

Throughout this journey, I have become deeply aware of the stakes: failure to integrate youth into this broader vision, or to navigate elite politics and structural inefficiencies, risks undermining the region's long-term security and progress. For Gulf states, balancing entrenched interests with bold reform is no longer optional—it is a matter of survival.

These themes—youth, energy, and innovation—are not just academic concepts for me; they are reflections of the immense potential I see in the Gulf. My work is driven by the belief that the region can rise to meet this moment, turning challenges into opportunities that will define its future for decades to come.

The analysis of state autonomy delves into the dynamics of reform, with a focus on state-business relations and their influence on private sector development.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

DT: The themes addressed in my book engage with academic literature on innovation, state autonomy, and state-business relations, particularly in the context of the GCC states. The focus on state-driven initiatives to stoke innovation-led development as a means to address youth economic grievances aligns with debates on state efforts to drive economic reform. The introduction of the concept of creative insecurity highlights the institutional challenges confronting GCC states in their quest for successful innovation-led development. These challenges reflect structural barriers that hinder the realization of innovation.

The discussion also explores missed opportunities for achieving innovation within the GCC, underscoring the importance of institutional environments in enabling innovation. The analysis of state autonomy delves into the dynamics of reform, with a focus on state-business relations and their influence on private sector development. Special attention is paid to the ways these relationships impact social relations and the political economy of various social cleavages.

The themes further examine competing explanations of state-business relations, highlighting the different taxonomies of state structures and their implications for state autonomy in implementing reform. 

Finally, the discussion addresses the relationship between state autonomy and state-led capitalism, laying out how these variables will be conceptualized. Variance in state autonomy within the GCC could be a defining factor when it comes to attaining the demographic dividend and could address the problem of creative insecurity in the Gulf states. However, there is a lack of research on how GCC economies fare with regards to states’ economic performance and their autonomy to conduct economic reform. Thus, this book seeks to understand the concept of state autonomy and how it may be affected by various state structures, societal forces, and institutions. The analysis underscores the critical role of these interconnected dynamics in shaping innovation, reform, and economic transformation.

To understand creative insecurity, I use Critical Political Economy (CPE) as a theoretical lens situated at the intersection of economic and security studies. CPE assesses both the economic and political spheres, with emphasis on security threats caused by the unequal division of wealth and power. It further explores how the inequality of power and wealth, and the role of private actors influencing these conditions, can also serve as a threat to the state. Fundamentally, CPE challenges the customary understandings of national security threats at the state level by identifying private corporations as both potential threats and potential providers of national security. It recognizes that authority can be exercised by private non-state actors that influence market forces, thereby obscuring the state’s autonomy to manage the security dynamics of the economy. Essentially, anything that threatens state autonomy to “narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state” and to “degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state” can be categorized as a national security threat.

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

DT: A new concept I introduce in this book is creative insecurity—a condition in which a state’s institutional ecosystem suppresses opportunities for innovation, to the extent that it causes economic and political vulnerabilities that threaten national security. In this context, creative insecurity can serve as a defining line between state success and failure. This differs from my previous work that focuses heavily on traditional security lenses viewing at a nation-state level and looks at traditional military-dominated concepts, energy security, and regional conflicts.

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

DT: As the first major study to examine how the surge in youthful human capital and the institutionalized dominance of the business elite in Gulf states affect innovation at a global and regional level, this book will be a useful tool to a diverse audience of policymakers, students, and scholars. The prospect of economic growth in the Gulf states affects players well beyond the region and raises important issues concerning future stability across the Middle East and its global repercussions. As Middle East studies departments across universities have been increasing Gulf studies courses, this book is readily adaptable for both undergraduate and graduate courses on a number of topics including political economy, comparative politics, economic development, and the politics of the Middle East. On a more practical policy level, I would like to promote youth employment, which is a major challenge for Middle Eastern countries that currently have the youngest populations in the world. Also, I hope to promote a deeper understanding of how to achieve innovation-led development which is critical for economic success and independent secure economies.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

DT: I am conducting research on the geopolitics of AI in the Gulf, exploring how emerging technologies are shaping power dynamics, regional alliances, and strategic competition. In parallel, I am examining the concept of middle powers and assessing how certain Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, align with this framework through their diplomatic initiatives, economic influence, and mediation roles. Additionally, my research focuses on the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda in the Gulf, analyzing regional efforts to enhance women’s roles in leadership within security frameworks.


Excerpt from the book (from the Introduction, page 4)

This study addresses several interrelated scholarly debates, such as the concept of state autonomy and reform; the conglomeration of elites that shape private sector development; and different elements and classifications of developmental states as they pertain to the GCC. It evaluates how these factors affect innovation, the prospects for successfully achieving the demographic dividend, and long-term creative security. It also assesses how various levels of state-led capitalism and elite dominance hinder GCC governments in pursuing inclusive dynamic entrepreneurial strategies, and the extent to which their inability to achieve this goal affects their long-term national security. It will do so by applying a comparative institutional analysis of GCC state structures and state-society relations, with emphasis on Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. The study’s goal is to identify differences between nations in state organization and connect these differences to variations in developmental outcomes (prospects of achieving innovation and the demographic dividend) and national security outcomes associated with creative insecurity (sustainable economic development and state longevity).

 

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.