Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought: Cultural Critique in Comparative Perspective, Second Edition (New Texts Out Now)

Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought: Cultural Critique in Comparative Perspective, Second Edition (New Texts Out Now)

Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought: Cultural Critique in Comparative Perspective, Second Edition (New Texts Out Now)

By : Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab

Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought: Cultural Critique in Comparative Perspective, Second Edition (Columbia University Press, 2025).

Jadaliyya (J): What made you write this book?

Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab (ESK): The first edition of this book appeared in 2010, on the eve of the momentous events that have since shaken the Arab region, from the massive popular revolts across countries to the Gaza war and the fall of the Assad regime. So a second edition was called for to try and take stock of the significant transformations that had taken place in the area, both on the historical and the intellectual level. Needless to say, I had been following the unfolding events both as a person living in the region and as a student of contemporary Arab thought, examining in particular the way intellectuals were interacting with and commenting on those events. The intensity and pace of events made that pursuit quite overwhelming but also extremely interesting. Fifteen years after the first edition it was also time for me to reflect on the methodological aspects of the work and ponder on ways in which the study of contemporary Arab thought could be developed further. The new introduction I wrote for the second edition articulated those reflections and tried to bring the book up to date, without altering the rest of the text, which in my opinion remains valid.

Its focus is on cultural malaise and cultural critique, and its emphasis is on critical thinkers, not ideologists, be they nationalists or Islamists.

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures does the book address?

ESK: The book offers a view of the major Arab intellectual debates that took place in the Arab region between 1967 and 2010, in the aftermath of the defeat of 1967, the establishment of the dictatorships, the defeat of the Left, and the rise of religious fundamentalism in the wake of the Iranian revolution. Its focus is on cultural malaise and cultural critique, and its emphasis is on critical thinkers, not ideologists, be they nationalists or Islamists. It examines some of the main Arab debates on culture, knowledge, religious thought, and democracy. Furthermore, it compares them with similar debates in Africa, Latin America, and Black and Native America, as well as presents the specificities of each set of debates in connection with its particular setting. By doing so it removes the alleged exceptionalism associated with some of those debates by placing them within the larger anti-colonial and post-colonial contexts. Finally, it underlines the historicity of the questions raised and the answers given to the challenges of Western hegemony and pitfalls of nativism. The contributions of those critical thinkers were in one sense my “minority report” on contemporary Arab thought.  

J: How does this book connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

ESK: In the new introduction, I reflect on some of the shortcomings of the first edition. I think that the first edition I produced was a book about books with few social historical studies that would have been necessary to frame those textual readings and produce a better understanding of those contemporary intellectual debates. The textual work was necessary but not sufficient. In my introduction to the second edition, I refer to the numerous studies that have appeared since the first edition and pinpoint the insights they offer on the socio-historical and economic factors that have shaped the Arab intellectual field in various parts of the region. I refer here to journal studies and social histories of cultural institutions, such as publishing houses and research centers. I also refer to power structures, including gendered ones, that have formed the field and its influential players, whether individual personalities or institutions. For me, there is clearly the need to open up the study of contemporary Arab thought to the neighboring fields of social history, contemporary Arab art history, Arab cultural studies, and gender studies. Comparative frameworks would also, in my opinion, widen the horizons of our reading of contemporary Arab thought: here I think of a reading that would compare Arab intellectual topics and approaches with those of contemporary Iran and Türkiye.

But then, what is the “contemporary” today, after so much has happened since the first publication in 2010? How is one to define our times in the midst of so much upheaval and traumatic experiences in the region? What light have the dramatic events shed on what we called “contemporary Arab thought” before 2010? What did the revolts reveal about the intellectual debates, especially the ones that dominated the mainstream intellectual space? So much of these debates turned around issues of identity, authenticity, tradition, and modernity. Whose issues were they? Who defined them and had a say in them? Were those issues the preoccupations of the people who took to the streets en masse in the various Arab cities and towns? Or were they discussion agendas set by particular thinkers and institutions? I think that one of the main questions that the massive revolts raised was the disconnect between much of what was considered to be the questions of contemporary Arab thought and what moved peoples and societies in the region. Interestingly, the “minority report” that I tried to cover in my book proved to be more in tune with people’s preoccupations. They privileged the political nature of the malaise, i.e., the questions of political participation and political accountability regarding corruption, power abuse, police brutality, state violence, and religious despotism. The critical thinkers whose work I covered in the book proved to be more in touch with their societies. They did not get drawn into the loud culturalist discourses that suited the powers to be, in that they did not raise the really disturbing questions of politics and economy.

Finally, in the new introduction I identify some of the new topics that have been emerging since 2010 on the Arab intellectual scene. It is no surprise that the questions of pain, loss, ruin, mourning, and affect come to the fore as central topics, and with them the questions of care, solidarity, community, and humanism. Ethical reflections on evil, atrocity, violence, and violation emerge as well as aesthetic reflections on the challenges of meaning production under conditions of material and moral devastation. Human dignity, freedom, democratization, and justice are central preoccupations and so are attempts to comprehend the nature of power and power abuse, be it in state or religious or gender structures. Finally, the whole question of values and universality takes prominence after the ongoing Gaza genocide and its handling by political, academic, and media institutions in the West. For many in the region and beyond, Gaza and the Western response to it was a shocking experience and a foundational turning point in the history of the region and probably also the world. All of these topics will no doubt stay with us and shape the new contemporary Arab thought.    

J: Who do you hope will read this book, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

ESK: Soon after its first publication the book became a major reference on the subject. My hope is that it will remain relevant for new generations of readers and encourage further work in the field.

J: What other projects are you working on now?

ESK: Since the publication of the first edition, I have been interested to look at how contemporary Arab artists, particularly visual artists, including graphic designers, have been dealing with the same questions of modernity, change, tradition, authenticity and, after 2010, of rebellion, dignity, pain, and mourning. “Thought” for me can no longer be limited to “logos”, i.e., analytical writings and discourses. There is thought also in the visual arts and there are seminal studies of those arts coming out since the 2000s. Widening our understanding of “thought” through a contrapuntal reading of analytical and artistic productions is my current project. It is my contention that such a reading breaks the logocentrism of much of the analytical writings and provincializes the logocentric self-sufficiency and authoritarianism of their authors. It also widens the circle of contributors whose work make up contemporary Arab thought, limited hitherto largely to patriarchal figures. It would make room for a more inclusive and more diversified circle, especially regarding age and gender. 

 

Excerpt from the book

Introduction to the Second Edition

The Deferred Dream Explodes

What happens to a dream deferred?

Does it dry up
like a raisin in the sun?
Or fester like a sore—
And then run?
Does it stink like rotten meat?
Or crust and sugar over—
like a syrupy sweet?

Maybe it just sags
like a heavy load.

Or does it explode?

—Langston Hughes, “Harlem: A Dream Deferred”

Critique at the End of Time

… soon after the people spoke, the lid of fierce repression hit anew, and a formidable reign of silence was imposed again, with varying degrees of vindictiveness and brutality, by the surviving regimes. The violence left people, and the intellectuals among them, with an unspeakable pain that was both necessary and impossible to express. The well-known questions posed themselves anew: How was one to express the ineffable? How was one to think the atrocious? How was one to piece together what was so violently torn apart with so much brutality? What critique could be exercised, if at all, under such circumstances? As always in the aftermath of radical destruction, survivors needed to figure out forms of expression and forms of bridging the inhuman with human life again.

In his keynote speech at the sixth conference of the Arab Council for the Social Sciences, [Yassin] Haj Saleh defined the task of critique in our times as one focused on making the real credible, for what has been happening has been hard to believe, indeed unbelievable in its gratuitous evil. In normal times, he said, Enlightenment critique consisted in unveiling and rejecting superstitions and illusions, or false beliefs, which blur the sight of the true and the real. In times of atrocities like ours, however, the task of critique is to unveil the structures and forms of the powers that led to those atrocities and to bring them to light in order to build a more humane future. 

It is this critique, in and of the dark times, in which a good part of contemporaneous contemporary Arab thought is invested. It purports to understand the present, its genealogy and phenomenology, and to figure out life, even a good life, in the ruinous realities of an exploded dream. It includes a meditation on evil, horror, and disaster. It seeks an understanding of power and its multifaceted structures and mechanisms, with gender at the center of its workings and manifestations. It envisions democratic transitions and analyzes their many challenges. It gazes at despair, pain, and catastrophe and tries to imagine forms of humane life in the midst of unspeakable barbarity. This is what I call the new Arab critique and try to follow in current Arab discussions and expressions, both in analytic writings and in the visual arts, keeping an attentive eye on what is also being produced in literature and literary studies as well as in popular culture and its studies.

The 2023–2024 Gaza war erupted as I was writing this introduction. Its unfolding atrocities made us witness new levels of contempt for human life and dignity, or to be precise for some lives more than others, this time with wide moral, political, and military support provided by Western official institutions. War crimes and mass killings have been transmitted on mass media in real time for more than a year now, with some Western media and academia, in addition to governments, condoning the crimes in the name of unconditional support for Israel. This is clearly not the first time that people in the region have been faced with the moral double standards of the West. That the lives of Arabs/Palestinians/Muslims matter less than those of others, and that the weight of their suffering is not equivalent to that of others, are familiar givens for many. Still, witnessing the protracted war over months on end and seeing it not only permitted but also justified by Western powers constituted for a vast majority of people in the region, including thinkers and artists, a shocking experience and a profound turning point in the relationship with the West. Never had the discriminatory divide been so clear and so abysmal. For people in the region and beyond, this is a new fall of the West, another fall of European culture, of “universal” European intellectual and moral values, let alone universal human rights. Moreover, what aggravated the fall this time was the repression carried out within Europe, and the West in general, by official powers, including academic institutions, against the freedom of expression and of speech—freedoms that are/were at the core of what was deemed “European culture.” Numerous contemporary Western intellectual and moral references lost a considerable part of their authority through their participation in the stifling of rational public debate about the war and the forbidding of critical discussions of Israeli claims and actions, equating the critique of Zionism with anti-Semitism. For many if not a majority in the region, the credibility and authority of those references were irremediably damaged. They could no longer relate to them, even critically, as they did before the war. Clearly, in this relationship there will be a before and an after the Gaza war, and the new contemporary Arab thought will be a “post–Gaza genocide” one. The moral and intellectual consequences of this turn are yet to be fathomed. A whole literature has emerged around the various intellectual and moral positions that have accompanied this war, both within the West and beyond. An examination of such important debates would fall outside the scope of this introduction. Suffice it here to say that in the Arab region, and in many other places outside the West, the loss of that Western intellectual and moral authority has been perceived as a resounding fall of the West itself, or of the remnants of its claims to “universal European values.” These values, as was already well known, had been more readily applicable to white Westerners than to non-Europeans since their declaration in the West. Interestingly, those non-Europeans and non-Westerners have been absent from the critical European and Western traditions that have critiqued the flaws and falls of those “universal” European values, particularly in the devastating colonial and world wars carried out by European and Western powers.

Rethinking the universal will certainly belong to the new Arab critique: its meanings in a post-Gaza world and the challenges of translating those meanings into realities on the ground in a wasteland of destroyed cities and lifeworlds. The second large headline will be the ethical and existential questions born from the experience of extreme barbarity: the radical question of meaning creation in the face of so much annihilation, aggression, violence, evil, dehumanization, and destruction; questions of rehumanization, mourning, reconciliation, forgiveness, and healing; questions of community building around care, solidarity, mutual recognition, tolerance, peace, and justice. This leads to the third major set of issues that has been gaining prominence since the cataclysms of 2011: the formation of a functioning body politic and the vicissitudes of democratic transitions in each of the many affected areas, along with the central questions of power, in politics, religion, and gender, in the midst of massive societal transformations. Some aspects of these three sets of themes were already present in the pre-2011 critique: for instance, the destruction of the human in the Syrian Asad dictatorship, which I covered in my book on the Enlightenment debates; the quest for dignity and freedom, which predated the 2011 revolts, as I have shown elsewhere; and the demand for political participation, which I have documented in this book. All of these questions become increasingly radicalized with the unfolding cataclysms in the region and demand greater attention to their ethical and existential dimensions. This is already manifest in the writings referred to in this introduction. They announce further developments in the three thematic directions mentioned here. They attempt to weave meanings in the face of horror, knit communities of care after strife and war, and theorize the human anew from the abyss. They will be part and parcel of making human life possible again in the region. They will be worth following up, not only in the analytical register, but also in those of the arts and the social sciences.

Portrait of the Iraqi Person at the End of Time

I see him here, or there:
his eye wandering in the river of catastrophes
his nostrils rooted in the soil of massacres
his belly which ground the wheat of madness
in Babylon’s mills
for ten thousand years
I see his image, which has lost its frame
in history’s repeated explosions:
An enemy destroys Ur. Nippur’s ruin.
Destroys Nineveh. Babylon’s ruin.
Destroys Baghdad. Uruk’s ruin.
His image, which he retrieves
its features like a mirror
to surprise us every time
with its extravagant ability to squander
On his wrinkled forehead, like a screen,
you can see columns of invaders passing through
as if in a black and white film:
give him any prison or graveyard!
give him any exile
any “here” or “there”
You will see the catapults
pounding the walls
so that once again,
they rise in your face
With which face
will you come to us, O enemy?
With which face will you come to us, this time?

—Sargon Boulus, translated from the Arabic by Sinan Antoon

New Texts Out Now: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein, guest eds. "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis." Special Issue of Conflict, Security & Development

Conflict, Security and Development, Volume 15, No. 5 (December 2015) Special issue: "Israel-Palestine after Oslo: Mapping Transformations in a Time of Deepening Crisis," Guest Editors: Mandy Turner and Cherine Hussein.

Jadaliyya (J): What made you compile this volume?

Mandy Turner (MT): Both the peace process and the two-state solution are dead. Despite more than twenty years of negotiations, Israel’s occupation, colonization and repression continue–and the political and geographical fragmentation of the Palestinian people is proceeding apace.

This is not news, nor is it surprising to any keen observer of the situation. But what is surprising–and thus requires explanation – is the resilience of the Oslo framework and paradigm: both objectively and subjectively. It operates objectively as a straitjacket by trapping Palestinians in economic and security arrangements that are designed to ensure stabilization and will not to lead to sovereignty or a just and sustainable solution. And it operates subjectively as a straitjacket by shutting out discussion of alternative ways of understanding the situation and ways out of the impasse. The persistence of this framework that is focused on conflict management and stabilization, is good for Israel but bad for Palestinians.

The Oslo peace paradigm–of a track-one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution–is therefore in crisis. And yet it is entirely possible that the current situation could continue for a while longer–particularly given the endorsement and support it enjoys from the major Western donors and the “international community,” as well as the fact that there has been no attempt to develop an alternative. The immediate short-term future is therefore bleak.

Guided by these observations, this special issue sought to undertake two tasks. The first task was to analyze the perceptions underpinning the Oslo framework and paradigm as well as some of the transformations instituted by its implementation: why is it so resilient, what has it created? The second task, which follows on from the first, was then to ask: how can we reframe our understanding of what is happening, what are some potential alternatives, and who is arguing and mobilizing for them?

These questions and themes grew out of a number of conversations with early-career scholars – some based at the Kenyon Institute in East Jerusalem, and some based in the occupied Palestinian territory and elsewhere. These conversations led to two interlinked panels at the International Studies Association annual convention in Toronto, Canada, in March 2014. To have two panels accepted on “conflict transformation and resistance in Palestine” at such a conventional international relations conference with (at the time unknown) early-career scholars is no mean feat. The large and engaged audience we received at these panels – with some very established names coming along (one of whom contributed to this special issue) – convinced us that this new stream of scholars and scholarship should have an outlet.  

J: What particular topics, issues, and literatures do the articles address?

MT: The first half of the special issue analyzes how certain problematic assumptions shaped the Oslo framework, and how the Oslo framework in turn shaped the political, economic and territorial landscape.

Virginia Tilley’s article focuses on the paradigm of conflict resolution upon which the Oslo Accords were based, and calls for a re-evaluation of what she argues are the two interlinked central principles underpinning its worldview: internationally accepted notions of Israeli sovereignty; and the internationally accepted idea that the “conflict” is essentially one between two peoples–the “Palestinian people” and the “Jewish people”. Through her critical interrogation of these two “common sense” principles, Tilley proposes that the “conflict” be reinterpreted as an example of settler colonialism, and, as a result of this, recommends an alternative conflict resolution model based on a paradigm shift away from an ethno-nationalist division of the polity towards a civic model of the nation.

Tariq Dana unpacks another central plank of the Oslo paradigm–that of promoting economic relations between Israel and the OPT. He analyses this through the prism of “economic peace” (particularly the recent revival of theories of “capitalist peace”), whose underlying assumptions are predicated on the perceived superiority of economic approaches over political approaches to resolving conflict. Dana argues that there is a symbiosis between Israeli strategies of “economic peace” and recent Palestinian “statebuilding strategies” (referred to as Fayyadism), and that both operate as a form of pacification and control because economic cooperation leaves the colonial relationship unchallenged.

The political landscape in the OPT has been transformed by the Oslo paradigm, particularly by the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Alaa Tartir therefore analyses the basis, agenda and trajectory of the PA, particularly its post-2007 state building strategy. By focusing on the issue of local legitimacy and accountability, and based on fieldwork in two sites in the occupied West Bank (Balata and Jenin refugee camps), Tartir concludes that the main impact of the creation of the PA on ordinary people’s lives has been the strengthening of authoritarian control and the hijacking of any meaningful visions of Palestinian liberation.

The origin of the administrative division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the focus of Tareq Baconi’s article. He charts how Hamas’s initial opposition to the Oslo Accords and the PA was transformed over time, leading to its participation (and success) in the 2006 legislative elections. Baconi argues that it was the perceived demise of the peace process following the collapse of the Camp David discussions that facilitated this change. But this set Hamas on a collision course with Israel and the international community, which ultimately led to the conflict between Hamas and Fateh, and the administrative division, which continues to exist.

The special issue thereafter focuses, in the second section, on alternatives and resistance to Oslo’s transformations.

Cherine Hussein’s article charts the re-emergence of the single-state idea in opposition to the processes of separation unleashed ideologically and practically that were codified in the Oslo Accords. Analysing it as both a movement of resistance and as a political alternative to Oslo, while recognizing that it is currently largely a movement of intellectuals (particularly of diaspora Palestinians and Israelis), Hussein takes seriously its claim to be a more just and liberating alternative to the two-state solution.

My article highlights the work of a small but dedicated group of anti-Zionist Jewish-Israeli activists involved in two groups: Zochrot and Boycott from Within. Both groups emerged in the post-Second Intifada period, which was marked by deep disillusionment with the Oslo paradigm. This article unpacks the alternative – albeit marginalized – analysis, solution and route to peace proposed by these groups through the application of three concepts: hegemony, counter-hegemony and praxis. The solution, argue the activists, lies in Israel-Palestine going through a process of de-Zionization and decolonization, and the process of achieving this lies in actions in solidarity with Palestinians.

This type of solidarity action is the focus of the final article by Suzanne Morrison, who analyses the “We Divest” campaign, which is the largest divestment campaign in the US and forms part of the wider Palestinian Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement. Through attention to their activities and language, Morrison shows how “We Divest”, with its networked, decentralized, grassroots and horizontal structure, represents a new way of challenging Israel’s occupation and the suppression of Palestinian rights.

The two parts of the special issue are symbiotic: the critique and alternative perspectives analyzed in part two are responses to the issues and problems identified in part one.

J: How does this volume connect to and/or depart from your previous work?

MT: My work focuses on the political economy of donor intervention (which falls under the rubric of “peacebuilding”) in the OPT, particularly a critique of the Oslo peace paradigm and framework. This is a product of my broader conceptual and historical interest in the sociology of intervention as a method of capitalist expansion and imperial control (as explored in “The Politics of International Intervention: the Tyranny of Peace”, co-edited with Florian Kuhn, Routledge, 2016), and how post-conflict peacebuilding and development agendas are part of this (as explored in “Whose Peace: Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding”, co-edited with Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (PalgraveMacmillan, 2008).  

My first book on Palestine (co-edited with Omar Shweiki), Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-development and Beyond (PalgraveMacmillan, 2014), was a collection of essays by experts in their field, of the political-economic experience of different sections of the Palestinian community. The book, however, aimed to reunite these individual experiences into one historical political-economy narrative of a people experiencing a common theme of dispossession, disenfranchisement and disarticulation. It was guided by the desire to critically assess the utility of the concept of de-development to different sectors and issues–and had a foreword by Sara Roy, the scholar who coined the term, and who was involved in the workshop from which the book emerged.

This co-edited special issue (with Cherine Hussein, who, at the time of the issue construction, was the deputy director of the Kenyon Institute) was therefore the next logical step in my research on Palestine, although my article on Jewish-Israeli anti-Zionists did constitute a slight departure from my usual focus.

J: Who do you hope will read this volume, and what sort of impact would you like it to have?

MT: I would imagine the main audience will be those whose research and political interests lie in Palestine Studies. It is difficult, given the structure of academic publishing – which has become ever more corporate and money grabbing – for research outputs such as this to be accessed by the general public. Only those with access to academic libraries are sure to be able to read it – and this is a travesty, in my opinion. To counteract this commodification of knowledge, we should all provide free access to our outputs through online open source websites such as academia.edu, etc. If academic research is going to have an impact beyond merely providing more material for teaching and background reading for yet more research (which is inaccessible to the general public) then this is essential. Websites such as Jadaliyya are therefore incredibly important.

Having said all that, I am under no illusions about the potential for ANY research on Israel-Palestine to contribute to changing the dynamics of the situation. However, as a collection of excellent analyses conducted by mostly early-career scholars in the field of Palestine studies, I am hopeful that their interesting and new perspectives will be read and digested. 

J: What other projects are you working on now?

MT: I am currently working on an edited volume provisionally entitled From the River to the Sea: Disintegration, Reintegration and Domination in Israel and Palestine. This book is the culmination of a two-year research project funded by the British Academy, which analyzed the impacts of the past twenty years of the Oslo peace framework and paradigm as processes of disintegration, reintegration and domination – and how they have created a new socio-economic and political landscape, which requires new agendas and frameworks. I am also working on a new research project with Tariq Dana at Birzeit University on capital and class in the occupied West Bank.

Excerpt from the Editor’s Note 

[Note: This issue was published in Dec. 2015]

Initially perceived to have inaugurated a new era of hope in the search for peace and justice in Palestine-Israel, the Oslo peace paradigm of a track one, elite-level, negotiated two-state solution is in crisis today, if not completely at an end.

While the major Western donors and the ‘international community’ continue to publicly endorse the Oslo peace paradigm, Israeli and Palestinian political elites have both stepped away from it. The Israeli government has adopted what appears to be an outright rejection of the internationally-accepted end-goal of negotiations, i.e. the emergence of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. In March 2015, in the final days of his re-election campaign, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, visited the Jewish settlement of Har Homa in Palestinian East Jerusalem, which is regarded as illegal under international law. Reminding its inhabitants that it was him and his Likud government that had established the settlement in 1997 as part of the Israeli state’s vision of a unified indivisible Jerusalem, he promised to expand the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem if re-elected. And in an interview with Israeli news site, NRG, Netanyahu vowed that the prospects of a Palestinian state were non-existent as long as he remained in office. Holding on to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), he argued, was necessary to ensure Israel’s security in the context of regional instability and Islamic extremism. It is widely acknowledged that Netanyahu’s emphasis on Israel’s security—against both external and internal enemies—gave him a surprise win in an election he was widely expected to lose.

Despite attempts to backtrack under recognition that the US and European states are critical of this turn in official Israeli state policy, Netanyahu’s promise to bury the two-state solution in favour of a policy of further annexation has become the Israeli government’s official intent, and has been enthusiastically endorsed by leading ministers and key advisers.

[…]

The Palestinian Authority (PA) based in the West Bank also appears to have rejected a key principle of the Oslo peace paradigm—that of bilateral negotiations under the supervision of the US. Despite a herculean effort by US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to bring the two parties to the negotiating table, in response to the lack of movement towards final status issues and continued settlement expansion (amongst other issues), the Palestinian political elite have withdrawn from negotiations and resumed attempts to ‘internationalise the struggle’ by seeking membership of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), and signing international treaties such as the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court. This change of direction is part of a rethink in the PA and PLO’s strategy rooted in wider discussions and debates. The publication of a document by the Palestine Strategy Study Group (PSSG) in August 2008, the production of which involved many members of the Palestinian political elite (and whose recommendations were studiously discussed at the highest levels of the PA and PLO), showed widespread discontent with the bilateral negotiations framework and suggested ways in which Palestinians could ‘regain the initiative’.

[…]

And yet despite these changes in official Palestinian and Israeli political strategies that signal a deepening of the crisis, donors and the ‘international community’ are reluctant to accept the failure of the Oslo peace paradigm. This political myopia has meant the persistence of a framework that is increasingly divorced from the possibility of a just and sustainable peace. It is also acting as an ideological straitjacket by shutting out alternative interpretations. This special issue seeks a way out of this political and intellectual dead end. In pursuit of this, our various contributions undertake what we regard to be two key tasks: first, to critically analyse the perceptions underpinning the Oslo paradigm and the transformations instituted by its implementation; and second, to assess some alternative ways of understanding the situation rooted in new strategies of resistance that have emerged in the context of these transformations in the post-Oslo landscape.

[…]

Taken as a whole, the articles in this special issue aim to ignite conversations on the conflict that are not based within abstracted debates that centre upon the peace process itself—but that begin from within the realities and geographies of both the continually transforming land of Palestine-Israel and the voices, struggles, worldviews and imaginings of the future of the people who presently inhabit it. For it is by highlighting these transformations, and from within these points of beginning, that we believe more hopeful pathways for alternative ways forward can be collectively imagined, articulated, debated and built.